C.M. v. R.S.E.M., 2026 ONCJ 296
COURT FILE NO. DR30892/19
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
C.M.
JENNIFER HOWARD for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and –
R.S.E.M.
ACTING IN PERSON
RESPONDENT
HEARD: MAY 25, 2026
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
1The parties both brought amended motions to change the parenting terms contained in the final order of Justice Danielle Szandtner dated July 14, 2023 (the existing order) regarding their two daughters, ages 9 and 7 (the children). The respondent (the father) also seeks to terminate a restraining order made the same day against him by Justice Szandtner.
2The existing order grants primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for the children to the applicant (the mother). It permits her to obtain or renew government documentation for the children and travel with them, in or outside of Canada, without the father’s consent. It provides supervised parenting time to the father, with the right of either party to review this issue after one year. Lastly, a restraining order was made against the father.
3On October 18, 2023, Justice Szandtner ordered the father to pay the mother $8,500 for her costs.
4The father exercised supervised parenting time with the children at Access for Parents and Children in Ontario (APCO) after the existing order. On July 19, 2025, APCO terminated its services because of the father’s conduct. He has not seen the children since then.
5The father initiated this current proceeding by bringing a motion to change the existing order. He seeks:1
a) To set aside Justice Szandtner’s orders made on July 14, 2023 and October 18, 2023.
b) Joint decision-making responsibility for the children.
c) An order that the mother must obtain his consent to obtain or renew government documentation for the children.
d) An order that the mother must obtain his consent to travel with the children outside of Canada.
e) Equal parenting time during the summer and on holidays.
f) Alternate weekend parenting time at other times. Parenting exchanges to take place from Friday with pick-up after school to drop-off on Sundays in Kanata, Ontario.
6The mother seeks to dismiss the father’s motion to change. She submits that the father has not proved there has been a material change in circumstances that warrants changing the existing order.
7The mother also seeks a change to the existing parenting time order. She asks that:
a) The father shall have parenting time with the children in her sole discretion.
b) Any parenting time between the father and the children takes place at a supervised access centre chosen by her, with all supervision costs paid by the father.
c) The father, at his expense, shall provide her with the parenting time observation notes.
d) The father must obtain leave of the court prior to starting any future proceedings in this court. She asks that granting leave be contingent on the father paying the outstanding costs order of Justice Szandtner and posting security for costs of $20,000.
8Justice Szandtner directed that the motions to change be heard based on the affidavits filed and submissions. She gave the parties the opportunity to file supplementary affidavits. The mother filed a supplementary affidavit. The father did not. The court relied on his amended motion to change and affidavit sworn on December 1, 2025. He attached a letter from his psychiatrist (the psychiatrist) to his December 1, 2025 affidavit.
9The court told the parties a few times during their submissions that submissions are not evidence. The court only relied on the evidence filed. See: P.D. v. The Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel and K.D., 2022 ONSC 1817.
10The issues for the court to determine are:
a) Should the court set aside Justice Szandtner’s orders dated July 14, 2023 and October 18, 2023?
b) Has there been a material change in circumstances affecting or likely to affect the children’s best interests regarding decision-making responsibility or the incidents of decision-making responsibility?
b) If so, what decision-making responsibility orders are in the children’s best interests?
c) What parenting time orders are in the children’s best interests? In particular:
i) Should the mother have total discretion over the father’s parenting time?
ii) Should the father’s parenting time be supervised by a professional parenting time supervisor (PPTS)?
iii) What should be the frequency and duration of the father’s parenting time?
iv) Where should the parenting time take place?
v) If supervised parenting time is ordered, what further terms should be ordered, including the costs of the PPTS?
d) Has there been a material change in circumstances that warrants terminating or changing the terms of the existing restraining order?
e) Should the father require leave of the court prior to bringing any further proceeding in this court? And if so, should the court order that the father pay the outstanding costs order of Justice Szandtner and post $20,000 as security for costs as pre-conditions for leave being granted?
Part Two – The parties
11The mother is 43 years old. She resides in Toronto with the children. She is employed full-time.
12The father is 41 years old. He resides in Quebec. He is a former soldier in the Canadian Armed Forces. He is not employed and relies on financial support from the Veteran Affairs Program.
13The parties began cohabiting in January 2016. They had the two children together. They separated in June 2019. The children have lived with the mother since the parties separated.
Part Three – History of court proceedings
14The mother issued an application for parenting and support orders in this court on September 13, 2019. The parties reached a final agreement and a court order was made by Justice Robert Spence on August 20, 2020 regarding parenting arrangements for the children. It provided for joint decision-making responsibility for the children and a shared parenting arrangement. No child support was payable by either party.
15The mother issued a motion to change Justice Spence’s order on August 26, 2022, seeking orders for sole decision-making responsibility for the children, supervised parenting time between the father and the children, and a restraining order against the father. The father issued his response to motion to change on March 22, 2023, opposing this motion.
16On March 31, 2023, Justice Szandtner made a temporary order that the father have supervised parenting time with the children. She also granted a temporary restraining order against him.
17The motions to change were heard by Justice Szandtner on July 7, 2023, and she released written reasons for decision on July 14, 2023.
18Justice Szandtner made the following findings in her reasons for decision:
a) The evidence was overwhelming that the mother should have sole decision-making responsibility for the children with no requirement that she consult with the father on any decisions regarding them.
b) The father is unable to focus on the children’s needs when decisions have to be made. He is focused on his own needs, specifically his need to be directly involved and do his own research. She gave examples in her decision, including the father refusing to provide his consent for an autism-spectrum disorder assessment that had been recommended for one of the children. He also obstructed the children obtaining individual therapy.
c) The father is unable to maintain a respectful and cooperative relationship with the mother. His materials continuously denigrated her, calling her a liar, a drug user, and mentally ill. His communications with the mother’s lawyer referred to the mother as a deranged narcissist, who is evil and vile.
d) It was in the children’s best interests for the father’s parenting time to be fully supervised by a PPTS.
e) The father was speaking to the children about inappropriate topics, upsetting and stressing them. He told one daughter that the COVID vaccine would kill her. He also told this child that the mother had kidnapped her.
f) The father engaged the children in the litigation. He read the existing court order to one child and told her that “mommy is trying to take you away from me”. The child was hysterical and crying when the mother came to pick her up.
g) On a virtual call, the father told one child that he would never see her again after the case concluded.
h) The father did not exercise the temporary supervised parenting time she had ordered on March 31, 2023.
i) A graduated supervised schedule was appropriate as it would allow the father to demonstrate his understanding of appropriate parenting behaviour, and his mental stability, and it would allow the children to safely renew their relationship with him.
j) She had no confidence that the father would reasonably provide consents for government documentation or travel for the children. His consent was dispensed with.
k) A restraining order was made against the father for the following reasons:
i) He was hostile and threatening in his communications with the mother. Justice Szandtner described several examples in her decision.
ii) He came to the mother’s home unannounced and told her, “He can do whatever he wants”. Another time he came to her home yelling loudly at her so the neighbours could hear.
iii) On June 15, 2023, he breached the temporary restraining order by sending her an abusive text message. He was charged with breach of a criminal release order.
iv) The father is profoundly angry at the mother and is willing to threaten and verbally abuse her to get his way. He also uses the children to force her to interact with him.
v) There were reasonable grounds for the mother to fear for her safety and the safety of the children.
19On October 18, 2023, Justice Szandtner ordered the father to pay the mother’s costs fixed at $8,500 within 180 days. He has not paid any of those costs.
20The father issued his motion to change the existing order on August 22, 2025, shortly after his visits with the children at APCO were terminated. The mother issued her response to motion to change on October 24, 2025.
21The father issued his amended motion to change on January 9, 2026. The mother issued her amended response to motion to change on February 10, 2026.
22On January 29, 2026, Justice Szandtner endorsed that the father was seeking to have his motion to change heard as soon as possible. The mother sought a stay of his motion to change because he had not paid any costs. Justice Szandtner exercised her discretion to have the father’s motion to change proceed. She organized this hearing and set filing timelines.
23Justice Szandtner also endorsed that the mother consented to the use of Brayden Supervision Services (Brayden) or Renew Supervision Services (Renew) for the father’s parenting time with the children during the adjournment period. She ordered that the father was responsible for all costs related to these services, including any cost for copies of the observation notes.
24The mother completed the intake process for Brayden. The father did not complete the intake process for Brayden and has not seen the children.
Part Four – The father’s narrative
25The father’s narrative is briefly summarized as follows:
a) Justice Szandtner’s decisions were based on her acceptance of the mother’s lies and false evidence.
b) Justice Szandtner refused to listen to anything he had to say. She was biased and did not give him a fair hearing.
c) He has never been a danger to the mother or the children. He has never and would never hurt the mother.
d) The mother is trying to exclude him from the children’s lives. She has restricted him from seeing the children and from obtaining information about the children from their school and service providers. The mother does not have the best interests of the children at heart – only her interests.
e) The mother does not want to work with him. She only wants control.
f) The mother and her lawyer continue to lie about him in affidavits and submissions.
g) He was critical of the mother’s parenting and often referred to her being a drug abuser.
h) The mother is being influenced by people with only their own financial interests at heart. He was very critical of her lawyer.
i) The mother leads a luxurious lifestyle. He seeks a financial audit of her.
j) He was mistreated by APCO staff. He was the victim of racism because he is a white man. APCO had different rules for white men.
k) He is a good father who only wants to have a meaningful relationship with the children. The children need him in their lives. He has built a small music studio and wants to nurture their musical abilities. He lives near the water. They can go paddle boating together. He has dirt bikes for them.
l) He wants to be fully involved in the children’s lives.
m) He cannot afford to pay for supervised parenting time.
n) He has a supportive community in Quebec.
o) He has followed all court orders. The mother has not followed court orders.
Part Five – The admissibility and weight to be given to the psychiatrist’s letter.
26The father attached as an exhibit to his affidavit of December 1, 2025, a letter dated October 9, 2025, from his treating psychiatrist.
27The mother did not ask to exclude the psychiatrist’s letter. However, she asked the court to give it no weight.
28Ordinarily, a letter from a treating physician is admissible as evidence from a participant expert.2 See: Westerhof v. Gee, 2015 ONCA 206. It is unnecessary for the participant expert to provide an affidavit – the report is sufficient. See: Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. A.H., 2021 ONSC 2789.
29The test for admissibility of opinion evidence from participant experts is the same that applies to litigation experts.3 The evidence must be relevant; it must be necessary in assisting the trier of fact; no other evidentiary rule should apply to exclude it; and the expert must be properly qualified. Then, the trial judge must execute the gatekeeper function. See: Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260.
30However, a doctor can turn from a participant expert into a litigation expert if they start expressing opinions that go beyond their role as a treating physician. See: Laroche v. Lynn, 2019 ONSC 6602.
31In G.S. v. S.B., 2023 ONSC 5646 (Div. Ct.), the appeal court upheld the trial decision that found that the father’s psychologist appeared to have been retained by the father to act in the role of a litigation expert in the guise of a participant expert. He was not permitted to testify at all, as the court found that he was biased and not independent and totally relied on the father’s self-reporting to opine on the mother’s functioning and to raise concern about a parenting assessment.
32Here, the psychiatrist assumed the role of the father’s advocate. He left little doubt about that in his letter. He wrote:
a) I am writing in support of the father’s application to have greater access to his daughters.
b) I have provided regular treatment for the father since 2019. During that time, he has endured considerable hardship. He faced criminal charges which were ultimately dropped as they were without foundation. This was a very long process which restricted his access to his children and the legal costs almost bankrupted him.
c) After some visits at APCO the father described facing situations which could be perceived as deliberately provocative.
d) Ultimately, the father was accused of violating the APCO Service Agreement and had his services terminated, with no opportunity to appeal. I would argue that as a parent and CAF veteran, the father should receive some consideration of the extraordinary stress posed by the restricted and constrained circumstances which have limited his access to his children for over four years. Anger and impatience would be expected at times.
e) The father’s mental health condition is stable, and he does not pose a risk of harm to himself, his daughters, to his children’s mother or to anyone else. I cannot stress enough that in my professional judgment, these behaviours do not indicate or raise any concerns about the father’s ability to be a parent. I fully support his application for full involvement in the life of his daughters.
33The psychiatrist, by assuming a role as the father’s advocate, and expressing opinions that went well beyond his role as a treating physician, went from being a participant expert to a litigation expert. The father did not comply with the requirements to admit a litigation expert’s report set out in subrule 20.2 (2) of the Family Law Rules.4
34The Supreme Court of Canada set out the steps for courts to take in admitting expert evidence in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23. The process has two main components. The first component requires the court to consider the four traditional threshold requirements for the admissibility of the evidence, being:
a) Relevance (which has been defined as logical relevance);
b) Necessity in assisting the trier of fact;
c) Absence of an exclusionary rule and;
d) The need for the expert to be properly qualified.
35The second component is a discretionary gatekeeping step where the judge decides whether the potential benefits of admitting the evidence justifies the risks of doing so. It is a cost-benefit analysis under which the court must determine whether the expert evidence should be admitted because its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
36The lack of independence or impartiality on the part of an expert witness goes to the admissibility of the witnesses’ testimony, not just to its weight. See: White Burgess, paragraph 40.
37Where an expert appears to have adopted the role of advocate for a party, that witness will not be impartial and the evidence should not be admitted. See: Bruff-Murphy (Litigation guardian of) v. Gunawardena, 2017 ONCA 502.
38In M.N. v. J.D.R., 2026 ONSC 200, the court found that sometimes, in some family law contexts, applying the fine line to limit what a long-standing treating family doctor can say about her patient risks excluding relevant and reliable aspects of the evidence. The court accepted the doctor’s views about the wife’s future employability, as they were intertwined with her medical training and her years of experience on the ground as a treating family doctor who deals with mental health. The court accepted that she relied on reports from the wife to formulate her opinions. She also relied on her own observations and interactions with the wife in appointments over the years. Any reliance on self-reporting went to weight.
39The psychiatrist’s letter was very flawed because:
a) He took on the role of advocate for the father. His letter was one-sided and unbalanced.
b) He went far beyond his area of expertise to opine on parenting issues, the merits of the criminal charges against the father and APCO’s treatment of the father.
c) He opined on parenting issues without ever having met the children or observing the father with the children.
d) He opined about parenting issues without adequate information to provide a reliable opinion. For example:
i) He did not obtain independent information about any risk concerns for the children arising from the father’s conduct.
ii) He obtained no independent information about the children’s interactions with the father.
iii) He did not appear to have reviewed Justice Szandtner’s reasons for decision. Those set out significant risk concerns that resulted in an order for fully supervised parenting time.
iv) He appeared to have little knowledge of the father’s concerning conduct (that will be reviewed below) since Justice Szandtner’s decision.
v) He did not speak to the mother.
vi) He criticized APCO staff without finding out why it terminated its services after warnings to the father.
vii) He totally relied on self-reporting by the father – self-reporting that was inaccurate.
e) He did not complete an Acknowledgement of Expert’s Duties as required by the Family Law Rules.
f) He provided little information that would assist the court. He did not set out why he has been seeing the father since 2019. He provided no diagnosis. He said the father was compliant with treatment and medication but did not set out the treatment or specific medication. He provided no prognosis for the father.
40These flaws were more than enough to justify the court striking the psychiatrist’s letter. However, the court recognizes that the father is self-represented. The court has no expectation that he is aware of the distinction between participant experts and litigation experts and the tests for the admission of expert reports. He did the best he could to provide the court with psychiatric evidence. The court exercised its discretion and admitted the psychiatrist’s letter but only gave weight to his statements about the length of time he has treated the father, the father’s consistency in attending for treatment, the father’s compliance with treatment recommendations and his assessment of the father’s mental stability as of the time of the letter. Otherwise, the letter was unreliable and had little value.
41The court hopes that any medical or legal professional reading this decision will appreciate it is not helpful for the court (or their patient/client) when the medical professional goes beyond their expertise to advocate for their patient. Medical professionals should confine their opinions to their areas of expertise and not give opinions on matters where they have inadequate information to provide reliable opinions. Most courts, and certainly this court, are likely to treat such reports with considerable caution.
Part Six – Should the court set aside Justice Szandtner’s orders?
42The short answer is no. There is no legal basis to do this.
43The father did not plead this relief. He first raised the issue during submissions.
44The father did not appeal Justice Szandtner’s decisions. He did not previously move to set them aside.
45Subrule 25 (19) of the Family Law Rules is the applicable rule when a court is asked to set aside an order. See: Gray v. Gray, 2017 ONCA 100. This subrule reads as follows:
Changing order — fraud, mistake, lack of notice
25 (19) The court may, on motion, change an order that,
(a) was obtained by fraud;
(b) contains a mistake;
(c) needs to be changed to deal with a matter that was before the court but that it did not decide;
(d) was made without notice; or
(e) was made with notice, if an affected party was not present when the order was made because the notice was inadequate or the party was unable, for a reason satisfactory to the court, to be present.
46None of the criteria in subrule 25 (19) apply here. The father’s request to set aside Justice Szandtner’s orders are dismissed.
Part Six – Decision-making responsibility and incidents of decision-making responsibility
6.1 Legal considerations
47Section 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act) provides the statutory authority for changing a parenting or contact order. Subsection 29 (1) of the Act reads as follows:
A court shall not make an order under this Part that varies a parenting order or contact order unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order.
48The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Gordon v. Goertz (1996) 1996 191 (SCC), 19 R.F.L. (4th) 177 S.C.C. sets out a two-stage process for the court to conduct in motions to change custody or access as follows:
a) First, the parent applying for a change in the custody or access order must meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting the child.
b) If the threshold is met, the court must embark on a fresh inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child, having regard to all the relevant circumstances relating to the child's needs and the ability of the respective parents to satisfy them.
49In L.M.L.P. v. L.S., [2011] SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the change must be substantial, continuing and that “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in a different order.” The Supreme Court stated that it must limit itself to whatever variation is justified by the material change of circumstances.
50The previous order is presumed to be correct based upon the circumstances which existed at the time. See: Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22.
51The change must have arisen since the making of the order or the last variation of the order. See: N.S. v. A.N.S., 2021 ONSC 5283; K.M. v. J.R., 2021 ONSC 111.
52A change alone is not enough to justify a variation. The change must materially affect the child, the parents, or both. See: K.M. v. J.R., 2021 ONSC 111. The threshold material change in circumstances test is aimed in part at ensuring that the parties do not resort to litigation whenever any change occurs, however minimal. See: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.
53On a motion to change, the court has the option of restricting changing the existing order to address a specific issue, while maintaining its integrity. See: Elaziz v. Wahba, [2017] ONCA 58.
54The case law has set out that mutual trust and respect are basic elements for a joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively. See: G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511; T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057; Jacobs and Coulombe v. Blair and Amyotte, 2022 ONSC 3159; El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667.
6.2 Analysis
55The evidence shows that the only material changes in circumstances since the existing order was made are that the father’s parenting time at APCO was terminated and he has not seen the children since July 19, 2025 because he did not complete the intake process at Brayden.
56However, a party cannot rely on their own misconduct to support a claim that there has been a material change in circumstances that warrants changing a parenting order in their favour. See: Kale v. Santiago, 2026 ONCJ 4.
57The events that have taken place since the existing order have reinforced Justice Szandtner’s findings in her reasons for decision. That evidence is as follows:
a) The father continues to be highly critical of the mother and her parenting. He posts negative comments about her on social media.5 His affidavit material refers to her as being delusional.
b) The father continued to say inappropriate things to the children during his parenting time. He continued to involve the children in the litigation.6 This included statements that the mother uses drugs and that she is exposing the children to “men who will touch them”.
c) APCO staff continually had to redirect the father from saying inappropriate things to the children.
d) The father engaged in conflict with APCO staff in front of the children.
e) Due to repeated violation of APCO’s policies, APCO required the father during his June 7, 2025 visit to review and re-sign the agreement confirming that he understood the behavioural expectations for his visits, including appropriate conversation, conduct and attitude.
f) APCO terminated its services for the family on July 19, 2025 because of the father’s misconduct. Both parties filed the APCO termination letter dated Tuesday July 22, 2025.7 It included the following:
i) The father was reminded on July 19, 2025 of APCO’s policy against taking photos. The father became agitated and raised his voice. He disregarded requests to calm down.
ii) The father yelled at APCO’s program manager, “you people are corrupt. I hope you know that. This place is corrupt”. He then swore as he walked to the visitation room. This violated APCO’s conduct policy for parents.
iii) During the visit he told the children that he had seen the judge last week and he is going to go again this week and hopefully there will be some changes.
iv) He reminded one child to practice writing his last name and said, “your mommy hates me. Mommy is trying to remove me from your life. That’s why she’s telling you your last name is her last name, but your last name is my last name”. When staff intervened, he told the children, “See, and if daddy says anything then these people say something and daddy gets in trouble”.
v) APCO staff have asked him to redirect his conversations during past visits, reminding him of APCO’s policies with the expectation he would follow them.
vi) His conduct has violated APCO’s policies. APCO does not feel comfortable providing services to him.
vii) Effective immediately, his services with APCO are terminated, with no chance of reinstatement. He is to have no further communication with APCO staff (in-person, phone or e-mail.) He is prohibited from attending APCO’s offices and parenting centres.
g) The father has not exercised parenting time with another PPTS since APCO was terminated, despite the temporary order of Justice Szandtner permitting this.8 The father’s claim of having no money to pay for this is the same reason he gave for not exercising supervised parenting time that Justice Szandtner previously rejected. He is earning about $86,198 annually9 and paying no child support. This reflects a continued pattern of prioritizing his need to be right over the children’s best interests.
h) The father has violated the restraining order. This will be discussed below. The mother remains afraid of him. There is no basis to believe the parties can make joint decisions together.
i) The father continues to disregard court orders. He has paid nothing towards the costs order, despite having the ability to do so. He continued to disregard the existing order not to talk to the children about the court case or to denigrate the mother to them.
58The father continues to show no insight into how his conduct has adversely affected his relationship with the children. He takes no responsibility for it. Instead, he externalizes blame on the mother, her counsel, Justice Szandtner and APCO. He claims that he was discriminated against at APCO because he is a white man. He said, “my entire time at APCO I was under threat as if I had a knife to my throat. Not to mention the multiple times the center could not even provide an individual that could read, write or speak English.”
59There is no basis to doubt the accuracy of the APCO notes. They are a neutral observer.
60The father’s lack of insight and accountability make him a poor candidate to make any meaningful change.
61The court rejects the father’s submission that the mother has not facilitated his parenting time. It was his conduct that resulted in APCO terminating its services. The mother agreed to use Brayden or Renew instead. She completed the intake process for Brayden. The father chose not to use those services and go without parenting time. He showed very poor judgment in doing so.
62The court rejects the father’s submission that the mother has prevented him from obtaining information about the children from their schools or service providers. In her March 13, 2026 affidavit, the mother described her efforts to facilitate the provision of this information to the father. He was provided with the children’s report cards and one child’s autism report. The court is satisfied she has made reasonable efforts to comply with Justice Szandtner’s orders.
63The court also rejects the father’s submission that the mother is seeking costs or security for costs to frustrate his relationship with the children. The mother’s interests in this case are not financial. The father has not paid her any child support and she has chosen not to seek it. The court does not blame her for not wanting to engage with the father on this issue. She seeks costs and security for costs to curtail the father’s propensity for litigation and to bring some peace for her and the children.
64Justice Szandtner, in her reasons for decision, found that the father unreasonably refused to provide his consent to obtain an autism report for one child and for the children to receive therapy. He has provided no basis to believe he would cooperate with the mother at this time to reasonably sign consents for her to obtain government documentation for the children or for her to travel with them outside of Canada.
65The court finds that the father did not meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting the children that warrants changing the existing decision-making responsibility orders. The court finds that even if he did reach this threshold, it is not in the children’s best interests to change these orders. His motion to change the decision-making responsibility terms in the existing order is dismissed.
Part Seven – What parenting time orders are in the children’s best interests?
7.1 The existing order
66The existing order sets out the following terms for parenting time between the father and the children:
a) The father is to have fully supervised visits with the children for up to three hours on Saturday or Sunday on alternate weekends with a professional supervisor. The father may use a private service such as Brayden or Renew and will pay the costs of same. He may also use APCO. He is to provide the supervision notes to the mother’s counsel.
b) If the father is consistently attending the supervised visits for three months and no concerns are noted by the supervisor he may progress to fully supervised visits for up to three hours on Saturday or Sunday every weekend with a professional supervisor. He is to pay the costs of same.
c) Following eight months of the father’s attendance at supervised parenting time, the level of supervision of his parenting time shall be in the mother’s discretion.
d) If the parties cannot agree on the parenting plan after twelve months either party has leave to seek a review of the parenting time order with the court.
7.2 Legal considerations
67Justice Szandtner ordered that either party could seek a review of the terms of parenting time in the existing order. Neither party is required to establish a material change in circumstances with respect to an issue on which the court has authorized a review. See: Cuthbert v. Nolis, 2024 ONCA 21; Fournier v. Fournier, 2020 ONSC 606. The court must conduct a best interests analysis.
68That said, a court will look at what has changed since the existing parenting order was made in determining the children’s best interests. The court will look at:
a) Has the relationship between a parent and a child changed?
b) Have the views and wishes of a child changed?
c) Is the primary parent facilitating the court-ordered parenting time?
d) Have the expectations of the parties set out in the existing order been met?
e) How have the parties conducted themselves since the existing order was made?
f) How has each parent protected the children from conflict?
g) What has a parent done to address any of the court’s risk concerns?
h) Has a parent developed more insight into the court’s concerns about them?
i) Have the parties complied with court orders?
69The court considered the relevant best interests factors set out in subsections 24 (2) to (6) of the Act in making this decision.
70Subsection 24 (2) of the Act sets out that the primary best interests consideration is the children’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
71Subsection 24 (6) of the Act states that in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
72Subsection 33.1 (2) of the Act states that any party to a proceeding shall, to the best of their ability, protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding.
73The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. See: White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736. It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.
74The court must ascertain a child’s best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. See: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC). Adult preferences or “rights” do not form part of the analysis except insofar as they are relevant to the determination of the best interests of the child. See: Young v. Young 1993 34 (SCC); E.M.B. v. M.F.B., 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.
75In considering a child’s best interests it will often be important to determine if a parent will follow the terms of a court order. See: Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201; Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501; Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148.
76A party's failure to protect a child from conflict may be an important consideration in granting primary residence or decision-making responsibility to the other parent. See: Dayboll v. Binag, supra; I.A. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 523.
77A starting point to assess a child’s best interests when making a parenting order is to ensure that the child will be physically and emotionally safe. It is also in a child's best interests when making a parenting time order that his or her caregiver be physically and emotionally safe. See: I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615. Also see: Armstrong v. Coupland, 2023 ONSC 5451; J.N. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 5292; N.D. v. R.K., 2020 ONCJ 266; K.M. v. J.R., 2022 ONSC 111.
78The party who seeks to reduce normal parenting time will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See: M.A. v. J.D. 2003 52807 (ON CJ), [2003] O.J. No. 2946 (OCJ); Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510. Furthermore, the greater the departure from the established parenting regime, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See: Evans v. MacPherson, 2026 ONSC 1760.
79The person seeking supervised parenting time bears the burden of establishing that supervision is necessary. See: Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451.
80Supervised parenting time is not intended to be a long-term arrangement for a child. It is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated, and a child is no longer in danger of physical or emotional harm. See: I.O. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 520.
81Supervised parenting time is usually a temporary arrangement. However, when the court does not expect the risks addressed by supervision to diminish, it is appropriate to order long-term supervision of access. See: Tuttle v. Tuttle, 2014 ONSC 5011; A.B. v. K.S., 2025 ONCJ 614.
82Impulse control and self-regulation are important parenting qualities. Children learn by observing their parents. If a parent is unregulated, there is a strong possibility that is what the child will learn. See: D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279; J.A. v. S.M., 2026 ONCJ 259.
7.3 Is it in the children’s best interests to give the mother total discretion over the father’s parenting time with the children?
83The mother seeks an order giving her total discretion over the father’s parenting time. The father opposes this request.
84The court finds that the mother’s request is not in the children’s best interests for the following reasons:
a) The mother submitted it was important for the children to have a relationship with the father. She said she supports supervised parenting time taking place at Renew. The court finds that a structured and predictable schedule is required to ensure the children’s relationship with the father is preserved. An order giving the mother total discretion over parenting time compromises that objective. There have already been long gaps of time where the father has not seen the children because of a lack of communication between the parties.
b) The parties are unable to directly communicate due to the restraining order. A structured and predictable schedule is required to ensure there are no misunderstandings about where and when parenting time takes place – and on what terms. This will reduce the potential for conflict and is in the children’s best interests.
c) The mother’s concerns about the father’s consistency in exercising parenting time and his conduct during parenting time can be addressed by establishing clear boundaries, expectations and consequences for non-compliance in the order. This is preferable to delegating this responsibility to the mother.
7.4 It is in the children’s best interests that their visits with the father be fully supervised by a professional parenting time supervisor.
85The psychiatrist wrote that the father’s mental health is stable and that he is fully compliant with attending scheduled appointments and following through with treatment recommendations. This is a positive. However, the court’s concern is with the father’s unregulated conduct and poor judgment and the impact this has had and may have in the future on the mother and the children. This concerning conduct has taken place during the time the psychiatrist has described the father’s mental health as being stable.
86Justice Szandtner provided the father with an opportunity to increase his parenting time in the existing order. If he consistently exercised his parenting time on alternate weekends for three months, and no problems were noted by the supervisor, the visits would increase to each weekend. And, if he was consistent, and there were no further concerns after eight months, supervision of his parenting time would be in the mother’s discretion.
87The father did not come close to meeting these expectations. He never moved beyond the first stage of Justice Szandtner’s order.
88The father only exercised his parenting time about once each month. Those visits were for one hour – not for three hours.10
89The father continued to use the visits as an opportunity to discuss the court case with the children, to denigrate the mother to the children and say inappropriate things to the children in breach of the existing order.11 APCO staff frequently had to redirect him.
90The father exposed the children to his conflict with APCO staff. His behaviour was often unregulated.
91The children often came home from visits distressed and confused about the father’s comments and behaviour. One child expressed concern because the father had told the children they would be with him once they spoke to the judge.
92The father has not seen the children for over ten months. He did not complete the intake process at Brayden once Justice Szandtner made a temporary order permitting this. His relationship with the children is more problematic now than it was when the existing order was made.
93The father has shown no improvement in:
a) His ability to prioritize the children’s needs ahead of his need to be right.
b) His ability to protect the children from conflict.
c) His insight into his conduct and how it has impaired his relationship with the children. He continues to view himself as the victim.
d) His ability to comply with court orders. He has been dismissive of the costs order made by Justice Szandtner and views it as a tactic by the mother to keep him away from the children. He breached Justice Szandtner’s orders not to discuss the court case with the children and not to denigrate or demean the mother. He has breached the restraining order. He disregarded filing timelines ordered by Justice Szandtner.
94The court’s concerns for the children’s emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being by having unsupervised parenting time with the father remain just as high today, if not higher, than they were at the time of the existing order.
95This is a case where the safety of the mother and the children dictate that it is in the children’s best interests to make a long-term order for supervised parenting time.
7.5 What terms of supervised parenting time should be ordered?
7.5.1 Frequency of parenting time
96The father’s request for extensive parenting time was premised on him not having to pay for a PPTS. He claims he cannot afford to pay for this.
97The father has spent very little time with the children for the past three years – none for over ten months. He needs to re-establish his relationship with them in a safe and calm manner. He needs to start slowly to do this. His claim for extensive parenting time has no merit and is not in the children’s best interests.
98The father only exercised parenting time once each month despite the existing order granting him more frequent parenting time. This indicates that this is the extent of parenting time he is willing to fund and exercise. It is not in the children’s best interests to arrange more parenting time, only to be disappointed when the father does not follow through. It is also in the children’s best interests that the mother be able to organize their schedules in a predictable manner.
99The court will maintain the three-hour length of the visits ordered by Justice Szandtner. This gives the father the opportunity to participate in activities with the children. He will need to show he can exercise his parenting time responsibly over a sustained period of time before the court will consider longer visits.
100The court will specifically set out when the father’s parenting time takes place to avoid any confusion. It will take place on the second Saturday of each month from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m., or such other times agreed to by the parties and the PPTS.
7.5.2 Where will the parenting time take place?
101The father submitted that if supervised parenting time is ordered that it should take place in Kanata Ontario and be supervised by Renew. He submitted that he mistrusts Brayden because he suspects someone the mother knows works there. The mother asks that the supervised parenting time take place in Toronto. She is agreeable to using Renew. She proposes it take place at the Riverdale library.
102It isn’t in the children’s best interests to drive from Toronto to Kanata and back to Toronto for parenting time with the father. The father is not working. He is able to drive to Toronto once a month. The parenting time will be supervised by Renew, or such other PPTS approved by the mother. The father will exercise his parenting time in Toronto. The first three visits shall take place at the Riverside Library, as proposed by the mother. After those visits, the father may take the children elsewhere in Toronto during his visits.
7.5.3 What will happen if the father does not consistently attend his parenting time?
103The father has not consistently exercised his parenting time. There is a real risk that he will continue to be inconsistent. The court will make the following orders with the objectives of ensuring the visits take place and providing predictability and stability for the mother and the children:
a) The father must confirm with the PPTS at least 48 hours before the scheduled visit that he will be attending. If he fails to do so, the visit will be cancelled.
b) If the father confirms the visit and he does not attend, the visit scheduled for the next month will be cancelled.
c) All communication about the visits shall take place through the PPTS.
7.5.4 What terms will be ordered to ensure the father acts appropriately during his parenting time?
104The father needs to show he can focus on just having a good time with the children during his parenting time. He should not be asking them anything about the mother or anyone else in her home. He should not be discussing court proceedings. He should not be saying anything negative to them about the mother. This conduct is confusing and upsetting for them.
105The court will order that the PPTS shall have the discretion to end any visit if the father:
a) Questions the children about the mother or anyone else in her household.
b) Starts speaking negatively about the mother or anyone else in her household in front of the children.
c) Discusses court proceedings with or in front of the children.
d) Behaves himself in any other manner that the PPTS deems inappropriate for the children.
106If the PPTS ends a visit for any of these reasons it is requested to notify the mother about this and the reasons the visit was ended.
7.5.5 Who shall pay the costs of the PPTS?
107The court will order the father to pay the costs of any supervised parenting time, including the PPTS’s observation notes. This is the same order made in the existing order. The supervision of parenting time is required due to the father’s conduct. He receives a significant annual income each year and pays no child support. He can afford to pay for this.
Part Eight – Should the court terminate or change the existing restraining order?
8.1 Positions
108The father seeks to terminate the existing restraining order. He claims it was never necessary. He said he has complied with it.
109The mother seeks to dismiss the father’s claim.
8.2 Legal considerations
110In M.A.L. v. R.H.M., 2018 ONSC 1597, Justice Alex Pazaratz discussed the legal test to change an existing restraining order. He set out the following:
a) The onus is on the party seeking to terminate a restraining order to establish a material change in circumstances.
b) Where a court has already made a determination that someone is fearful and requires protection, that person shouldn’t be re-victimized by being arbitrarily dragged back to court – at the instance of the abuser – to “prove that they’re still afraid.”
c) Where a court has already made a determination that someone is aggressive and dangerous, we mustn’t allow the bully to use the family court process to re-inflict psychological pain by re-litigating the same emotionally draining issues. What’s the point of judges telling victims we believe them, if we then require victims to come back and convince us again?
d) And while on motions to change, courts ordinarily only consider events arising since the date of the last order, emotional harm and distress can’t be so neatly compartmentalized. Fear is a consequence of accumulated human experiences. It would be doubly offensive for a perpetrator to be able to able to say: “Prove that you’re still afraid…but you can’t talk about the old stuff.”
8.3 Discussion
111The father did not meet his onus of showing a material change in circumstances that would warrant terminating or changing the existing restraining order for the following reasons:
a) The evidentiary basis for the existing restraining order remains unchanged. The father remains profoundly angry at the mother. He threatens and abuses her. He demeaned her to the children in breach of the existing order. He demeaned her to the court.
b) The father continues to take no accountability for his actions. He shows no insight into them.
c) The father has posted negative comments about the mother on social media. He has referred to her as a child abuser.12 He also wrote:
She is a deranged individual with no sense of what is right for the children. Hopefully next time she overdoses from cocaine she will actually pass away from it. God forbid my children have to live an entire life with a vindictive self centered narcissistic toxic female of a mother.
d) The father has breached the restraining order by sending items to the mother’s home and by corresponding directly with her.
e) The mother is taking safety precautions due to her fear of the father.
f) Reasonable grounds still exist for the mother to fear for her safety and the safety of the children.
112The father’s motion to terminate or change the existing restraining order is dismissed.
Part Nine – Why the father will require leave before starting any future proceeding in this court
113The Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to impose a term requiring leave to bring a motion to change. The jurisdiction is under subrules 14 (21), 15 (27) and 1 (6) and rule 2 of the Family Law Rules. See: Tiveron v Collins, 2017 O.J. No. 2989 (OCA); Guma v. Nedelcu, 2019 ONSC 3429; Watson v. Watson, 2023 ONCJ 435, per: Justice Carole Curtis; Obitulata-Ugwu v. Ugwu, 2024 ONCJ 586. Courts may order this relief when, as there is here, an unpaid costs order. See: W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2024 ONCJ 327; J.A. v. S.M., 2026 ONCJ 259.
114Courts should be cautious before making leave orders, particularly regarding parenting issues. See: Rodriguez v. Vella, 2022 ONCA 870.
115This court has written that leave orders should not be made just because a party was unsuccessful on one motion to change. Something more is required. See: Sajid v. Mahmood, 2023 ONCJ 120; Ambia v. Degenstein, 2023 ONCJ 445.
116This is an appropriate case to require leave of the court before the father can bring another proceeding in this court for the following reasons:
a) His motion to change lacked merit.
b) He has paid nothing towards the previous $8,500 costs order.
c) The mother is incurring significant legal expenses because of his propensity for litigation.
d) The children have been the subject of significant litigation since 2019. This needs to stop.
e) He has breached court orders.
f) He does not live in Ontario.
117The court will require the father to obtain leave of the court before he can bring any future proceeding in this court. This does not stop him from returning to court if he can provide a good reason for doing so.
118The mother asked that the father be required to pay the $8,500 outstanding costs order and post security for costs of $20,000 as a precondition to obtaining leave. The court has the authority to make such orders. See: Watson v. Watson, supra.
119The court is not prepared to order pre-conditions for the father obtaining leave at this time. What will be required for the father to obtain leave may be very different five years from now than it would be today. The court will want to see what his financial circumstances are at the time of his leave motion. This is particularly important when barriers are sought to him coming to court to address parenting issues.
120The father should bring any leave motion by Form 14B on notice to the mother. It is highly unlikely that leave will be granted in the next 18 months. The children need some peace and stability. The father will need to show the court a sustained period where he can exercise his parenting time in a consistent and responsible manner. He will also need to show he can treat the mother in a respectful manner. He is strongly discouraged from posting about her on social media.
121The father should also expect that it is highly unlikely that he will be granted leave unless he has made a meaningful effort to comply with all costs orders.
Part Ten – Costs
122The mother seeks costs of $23,598 for these motions. She is the successful party and is entitled to costs. However, the court would like to receive more information from her before deciding this issue, including any offers to settle made, a much clearer bill of costs (the itemized time is in tiny font) and any written submissions in support of the costs claim. The court also wants to give the father the opportunity to make a written response and submit any offer to settle he made. A process for determining costs will be set out in the order below.
Part Eleven – Conclusion
123A final order shall go as follows:
a) Paragraph 4 of the existing order is changed to read as follows:
i) The father’s parenting time shall be fully supervised by Renew, or any other PPTS agreed to by the mother.
ii) The father’s parenting time shall take place on the second Saturday of each month, from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m., or at such other times agreed to by the parties and the PPTS, starting on June 13, 2026.
iii) The father must confirm with the PPTS at least 48 hours before the scheduled visit that he will be attending. If he fails to do so, the visit will be cancelled.
iv) If the father confirms the visit and he does not attend, the visit scheduled for the next month will be cancelled.
v) If the mother wishes to cancel a visit, she is to give the father as much notice as is reasonably possible, through the PPTS. If she cancels a visit, reasonable attempts should be made to make up the visit the following weekend, or the earliest weekend that the PPTS is available.
vi) All communication about the father’s parenting time with the children, such as confirmations and cancellations, shall take place through the PPTS.
vii) The parenting time shall take place in Toronto and shall be coordinated through the PPTS. The first three visits shall take place at the Riverside Library in Toronto.
viii) The parties shall immediately complete the intake process with Renew.
ix) The father shall pay the costs of the PPTS. He shall also pay for any of its observation reports.
x) The PPTS shall have the discretion to end any visit if the father:
Questions the children about the mother or anyone else in her household.
Starts speaking negatively about the mother or anyone else in her household in front of the children.
Discusses court proceedings with or in front of the children.
Behaves himself in any other manner that the PPTS deems inappropriate for the children.
b) The father requires leave of the court before he can start any future proceeding in this court. He should bring any leave motion by Form 14B on notice to the mother, together with a supporting affidavit not exceeding six pages.
c) The mother’s claims for pre-conditions for granting leave are dismissed.
d) Otherwise, the father’s motion to change the existing order, and any additional claims he made in submissions, are dismissed.
e) The mother shall serve and file any additional costs submissions by June 8, 2026. The father will have until June 22, 2026 to make any written response. The submissions shall not be more than 3 pages, not including any offer to settle or bill of costs. The submissions should be double-spaced, with a minimum 12-point font.
Released: May 28, 2026
Justice Stanley B. Sherr
Expert witness reports
20.2 (2) A party who wishes to call a litigation expert as a witness at trial shall, at least six days before the settlement conference, serve on all other parties and file a report signed by the expert and containing, at a minimum, the following:
1. The expert’s name, address and area of expertise.
2. The expert’s qualifications, including his or her employment and educational experiences in his or her area of expertise.
3. The nature of the opinion being sought and each issue in the case to which the opinion relates.
4. The instructions provided to the expert in relation to the case.
5. The expert’s opinion on each issue and, where there is a range of opinions given, a summary of the range and the reasons for the expert’s own opinion within that range.
6. The expert’s reasons for his or her opinion, including,
i. a description of the factual assumptions on which the opinion is based,
ii. a description of any research or test conducted by or for the expert, or of any independent observations made by the expert, that led him or her to form the opinion, and, for each test,
A. an explanation of the scientific principles underlying the test and of the meaning of the test results, and
B. a description of any substantial influence a person’s gender, socio-economic status, culture or race had or may have had on the test results or on the expert’s assessment of the test results, and
iii. a description and explanation of every document or other source of information directly relied on by the expert in forming the opinion.
7. An acknowledgement of expert’s duty (Form 20.2) signed by the expert. O. Reg. 250/19, s. 8.
Footnotes
- The father’s amended motion to change did not ask to set aside Justice Szandtner’s orders or seek specific parenting time terms. He made those requests during this hearing. The court considered them.
- “participant expert” means a person who is not engaged to provide expert opinion evidence for the purposes of litigation, but who provides expert opinion evidence based on the exercise of his or her skills, knowledge, training or experience while observing or participating in the events at issue. See: Subrule 20.2 (1) of the Family Law Rules.
- “litigation expert” means a person engaged for the purposes of litigation to provide expert opinion evidence. See: Subrule 20.2 (1) of the Family Law Rules.
- Subrule 20.2 (2) of the Family Law Rules [that] reads as follows:
- See: Exhibit E to the mother’s affidavit sworn on March 13, 2026.
- The mother provided numerous examples of this in paragraphs 13-31 of her affidavit sworn on March 13, 2026. Aside from bald comments that the mother’s affidavit was full of lies and APCO staff were biased against him, the father did not specifically refute the observations of APCO staff, as set out by the mother.
- The mother also attached APCO observation notes for July 19, 2025 as business records.
- In submissions, the father said he signed up for the Renew program in April 2026. However, he signed up to use the site in Kanata Ontario. The mother reasonably did not agree to this and proposed to use Renew in Toronto. The father did not agree with that. No visits have taken place.
- The father deposed this was his annual income in his January 9, 2026 financial statement. In submissions, he said he earned closer to $82,000 annually. The difference is immaterial.
- The mother set out the dates the father exercised his parenting time in her March 13, 2026 affidavit. The father did not dispute the accuracy of those dates.
- Again, see paragraphs 13 to 31 of the mother’s March 13, 2026 affidavit. The inappropriate comments included the father making repeated disparaging comments to the children about Pride celebrations. He told the children these were bad events they should not support. This upset the children as may of their family and friends identify as LGBTQ+.
- The father admitted posting this on social media and blamed the mother for frustrating him.