CITATION: R. v. Murray, 2026 ONCJ 385
4810 998 24 48127934-00
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
GEORGE MURRAY
Before Justice Peter Scrutton
Heard on June 5, 2026
Reasons for Sentence released on June 24, 2026
A. Singh for the Crown
O. Bedi for George Murray
I. Introduction
1George Murray was found guilty of criminal harassment and uttering threats to cause bodily harm after a trial. Both offences were committed against Laura Scott, a stranger he happened upon in a dark, deserted parking lot very early on the morning of December 1, 2023. He threatened to rape her and then yelled Islamophobic insults at her. This conduct appears to be an aberration in what has otherwise been a productive, pro-social life well lived. I must decide what sentence appropriately balances the seriousness of these offences and the harm that they caused against the fact that nothing in Mr. Murray’s history resembles or foreshadowed this offending.
II. The Offences
2Ms. Scott is a Muslim woman of Caucasian descent. She was coming from an early morning workout, wearing a hijab, walking through the parking lot of a large plaza in Scarborough when Mr. Murray called out to her from his running car. He initiated what began as an innocuous conversation by asking questions about her conversion to the Muslim faith and Muslim religious practices. After politely tolerating his questions for a few minutes, Ms. Scott tried to end the conversation. When she did, Mr. Murray threated to rape her before going on an Islamophobic tirade, telling her she ought to join Hamas or a terrorist organization and referring to genocide. Ms. Scott felt very fearful and unsafe, and walked away from the man as he continued to yell at her from his car. She was scared enough during this interaction to surreptitiously call her husband and repeatedly texted for him to “help” her. Once home she called the police.
III. Victim and Community Impact
3Ms. Scott spoke poignantly about the emotional harm and fear that Mr. Murray’s actions caused, effects which continue to impact her. He attacked both her faith and her gender, two core aspects of her identity. Neither of these things makes her vulnerable but she feels vulnerable and unsafe because of others’ problematic views. Strong and resilient, she refuses to sublimate her faith and autonomy to account for the Islamophobia and misogyny she has been subject to.
4The Crown tendered a community impact statement authored by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. It explained how hateful offences create fear among Muslim women, discourage their participation in public life, and undermine their confidence in the safety of everyday settings. When threats of sexual violence are linked to religious identity, members of this community fear that they may be similarly targeted. The CCMW outlined how hate crimes in Canada have been rising sharply. In 2023, there were 4,777 hate crimes reported nationally, a 32 % increase over the previous year. Within that figure, 1,284 incidents were motivated by religion, a 67 % increase from 2022. Hate crimes directed at Muslims nearly doubled, increasing by 94% between 2022 and 2023. Muslim women are disproportionately targeted, in part because they are so visibly identifiable. Many incidents go unreported due to fear or cultural barriers.
IV. The Offender
5Mr. Murray is 56 years old. He is a Black man1 who immigrated to Canada from Jamaica at the age of four. His criminal record – a 1993 conviction for failing to appear for which he received a $50 fine – is so dated and minor that I do not consider it to be relevant to my assessment of his character or the appropriate sentence in any way. Mr. Murray is married, the father of a 15-year-old child, and has strong family supports. Hard-working and industrious, he owns and runs a cleaning company with more than a dozen employees. He has no substance abuse or mental health issues and is described as calm and kind by those who know him.
6Mr. Murray expressed remorse in his Pre-Sentence Report, and at his sentencing hearing. He has completed rehabilitative programs in anticipation of his sentencing, including an intensive, 52-session anger management course, and two separate courses on human rights and racism offered by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Defence counsel tendered several character letters that speak to the defendant’s positive qualities. Some of the letters are from Muslim people the defendant knows in a professional capacity; none of these writers have seen any signs of discrimination or bias in their interactions with Mr. Murray.
V. The Parties’ Positions
7The Crown initially indicated that Mr. Murray ought to receive a jail sentence for these offences but revised its position to account for all the positive rehabilitative efforts Mr. Murray has undertaken in advance of this sentencing. The Crown seeks a 90-day conditional sentence followed by 18-months of probation, submitting that a conditional sentence is the lowest sentence capable of achieving denunciation and deterrence. The Crown emphasizes that the element of hate is a significantly aggravating factor, and the increasing prevalence of hate crimes in this community means that there is a real need for general deterrence. The Crown also submits that the mitigating value of the character letters Mr. Murray tendered is attenuated because his interactions with Muslims in his professional or public life do not necessarily reflect his personal views and are difficult to reconcile with how he treated Ms. Scott.
8Defence counsel seeks a conditional discharge followed by 18 months of probation. Counsel focussed on how much insight Mr. Murray has gained from this trial and from the remedial programming he has voluntarily completed. Mr. Murray has close family in the United States and owns an investment property there. A sentence that leaves him with a criminal record could have collateral consequences that prevent or restrict his ability to travel to the United States, negatively impacting his ability to visit family or deal with his property; a criminal record could also limit some of the contracts his cleaning business is eligible to compete for.
VI. Relevant Sentencing Principles
9The principles of sentencing are set out in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. The fundamental principle is proportionality – a sentence must reflect the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2(b) provides that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. The range of sentence for similar offences appears to be broad, from suspended sentences for first offenders (see, for example, R. v. Gillard, 2022 ONCJ 164) and, possibly, conditional discharges, to lower reformatory sentences.
10Factually, this case closely resembles R. v. Medeiros, 2014 ONSC 6550, where an offender (with a dated but more serious criminal record than Mr. Murray) who pled guilty to similar criminal harassment received a 90-day intermittent sentence. The summary conviction appeal court concluded that the 90-day sentence “properly reflects the objective gravity of the offence … and properly reflects the aggravating circumstance that the offence was motivated by the appellant’s bias, prejudice and hatred of Muslims.”
11Section 730 of the Criminal Code provides that a court can impose a discharge if it considers it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest. Other than offences with a mandatory minimum sentence or offences punishable by at least fourteen years’ imprisonment, there is no list of offences that are ineligible for a discharge. That said, as the seriousness of the offence rises, the likelihood of a discharge being contrary to the public interest will also rise. Courts have recognized that it is possible for a conditional discharge to achieve a deterrent effect: R. v. Pera, 2016 ONSC 2800. Courts have also explained that judges should not “impose a sentence that places a relatively serious crime, with significant aggravating features, in a category intended to communicate the opposite”: R. v. Smart-James, 2022 ONSC 3711 at para. 23.
12Section 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code provides that it is an aggravating factor if an offence was motivated by bias, prejudice, or hate based on specific immutable characteristics. These include race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, and sex. For section 718.2(a)(i) to apply, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was motivated by an enumerated factor: R. v. Wright, 2002 ABCA 170, at para. 10. Bias, prejudice or hate need not be the sole reason the offence was committed, so long as the offending was motivated in part by one or more of the enumerated factors: R. v. Bethune and Secreve, 2022 BCPC 243 at para. 73; R. v. Vrdoljak, 2002 CarswellONT 1005 at paras. 4-6 (Ont. C.J.). Additionally, section 718.04 requires a sentencing court to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence for an offence that “involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances – including because the person is Aboriginal and female.”
13While sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence clearly take precedence at this sentencing, because I am treating Mr. Murray as a first offender I must also consider the principle of restraint codified in sections 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code. This obliges me to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and to impose imprisonment only when there is no other reasonable punishment. Similarly, where imprisonment is required, it should be for as short as is reasonably possible in the circumstances. Rehabilitation is also a relevant sentencing principle, given Mr. Murray’s prior good character and the remedial efforts that he has already undertaken.
VII. The Appropriate Sentence
14I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these offences were motivated by Mr. Murray’s bias, prejudice, or hate towards Muslims. Ms. Scott’s Muslim faith, which was obvious in virtue of her hijab, was the hook that Mr. Murray used to begin a conversation with her. During that conversation, Mr. Murray voiced his opinion about the incongruity of male and female Muslim religious practices. When Ms. Scott attempted to end the conversation, he threatened her with sexual violence and then made comments that profanely and stereotypically connected her faith to terrorism.
15Ms. Scott, a female who is smaller than the defendant, was alone and accosted by an unknown man because of her faith. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this conduct meets the s. 718.04 vulnerability criteria for treatment as an aggravating factor: R. v. Grant, 2025 ONCJ 231 at para. 27. The aggravating factors here are significant and warrant, even require, the imposition of a sentence that prioritizes denunciation and deterrence. Further, the threat that Mr. Murray uttered, “to rape” Ms. Scott, is particularly violent, serious, and problematic, especially in the context of the dark and isolated character of the place where the threat was made. Misogyny and cultural prejudice intersected in Mr. Murray’s abhorrent treatment of Ms. Scott.
16I find that Mr. Murray’s expression of remorse and his rehabilitative efforts are sincere but that their mitigating value is less than if they had accompanied a guilty plea, as Mr. Murray’s insight only occurred after a trial in which he denied any wrongdoing.2 It is not mitigating that Mr. Murray did not leave his car during his interaction with Ms. Scott but I recognize that his offending would have been more serious if he had gotten out of it to interact with Ms. Scott. It is to his credit that Mr. Murray has reached his mid-50s without having committed any similar offences but, at the same time, no youthful immaturity or intoxication or mental health issues explain his actions. Unless irrational, the only explanation that makes any sense is rooted in bias, prejudice, or hate.
17Defence counsel raised what I would characterize as potential collateral consequences that could flow from this sentencing if Mr. Murray is left with a criminal record. I do not know with certainty that Mr. Murray will face issues travelling to the United States or obtaining new contracts for his business if convictions for these summary offences are entered, or even that these collateral consequences are more probable than not. That said, I accept that the fact that he may suffer these collateral consequences is a relevant factor to consider. Regardless, collateral consequences cannot reduce a sentence to a point where it becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender: R v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34.
18It is clearly in Mr. Murray’s interest to receive a conditional discharge. I find, however, that the imposition of a conditional discharge here would be contrary to the public interest. I am certain that these offences are too serious, with too many aggravating factors, committed by a man with too high a degree of moral responsibility, to result in sentences that avoid a conviction. Further, I am satisfied that a suspended sentence would be similarly insufficient to achieve denunciation and deterrence. I make that finding mindful of the principle of restraint.
19Like the Crown, absent Mr. Murray’s positive post-trial rehabilitative efforts, I would take the view that the principle of proportionality requires a real jail sentence to achieve the primary sentencing objectives. But because of Mr. Murray’s efforts, and in light of the Crown’s reduced sentencing position, I conclude that a 90-day conditional sentence concurrent on both counts is appropriate. I view this 90-day conditional sentence as the minimum sentence that is fit and appropriate.
20I will also impose a s. 110 order for 5 years and order that Mr. Murray provide a sample of his DNA. I would have imposed a probationary period with conditions that included counselling if Mr. Murray had not completed the intensive and thematically appropriate counselling that he did. But because of his rehabilitative efforts to date, his age, the fact that this offending is so out of character, and the unlikelihood that he will ever come into contact with Ms. Scott again, I do not feel that a probationary period is required.
VIII. Kienapple
21The parties disagree as to whether the uttering threats count should be conditionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple, 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729. For the Kienapple principle to apply, there must be both a factual nexus (in that the same act of the accused grounds both offences) and a legal nexus (in that the essential elements of the offences are substantially the same). The legal nexus considers the presence or absence of additional distinguishing elements: R. v. Prince, 1986 CanLII 40 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480; R. v. Palmer-Coke, 2019 ONCA 106 at para. 32, and R. v. Young, [2007] O.J. No. 311 (C.A.).
22I find that the conduct underlying the uttering threats count involved additional or distinctive factual elements that were not a necessary element of the criminal harassment count. If Mr. Murray had accosted Ms. Scott in a dark, deserted parking lot, and only directed Islamophobic invectives at her with no threats to cause bodily harm, his conduct could still have established the elements of the criminal harassment offence: R. v. Medeiros, supra, at paras. 30-32. As such, I am satisfied that his threat to sexually assault Ms. Scott represents a distinct element that is not a necessary part of the criminal harassment offence and decline to stay the uttering threats count on that basis.
Dated: June 24, 2026 __________________________
Justice Peter Scrutton