ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
D. B.
Applicant
— AND —
M.N.
Respondent
Before Justice S. Cleghorn
Heard on July 13, 2026
Reasons for Sentence released on July 17, 2026
D.B Counsel for the applicant, M.R.
M.N................................................................................................................. On her own behalf
J.S Counsel for Guelph Police Service
Cleghorn, J.:
Overview
1The Respondent mother, M.N., has been found in contempt of court, and my reasons were released on June 9, 2026 (D.B. v. M.N., 2026 ONCJ 416).
2Submissions on sentencing were heard on July 13, 2026, including from J.S., counsel for the Guelph Police Service, on the issue of police enforcement.
3A finding of contempt does not end the analysis. The court must determine the appropriate sanction. The purpose of a sentence for civil contempt is not simply to punish the contemnor. Rather, it is to uphold the administration of justice, encourage compliance with court orders, deter future misconduct, and, in family proceedings, promote the best interests of the child.
4Court orders are not suggestions. They are binding on the parties until varied or set aside by a court. A party who disagrees with an order must nevertheless comply with it. The rule of law depends upon litigants respecting court orders even when they believe those orders are wrong. Were it otherwise, the authority of the court would be undermined, and disputes would be resolved by unilateral action rather than through the judicial process.
5The mother has been provided multiple opportunities to purge the contempt, including on the day of sentencing submissions. The court was prepared to stand the matter down to allow for an unsupervised visit between the father and the child. When pressed, the mother was forthright that she had no intention of complying with the operative order and continues to have none. She believed that if a custodial sentence were to be imposed, she would be entitled to make the care arrangements for R.N., which would have, in her plan, been to have her sister care for R.N.
6M.R., counsel for the father, submits that a fine of $5,000.00 is appropriate in the circumstances. I do not agree.
7In determining the appropriate sentence, I have considered the nature and duration of the contempt, the degree of deliberateness involved, the prejudice suffered by the father, the impact upon the child, the need for both specific and general deterrence, and any mitigating circumstances.
8The contempt in this case is serious and ongoing.
9The mother repeatedly failed to comply with clear court orders respecting the father’s parenting time. The breaches were not isolated or inadvertent. They occurred over an extended period, despite repeated court involvement and ample opportunity for the mother to comply with the order. Instead, the mother elected to decide for herself whether the father would have a relationship with the child, without her supervision.
10The greatest harm arising from the mother’s conduct has not been suffered by the father alone. It has been suffered by the child. Children benefit from meaningful relationships with both parents whenever it is safe and appropriate. A parent cannot be permitted to unilaterally frustrate those relationships simply because they disagree with an existing court order.
11I have also considered the mother’s personal circumstances. I accept that the mother genuinely believes she has acted in the child’s best interests. I do not find that she acted out of malice or for the purpose of punishing the father. However, a sincere belief that one is protecting a child does not justify disobedience of a court order. A parent cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the court.
12This mitigating factor reduces, to some extent, the mother’s moral blameworthiness. It does not excuse the contempt.
13I have considered whether a custodial sentence is appropriate. Imprisonment remains an available remedy for serious civil contempt and, in appropriate circumstances, is necessary to preserve respect for the administration of justice. However, incarceration should generally be imposed only where lesser sanctions would be ineffective or where no other remedy adequately addresses the contempt.
14In this case, I am satisfied that the objectives of sentencing can be achieved without immediately imposing a custodial sentence. The more pressing concern is to allow the father and the child to have a relationship without the mother’s interference. Those objectives are better achieved through a change in the parenting arrangements than through the immediate incarceration of the mother.
15Accordingly, I order that the child’s primary residence shall be transferred to the father.
16Given the history of this matter and my findings, I further conclude that a temporary suspension of the mother’s parenting time is necessary. This is not intended as punishment. Rather, it is a protective measure designed to permit the child an opportunity to stabilize in the father’s care, to re-establish that relationship free from ongoing conflict, and to reduce the risk of further interference with the implementation of the court’s orders.
17I have considered whether supervised parenting time for the mother after the transfer occurs would be in the child’s best interest. I am not satisfied that it would. The immediate priority is to permit Roman to establish stability in the father’s care and to re-establish that relationship without further conflict or interference. Once that transition has occurred, the issue of the mother’s parenting time can be revisited on a proper evidentiary record.
18The suspension of parenting time shall remain in effect until further order of the court.
19I further order that the father will have sole decision-making responsibility. Given the mother’s conduct to date, cooperation between the parents to meet R.N.’s needs, including his schooling and medical care, is not feasible.
20From the date of this order until the transfer of primary residence, the parties shall have joint decision-making authority, allowing the father to access third-party service providers without requiring the mother’s consent.
21I would urge the mother to make R.N.’s transition as child-focused as possible. The mother shall provide R.N.’s health card and any information necessary respecting his schooling and medical care.
22When pressed at the hearing as to whether the mother would ensure a smooth transition for the child and whether she would comply with the exchange date (should I make such an order), the mother was noncommittal. I explained to the mother that if needed, an order for police enforcement may be necessary, and how this is a traumatic experience for a child and should be used as a last resort. Despite my warnings, I am not confident that the mother will voluntarily deliver R.N. to the father.
23On behalf of the Guelph Police Service, J.S. assured the court that the police will enforce a time-limited order.
24The mother is reminded that future compliance with all court orders is mandatory. Any further acts of contempt, interference with the father’s parenting time, or attempts to undermine the implementation of these orders may result in more severe sanctions, including imprisonment.
25The court does not impose these orders to punish either parent. They are made because the evidence establishes that they are necessary to restore respect for the court’s orders and, most importantly, to promote the child’s best interests going forward.
26This decision has not been made lightly. Throughout these proceedings, R.N.’s best interests have remained the court’s paramount consideration.
27A copy of this endorsement shall be sent to Family & Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County. Should the exchange not occur as ordered by the court, I would request that the society be present with the Guelph Police Service. In my endorsement dated April 21, 2026, I referred the matter to the society regarding emotional harm to R.N. and provided a copy of the parties’ affidavits in support of the contempt motion.
28The father seeks reimbursement of $35,174.00 in costs. The costs sought include the father’s need to respond to the mother’s cross-contempt motion, which I dismissed.
29The costs incurred by the father were necessitated by the mother’s conduct. Attempts were made to encourage settlement, and opportunities were provided for the mother to purge her contempt. The father should not bear the financial burden caused by the mother’s unreasonable conduct and position taken on the contempt motion.
30Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, provides that cost orders are in the court’s discretion. In addition, Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules sets out a framework to guide judges in exercising their discretion to award costs in family cases.
31Rule 24(3) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. Therefore, consideration of success is the starting point in determining costs.
32The contempt motion ought never to have been necessary. A finding of contempt supports that the contemnor has engaged in unreasonable conduct, which is a factor to be taken into consideration under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.
33I find that a cost award of $15,000.00 is reasonable and proportionate, for the reasons set out below.
34The contempt hearing had several appearances, with the matter first returnable on April 21, 2026. On this date, submissions were heard regarding the mother’s issue that the order was ambiguous. The matter was adjourned to a settlement conference on May 13, 2026, to provide the parties with an opportunity to resolve the contempt motion.
35The motion was argued on June 8, 2026.
36The sentencing hearing was held on July 13, 2026.
37Although there were several court appearances, the total time spent before the Court amounted to, at most, one full hearing day.
38Having reviewed the bill of costs, I note that counsel, who had four years of experience, charged an hourly rate of $400.00, which later increased to $450.00 per hour. I also note that the hourly rates charged for the two law clerks ranged from $300.00 to $350.00 per hour, rates that approached those charged by counsel.
39In the circumstances of this case, I find that both counsel’s hourly rate and the hourly rates charged for the law clerks were higher than would reasonably be expected and are not reasonable for the purposes of fixing costs.
Temporary Order to be issued
The Applicant D.B. and the Respondent M.N. shall have joint decision-making for the child, R.N. This order shall allow third-party service providers (for example, the child’s school and primary physician, etc.) to release information and communicate with the Applicant D.B., without the consent of the Respondent, M.N. This paragraph expires on August 23, 2026 at 4:00 p.m.
The Applicant, D.B. shall have sole decision-making for the child, R.N., commencing August 23, 2026, at 4:00 p.m. until further order of the court.
The primary residence of the child, R.N., shall be with the Applicant, D.B., effective August 23, 2026, at 4:00 p.m.
The Respondent, M.N. shall deliver the child, R.N., to the Applicant’s, D.B.’s, home on August 23, 2026, at 4:00 p.m.
The Respondent, M.N. shall provide the child’s, R.N., health card, birth certificate, and a list of any third-party service providers, together with the child’s clothing and personal items, on August 23, 2026.
The Respondent, M.N., shall have no parenting time, in-person or virtual, with the child, R.N., starting August 23, 2026, at 4:00 p.m. until further order of the court.
The Respondent, M.N., shall not attend the child’s, R.N., school, the Applicant’s, D.B., home, or any place the child, R.N., is known to be until further order of the court.
Should the Respondent, M.N. not deliver the child, R.N., to the Applicant, D.B. as set out in paragraph 3, paragraphs 9 through 14 shall apply. Counsel for the Applicant, D.B. shall inform the Guelph Police Service that police enforcement is required. Counsel for the Applicant, D.B., shall contact Family & Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County once the date has been confirmed by Guelph Police Service to notify them of the date and time when the apprehension will occur.
Pursuant to section 36(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, Guelph Police Service and any other police service having jurisdiction where the child, R.N., may be found are directed to forthwith locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the Applicant, D.B.
Pursuant to section 36(4) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Guelph Police Service any other police service having jurisdiction where the child, R.N., may be found shall do all things reasonably able to be done to locate, apprehend and deliver the child, R.N., in accordance with this Order.
Pursuant to section 36(5) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, for the purpose of locating and apprehending the child, R.N., in accordance with this Order, any member of the Guelph Police Service and any member of any other police service having jurisdiction where the child, R.N., may be found may enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the child, R.N., may be, with such assistance and such force as are reasonable in the circumstances.
Pursuant to section 36(6) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, an entry or a search referred to in this Order shall be made between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., standard time.
Paragraphs 9 through 12 of this order shall expire three months after the date of this Order or upon delivery of the child, R.N., to the Applicant, D.B., whichever occurs first.
This order does not direct or authorize police to locate, apprehend and deliver the child, R.N., where the child, R.N., has already been delivered to the Applicant, D.B. pursuant to this Order.
Court Administration shall provide a copy of this order to the Chief of Police/Commissioner or their designate of the police service/agency named in the Order and any other police service having jurisdiction where the child, R.N., as identified in this Order, may be.
The Respondent, M.N., shall pay costs fixed in the amount of $15,000.00 (inclusive of HST) to the Applicant, D.B.
The requirement for the unrepresented party to approve the order is waived.
The matter is adjourned to August 20, 2026, at 3:15 p.m. to determine the next step on the Application.
Released: July 17, 2026
Signed: Justice S. Cleghorn