ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
D.B.
Applicant
— AND —
M.N.
Respondent
Before Justice S. Cleghorn
Heard on April 21, 2026, and June 8, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on June 9, 2026
D.B counsel for the applicant, M.R.
M.N................................................................................................................. On her own behalf
Cleghorn, J.:
Overview
1The Applicant father, D.B., has brought a motion for contempt alleging that the Respondent mother, M.N., is in breach of the court order dated February 27, 2026, regarding the child, R.N.. As the motion was adjourned for continuation, two subsequent orders were made on April 21 and May 13, 2026.
2The father requested an order for police enforcement should a finding of contempt be made, or any other remedy the court deems just.
3The mother has brought a motion for contempt alleging that the father has willfully failed to comply with the order of April 2, 2024, requiring him to undergo phallometric testing. She seeks an order requiring the father to complete the testing and assume the cost. She also seeks an order setting aside the February 27, 2026 order and returning to the status quo, under which the father exercised supervised parenting time.
4The father has sworn affidavits dated March 27, April 15, April 16 and June 3, 2026.
5The mother has sworn affidavits dated April 8, April 15 and June 4, 2026.
6On February 19, 2026, a parenting motion was fully argued. A decision was released on February 27, 2026.
7The order provides for a gradual increase in the father’s parenting time, moving from supervised to unsupervised, with the first unsupervised visit scheduled for March 21, 2026. The visit did not occur.
8In advance of the first unsupervised visit, M.R. sent an email to the mother with proposed exchange details. Several emails were exchanged between the mother and M.R.
9On March 20, 2026, the mother sent an email to the father, stating:
No cowardly abusive man, no ignorant judge, no lawyer who is devoid of integrity and all of whom see a child as a possession and not a child with the human right to live a life free from abuse, emotional, physical, sexual, may strip me of my legal and biological right to protect R.N.
I will not be leaving R.N. alone with you. He trusts me and I will not betray that trust.
10The mother’s position regarding unsupervised parenting time has remained consistent throughout these proceedings.
11Before the motion, supervised visits were occurring at Child and Parent Place (“CAPP”), a supervised access centre. The father shared the court’s decision with CAPP. The agency then put the supervised visits on hold as the order contemplated a transition to unsupervised visits. As a result, the father’s in-person visits were suspended because the mother was not allowing unsupervised parenting time and CAPP was unwilling to continue providing services.
12The mother maintains her position that unsupervised parenting time places the child at risk. She believes that the father is exerting coercive control by bringing the contempt motion, that counsel for the father, M.R., is bullying her, and that the decision of February 27, 2026, is wrong.
13She seeks to have the order set aside under Rule 25 on the basis that it was obtained by “fraud”.
14The motion was first returnable on April 21, 2026. The mother argued that the February 27, 2026 order was ambiguous, particularly regarding exchange logistics.
15During the April 21, 2026, court appearance, in her comments to the court, the mother made it clear that she would not comply with any order providing for unsupervised parenting time and maintained that parenting time should remain supervised or virtual. An opportunity was provided to the parties to make submissions on the issue of ambiguity. Instead of making submissions, the mother chose to leave the courthouse.
16On April 21, 2026, the February 27, 2026 order was varied to facilitate the mother’s compliance by providing exact dates and locations for the exchanges, in an attempt to avoid the need to continue the contempt motions while ensuring that the best interests of the child remained paramount. This resulted in the April 21, 2026 order.
17The transcript of the April 21, 2026 appearance confirms that the purpose of the subsequent order was to eliminate any uncertainty regarding exchanges. The court advised the parties that specific exchange times and locations would be incorporated into the order. The mother maintained that parenting time should remain supervised or virtual. The significance of that exchange is that it demonstrates that the mother’s objection extended beyond exchange logistics and reflected an ongoing opposition to the court-ordered transition to unsupervised parenting time.
18The contempt motions were adjourned to May 13, 2026, for a settlement conference, with a request that, if the motions could not be resolved, they be adjourned to May 25, 2026, for argument.
19As the mother had chosen to leave the courtroom on April 21, 2026, and given the seriousness of the contempt motion, it was imperative that the motion be adjourned to a date when both parties could make submissions to the court. Although a decision could have been rendered on April 21, 2026, I decided against doing so in order to allow the mother to re-engage in the court process.
20On June 8, 2026, the motions returned to court for argument.
21In the interim, the mother appealed the temporary order of February 27, 2026, including requesting a stay of the order. The appeal was heard on May 12, 2026. A decision on the appeal has not yet been released.
22The filing of an appeal does not suspend the operation of a court order unless a stay has been granted. There is no evidence before me that a stay has been issued with respect to the February 27, 2026 order or the subsequent orders implementing it. Accordingly, those orders remain binding on both parties pending the outcome of any appeal.
23The first unsupervised visit should have occurred on March 21, 2026. It did not. M.R., counsel for the father, wrote to the mother on March 11, 2026, to confirm the date, time, and proposed exchange details. The mother’s response was that the visits should remain at CAPP.
24Instead of the in-person visit, the mother presented the father with two options. He could have a supervised visit at the public library, with her acting as supervisor, or he could have a virtual visit. The mother emailed the father:
In order to keep R.N. out of conflict, as I am the parent and my role is to take care of and protect him, I have presented you with two options for parenting time. I will facilitate parenting time in a manner that is safe as is my right, and R.N.’s right.
25The father responded that what she proposed was not in compliance with the order. He attended the library; the mother did not bring R.N.
26In response to the allegation of a breach, the mother states that the parties never agreed on where the exchanges would take place. The father chose the library, and the mother states that she was at home at 9:30 a.m. on March 21, 2026, and that it is not her fault the father did not attend her home. She argues that she cannot be found in contempt for the March 21, 2026 visit.
27On April 4, 2026, the father proposed a visit for the Easter weekend. It did not occur. The father suggested the public library as the exchange location. The mother blames counsel for the father for her failure to read the proposal, which was sent by email, because M.R. did not identify the email as “time sensitive”.
28At the visit on May 9, 2026, the mother told the father that she would bring R.N. to the library on the condition that she remain to supervise. The father had not had in-person parenting time for two months. As a result, he attended the library, the mother attended with R.N. and remained present throughout the visit. The father argues that the mother breached the order by remaining in the role of supervisor
29The in-person unsupervised visit scheduled for May 30, 2026, did not occur because the mother advised the father that she and R.N. were ill.
Contempt Motion Test
30Kim J. has summarized the jurisdiction and test to be applied in a contempt proceeding, in her unreported decision of T.M. v. M.F., released on June 23, 2025. Additionally, the issues raised in T.M. v. M.F. are exactly the same as those presented by this case. The relevant portions of Kim J.’s decision, at paragraphs 5 through 21, are reproduced below:
Jurisdiction
(5) Rule 31 of the Family Law Rules sets out the court’s jurisdiction with respect to contempt orders. The subrules engaged in this case can be summarized as follows:
(1) An order, other than a payment order, may be enforced by a contempt motion even if another penalty is available (subrule 31(1));
(2) If the court finds a person in contempt of the court it may order that the person: be imprisoned; pay a fine; pay a penalty to a party; do anything else that the court decides is appropriate; not do what the court forbids; pay costs in an amount decided by the court; and obey any other order.
Burden of Proof
(6) Because contempt can result in imprisonment, a contempt motion is quasi-criminal in nature. This means that contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is different from the burden of proof required for other family law orders.
(7) The burden is therefore on the father to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother is in contempt of the Final Order. Furthermore, any doubt with respect to the necessary elements of contempt must be exercised in favour of the mother (see e.g.: P-R. v. N.G. et al., 2006 CanLII 81792 (ONCA) at paras. 26-7; C. v. L., 2015 SCC 17, 2015 SCC17 at para. 32; M. v. N-D., 2016 SCC 44 at para. 20.
Elements of Breach
(8) The elements the father must prove are:
(1) Did the mother have proper notice of the hearing?
(2) Was the Final Order in force at the time of the hearing?
(3) Is the Final Order clear about what should be done and what should not be done?
(4) Did the mother know about the Final Order?
(5) Did the mother intentionally fail to follow the Final Order?
(9) If the father is unable to prove even one of these five elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must dismiss the motion for contempt.
Issues
(10) In this case, the mother had notice of the hearing, knowledge of the Final Order, and the Final Order was in force. The issues to be decided are:
(1) Was the Final Order clear?
(2) Did the mother intentionally fail to follow the Final Order?
(3) If the elements of breach are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, should the court make a finding of contempt or exercise its discretion not to make a finding of contempt?
(4) If contempt is found, what is the appropriate sentence? If contempt is not found, what is the appropriate remedy?
Clarity of the Order
(11) With respect to clarity of an order, the father must demonstrate that the Final Order “clearly and unequivocally” states what should or should not be done.
(12) This is a high threshold, requiring “absolute clarity” to ensure that a party will not face the serious consequences of a contempt finding due to a vague or ambiguous order that is open to different interpretations. The meaning of the order must be clear from reading the order (“on its face”) and any interpretation must not depend on extrinsic evidence (C., at para. 33; Morasse, at para. 25). Any ambiguity in the text of the order must be resolved in favour of the party who has been accused of contempt (P-R. c. K.R., 2021 ONCA 366 (C.A.), at para. 29).
Failing to follow an order
(13) Proof of a breach of the order can be established by evidence that the accused party violated specific terms of the order, or that they engaged in a course of conduct that had the effect of sabotaging or thwarting an order. With respect to the latter, where a parent has a history of intentionally frustrating or inappropriately suspending parenting time, a court may conclude that the party thwarted the order thus supporting a contempt finding (see e.g. J. v. J., 2016 ONSC 3466 at para. 63).
Exercise of Judicial Discretion
(14) If the father proves all of the items beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court may:
- make a finding of contempt and then consider an appropriate sentence or penalty; or
(2) choose not to make a finding of contempt based on the circumstances and consider a less severe but still appropriate remedy.
(15) A finding of contempt is to be made cautiously and with great restraint. The remedy cannot be reduced to a mere means of enforcing orders and should not be routinely used as a compliance mechanism. It is an enforcement power of last resort to address matters that are not trifling (see e.g.: Carey at para. 36; Morasse at para. 84; R. v. D., 2019 ONCA 385 at para. 18; M. v. P., 2021 ONCA 462 at para. 10).
(16) The principle of restraint is particularly compelling in the family law context where it may be desirable to avoid further escalation of conflict between the parties (see e.g. H. v. H., 2013 ONCA 44; R., supra; M., supra).
(17) This reluctance to add to family conflict should not be read, however, as fettering judicial decision-making. The court cannot be reluctant to render judgments that might upset one or both parties. On the contrary, the court must find facts and apply the law justly without regard to how its judgment may be received by the parties or, indeed, by any other persons.
(18) Rather, it is undesirable for conflict to escalate between parties because parental conflict has a negative effect on children. As the court is mandated to make decisions that are in the best interest of the child it is therefore proper to consider how escalated conflict could affect the child or children before the court.
(19) The court must also, of course, consider how the best interest of the child may be negatively affected when court orders are breached.
Alternatives to Contempt
(20) Courts have provided various options for steps that ought to be taken by parties prior to a contempt order. The following are applicable to this case:
(1) Bringing a motion for a declaration that the allegedly non-compliant party breached the order, an order requiring that party to comply with the order, and for costs;
(2) Bringing a motion for directions or a motion to clarify the terms of the order;
(3) Bringing a Motion to Change for a new final order;
(4) Bringing a motion for make-up parenting time; or
(5) Attempting to mediate the issues in dispute.
(21) Courts are also to consider alternative remedies, such as those found in Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, which states that:
“1(8). If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter…”
Father’s Contempt Motion - Analysis
31In this motion, the issues are whether the relevant orders were sufficiently clear and whether the mother intentionally failed to comply with them.
32The evidence establishes that the mother fundamentally disagrees with any order providing the father with unsupervised parenting time. She has repeatedly expressed that position both in correspondence and before the court. In her email to M.R., she referred to the father as abusive, described the court as “ignorant,” questioned counsel’s integrity, and expressly stated that she would not leave R.N. alone with the father. On April 21, 2026, she similarly advised the court that she would not comply with any order permitting unsupervised parenting time. The email is relevant not because of its criticism of the court, but because it contains a clear statement that the mother would not permit unsupervised parenting time notwithstanding this court’s order.
33As noted above, contempt is a remedy of last resort and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court must first determine whether the order alleged to have been breached was clear and unequivocal.
34The February 27, 2026 order provided that the father’s parenting time would gradually transition from supervised to unsupervised. However, the order incorporated the relief sought in the father’s Notice of Motion and did not specify the exchange location. Instead, the parties were left to agree on a location for the exchanges.
35In hindsight, given the history of conflict between the parties, it is not surprising that they were unable to reach agreement. The resulting disagreement over exchange logistics created ambiguity in the order's implementation. Because contempt requires absolute clarity regarding what each party was required to do, I am unable to conclude that the February 27, 2026 order was sufficiently clear and unequivocal for the purpose of a contempt finding.
36Accordingly, the mother cannot be found in contempt for any missed in-person visits occurring between February 27, 2026 and April 21, 2026.
37The ambiguity of the February 27, 2026 order was clarified in the April 21, 2026 order. The transcript of the April 21, 2026 appearance confirms that the purpose of the subsequent order was to eliminate any uncertainty regarding exchanges. The court advised the parties that specific exchange times and locations would be incorporated into the order and indicated that the order would be made “crystal clear.” During that discussion, the mother repeatedly maintained that she would not facilitate parenting arrangements that she considered unsafe and stated that she would agree only to parenting time that remained supervised or virtual. The significance of that exchange is that it demonstrates that the mother's objection extended beyond exchange logistics and reflected an ongoing refusal to implement the court-ordered transition to unsupervised parenting time.
38The May 13, 2026 order contained substantially the same exchange provisions.
39Following the April 21, 2026 order, two in-person visits were scheduled for before the return date of the motion.
40The first was on May 9, 2026. Although the mother attended the library with R.N., she insisted on remaining present to supervise the visit. The April 21, 2026 order clearly contemplated unsupervised parenting time. The concept of unsupervised parenting time is inherently inconsistent with the mother remaining in a supervisory capacity during the visit. Faced with the prospect of losing yet another visit after having had no in-person parenting time for approximately two months, the father proceeded with the visit as permitted by the mother. Her insistence on remaining as supervisor was inconsistent with the order.
41The second visit was scheduled for May 30, 2026. The mother advised the father that she and R.N. were ill and did not attend. Having considered the mother's explanation in light of her repeated statements that she would not comply with orders permitting unsupervised parenting time, together with her conduct throughout these proceedings, I do not accept her explanation. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure of the May 30, 2026 visit resulted from intentional non-compliance with the order.
42The mother's statements on April 21, 2026 are also relevant when assessing intent. The court specifically advised her that any ambiguity concerning exchanges would be addressed through a revised order containing precise exchange provisions. Despite that opportunity, the mother continued to maintain that parenting time would occur only on terms she considered acceptable. The events of May 9 and May 30, 2026 are therefore not isolated incidents but part of a continuing course of conduct that frustrated the implementation of the father's court-ordered parenting time.
43Viewed as a whole, the evidence demonstrates more than isolated breaches. It establishes a deliberate course of conduct to prevent the implementation of the father's court-ordered unsupervised parenting time. The mother’s actions have frustrated, sabotaged, and thwarted the orders of this court.
44I therefore find that the father has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother intentionally failed to comply with the April 21, 2026 and May 13, 2026 orders. A finding of contempt is made with respect to the May 9, 2026 and May 30, 2026 parenting visits.
45In reaching this conclusion, I have exercised the caution and restraint required in contempt proceedings. I also note that a finding of contempt was not made on April 21, 2026. Instead, the court accepted the mother's position that the February 27, 2026 order lacked sufficient clarity regarding exchange logistics and issued a further order designed to remove any uncertainty. The contempt motion was adjourned to provide the mother with an additional opportunity to comply before any finding was considered.
46I have considered the alternatives identified above, including further compliance orders, declarations of breach, make-up parenting time, and remedies available under Rule 1(8). Given the mother's repeated and unequivocal statements that she will not comply with orders providing for unsupervised parenting time, together with her conduct in preventing or restricting those visits, I am not satisfied that lesser remedies would secure compliance. Permitting the continuation of such self-help measures would significantly impair the development of the father and R.N.'s relationship and would not be in R.N.'s best interests.
47In these circumstances, a finding of contempt is necessary and appropriate.
48The mother's allegation that the February 27, 2026 order was obtained by fraud is unsupported by any evidence. The request to set aside the order on that basis is therefore dismissed.
Mother’s Contempt Motion – Analysis
49The father is not in contempt of the order dated April 2, 2024. The evidence establishes that the CAMH facility capable of conducting the testing contemplated by Dr. H.'s assessment is not presently available. The father has maintained his willingness to complete the testing when the facility reopens. I am therefore unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally failed to comply with the order.
Orders to be issued
There shall be a finding of contempt against the Respondent, M.N.
The contempt motion brought by the Respondent, M.N., against the Applicant, D.B., shall be dismissed.
The matter is adjourned to July 13, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. for submissions on sentencing. 60 minutes is required. This shall be an in-person appearance.
Costs of the motion will be dealt with once the sentencing portion of the contempt motion has been completed.
The requirement for the unrepresented party to approve the order is waived.
Released: June 9, 2026
Signed: Justice S. Cleghorn