ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025 04 25
COURT FILE: Toronto #23-48117859
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
DAVID GRANT
SENTENCING JUDGMENT
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on April 15, 2025
Written Reasons Provided on April 25, 2025
H. Mann ................................................................................................. counsel for the Crown
J. Virk ................................................................................................... counsel for Mr. Grant
Introduction
1After a trial, I found David Grant guilty of two counts of uttering death threats contrary to section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and one count of causing a disturbance in or near a public place, to wit: a TTC bus, by using obscene language, contrary to section 175(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
2Mr. Grant targeted his victims and threatened their lives. He did this for no other reason than he perceived them to be different and unwelcome in Canada because they are young Muslim women.
3On April 15, 2025, the parties made their submissions as to an appropriate sentence.
Findings of Fact
4In my trial judgment, I found that Ms. L. Afkul and Ms. S. Mohamed-Farah were passengers on a busy TTC bus in Scarborough on September 19, 2023. They were both approximately 19 years old. They sat on the bus, chatting with each other and minding their own business. They were wearing hijabs and have dark complexions. They testified that they are Muslim-Canadians who were wearing traditional attire.
5Mr. Grant was also a passenger on the bus, seated a short distance from them. He yelled at them, “Go back to Dubai” and “Go back to your country” and “I will cut your fucking heads off.” Another passenger on the bus hit the emergency alarm, and the bus came to a stop.
6Ms. Akful was very upset and reported the incident to the bus driver, Ms. N. Bailey. She independently heard Mr. Grant tell the victims he would “cut their necks off” or words to that effect. The bus was busy and full of other passengers. Someone else on the bus pushed the yellow alarm button, which caused Ms. Bailey to stop the bus. Ms. Afkul exited the bus in tears.
7Mr. Grant’s behaviour interfered with Ms. Afkul’s and Ms. Mohamed-Farah’s ordinary and customary conduct as bus riders that day. By yelling death threats on a crowded bus and causing the bus to come to an emergency stop, Mr. Grant caused a disturbance.
8Ms. Bailey confronted Mr. Grant outside the bus, and he uttered a vulgar, racist remark to her. Because both she and Mr. Grant are black, she found this remark more pathetic than intimidating. However, she noticed how emotionally distraught Ms. Akful was at the time due to the threats directed at her.
Background of the Offender
9A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was provided to the court.
10Mr. Grant is 45 years old and does not have a prior criminal record. He graduated from high school and completed post-secondary education at the Centre for Security Training and Management in Scarborough, where he obtained a security certificate and an Ontario Security License. On May 23, 2024, he received another certificate in security training from the Centre for Security Training and Management Inc.
11He has three children, aged 16, 8 and 5. His oldest child lives in Saskatchewan with his former partner, and he pays child support. His youngest children reside in Toronto with his last partner, Ms. T. Phung. He maintains regular contact with them.
12Ms. Phung was interviewed for the report. She was in a common-law relationship with Mr. Grant for seven years. She observed his struggles with anger and problem-solving. He often processes situations inappropriately due to his firmly held cultural beliefs, and she believes he would benefit from counselling focused on diversity, cultural sensitivity, and appropriate communications.
13Mr. Grant is currently unemployed. He receives financial support from Ontario Works. He has expressed interest in pursuing work in either security or building maintenance. He is connected with an employment agency.
14Mr. Grant admits that he has ongoing issues with anger and is trying to address this daily. He completed an eight-hour anger management course on August 20, 2024. He is a devout Christian and looks to his faith for support.
15Regarding the offences, he believes he was irritable and sleep-deprived after a long day at work. He “took his frustrations out on strangers on public transit.” His conduct stemmed from frustration, and he expressed some regret for his actions. I note, however, that Mr. Grant testified at his trial and denied making the threats at all. His position for the sentencing hearing contradicts his trial testimony (which I rejected).
16Mr. Virk also presented the court with a reference letter from Ms. T. Chan. Ms. Chan has known Mr. Grant for five years as a neighbour. She described him as a hard-working man who cares for his children. He volunteers to help her with daily tasks as she has significant health issues. He has done over 100 hours of service for her.
Positions of the Parties
17Mr. Mann submits that this was an offence motivated by hatred. If I come to that conclusion, the appropriate sentencing range is between a suspended sentence and a short custodial sentence. A discharge is not appropriate. The sentencing principles of general and specific deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized. There can be no place in Canada for threats animated by hatred. Canada’s defining values include respect for our cultural mosaic.
18He provided me with two recent decisions of the Ontario Court of Justice. In R. v. Rogers, 2020 ONCJ 288, the offender uttered threats to a women’s shelter, which were recovered from a voicemail system. Justice Latimer (as he then was) was not willing to conclude the Crown had proven that the offender was motivated by hatred towards women beyond a reasonable doubt. The offences may have been driven by “disordered thinking”: see para. 45. As a result, he imposed a suspended sentence with probation.
19Mr. Mann asked me to take notice of the rise of hate-based offences in this city. That is a relevant factor to consider when deciding upon an appropriate disposition.
20In R. v. Astoforoff, an unreported decision of the Ontario Court of Justice dated March 17, 2022, Justice Maille found that the offender, while intoxicated, yelled threats at his neighbour. After the neighbour’s dog defecated on his lawn, he swung his fist at her face while yelling, “I will punch you in the face, go back to f###ing China.” He was 60 years old and had no prior record. The court accepted a joint recommendation for a suspended sentence with probation.
21Mr. Virk submits that his client should receive a conditional discharge with probation. This was not a hate-based offence. Instead, it was an offence borne out of his client’s difficult personal circumstances. He accepts the need for Mr. Grant to take counselling, but anything more than a discharge would be a disproportionate punishment.
22If Mr. Grant receives a conviction, he will find working in his chosen profession to be much harder. Mr. Grant is black, and I should consider the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680. Mr. Grant has experienced racism, poverty and disassociation from his family members. Despite these challenges, he has achieved a great deal of success.
23Mr. Virk relied upon several prior decisions where courts have granted discharges, even for crimes of violence. They emphasize that courts should applaud efforts at rehabilitation (such as what Mr. Grant has done) and place less emphasis on deterrence and denunciation for first-time offenders.[1] None of these cases involved an offence motivated by hatred, however.
24Mr. Grant exercised his right of allocution and apologized to everyone on the bus for his actions. He blamed financial stress for why he made an outburst. He acknowledged the need to be respectful of other citizens in the future.
Sentencing Law – General Principles
25A sentence must be proportionate to “the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender”: Criminal Code section 718.1. The assessment of moral culpability takes into account several factors. In R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, the Supreme Court described the assessment of moral culpability at para. 58:
The offender’s moral culpability or degree of responsibility should be measured by gauging the essential substantive elements of the offence, including the offence’s mens rea, the offender’s conduct in the commission of the offence, the offender’s motive for committing the offence, and aspects of the offender’s background that increase or decrease the offender’s individual responsibility for the crime, including the offender’s personal circumstances and mental capacity.
26I accept that Mr. Grant was under considerable stress at the time of this incident due to events in his personal life. Yet that does not diminish his level of moral culpability, which I find to be very high. He threatened two innocent young women in a public setting with hideous language. He exposed everyone on the bus to his words, causing a disturbance. Once someone activated the emergency alarm, the bus stopped, disrupting the evening commute for all passengers. Then, when confronted by the bus driver, he resorted to further demeaning language.
27General deterrence and denunciation must normally be emphasized for all crimes of violence. Criminal Code section 718.04 further requires a sentencing court to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence for an offence that “involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances – including because the person is Aboriginal and female.” Ms. Afkul and Ms. Mohamed-Farah were vulnerable young women targeted by an older man due to their characteristics, including their faith.
28General deterrence “refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and others from engaging in criminal conduct”: see R. v. B.W.P.; R. v. B.V.N., 2006 SCC 27, at para. 2. Denunciation refers to the Court's "communication of society's condemnation of the offender's conduct": see R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, at para. 102. In R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 SCC 230, C.J. Lamer wrote at para. 81:
…a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.
Offences Motivated by Bias, Prejudice or Hate
29Section 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code states that it is an aggravating factor if an offence was motivated by “bias, prejudice, or hate” based on specific immutable characteristics. These include race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, and sex.
30In R. v. Ingram and Grimsdale, 1977 ONCA 2018, which was decided before the enactment of section 718(2)(a)(i), two offenders attacked a random person on the subway in Toronto. The victim was a 49-year-old man who had recently immigrated to Canada from Tanzania. He suffered serious injuries. The trial judge found the assault was “completely unprovoked” and “racially motivated” but did not consider the racial motivation an aggravating factor. The Crown appealed.
31In allowing the Crown sentence appeal, Justice Dubin stated (at p. 379):
It is a fundamental principle of our society that every member must respect the dignity, privacy and person of the other. Crimes of violence increase when respect for the rights of others decreases, and, in that manner, assaults such as occurred in this case attack the very fabric of our society. Parliament's concern for the incitement of racial hatred is reflected in s. 281 [sic, s. 281.2, now s. 319] of the Criminal Code. An assault which is racially motivated renders the offence more heinous. Such assaults, unfortunately, invite imitation and repetition by others and incite retaliation. The danger is even greater in a multicultural, pluralistic urban society. The sentence imposed must be one which expresses the public abhorrence for such conduct and their refusal to countenance it.
32In order for Criminal Code section 718.2(a)(i) to apply, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was motivated by one of the listed factors. This provision was intended to permit sentencing courts to impose increased penalties on those who commit criminal offences due to such beliefs: see R. v. Wright, 2002 ABCA 170, at para. 10. Bias, prejudice or hate need not be the sole reason the offence was committed. It need only have been motivated, in part, due to one or more of those factors: see R. v. Bethune and Secreve, 2022 BCPC 243, at para. 73; R. v. Vrdoljak, 2002 CarswellONT 1005, at para. 4 (Ont. C.J.).
33I have no difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that these offences were motivated by Mr. Grant’s bias, prejudice or hate towards Muslim women. Ms. Afkul and Ms. Mohamed-Farah were wearing hijabs. The threats explicitly referenced the victims’ presumed foreign nationality (from a predominantly Muslim country)[2] and Mr. Grant’s subjective belief that they did not belong in Canada.
34Section 718.2(a)(i) was added to the Criminal Code in 1995 with the objective of denouncing and deterring hate crimes: see Michelle S. Lawrence and Simon N. Verdun-Jones, Sentencing Hate: An Examination of the Application of s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code on the Sentencing of Hate-Motivated Offences, 2011 57 C.L.Q. 28.
35Sadly, thirty years later, hate crimes have seen a significant rise in Canada. The number of hate crimes reported by police rose from 3,355 incidents in 2021 to 3,576 in 2022. This followed two sharp annual increases, resulting in a cumulative rise of 83% from 2019 to 2022: see Police Reported Hate Crime, 2022, Statistics Canada, The Daily, released on March 13, 2024.[3] The Toronto Police Service’s 2023 Annual Hate Crime Statistical Report provides data on criminal offences committed against persons or property that are motivated by bias, prejudice or hate. The report concluded that the number of reported hate crime occurrences increased from 248 in 2022 to 365 in 2023, representing a 47% increase.[4]
36In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the prevalence of a crime in a particular community is a relevant factor for a sentencing court to include when crafting an appropriate sentence: see paras. 89-90. While the frequency of a crime in a region is not itself an aggravating factor, it may be considered when determining what weight to afford to the applicable sentencing principles, including denunciation or general deterrence.
37In R. v. Woodward, 2011 BCCA 251, the British Columbia Court of Appeal described the importance of this section and noted that where a court is satisfied it applies, it represents a significant aggravating factor. At para. 27, the Court wrote:
Section 718(2)(a)(i) reflects the fact that Canadians take pride in being members of a pluralistic, multicultural society, in which every individual is entitled to respect. Not only do we abhor violence, we particularly abhor it being gratuitously directed at someone solely because of his or her personal characteristics, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. Such conduct is antithetical to our collective beliefs.
38Canadian law recognizes the fundamental dignity and worth of all human beings. Furthermore, Canada has a long tradition of not only protecting but also embracing minority rights. This is a foundational principle of our constitutional architecture and one of our most cherished underlying values: see Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 SCC 793, at para. 82. In Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, Justices Iacobucci and Bastarche held that “the extent of diversity in Canada” forms part of the “fabric of the society”: see para. 13.
39Criminal courts must demonstrate their commitment to these values by issuing sentences that genuinely reflect the moral culpability of those who transgress against them. An offence motivated by bias, prejudice, or hate is not merely an offence against an individual victim; it is also an offence against their community and, indeed, all of Canada: see R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 144. Understanding the full extent of the harm inflicted by these offences is vital for crafting an appropriate sentence.
40Moreover, crimes of this nature have a corrosive effect on a healthy, pluralistic society. Canadians respect diversity in all our citizens, including their racial or ethnic backgrounds, religions, cultures, and beliefs. Offences that target vulnerable victims due to their immutable characteristics strike at the beating heart of our shared values.
41During the trial, Ms. Afkul testified that the threats caused a panic attack and that she would remember them forever. She was scared and did not feel safe. She added that she was worried other people might, unfairly, consider her less worthy of being in Canada than other members of the general public simply due to who she was. She was visibly shaken when testifying. Ms. Mohamed-Farah felt uncomfortable and wished she had taken the threats more seriously at the time.
42Ms. Afkul and Ms. Mohamed-Farah were deeply affected by Mr. Grant’s words. Nothing I include in this judgment can change that. But I want them to know, in clear and unequivocal terms, that they are cherished members of society who are as Canadian as anyone else in this country. They should never have been mistreated in this manner. This incident has made them question their faith in their safety in public and their very sense of self-worth. That is terribly regrettable. I hope, in time, that they will be able to overcome the emotional harm inflicted upon them. I conclude this harm was significant, which constitutes another aggravating factor: see Criminal Code section 718.2(a)(iii.1).
Sentencing Precedents
43Prior court decisions for sentencing crimes of violence associated with hateful motivation against women and/or Muslim Canadians provide some guidance on an appropriate disposition in this case. In addition to the cases provided to me by counsel, I have reviewed the following decisions.
44At the lower end of the spectrum, Justice Faria imposed a suspended sentence for a first-time offender in R. v. Gillard, 2022 ONCJ 164. The offender lived in a high-rise apartment building in Toronto with the victim. On July 20, 2019, they were both waiting for an elevator. The offender was angry and bumped into the victim, a Muslim woman, with his chest. He told her, “You fucking guys wear these ugly things”, while pointing at her hijab. He grabbed the hijab from her head and threw it on the floor. He then punched the victim on the left side of her face.
45The offender was 24 years old. He suffered from significant mental health issues. Due to his unmedicated mental health condition, which at least partially explained why he acted as he did, Justice Faria decided against a custodial sentence: see paras. 26-27.
46In R. v. Goudreau, 2024 ONCJ 239, the 48-year-old offender was convicted of two counts of criminal harassment for repeatedly communicating with the victims and a single count of breaching his probation order by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The offender engaged in a “very loud, racist, homophobic rant in the backyard outside his basement apartment at nighttime.” A gay couple who resided above him heard the threats and were terrified.
47He had a prior criminal record, but had taken steps to address his alcoholism, which he blamed for his offending behaviour. Justice Green sentenced him to 60 days intermittent on the criminal harassment counts and 30 days intermittent on the fail to comply count: see para. 110.
48In R. v. Lockhart, 2025 BCPC 21, the offender was involved in a minor car accident on a highway. He approached the victim after they stopped their vehicles with a hammer in his hand. He engaged in what the trial judge described as “highly offensive and misogynistic behaviour” towards the female driver of the other car. He screamed at her that he was going to kill her while holding the hammer in a threatening manner. The victim was terrified. He referred to her as a “fucking bitch” and yelled at her to “fuck off and die.” A detailed summary of the judge’s findings at trial is available in the court’s trial judgment: R. v. Lockhart, 2025 BCPC 3.
49The offender was 69 years old. He did not have a prior criminal record. He struggled throughout his life with alcoholism and drug use but had been sober for nearly thirty years at the time of the offence. He regularly attended AA meetings. He had mental health issues, including a major depressive disorder.
50Nevertheless, the court imposed a 90-day jail sentence to adequately reflect the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation: see paras. 57-62. There was no evidence of how his mental health condition caused or contributed to the commission of the offences: see para. 53. The offender’s “vile” conduct had to be condemned by the court.
51In R. v. Medeiros, 2014 ONSC 6550, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld a sentence of 90 days in jail for a charge of criminal harassment involving threatening conduct. The offender targeted a Muslim woman who wore a hijab. One day, when she was in a park with friends, the offender yelled at her, “You Muslims are terrorists” and “You pigs.”
52Justice Campbell wrote the following at paras. 44-45 of his decision:
Canada is a diverse and multicultural society that welcomes individuals of varied origins and beliefs, and which provides a constitutional guarantee of legal equality without discrimination based on such individual factors as race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion. In such a society, Muslim Canadians, like all other Canadians, must be able to freely live their daily lives, enjoying activities such as a daily walk through a public park, without being randomly accosted and threatened by bigots spewing hatred against them because of their race and/or their religious beliefs. As s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code provides, the courts must stand on guard against crimes motivated by such bias, prejudice and hatred. Accordingly, the sentences imposed for such crimes must provide the necessary general deterrence and denunciation to effectively prevent their commission.
The sentence imposed by the trial judge, in my view, properly reflects the objective gravity of the offence committed by the appellant, and properly reflects the aggravating circumstance that the offence was motivated by the appellant’s bias, prejudice and hatred of Muslims. This sentence also provides an effective measure of denunciation and general deterrence. While the 90-day intermittent custodial sentence imposed upon the appellant is not a lenient one, nor is it beyond the range of sentence that is appropriate having regard to all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender.
Conclusion
53While courts cannot impose a punishment that exceeds the offender’s degree of moral culpability, they can and must impose a penalty that reflects our shared values and promotes respect for the rule of law. In this sense, sentencing decisions serve a communicative function: see R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at para. 49. In M.(C.A.), supra, Chief Justice Lamer described the role of sentencing courts in the following language at para. 81:
Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code.
54The sentence I impose today must meaningfully reflect those values. It must also, to an extent, adequately respond to the rise in hate crimes that have occurred in the last few years in this city.
55Mr. Grant is a first-time offender. The principle of restraint “requires a sentencing judge to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration, especially for first offenders”: R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, at para. 40. If a custodial sentence is imposed, it should be the minimum required to adequately reflect the appropriate sentencing principles.
56Nevertheless, Mr. Grant was not an immature young man when he committed these offences. He was 44 years old. His threats were cruel and had a significant impact on his victims. He accosted two vulnerable women in a public place, threatening them with violence of a gruesome nature. As noted by Justice Watt (as he then was) in R. v. Cheong, 1998 ONCJ 31290, [1998] O.J. No. 5857 (Gen. Div.), one’s sense of personal security that accompanies what is otherwise a regular, normal occurrence – that is, riding public transit - may never recover from being the victim of a violent crime in this setting: see para. 22.
57Balanced against the aggravating factors in this case, I accept that he has rehabilitative prospects. He is likely to find employment in the future. While he does not have a robust social circle, his former partner described him as a “responsible father” who cares for his children. He attends church regularly. These are supports that may help him avoid re-offending in the future.
58Yet, I am also concerned that Mr. Grant does not fully take responsibility for his actions. He informed the author of the PSR that actions were “heavily influenced by spiritual forces, including a perception that he was misled by the devil.” He reported an ongoing internal struggle to resist what he describes as “traps.” Mr. Grant's deplorable conduct on the TTC bus was not the result of a “spiritual force.” Nor was it a “trap” he had to avoid. He made a choice to threaten two women simply because he could not control his hatred or his prejudice. Any attempt to characterize his conduct otherwise is an attempt at minimization, which I reject.
59Of greater concern, he has sent mixed signals to the Court regarding any sincere empathy for his victims. He did express some regret during the sentencing hearing about how he made Ms. Afkul and Ms. Mohamed-Farah feel. However, he also informed the author of the PSR that he questioned their presence in a "Christian country" as if this would somehow justify his conduct. As I have previously explained, Canada is strengthened by its diversity, and every member of this country must know that they are welcome here and will be treated with dignity and respect. Mr. Grant’s attitude towards his offences is alarming. He seems to believe he is superior to other members of society and can therefore mistreat those he deems unworthy. That is a significant risk factor.
60A discharge represents an opportunity for an offender to avoid a formal criminal conviction. The test for a discharge is contained in Criminal Code section 730(1):
(i) The court must be satisfied that it is in the best interests of the accused; and
(ii) the court must be satisfied that it is not contrary to the public interest that the accused receive a discharge.
61Where the circumstances surrounding an offence are sufficiently mitigating such that a conviction would be an unduly harsh penalty, a discharge may be appropriate. I must also consider if a conviction would carry with it significant adverse repercussions for the offender, such as an impact on potential future employment prospects: see R. v. Campbell, 2013 BCCA 43, at para. 27.
62While it may be in Mr. Grant’s best interests to receive a discharge, I find it would be manifestly contrary to the public interest to grant a discharge in this case. To impose such a sentence would be to trivialize Mr. Grant’s hateful conduct, the impact it had on his victims, and the values underpinning our society. Mr. Grant’s insight into his behaviour is limited, at best. Mr. Virk argued that his client’s employment prospects in the security industry may be affected by a conviction. As I received no evidence to support this claim, it is difficult to fully assess the impact of this potential collateral consequence: see R. v. Christie, 2025 ONSC 2152, at para. 21. Regardless, this factor cannot be given undue weight. Even if this claim is valid, I question whether someone with such serious anger management issues should be employed in the security industry until he undergoes prolonged and intensive rehabilitative programming. What has been done thus far is insufficient.
63Usually, a jail sentence is required to address hate-based offences. However, a conditional sentence order must be considered as a potentially reasonable alternative to jail for a first-time offender. Furthermore, a conditional sentence can have a strong deterrent effect, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx.
64This is a difficult decision. The objective gravity of the offences weighs heavily toward a jail sentence, and I am deeply concerned that the need for the court to denounce hate-based conduct cannot be adequately captured through any other disposition: see Proulx at para. 106; R. v. Macintyre-Syrette, 2018 ONCA 706, at para. 19. Yet Mr. Mann did not strenuously advocate for a jail sentence, focusing instead on the appropriateness of a suspended sentence. Courts should generally show respect for a Crown position that aims to emphasize the sentencing principles of rehabilitation and restraint, particularly in light of the offender’s circumstances: see R. v. Al-Akhali, 2025 ONCA 229, at para. 83. As Mr. Grant provides child support for his eldest child and has a good relationship with his youngest children, any jail term would indirectly harm them as well, which I must seriously consider: see R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, at para. 43.
65While I cannot accede to the proposal for a suspended sentence, I will instead impose a conditional sentence for 120 days on each of the threatening counts, concurrent with each other. The terms of that order will include a period of house arrest, a requirement that he have no contact with his victims, always remain 100m away from them, and that he is prohibited from possessing any weapons. He is also ordered to take counselling or programming as directed by his conditional sentence supervisor. I further order him to provide support and care for his dependent children if he is financially able to do so: see Criminal Code section 742.3(c).
66On the count of causing a disturbance, I agree with the Crown that a suspended sentence is appropriate.
67After he has completed the conditional sentence, Mr. Grant will be placed on probation for 18 months. The probation order will contain similar terms, without any house arrest, which is not a lawful component of such an order. While on probation, he is ordered to complete 50 hours of community service to the satisfaction of his probation officer. Mr. Grant requires a more extended period of supervision in the community to ensure that he does not re-offend and engages with appropriate programming to address his anger issues. By completing the community service hours, he can make amends to the community for the harm he has caused and, hopefully, improve himself.
68I impose a Criminal Code section 110 order for five years, prohibiting Mr. Grant from possessing weapons such as firearms.
69It is in the best interests of the administration of justice to do so, and I order that a sample of his DNA be taken as these are secondary designated offences.
70I grant him one year to pay the victim fine surcharges.
Released: April 25, 2025
Signed: Justice Brock Jones
1R. v. Blake, 2020 BCPC 177; R. v. Huezo-Contreras, 2018 ONCJ 63; R. v. Manuel, 2021 BCPC 310; R. v. McGee, 2011 ONSC 1995; R. v. M.M., 2020 ONCJ 635; R. v. Rai, 2018 ONCJ 949; R. v. Singh, 2014 ONSC 2289.
2Dubai is a city in the United Arab Emirates, a country at the eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula, which is predominantly Muslim.
3https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/240313/dq240313b-eng.htm