Ontario (Attorney General) v. Roberts, 2026 ONCJ 41

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Roberts, 2026 ONCJ 41

DATE: 2026 01 29

COURT FILE No.: Hamilton 24-1680

BETWEEN:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO (Respondent)

— AND —

MICHAEL ROBERTS (Applicant)

Ruling on Constitutional Challenge

Before Justice Davin M.K. Garg

Heard on October 30, 2025, November 7, 2025, and January 14, 2026

Reasons released on January 29, 2026

Eric Taylor & Stephanie Pak counsel for the prosecution/respondent

Dean Paquette counsel for the defendant/applicant

GARG J.:

I

Overview

1Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 1 established Ontario’s provincial sex offender registry, a centralized database designed to assist the police in the prevention and investigation of sexual offences. Sex offenders must provide detailed personal information and report regularly to law enforcement so that the registry remains current.

2The applicant, Mr. Michael Roberts, was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. Upon his release, he was required to register with the provincial registry. Because he was convicted of multiple sexual offences, he was obliged to report for life, subject to receiving a record suspension.

3The applicant was last required to report by June 1, 2024. He intentionally failed to report and was charged with an offence under Christopher’s Law.

4The applicant’s deliberate non‑compliance was meant to place the constitutionality of the regime before the court. He challenges both the mandatory registration of all sex offenders and the lifetime reporting obligation for certain offenders. He argues that these components of Christopher’s Law are overbroad and grossly disproportionate, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Charter. The central issue is whether the breadth of the regime corresponds to its legislative objectives in a manner consistent with the Charter.

5This application is premised on a similar challenge to the national sex offender registry. In R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38, a majority of the Supreme Court found that mandatory registration and lifetime reporting under the national regime unjustifiably violated s. 7. The respondent resists a similar result by arguing that the provincial regime has a distinct purpose, with a greater focus on time-sensitive investigations.

6Ndhlovu compels me to conclude that the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions of Christopher’s Law are unconstitutional. The provincial regime is not sufficiently different from the national regime to rationalize a different result. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as a criticism of the existence of the provincial registry. The evidence demonstrates the important work carried out by those using the registry and responsible for its administration. However, the federal law was amended following Ndhlovu to achieve constitutional compliance. The provincial law may require a similar legislative response to ensure that its objectives are pursued within constitutional limits. Constitutional compliance is not an obstacle to public safety; it is the condition on which public power is exercised.

II

Legislation

7Christopher’s Law established a provincial sex offender registry in response to the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of 11-year-old Christopher Stephenson. Christopher was killed in 1988 by a sex offender released from prison after serving a five-year sentence for sexually assaulting another 11-year-old boy.

8At the 1993 inquest into Christopher’s death, the coroner’s jury recommended a centralized registry that would require sex offenders to register with the police in their local jurisdiction. The jury believed this registry would assist with the “investigation and apprehension” of sex offenders and was one of 77 recommendations aimed at preventing deaths like Christopher’s in the future.¹

9After unsuccessful attempts at lobbying for a national registry, the Solicitor General introduced Christopher’s Law to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario in December 1999. The legislation came into force on April 23, 2001. It created the Ontario Sex Offender and Trafficker Registry, which I will refer to in these reasons as the provincial registry.

10By virtue of his convictions for sexual assault, the applicant was an “offender” who committed a “sex offence” under s. 1(1) of Christopher’s Law. The definition of “sex offence” is quite broad and includes any offence in respect of which an offender has a reporting obligation under the national regime.

11Section 3(1)(a) governed the applicant’s initial obligation to report and s. 3(1)(f) required him to report every year:

3 (1) Every offender who is resident in Ontario shall present himself or herself at a designated bureau, police station or detachment of the police service that provides policing where he or she resides or at another place in the area where the police service provides policing designated by that police service,

(a) within the prescribed period after he or she is released from custody after serving the custodial portion of a sentence in respect of a sex offence;²

(f) on a day that is not later than one year after and not earlier than 11 months after he or she last presented himself or herself to a police service under any of clauses (a) to (d) or under subsection 7 (2);

12In addition to the yearly reporting obligation, certain events trigger a reporting obligation, such as an address change (s. 3(c)), a name change (s. 3(c.1)), or a change in Ontario residency (s. 3(e)).

13When attending the police station, s. 3(2) requires an offender to provide “satisfactory proof of his or her identity, his or her name, date of birth and address, and such other information as may be prescribed”. This additional information is fleshed out by s. 2(1) of the regulation.³ The information that an offender must provide includes their: current and former names; aliases; updated photograph; physical description, including any distinguishing features; current and former addresses; secondary residences; phone numbers; employer names; volunteer engagements; work locations; education locations; driver’s licence number; and motor vehicles. The registry will also include detailed information about their sex offences. Section 2(3) of the regulation stipulates that “the sex offender registry shall be a cumulative and permanent record of all the information … that was ever contained in the sex offender registry”.

14Section 7 of Christopher’s Law determines the reporting period. Because the applicant was convicted of multiple sex offences, s. 7(1)(c) applied and required him to report for life:

7 (1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), an offender shall comply with section 3,

(c) for the rest of his or her life, if, on or after the day section 3 comes into force, he or she is serving a sentence for, or is convicted or found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder of, more than one sex offence.

15Offenders convicted of a sex offence with a maximum sentence greater than 10 years must also report for life (s. 7(1)(b)). Offenders convicted of a single sex offence with a maximum sentence not greater than 10 years must report for 10 years.

16An offender is removed from the registry upon receiving a “free pardon”. A “record suspension” is not sufficient for removal. Section 9.1 reads:

9.1 If an offender receives a pardon of the type described in clause (a) or (b) of the definition of “pardon” in subsection 1 (1),⁴ for every sex offence for which this Act is made applicable to him or her, the ministry shall delete every reference to and record of the offender from the sex offender registry.

17However, a record suspension is sufficient to terminate an offender’s reporting requirement. Section 7(4) reads:

(4) An offender is no longer required to comply with section 3 if he or she receives a pardon for every sex offence for which this Act would be made applicable to him or her under section 8 and if he or she provides proof of the pardon or pardons under section 9.

18Under the Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47, s. 4, an offender can be eligible for a record suspension ten years after the completion of a sentence where the offence was prosecuted by indictment, and five years where the offence was prosecuted by summary conviction. Certain circumstances render an offender ineligible for a record suspension.

19Section 11 of Christopher’s Law sets out the offence and punishment that an offender can face for breaching a legislated obligation:

11 (1) Every offender who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with this Act or provides false information under this Act is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable,

(a) for a first offence, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both;

(b) for a subsequent offence, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.

20The national sex offender registry was established in 2004 with the passage of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (SOIRA). The national registry was modelled on Ontario’s provincial registry. Parliament created a national registry after calls mounted for an interprovincial database of sex offenders: Ndhlovu at para. 31.

21Courts have upheld the validity of the overlapping national-provincial registry system. Christopher’s Law is a valid exercise of the provincial legislature’s power. It creates a regulatory regime instead of imposing prohibitions and penalties for a criminal law purpose. Its enactment falls within Ontario’s legislative competence under ss. 92(13) (property and civil rights) and 92(14) (administration of justice) of the Constitution Act, 1867: R. v. Dyck, 2008 ONCA 309 at para. 38.

III

Issues

22The applicant initially asked me to find that Christopher’s Law violates s. 7 of the Charter and declare the law of no force or effect to the extent of the violation under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. After discussion with the parties, it was agreed that I do not have jurisdiction as a provincial court judge to grant such a remedy. However, I can determine the constitutionality of a law in the course of my decision-making: R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13 at paras. 14-20.

23The primary issue is the constitutionality of the applicant’s lifetime reporting obligation under s. 7(1)(c) of Christopher’s Law. When the applicant failed to report, he had been reporting for 13 years. His duty to continue reporting arose solely from the lifetime requirement that attaches to convictions for multiple sex offences. If that statutory provision is unconstitutional, then the applicant should not be found guilty of failing to report. But for the lifetime reporting obligation, he never would have been charged with an offence.

24I am also asked to rule on the constitutionality of the applicant being required to join the provincial registry in the first place under s. 3(1)(a) of Christopher’s Law. It is less clear that the constitutionality of this provision arises as part of my decision-making process: Lloyd at para. 18.⁵ I will nevertheless analyze the constitutionality of mandatory registration.

IV

Facts

25The applicant pleaded guilty to eight counts of sexual assault on December 21, 2010. The Crown proceeded summarily.⁶ The facts related to the applicant touching four victims over their clothing. He was sentenced to four months’ custody on each count to be served concurrently. He was placed on probation for two years and joined the national sex offender registry pursuant to a SOIRA order.

26The applicant also joined the provincial sex offender registry pursuant to Christopher’s Law and was required to report every year. He last reported with the Hamilton Police Service on June 1, 2023. He was required to subsequently report between May 1 and June 1, 2024. He intentionally failed to report for the purpose of bringing this constitutional challenge. He was charged on September 16, 2024.

27The applicant received a record suspension for the sexual assault convictions on November 5, 2025. Consequently, the applicant is not required to report going forward, but his information remains on the registry. The parties agree that this development does not render moot the constitutional challenge. The applicant was required to report in 2024 and continues to face a charge for not reporting.

Evidence from Ndhlovu

28The parties filed on consent the evidence called in the trial court during the Ndhlovu proceedings. Four witnesses testified: Dr. Robert Hanson (Crown expert); Dr. Kristen Zgoba (defence expert); Brennan Nelson (RCMP database manager); and Patricia Shuttleworth (provincial coordinator).

29Dr. Hanson and Dr. Zgoba, whose expertise lay in the assessment and study of sex offender behaviour and recidivism, provided complementary evidence establishing that recidivism among sex offenders declines substantially over time. The risk of reoffending is highest in the first five years post-release and declines by about half every five years that the offender is offence-free in the community. The risk reaches background population levels after approximately 15 to 20 years offence‑free. About 75 to 80 percent of sex offenders do not reoffend.⁷ Risk varies widely across offenders depending on specific characteristics (e.g., nature of the offence, victim type, offender’s age, offence pattern, and the presence of protective supports). There is no single factor that reliably predicts future offending. The seriousness of a sexual offence is a poor predictor of recidivism on its own. The evidence established that while actuarial tools can marginally improve risk prediction, no method allows for prediction with certainty. Unstructured professional and lay assessments tend to err on the side of over‑prediction. Collectively, this evidence demonstrated that the risk posed by sex offenders is heterogeneous and that any assessment of future risk must be individualized rather than categorical.

30The experts testified that there are disadvantages to registries that cast too wide a net. Dr. Hanson explained that society is better served when legislation and policy recognize a cost‑benefit break point, after which resources devoted to tracking and supervising low‑risk sex offenders should be diverted.⁸

31The respondent takes issue with Dr. Hanson’s testimony regarding the use of multiple convictions as a proxy for risk. Dr. Hanson testified:⁹

Having two convictions on the same date essentially for the same spree is unrelated to recidivism risk. So individuals who are convicted of one or two or three offences at the same sentencing occasion are the same risk as an individual who is convicted of one. If somebody is convicted in the past of a sexual offence and then goes on to re-offend afterwards, that substantially increases their risk, so it is the distinction between offending, getting caught, then re-offending, which increases risk, as opposed to one or two or more crimes committed and then getting caught for all those, and that is unrelated. The number [of convictions entered in a single proceeding] is unrelated to recidivism risk.

New evidence

32During the proceedings before me, the respondent called additional evidence to provide details about the provincial sex offender registry. The evidence was called to show the utility of the provincial registry and how it differs from the national registry. The respondent called two witnesses, each of whom testified and provided an affidavit.

Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Lisa Burns (OPP)

33Officer Burns is the Acting Detective Staff Sergeant with the Ontario Provincial Police and manager of the High Risk Offender Unit. This unit is responsible for the Sex Offender Registry Program, which manages both the provincial sex offender registry and the national sex offender registry for the province of Ontario. She has over 25 years of policing experience.

34The provincial registry, established in direct response to the abduction and murder of Christopher Stephenson, was designed as a proactive tool to notify all Ontario police services about convicted sex offenders living in their communities. According to Officer Burns, the registry’s central purpose is to assist the police in preventing and solving crimes of a sexual nature, and to provide investigators with immediate access to current and historical information about offenders. She emphasized that the registry enables the police to act quickly in time-sensitive investigations, such as child abductions, by allowing for rapid identification and elimination of suspects based on proximity, physical descriptors, and about 200 other search criteria.

35Officer Burns gave evidence on the operational advantages of the provincial registry as compared to the national registry. She explained that the provincial registry is always available to Ontario police officers with the requisite training, allowing for direct, real-time access to offender information. As of June 2025, there were approximately 1,420 active users who accessed the registry about 81,200 times in the preceding 12 months. By contrast, the national registry is only accessible by specialized staff, and police services must request queries through the provincial centre, which may not always be available.

36At the time that Officer Burns swore her affidavit, the provincial registry contained approximately 29,900 unique offender records, with about 12,200 offenders currently under an active obligation to report. Of those, approximately 8,600 carried a designation as a child sex offender. Officer Burns reported a 96% compliance rate among registrants.

37Removal from the provincial registry occurs upon acquittal for the underlying offence (e.g., on appeal), a free pardon, or an absolute discharge for an accused found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. Officer Burns confirmed that routine record suspensions do not remove an offender from the registry. She acknowledged that there is no judicial mechanism under Christopher’s Law for individualized termination or relief once registered and no formal risk-assessment review within the regime.

38Officer Burns’ affidavit referred to the “success stories” of the provincial registry. Officer Burns acknowledged that the high-level success counts were compiled by another officer, lacked dates, and were not verified by her against case outcomes. I will not rely on Officer Burns’ own definition of what constitutes a “success”. I excluded ambiguous references to a police service reporting a “success” and admitted only the underlying factual statistics: twelve investigative searches led to charges;¹⁰ eleven cases involved the registrar identifying a suspect;¹¹ six instances saw registry information further an investigation;¹² two cases resulted in a community safety bulletin;¹³ and five routine compliance checks led to charges. Officer Burns also described a few case narratives to illustrate the registry’s practical utility.

Detective Constable Derek Houle (HPS)

39Officer Houle is a Detective Constable with the Hamilton Police Service, assigned to the Offender Management Unit of the Intelligence Branch since January 2023. In this role, he oversees the administration of the provincial registry for the City of Hamilton. His responsibilities include conducting initial registrations, annual verifications, and compliance checks for offenders subject to reporting obligations under Christopher’s Law. Officer Houle is the sole officer in his unit responsible for these registrations.

40The registration process in Hamilton generally requires offenders to attend the police station in person, where the initial intake typically takes 15 to 25 minutes. Annual reporting is required between 11 and 12 months after the previous report and generally takes 10 to 15 minutes. Officer Houle also conducts compliance checks, which involve attending offenders’ residences in plainclothes and verifying their presence at the registered address. He does not identify himself to neighbours or others during these checks.

41In terms of local statistics, Officer Houle indicated that approximately 600 registrations or annual reports are conducted every year in Hamilton. Of these, 20 to 50 are new registrants each year. He did not have data on the proportion of offenders subject to lifetime versus 10-year obligations, but the registry system tracks expiry dates for each offender. As of June 2025, the Hamilton Police had accessed the provincial registry 7,975 times during the preceding 12 months.

42Officer Houle has received specialized training from the Ontario Provincial Police on the use of the provincial registry, including the inquiry builder tool. He regularly assists other units, such as the Internet Child Exploitation unit and the Victims of Crime unit, with investigative queries using the registry. In practice, most investigative requests in Hamilton are routed through Officer Houle, who uses the inquiry builder to conduct proximity, geographical, and radius searches based on case-specific criteria.

43Officer Houle testified that he does not have direct access to the national registry; access must be obtained through the OPP or other authorized parties. He confirmed that while he cannot query the national registry directly, the information is accessible on request.

V

Summary of R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38

44Given the significance of the Ndhlovu decision in deciding this constitutional challenge, I will summarize the majority opinion of Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. In brief, the majority concluded that the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions of SOIRA were overbroad and thus breached s. 7 of the Charter. The measures were not justified under s. 1.¹⁴

The legislation

45Parliament introduced a national sex offender registry through the passing of SOIRA in 2004. The legislation was amended in 2011 to produce two salient changes: (i) any offender convicted of a listed sexual offence was required to register on the national registry; and (ii) any offender who committed more than one offence was required to register for life, regardless of the nature or timing of the offences. The Court in Ndhlovu considered the constitutionality of these amendments.

46Like Christopher’s Law, SOIRA captures a wide ambit of offenders. Many offences require an offender to register, and the offence of sexual assault can be committed in innumerable ways, from touching a victim’s buttocks over clothing to prolonged, penetrative assaults. “The number and breadth of designated sexual offences means that the net of sexual offenders subject to SOIRA is itself cast widely—many are subject to its provisions”: Ndhlovu at para. 35.

47Despite the national registry’s nearly two-decade existence, the majority found little to no concrete evidence of the extent to which it assists police in the prevention and investigation of sex offences: Ndhlovu at para. 36. That finding was based on the evidence called in the trial court.

48The majority deviated from the position of multiple appellate courts finding that SOIRA’s reporting requirements had “minimal” or “modest” impact on offenders. Instead, the majority found the requirements “exacting” and their impact “considerable”: Ndhlovu at paras. 45-46. “The scope of the personal information registered, the frequency at which offenders are required to update their information, the ongoing monitoring by the state, and, of course, the threat of imprisonment make the conditions onerous”: para. 46.

Section 7

49Section 7 was engaged because the challenged provisions interfered with offenders’ liberty interests. The nature and extent of the deprivations were significant given the ongoing reporting obligations under threat of prosecution and imprisonment: Ndhlovu at paras. 53-55. “Liberty is obviously undermined when personal information is collected, under threat of imprisonment, for the very purpose of monitoring a person in the community and promptly identifying the person’s whereabouts in the course of a criminal investigation”: para. 57.

50The Court examined the purpose of the challenged provisions as part of the overbreadth analysis. The national registry had largely been seen as a tool to help the police stop the sexual abuse and abduction of children, a type of investigation where “time is of the essence”: Ndhlovu at para. 32. The majority concluded that mandatory registration and lifetime reporting were closely tied to the overall purpose of helping the police prevent and investigate sex offences. The purpose of mandatory registration was to capture information about offenders that might assist the police in preventing and investigating sex offences; the purpose of lifetime reporting was to give the police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending: para. 76.

51The majority concluded that mandatory registration was overbroad because registering offenders who were not at an increased risk of reoffence bore no connection to the purpose of preventing and investigating sex offences: Ndhlovu at para. 79. “In certain cases, an offender’s personal circumstances mean they are not at an increased risk of reoffending, undermining any real possibility that their information on the registry will ever prove useful to police”: para. 85. The majority canvassed scenarios where there was no increased risk that an offender would ever commit another sex offence yet would be required to register. Since an effect on just one person’s liberty that bears no connection to the provision’s purpose is sufficient to make it overbroad, mandatory registration was overbroad: para. 87. “Although an offender may be part of a group that is generally—in other words, on average—at an enhanced risk of reoffending, this does not hold true for every individual in the group … an overbreadth analysis does not focus on the group, but on the individuals within that group”: para. 95. It was not sufficient for the Crown to argue that any sex offender poses a risk of committing a sexual offence in the future. A mere risk standard would deprive the law on overbreadth of its normative value: para. 100.

52The Court also concluded that lifetime reporting for those convicted of more than one sexual offence was overbroad. Lifetime reporting applied regardless of when the offences occurred and convictions were entered. For example, lifetime reporting would apply even if the offences were committed against the same victim during the same transaction. The Court relied on Dr. Hanson’s evidence that committing more than one offence without an intervening conviction is not associated with an enhanced recidivism risk: Ndhlovu at paras. 112-115. Lifetime reporting in all cases where the offender was convicted of multiple offences went beyond the purpose of giving the police a longer period of access to information on offenders at a greater risk of reoffending.

Section 1

53The majority concluded that the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

54There was no dispute that the provisions were enacted for a pressing and substantial purpose. “Parliament’s efforts to provide tools to police that make it easier to prevent and investigate sex offences are clearly aligned with the public’s interest in preventing sex crimes and bringing sex offenders to justice”: Ndhlovu at para. 120. The measures were also rationally connected to their purpose: para. 121.

55However, the measures were not minimally impairing of an offender’s rights. The majority examined alternative, less drastic means of achieving the purpose. The majority held that restoring judicial discretion in the registration process—which would still put 90% of eligible offenders on the registry—would substantially achieve Parliament’s aims: Ndhlovu at para. 124. Judges are generally well suited to assess risk and exclude an offender from the registry where appropriate: para. 125. The Court also held that exempting offenders from lifetime reporting who were convicted of multiple offences would still achieve the purpose in a real and substantial manner: para. 127.

56Finally, the majority held that the deleterious effects of the measures outweighed their salutary effects. The majority found the Crown’s evidence “limited” on how the measures helped to investigate and prevent sexual offences: Ndhlovu at para. 132. More importantly, the issue was not about the efficacy overall of the national registry. Mandatory registration and lifetime reporting did not exist before 2011. The Crown did not adduce evidence on how the police faced difficulties before 2011 and how the amendments mitigated those difficulties: para. 134. The potential and theoretical benefits of the measures did not outweigh the deleterious impacts from the considerable reporting requirements: para. 135.

Result

57The majority declared the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The declaration was immediate for lifetime registration and suspended for one year for mandatory registration.

VI

Lifetime Reporting – Section 7

58I will first examine the applicant’s challenge to the lifetime reporting provision in s. 7(1)(c) of Christopher’s Law that applies to offenders convicted of more than one sex offence. Other routes to lifetime reporting are not at issue. Ndhlovu provides the controlling analytical principles, but it does not relieve me of the obligation to examine the provincial scheme with care. The Supreme Court was considering a different statute on a different evidentiary foundation. The question remains whether any distinctions in the statutory text, legislative purpose, or evidentiary record warrant a different constitutional conclusion.

59I conclude that lifetime reporting under s. 7(1)(c) is overbroad and therefore breaches s. 7 of the Charter. I will not consider the applicant’s additional claim that lifetime reporting is grossly disproportionate.

Section 7 framework

60Section 7 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. To demonstrate a s. 7 violation, the applicant must first show that the law interferes with their life, liberty, or security of the person. The applicant must then show that the deprivation is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice: Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para. 55.

61Laws that curtail liberty in a way that is arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate do not conform to the principles of fundamental justice: Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para. 105. I will focus on the overbreadth claim. Overbreadth is a doctrine intended to address “failures of instrumental rationality”—a situation where a law is “inadequately connected to its objective or in some sense goes too far in seeking to attain it”: Bedford at para. 107, citing Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2012) at p. 151. A law is overbroad when its effects deprive some persons of liberty for reasons unrelated to its purpose: R. v. Safarzadeh‑Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para. 22. A law must not go further than reasonably necessary to achieve its legislative goals: Bedford at para. 101. There is a heavy onus on the party alleging that legislation is overbroad.

62The first step in the overbreadth analysis is to determine whether the law engages the applicant’s liberty interests. The second step is to ascertain the purpose of the law. The final step is to determine whether the law is so broad in scope that it includes some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose. A law is overbroad even if it overreaches with respect to a single individual: Bedford at paras. 113, 123; Ndhlovu at para. 78.

Interference with liberty

63There is no dispute that registration and reporting under Christopher’s Law engages the applicant’s liberty interests.¹⁵ The majority in Ndhlovu found the nature and extent of the deprivation to be significant. Given how similar the provincial regime is to the national regime, I must reach the same conclusion. This conclusion supplants the reasoning of Blair J.A. writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal in Dyck at paras. 104-112, who found the deprivation “modest”.

64The reporting requirements under the national and provincial registries are not exactly the same. The national reporting requirements are slightly stricter. For example, SOIRA imposes a travel-related reporting requirement: offenders must notify the registration centre if they intend to be absent from their primary or secondary residence for seven or more consecutive days. The majority in Ndhlovu considered this obligation to be a significant aspect of SOIRA’s impact on liberty interests: paras. 41-42, 46. By contrast, Christopher’s Law does not require an offender to provide this advance notice when planning to be away from their residence. The reporting obligations are limited to annual in-person reporting and notification within seven days of specified events, such as changes of name or address, or ceasing to reside in Ontario.¹⁶

65Despite some differences, the practical burdens imposed by each regime are, for constitutional purposes, indistinguishable. Both registries require offenders to submit detailed personal information to authorities under threat of sanction. The substance of these reporting obligations—annual attendance, disclosure of personal information, and ongoing compliance—results in an equivalent intrusion upon offenders’ liberty interests. The majority’s concern in Ndhlovu about how certain residency reporting obligations impact marginalized populations or people experiencing homelessness would apply equally to the provincial regime: paras. 56, 135.

Purpose of lifetime reporting

66Identifying the purpose of the challenged provisions is “critically important”: Safarzadeh‑Markhali at para. 24. To determine a law’s purpose, courts look to legislative statements of purpose; the text, context, and scheme of the legislation; and extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history and evolution. The respondent recognizes that distinguishing the purpose of Christopher’s Law from SOIRA’s purpose is central to its success in this case.¹⁷

Evidentiary record and respondent’s position

67The respondent argues that enabling the police to respond quickly in time-sensitive investigations, with detailed information about sex offenders living in close proximity, is central to the purpose of Christopher’s Law. According to the respondent, lifetime reporting furthers the objective of helping the police prevent and investigate sex crimes and respond to time-sensitive investigations.¹⁸ While Christopher’s Law and SOIRA employ similar means to achieve their aims, the respondent argues that extrinsic evidence shows that Christopher’s Law has the distinct purpose of assisting the police in time-sensitive investigations like child abductions, in addition to general investigative and preventative aims.¹⁹

68The respondent points to how the provincial registry was created in direct response to the abduction and murder of Christopher Stephenson and the coroner jury’s recommendation that a registry could prevent such tragedies in the future. When Christopher’s Law was first debated in 2000, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General explained how the registry could be used in a child abduction investigation to eliminate potential suspects:²⁰

In some cases, some of these offenders may not have done anything, yet a child goes missing in a community and the first thing you need to do is go through the process of elimination. If you know where the offender is, you can quickly eliminate that person as a potential suspect.

69In 2008, during the reading of a bill amending Christopher’s Law, Solicitor General Rick Bartolucci similarly highlighted the provincial registry’s importance to time-sensitive investigations:²¹

Research shows that time is critical when investigating the abduction of a child for a sexual purpose. The timely information the registry provides could help prevent a sexual offence and may even save a life.

70Comments by other Members of Provincial Parliament reflect a shared understanding of the provincial registry as a tool to be used in child abduction investigations. In 2000, MPP Brenda Elliot observed that the existing registry of criminal convictions, the Canadian Police Information Centre, did not give “accurate and up-to-date information for police,” and that, in a child abduction investigation:²²

… it’s a matter of only a few hours if that perpetrator is to be found, and the child is to be safe. So time is of the essence, and having an accurate and up-to-date database is essential. That is what this registry will do.

71In a 2007 report, the Auditor General reported that the provincial registry’s geographic mapping features were specifically designed for the realities of the child abduction context:²³

[O]ne very useful feature is the linkage of offender addresses to a geographical mapping application that enable investigators to quickly generate and print maps highlighting the addresses of all offenders living within a specified radius of a crime scene. This feature was developed because research indicates that there are unique patterns of distance in child abduction cases, with 80% of such abductions occurring within a quarter-mile of the victim’s last known location, usually by offenders who live or work in the area or had some other legitimate reason to be there.

72The respondent also relies on evidence that Christopher’s Law has been amended over the years to improve the registry’s utility in time-sensitive investigations. For example, in 2008, the Solicitor General amended Christopher’s Law and its regulations in direct response to the Auditor General’s recommendations on how to “improve the Registry’s usefulness for quickly identifying suspects”.²⁴

73The repeated assertions by government officials that the earliest hours of an abduction investigation are “critical” and “crucial” were substantiated by the evidence presented to the legislature over the years, particularly regarding the life expectancy of children abducted for a sexual purpose. Of victims who were murdered, 44% were murdered within an hour of the abduction, 74% within three hours, and 91% within 24 hours.²⁵

74Based on this evidentiary record, the respondent argues that the majority’s conclusions in Ndhlovu do not apply to the provincial regime. For example, the majority did not consider evidence of legislative purpose beyond SOIRA’s statement of purpose. The respondent argues that applying the same purpose “would be unfaithful to the Ontario legislature’s clear emphasis on time-sensitive investigations, and would foreclose meaningful engagement with the constitutionality of Christopher’s Law on its own terms”.²⁶

Analysis

75The respondent has successfully shown that an objective of Christopher’s Law is to assist the police with time-sensitive investigations. The very name of the statute reflects the circumstances that prompted its enactment and the legislature’s resolve to address investigative gaps identified in the aftermath of Christopher’s death. However, this objective does not render the purpose of the provincial regime’s lifetime reporting provisions materially different from its national counterpart.

76The evidence presented by the respondent does not establish a distinct legislative purpose for Christopher’s Law. Although the respondent has provided a more extensive evidentiary record than was presented in Ndhlovu, the majority still recognized that assisting the police in time-sensitive investigations was long considered an objective of the national registry. The majority held that the national registry “was largely seen as a tool to help police stop the sexual abuse and abduction of children, a type of investigation where ‘time is of the essence’”: para. 32.²⁷

77The majority did not explicitly mention time-sensitive investigations when determining the purpose of the national regime: Ndhlovu at para. 65. The majority described the overall purpose as helping “police services prevent and investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders”.²⁸

78In my view, the majority did not need to explicitly highlight the objective of assisting time‑sensitive investigations. The pursuit of preventing sexual offences necessarily requires time‑sensitive action. Indeed, when the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the purpose of Christopher’s Law, it did not isolate the facilitation of time‑sensitive investigations as a distinct or freestanding purpose: Dyck at paras. 41-47. The urgency is self-evident. When a child is reported abducted, the investigative imperative is immediate and acute. The registry’s core function, whether provincial or national, is to enable the police to rapidly identify and locate individuals who may pose a risk, quickly narrowing the field of potential suspects. The objective is not merely to investigate after the fact, but to swiftly apprehend a suspect and recover the child before further, heinous harm can be inflicted.

79This logic is not theoretical. Officer Burns illustrated how the provincial registry was designed to address such emergencies. She emphasized that the registry’s value lies in its capacity to provide the police with real-time access to offender data, enabling rapid geographic searches and immediate elimination or identification of suspects. She explained that, had the registry existed at the time of Christopher’s abduction, the police could have quickly identified the known sex offenders in proximity, potentially altering the tragic outcome.

80The national regime must have a similar objective given its overarching purpose of preventing sex crimes. The national registry was modelled on Ontario’s provincial registry, and other provinces—lacking their own provincial registry—rely on the national registry: Ndhlovu at para. 31.²⁹ The evidence establishes that police services across Canada can use the national registry to assist in time-sensitive investigations. Brennan Nelson, who testified in Ndhlovu about the use of the national registry, explained that a “tactical query request” can be made during an investigation into a sexual offence. In abduction cases, “where time is of the essence”, a query can be initiated even though a police file may not yet be open.³⁰ The requirement that offenders provide detailed contact and whereabouts information would enable the national registry to assist the police in quickly identifying or eliminating potential suspects.³¹

81Even if the respondent is correct that the provincial regime has a distinct emphasis on time-sensitive investigations, I must focus on the challenged provisions and not on the entire act in which they appear: Ndhlovu at para. 61. The provision at issue requires offenders to report for life when they were convicted of multiple sex offences. The Court in Ndhlovu held that the purpose behind lifetime reporting was to give the police a longer access period to information on offenders at greater risk of reoffending: paras. 74-75. Parliament used multiple convictions as a proxy for greater recidivism risk.

82I ascribe the same purpose to the lifetime reporting provision of Christopher’s Law. The provision itself does not disclose a distinct focus on assisting time-sensitive investigations. For example, the provision does not govern the information collected by the police and how it is accessed by or distributed to investigators.

83In summary, I find that the purpose of the lifetime reporting provision of Christopher’s Law is to give the police a longer period of access to information on offenders at greater risk of reoffending.³² I find that this provision forms part of the regime’s overall purpose of helping the police investigate and prevent sex offences. The objective of preventing crimes during time-sensitive investigations is inherent to the purpose of both the provincial and national regimes.

Lifetime reporting is overbroad

84The lifetime reporting requirements imposed by both the national and provincial regimes are animated by the same legislative purpose. In Ndhlovu, the Court found that lifetime reporting was overbroad. This conclusion applies to the provincial regime as well.

85The respondent argues that the Ontario legislature was entitled to rely on the common sense inference that someone who commits multiple sex offences poses a greater risk to community safety. Consequently, lifetime reporting is not overbroad since it subjects offenders who pose greater risk to a longer period of reporting.

86The Court in Ndhlovu rejected this argument: para. 115.³³ The Court relied heavily on the evidence of Dr. Hanson, who testified that committing more than one offence without an intervening conviction is not associated with an enhanced recidivism risk: para. 113. Relying on this testimony, the Court found that lifetime reporting was overbroad because it captures some offenders who are not at a relatively greater risk of reoffending because their multiple offences were committed, for example, in a single transaction: para. 114. This testimony is part of the record before me.

87The respondent seeks a different result by asking me to reject this portion of Dr. Hanson’s testimony. I can accept some, none, or all of a witness’s evidence: R. v. S.H., 2011 ONCA 215 at para. 8. There is merit to the respondent’s challenge to Dr. Hanson’s absolute assertion that multiple convictions are never indicative of greater risk.³⁴ An offender found guilty at one proceeding of ten sexual assaults committed against different victims over a period of years might pose greater risk than an offender found guilty of one sexual assault against a sole victim in a single incident.³⁵ Courts will often look at a pattern of conduct when considering an offender’s risk to public safety: see R. v. Long, 2018 ONCA 282 at paras. 127-132, 140.

88However, it must be remembered that a law is overbroad if it overreaches in only a single case: Ndhlovu at para. 78. “[L]aws that are broadly drawn … run afoul of s. 7 should they deprive the liberty of even one person in a way that does not serve the law’s purpose” [emphasis added]. Lifetime reporting overreaches in more than a single case, because it inevitably captures some offenders who do not pose greater risk. While multiple convictions may sometimes correlate with greater risk, they are not a consistent predictor of it. For example, an offender convicted after trial of a single count of sexual assault against an adult victim—where that count encompassed frequent, enduring, and highly invasive conduct over many years—would not be subject to lifetime reporting. By contrast, an offender who grabbed an adult victim’s buttocks over clothing on two separate days could be convicted of two counts and thereby subject to lifetime reporting. This disparity illustrates that the number of convictions is not a reliable proxy for the number of sexual acts committed. The number of offences for which an offender is convicted often reflects police charging decisions and prosecutorial choices about which counts to pursue, rather than the actual risk posed by the offender or the gravity of their conduct.³⁶

89The respondent also points to the possibility of relief from lifetime reporting that is built into Christopher’s Law. An offender who receives a record suspension is exempt from reporting. This mechanism provides an opportunity for relief following some assessment of the offender’s individual circumstances: Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, 2020 SCC 38 at para. 50 (“G. (S.C.C.)”).

90The applicant in this case secured a record suspension for eight convictions of sexual assault only five years after completing his 10-year reporting obligations under SOIRA. He had also accumulated additional convictions for non-sexual offences. While I am cautious about drawing broad conclusions from a single data point, this outcome demonstrates that record suspensions can be a viable route to relief for some offenders and cannot be dismissed as unattainable.³⁷

91The problem is that offenders under SOIRA also could have sought relief from lifetime reporting. An offender with lifetime reporting from multiple convictions could have sought a termination order after 20 years on the registry or after receiving a record suspension.³⁸ A judge would terminate the order if satisfied that continuing the offender’s registration would be grossly disproportionate “to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under … [SOIRA]”: Ndhlovu at para. 38.

92This off‑ramp in the national regime had no bearing on the majority’s conclusion in Ndhlovu that lifetime reporting was overbroad. The majority did not explain why the availability of termination orders did not factor into its analysis. It may be that such a mechanism speaks more to gross disproportionality than overbreadth.³⁹ I suspect there is also a limit to which post‑hoc relief mechanisms can cure ex ante overbreadth. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that the Court did not treat the existence of a termination order as mitigating or resolving the constitutional defect. Consequently, the possibility of obtaining a record suspension under the provincial regime does not alter my analysis of lifetime reporting under Christopher’s Law.

93A recurring theme from Ndhlovu was the absence of judicial discretion to exempt an offender from the registry: see e.g., paras. 65, 70-71, 114, 145, 195. The national regime at least preserved some measure of judicial discretion through termination orders. The provincial regime contains no comparable judicial discretion to relieve an offender from reporting obligations.

94Furthermore, I cannot find that record suspensions necessarily benefit those offenders who are improperly swept into lifetime reporting—namely, offenders who pose no greater risk of reoffending. No evidence was called about how record suspension decisions are made. From my review of the statutory framework, it is not clear that the criteria for granting a suspension bear a strong relationship to an offender’s current or prospective risk. The relevant provisions focus on the nature of the offences committed and the offender’s subsequent conduct: Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47, ss. 4.1(1)-(3), 4.2(1)(b); Criminal Records Regulations, S.O.R./2000-303, s. 1.1.⁴⁰ While the offender’s ongoing risk may be implicated in these considerations, there is no explicit statutory requirement that decision‑makers assess an offender’s present risk to public safety when determining whether to grant a record suspension. In addition, certain offenders are ineligible for a record suspension and thus enjoy no off-ramp at all from their reporting obligations.

Conclusion

95The lifetime reporting provision under s. 7(1)(c) of Christopher’s Law is overbroad and therefore breaches s. 7 of the Charter.

VII

Lifetime Reporting – Section 1

96The respondent seeks to justify the overbreadth of lifetime reporting under s. 1 of the Charter. I reach the same conclusion as the Court in Ndhlovu: the overbreadth is not demonstrably justified under s. 1. The evidence does not demonstrate that imposing lifetime reporting on all offenders with multiple convictions is minimally impairing, nor that its benefits outweigh the significant liberty costs.

Section 1 framework

97Under s. 1, the respondent bears the onus to show that the s. 7 infringement is “demonstrably justified”, meaning the infringing measures are supported by a “rational inference from evidence or established truths”: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1995 64 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 at para. 128. The s. 1 inquiry is broader than s. 7 in its consideration of societal interests: Bedford at paras. 113, 125-129; Carter at paras. 79-82, 94-95.

98An infringement is justified only where the impugned provision pursues a pressing and substantial objective and the means chosen are proportionate to that objective: Carter at para. 94. Proportionality requires a rational connection to the objective, minimal impairment of the right, and an overall balance in which the provision’s salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects: R. v. Oakes, 1986 46 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at pp. 136-40.

Pressing and substantial purpose

99The prevention and investigation of sex crimes is a pressing and substantial objective. A regime that facilitates timely police access to accurate offender information serves the public interest: Ndhlovu at para. 120. The lifetime reporting provision is aimed at that objective by maintaining continuous, up‑to‑date access to sex offender information for a cohort deemed to pose higher risk.

Proportional means

100The Court in Ndhlovu concluded that lifetime reporting did not minimally impair an offender’s rights and that its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects: paras. 127, 134-135. I reach the same conclusion for lifetime reporting under Christopher’s Law, given the similarities between the national and provincial regimes.

101I will address the respondent’s primary attempt to distinguish Ndhlovu. In that case, the evidence showed that the national registry had limited practical utility. Here, the respondent argues that the provincial registry functions more effectively and better supports police in time‑sensitive investigations.

102As compared to the evidence presented in Ndhlovu, I accept that the provincial registry has more utility to the police in their investigation of sexual offences. The evidentiary record before me includes statistical data and some anecdotal references in which the provincial registry assisted investigative efforts. I also accept that Ontario police can access and utilize the provincial registry far more rapidly than the national registry. Any delay in obtaining accurate offender information is problematic when the police are attempting to respond in a time‑sensitive situation.

103The provincial registry is more useful because Ontario police services have direct, 24/7 access to it. Approximately 1,400 sworn and civilian members are authorized to use the system. As an investigative tool for sexual offences committed by unknown offenders, the registry can be queried by geographic radius or jurisdiction and can incorporate vehicle information together with layered suspect descriptors. Its targeted filtering functions allow investigators to apply roughly 200 individual criteria to a search. Results are generated within minutes. Offender addresses in the database are geocoded and assigned to a specific police jurisdiction, enabling rapid proximity searches from an incident location. The registry also receives a daily electronic interface from the Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), which automatically imports key offender data. In short, trained Ontario police personnel can conduct real‑time investigative inquiries on the provincial registry at any hour to assist in the investigation of crimes of a sexual nature.

104By contrast, front‑line police services do not have direct access to the national registry. Access is mediated through the provincial centre, and not all centres are available 24/7. Police services must request searches through the provincial centre, which reviews the investigative documentation and runs the national query. While the national system can perform similar query functions, offenders in the national registry are not assigned to a specific police jurisdiction and are not mapped into jurisdictional boundaries. The data flow also differs: Ontario offender information is transmitted daily to the national registry, but the system does not interface with OTIS, meaning admissions and releases are entered or approved manually by the provincial centre.

105Practical considerations can justify overbreadth under s. 1: Bedford at para. 144. I accept that the provincial registry offers a more immediate investigative tool when time is of the essence.⁴¹ The main operational impediment with the national registry is that police officers must route queries through the provincial centre. Some of these challenges could be mitigated through administrative restructuring. For example, there is no apparent reason why the provincial centre could not be open 24/7.⁴² The difficulty is not with the quality of the national registry: it does not collect less information about offenders, nor does it impose less stringent requirements on them to keep their information current. The ability to use the provincial registry in time-sensitive scenarios was also undermined somewhat by the evidence on the local practice in Hamilton, where “usually all” requests for registry searches get sent to a single officer.⁴³

106In addition, there is no evidence that the provincial registry has been used in the type of investigations that, according to the respondent, lie at the very heart of its creation. No example was provided of the registry assisting the police during an ongoing crime—such as a child abduction—in a manner that enabled the identification of a suspect and the prevention of further harm. While Officer Burns described how the provincial registry, had it existed, might have assisted in identifying Christopher’s abductor, the respondent tendered no example of an analogous intervention in the nearly twenty‑five years since its creation. The absence of evidence does not establish that the registry is incapable of preventing such tragedies. It is, however, a relevant consideration that the core purpose said to justify the breadth of the legislation has not yet been realized in practice.

107While the foregoing context is relevant, it does not resolve the central issue. The evidence capably justifies the very existence of the provincial registry. But the s. 1 question is measure‑specific: Ndhlovu at para. 134. The onus is on the respondent to justify the specific infringing measure, not the overall regime.

108On a measure‑specific inquiry, I am not persuaded that lifetime reporting meaningfully advances any distinct objective of assisting the police in time‑sensitive investigations. That conclusion frames the next step of the analysis, which is to assess whether the measure is minimally impairing and provides sufficient salutary benefits to justify its breadth. As Ndhlovu makes clear, the respondent must explain why exempting offenders convicted of multiple offences would undermine the measure’s objective in any real and substantial way: para. 127. Even accepting that the provincial registry operates with greater operational agility, that fact alone does not establish that automatic lifetime reporting is minimally impairing. Readily available alternatives exist, such as a 10‑year default reporting period or judicial screening for lifetime reporting. The respondent has not shown why those mechanisms would fail to achieve the statutory purpose.

Conclusion

109The lifetime reporting provision under s. 7(1)(c) of Christopher’s Law is not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

IX

Mandatory Registration – Sections 7 and 1

110I turn to the constitutionality of the mandatory registration provision in s. 3(1)(a) of Christopher’s Law. Every offender convicted of a sex offence must attend a police station shortly after their release from custody and provide extensive personal information for inclusion in the provincial registry. The obligation arises automatically by operation of law. There is no judicial screening, individualized assessment, or discretion at the point of sentencing; the consequence of registration flows solely from the fact of conviction.

Mootness

111The preliminary question is whether I should address the constitutionality of mandatory registration. I am not obliged to consider it. My conclusion that lifetime reporting breaches s. 7 of the Charter without justification under s. 1 is sufficient to grant the applicant the remedy that he seeks: see R. v. Lavergne, 2023 ONCA 592 at para. 20.

112I will nevertheless address the constitutionality of mandatory registration, for two reasons. First, this case does not resemble the familiar sentencing scenario in which a court need not consider the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum because the fit sentence exceeds the statutory floor. The offender in those cases likely did not commit the underlying offence in order to mount a constitutional challenge. Here, by contrast, the applicant deliberately chose not to report for the sole purpose of testing the constitutional validity of both the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions of Christopher’s Law. He submitted himself to the court process—being charged, retaining counsel, and litigating the application—not to obtain a personal remedy, but to secure a judicial determination of these provisions’ constitutionality. Had the applicant merely wished to avoid a finding of guilt, he could have continued reporting as he had done for more than a decade. His objective was systemic, not individual.

113A reasonable counter‑argument is that the applicant could have complied with his reporting obligations and pursued a standalone constitutional challenge in the Superior Court. It is uncertain what persuasive effect, if any, the opinion of a provincial court judge may have on broader systemic reform. However, the litigation has unfolded in this forum, and the applicant has already borne the burdens of prosecution to obtain a constitutional ruling.⁴⁴ In these circumstances, I see little utility in declining to address the issue and directing him to commence fresh proceedings elsewhere.

114Second, as will become apparent, the analysis required to resolve this issue is necessarily concise. The constitutional defects that I have identified with respect to lifetime reporting—and the application of Ndhlovu to the provincial regime—largely dictate the result on mandatory registration.

Purpose of mandatory registration

115For the reasons already expressed, I do not accept that Christopher’s Law has a distinct purpose from SOIRA with respect to assisting the police in time-sensitive investigations. As with the national regime, I conclude that the purpose of mandatory registration is to capture information about offenders that may assist the police in preventing and investigating sex offences: Ndhlovu at para. 73.

Mandatory registration is overbroad

116The respondent argues that mandatory registration is not overbroad because the functionality of the provincial registry depends on having a comprehensive pool of registrants. The commission of a sexual offence is an empirically validated predictor of heightened risk for sexual recidivism: Ndhlovu at para. 94.⁴⁵ As Brown J. observed in dissent, even if certain offenders present little enhanced risk of reoffence, “any exclusion of convicted sex offenders based on perceived seriousness of an offence or likelihood of recidivism necessarily results in the police not having information on some offenders who do, in fact, reoffend” [emphasis in original]: para. 180. A smaller pool, the respondent submits, risks introducing blind spots and diminishes the registry’s effectiveness both in identifying potential suspects and eliminating innocent individuals from investigative focus.⁴⁶

117The respondent’s argument is not without force; however, it is not materially different from the submission rejected by the majority in Ndhlovu. Although sex offenders as a class present a higher statistical risk of reoffending, the majority in Ndhlovu held that this fact alone cannot support the breadth of mandatory registration. “The commission of a past sexual offence … is an inexact proxy for those offenders whose information may assist police”: para. 101. The majority held that something more than the bare fact of being a sex offender is constitutionally required to compel inclusion on the registry: para. 95.

118The respondent further argues that Ontario intentionally adopted a risk‑averse approach by requiring all sex offenders to register.⁴⁷ Given the uncertainty of predicting which individuals will reoffend, the mandatory nature of the regime is said to be necessary to ensure that the police have the necessary information on those who may pose a risk.⁴⁸ The respondent emphasized that the province sought to eliminate any possibility of exclusion, reasoning that “a registry with only 90 percent of sex offenders was no registry at all”. As the argument goes, omitting even a small minority of offenders would leave the police without the tools needed to prevent a tragedy like the one that befell Christopher.⁴⁹

119The difficulty for the respondent is that these same considerations informed the design of the national regime. The only reasonable inference from Parliament’s decision to mandate registration under SOIRA is that it too preferred to err on the side of overinclusion. Yet it was precisely this overbreadth—capturing individuals who are not at an increased risk of sexual reoffending—that led the majority in Ndhlovu to conclude that the mandatory registration was constitutionally infirm. The same conclusion follows for the provincial regime.

120I am satisfied that mandatory registration is overbroad notwithstanding the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decisions in R. v. Dyck, 2008 ONCA 309 and G. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 264 (“G. (C.A.)”).⁵⁰ Both Court of Appeal decisions rejected overbreadth challenges to the mandatory registration provisions of Christopher’s Law. In Dyck, the Court considered offenders convicted of a sex offence. In G. (C.A.), the Court considered persons who received an absolute discharge after being found not criminally responsible for a sex offence on account of mental disorder.

121This jurisprudential history raises the question of whether Ndhlovu should be confined to SOIRA, leaving Dyck and G. (C.A.) as the binding authorities on the constitutionality of Christopher’s Law. Although the respondent did not premise its submissions on this view of stare decisis, I consider it important to address the issue. In my view, it is the majority’s analysis from our apex court in Ndhlovu that now provides the controlling constitutional framework.

122First, as explained above, Christopher’s Law and SOIRA share the same statutory purpose, including with respect to their mandatory registration provisions. The operative features of the two regimes are sufficiently similar and give rise to comparable effects.

123Second, the relationship between Ndhlovu and Dyck, in particular, reinforces that the constitutional analysis in Ndhlovu must govern. The dissent in Ndhlovu, which would have upheld mandatory registration, relied in meaningful ways on the reasoning in Dyck, demonstrating that the two decisions rest on a common analytical framework: Ndhlovu at paras. 165-167, 175. The majority, for its part, considered propositions supporting the result in Dyck and rejected them. For example, the Court in Dyck held that uncertainty about which offenders will reoffend supported the breadth of mandatory registration, yet the majority in Ndhlovu reached the opposite conclusion: Dyck at para. 125; Ndhlovu at paras. 102-111. The majority did not show the same degree of deference to the legislature’s ability to make policy choices within a band of options: Ndhlovu at para. 100; Dyck at para. 124.⁵¹

124Third, the overbreadth conclusions in Dyck and G. (C.A.) were premised on the modest liberty intrusion imposed by Christopher’s Law: Dyck at paras. 104-112; G. (C.A.) at paras. 99, 100. However, the majority in Ndhlovu found a comparable intrusion to be significant; see also G. (S.C.C.) at para. 78.

125Fourth, the s. 7 framework has evolved since Dyck. In Dyck, the Court treated arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality as interrelated components of a single inquiry. The Court held that “overbreadth was a function of arbitrariness and … the standard for assessing a s. 7 infringement on this basis was gross disproportionality”: para. 94; see also paras. 96, 101. By contrast, the Court in Ndhlovu reaffirmed that arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality are distinct principles of fundamental justice, each with its own analytical role: para. 151. The majority held that the impugned measure was overbroad without resorting to an analysis of gross disproportionality: para. 116. This shift in the governing s. 7 framework undermines the continuing force of Dyck: see Long at paras. 34, 114. While G. (C.A.) applied the correct s. 7 framework, the Court there relied on Long, which was itself overruled by Ndhlovu: G. (C.A.) at paras. 78, 87.

126In sum, I am satisfied that the majority’s decision in Ndhlovu is the binding authority on the overbreadth of mandatory registration under Christopher’s Law.

Mandatory registration is not justified

127The mandatory registration provision is not justified under s. 1. Alternative measures would substantially achieve the provision’s purpose of capturing information that assists the police in preventing and investigating sexual offences. Following Ndhlovu, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to remove the automatic registration of all offenders convicted of a designated offence. The path to avoiding registration, however, remains demanding. Child sex offenders sentenced to the penitentiary must still register: s. 490.012(1). Recidivists must also register: s. 490.012(2). Other offenders may avoid registration only by establishing, on their onus, one of the two preconditions in s. 490.012(3) [emphasis added]:

(a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or

(b) the impact of the order on the person, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act.

128The respondent has not established how similar amendments to the provincial regime would fail to achieve the provision’s purpose in a real and substantial manner: Ndhlovu at para. 124. The provincial legislature could, for example, limit mandatory registration to any offender who becomes subject to a SOIRA order.

129It is not enough for the respondent to assert that a totally inclusive registry is necessarily better than a mostly inclusive one. The majority in Ndhlovu rejected the “unproven premise” that the police can only effectively prevent and investigate sexual offences if all sex offenders are registered. That premise rested on the unfounded assumption that “if some are good, more is better, and all is best”: para. 126.

130Turning to whether the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects, I have already acknowledged that the provincial registry offers greater operational advantages than the national one. This fact, however, does not justify the specific measure of mandatory registration. Evidence that the registry is generally useful does not establish that the infringing measure is proportionate: Ndhlovu at paras. 134-135.

Conclusion

131The mandatory registration provision under s. 3(1)(a) of Christopher’s Law is overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter and is not justified under s. 1.

X

Remedy

132Section 24(1) of the Charter confers a broad sphere of remedial authority. It equips me with a scalpel instead of an axe to craft the appropriate remedy: R. v. O’Connor, 1995 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at para. 69; R. v. Roy, 2026 ONCA 6 at para. 4.

133I conclude that ss. 3(1)(a) and 7(1)(c) of Christopher’s Law are unconstitutional as applied to the applicant. The reporting obligation that grounded the charge of failing to report is invalid for the purpose of these proceedings.

134The appropriate remedy is to stay the charge under s. 24(1).

Footnotes

1. 1Office of the Chief Coroner, Inquest into the Death of Christopher Stephenson: Verdict of the Jury (Toronto: February 1993) at p. 22.
2. 2The prescribed period is seven days.
3. 3General, O. Reg. 69/01.
4. 4Clauses (a) and (b) refer to free pardons. Clause (c), which refers to record suspensions, is excluded.
5. 5See Submissions, October 30, 2025 at pp. 14-16, 125-126.
6. 6The summary election necessarily flows from the duration of the applicant’s SOIRA obligation: Submissions, November 7, 2025 at p. 52.
7. 7Exhibit 2, Ndhlovu trial excerpt at p. 74. See also Ndhlovu at para. 80.
8. 8Exhibit 2, Ndhlovu trial excerpt at p. 94.
9. 9Exhibit 2, Ndhlovu trial excerpt at p. 59.
10. 10I understood an “investigative search” to refer to uses of the inquiry builder tool, which allows the police to conduct targeted queries.
11. 11The registrar is a police officer authorized to register offenders.
12. 12Officer Burns testified that information on the provincial registry “furthered an investigation” when registry data assisted the police, even if it did not directly result in a charge or identification of a suspect.
13. 13A community safety bulletin is an alert issued by the police when registry information indicates a potential risk to community safety.
14. 14The full Court found lifetime reporting unconstitutional. There was a dissent by Brown J. on the constitutionality of mandatory registration.
15. 15Respondent’s factum at para. 17.
16. 16Ontario has enacted amendments to Christopher’s Law that would introduce advance travel notification requirements for absences of seven or more days and additional rules for travel outside Canada. However, these provisions have not come into force and are not operative for the period relevant to this case. See also Lisa Burns, October 30, 2025 at p. 75.
17. 17Submissions, October 30, 2025 at pp. 133-134, 146-147.
18. 18Respondent’s factum at paras. 3-4.
19. 19Respondent’s factum at para. 24.
20. 20Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 37th Parl., 1st Sess., April 2000 at p. 1847.
21. 21Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 39th Parl., 1st Sess., April 2008 at p. 698.
22. 22Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 37th Parl., 1st Sess., No. 35, April 2000 at p. 1848; see also p. 1856.
23. 23Auditor General of Ontario, 2007 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario: 3.11 Ontario Sex Offender Registry, (Toronto: December 2007) at p. 267.
24. 24Auditor General of Ontario, 2007 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario: 3.11 Ontario Sex Offender Registry, (Toronto: December 2007) at p. 268.
25. 25See e.g., Auditor General of Ontario, 2007 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario: 3.11 Ontario Sex Offender Registry, (Toronto: December 2007) at p. 266. See also Exhibit 4, Respondent’s application record at pp. 4-5.
26. 26Respondent’s factum at para. 41.
27. 27The majority cited House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Statutory Review of the Sex Offender Information Registry Act: Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 40th Parl., 2nd Sess., December 2009 at pp. 3-4.
28. 28The Court held that the purpose statement in s. 2(1) of SOIRA accurately captured the Act’s purpose.
29. 29Lisa Burns, October 30, 2025 at pp. 66-67, 106.
30. 30Exhibit 2, Ndhlovu trial excerpt at pp. 192-194.
31. 31I find that the national registry was also meant to be a “very time-effective tool based largely on geographic profiling”: Submissions, October 30, 2025 at p. 142.
32. 32See also the preamble to Christopher’s Law, which draws a connection between “access to information” and “maintaining community safety”.
33. 33In essence, the common sense inference relied on in R. v. Long, 2018 ONCA 282 at para. 132 was rebutted by evidence.
34. 34Dr. Hanson did not say “never”. But if multiple convictions are unrelated to risk, and if offenders convicted of multiple offences pose the same risk as an offender convicted of one, then it follows that multiple convictions are never indicative of greater risk. See also Submissions, November 7, 2025 at pp. 30-34.
35. 35See the dissent’s recourse to “logic and experience”: Ndhlovu at para. 175.
36. 36In my view, the majority’s analysis in Ndhlovu overruled the Court of Appeal’s analysis on this point in Long at paras. 133-134.
37. 37Submissions, November 7, 2025 at pp. 44-45.
38. 38Submissions, November 7, 2025 at p. 25.
39. 39The potential for a termination order was relied on by the dissent when examining gross disproportionality: Ndhlovu at para. 170.
40. 40See also Submissions, November 7, 2025 at pp. 25-26.
41. 41See also Ndhlovu at para. 157.
42. 42Exhibit 4, Respondent’s application record at p. 19: “Not all Provincial/Territorial Centres are available 24/7”. This suggests that the provincial centre could be made available 24/7 without legislative reform.
43. 43Derek Houle, October 30, 2025 at p. 112.
44. 44I was told that the prosecution did not withdraw the charge specifically so that the applicant could advance his constitutional challenges.
45. 45See also para. 95, where the majority recognized that sex offenders as a group, on average, are at an enhanced risk of reoffending.
46. 46Respondent’s factum at paras. 44-45.
47. 47Submissions, October 30, 2025 at p. 155.
48. 48Submissions, November 7, 2025 at pp. 11-12.
49. 49Submissions, November 7, 2025 at pp. 15-16.
50. 50The Supreme Court in G. (S.C.C.) did not address s. 7 and only affirmed the Court of Appeal’s conclusions under s. 15(1) of the Charter.
51. 51This point was emphasized by the dissent in Ndhlovu at paras. 179, 181: “It was within Parliament’s purview to draw a line based on that known increased risk of unknown degree” based on the “heightened risk of committing a future sexual offence” shared by sex offenders.