R. v. Lehouillier, 2026 ONCJ 280

minicounsel

CITATION: R. v. Lehouillier, 2026 ONCJ 280

DATE: May 4, 2026

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

ETHAN LEHOUILLIER

Reasons for Sentence

Justice K. Crosbie

Oral reasons given and written reasons released on May 4, 2026

Mr. J. Spare and Ms A. Spieser ..………………… counsel for the Crown

Mr. C. Avery ………………. ….…… ………..………… counsel for the defendant

Introduction

On Sunday May 18, 2025, Akash Paladugu was driving with his partner Jade Galve and her four children – Ramone Lavina, Jace Lavina, Avery Lavina and Mya Lavina. They had been at Woodbine Mohawk Park to see the Victoria Day fireworks. They had a wonderful day together and they were on their way home.
On the same night, 50 kilometers away, Mr. Lehouillier was at his family’s trailer park. He had been drinking alcohol most of the day. As I will discuss later in these reasons, he was feeling worthless and hopeless and had used alcohol to cope. He went to bed around 11:00 p.m. but could not stop ruminating. He snuck out of is family’s trailer, got into his van and drove towards his home.
At 12:33 a.m., Mr. Lehouillier took an off ramp from the 401 at a speed of 168 kilometers per hour. He drove through a red light, across three lanes of traffic, hit a median and his vehicle launched through the air into the intersection.
The Galve-Lavina-Paladugu family were stopped at the red light at that intersection. Mr. Lehouillier’s vehicle struck Mr. Paladugu’s van with extreme force. The impact caused the family’s van to lift into the air and turn over. It came to rest upside down. The result was catastrophic. Two children, Jace and Mya, were killed immediately, while Ramone survived briefly. Ramone was 15, Jace was 13 and Mya was six.
Ms Galve, Mr. Paladugu and Avery, aged 11, all suffered significant physical injuries requiring each of them to stay in hospital for five days. They are still suffering from the impact of these injuries to this day.
Mr. Lehouillier was arrested on scene. Three hours later, samples of his breath were taken. It was determined that at the time he collided with the Galve-Lavina-Paladugu family’s van, his readings would have been 185 mgs of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. This was more than twice the legal limit.
Mr. Lehouillier never applied for bail. Since his arrest, he has been remanded in custody at the Toronto South Detention Center (TSDC). His intention, from the outset, has been to accept full responsibility for his actions.
On December 15, 2025, Mr. Lehouillier pleaded guilty to three counts of impaired driving causing death and three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm. I heard sentencing submissions on February 26, 2026, and today I am passing sentence.
This case is tragic in the extreme. But to call it a tragedy does not do it justice. To simply call the outcome of this case tragic creates an erroneous impression that, to some extent, it was a random fate that befell these children and this family. We need to call it what is. Their deaths were not the unfortunate result of a tornado or a flood. Their lives were extinguished because of a purposeful act. Mr. Lehoullier made a choice to get into his car while significantly impaired by alcohol and he made a choice to drive at a dangerously high rate of speed.
As a result, we are again confronted with a courtroom¹ filled with grieving family members and friends. This is a deplorably common sight within the walls of this courthouse and all over this country. The circumstances are equally predictable. Mr. Lehouillier, even though he had been educated about the risks of drunk driving, made a choice to drive anyway, failing to translate his knowledge into action. Mr. Lehouillier never set out that night with the intention of hurting or killing anyone. As I will address later in these reasons, he was struggling with emotional turmoil and wanted to get back to his home.
It is within this incredibly sad context that I must impose sentence on Mr. Lehouillier. The Crown asked for a sentence at the high end of an eight-to-10-year range. Mr. Avery argued that I should impose a sentence between six and eight years in prison.
I have no doubt that upon hearing the range being sought and the sentence that I will be imposing, many will think that even 10 years, the maximum within this range, falls drastically short. Mr. Lehouillier took the lives of three children and shattered their family. People may understandably ask why he isn’t getting three life sentences? In these reasons, I hope to explain the law that I must follow and the many reasons underlying my decision.
Everyone here knows that nothing I do will bring these children back - no wishes, no prayers, and certainly not the sentence I am about to impose. Not six year, 10 years or a hundred years of jail time would make a real difference when it comes to the infinite pain that lies ahead for the people affected by this terrible loss. No sentence could ever account for the years that these three children had ahead of them, the lives that they could have enjoyed, the joy they would have brought to their family. And most certainly, no sentence could ever attempt to measure the value of their three precious lives.²
Everyone here is also aware that Mr. Lehouillier knows what he did was terribly, terribly wrong. He thoroughly regrets the choice he made to drive while drunk. He is genuinely remorseful and feels tremendous guilt and shame. He pleaded guilty at an early opportunity, sparing the victims and their loved ones from having to endure a trial and from the ordeal of testifying. And I know that regardless of the sentence I impose, the most significant and difficult consequence Mr. Lehouillier will face is living with what he did for the rest of his life.

The harm Mr. Lehouillier caused

As I will attempt to explain in these reasons, there are many factors and circumstances that judges are compelled to consider when imposing sentence. Here, the most significant considerations are the deaths of three children and the monumental harm the defendant has caused.
Over thirty victim impact statements were filed, and several victims read theirs or a family member’s aloud in court. Ramone, Jace and Mya were part of a very close family and a tight-knit community. Their deaths have left a wave of destruction for so many, including their three parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, friends, classmates and their parents’ co-workers.³
It is hard to know where to begin in describing the pain and suffering they have all endured, and will continue to endure, for the reminder of their lives. Having three of your children killed by a drunk driver sounds unimaginable. But it isn’t, not for Ms Galve, for Mr. Paladugu, or Mr. Lavina, who every morning wake to this horrific reality.
I cannot do justice to what each victim wrote or said in court, but I will attempt to communicate some of their unbearable pain.
I will begin, though, by saying a few words about Ramone, Jace and Mya.
Everyone who spoke or wrote about these three children said they were remarkable, kind and happy. They were at the centre of many peoples’ lives. Their loss is felt daily. As Ms Kim, Ms Galve’s close friend, said: “It is in the empty seats at family gatherings. It is in the silence where laughter used to be. It is in the milestones that will never come, graduations, careers, marriages, children of their own.”
Mya was, as several people said, “a ray of sunshine.” She was funny, outgoing, affectionate and joyful. She loved to sing and dance. Her aunt Aileen described her as “fierce”, “lively” and as a girl who “always lit up the room”. Whenever Mya could, she wanted to be at her mother’s side. Her favourite colours were pink and purple. And she loved her stepfather and often asked him to carry her around, which he did gladly.
Jace was smart, generous, and compassionate. He always helped his mother with his siblings and housework. He was also grateful for the life he had been given and often told his mother how much he appreciated her and what she did for all of them. He was the light of his mother’s soul. Ms Manuel, Mr. Galve’s cousin, had a special bond with Jace. When together, they were inseparable. Ms Manual spoke of his warmth, affection, intelligence and kindness.
Matteo was Jace’s best friend. He read his victim impact statement out in court and spoke of the tremendous loss he feels. He said that he feels “deep sorrow, heartache and a constant emptiness [he] can’t full explain.”
Ramone, the eldest, loved sports, especially basketball and volleyball, as well as his Play Station 5. He was studious and always did his homework. He would often stay back from an outing to make sure he did what he needed to in order to get good grades. Ramone looked up to his step-dad and saw him as a good, solid male role-model. He wanted to be an engineer so that he could, as his uncle David related, “make stuff that makes people happy.”
Ms Manuel said of Ramone that he brought joy from the moment he was born. He was everyone’s baby - they all loved his huge appetite for food and for life. She also spoke of the way he tried to make everyone happy. She said he carried so much love in his heart.
I want to quote a passage from Ms Galve’s victim impact statement that describes part of the unbearable loss, trauma and heartache she has faced and will continue to endure for the rest of her life.

It has been so hard to cope with everything and the loss is unbearable. Every time I close my eyes the accident continues to replay in my head. I can remember every single detail, especially holding my lifeless daughter in my arms while I yelled for help. Seeing all my loved ones hurt and unresponsive. It breaks my heart every time. … They deserved to live a long and happy life. Now their lives have been cut short. I would have taken their place if I was given a choice. Akash, Avery and I are living in tragedy and loss. Having to deal with an extensive recovery process from or physical and mental injuries. The trauma that doesn’t seem to be away. Sleepless nights, constant nightmares, lack of appetite, memory loss and the list goes on. … Fighting myself to get up every day for my son Avery. To fight the depression and anxiety. To hold back the endless tears.

Avery’s life is very different without his siblings, and he misses them immensely. Aileen, their aunt, said that Avery: “…went to sleep with them, woke up with them, went to school with them, played with them, ate with them. Now it is just him”.
Avery said that he misses teasing his young sister and watching YouTube videos with her. He used to play Roblox with Ramone, and he appreciated what a good older brother he was. Ramone loved the colour blue. Avery and Jace used to go on walks together. Jace packed his lunch for him, helped him get his clothes ready for school and taught him things. Jace’s favourite colour was orange.
Mr. Paladugu loved his stepchildren.⁴ Before they entered his world, he had no idea the joy life had to offer. Even though there is not a single way in which he can be faulted, he feels tremendous guilt. The children were in his care and in his car. He replays the day repeatedly and will carry this burden for the rest of his life. The grief, he wrote, is constant and overwhelming. Anytime he is in a car, he fears another tragedy. He is unable to work because of the physical injuries he sustained. He struggles to sleep and when he does, he has nightmares. Gone are the days when he was happy and fulfilled with waking up with his family, going to work and getting home to them.
The community, more broadly speaking is also, and often, impacted by these types of offences. Witnessing such a collision and its aftermath, assisting victims, witnessing the carnage, all can notably affect first responders, other motorists and bystanders. To this point, officer Tait submitted a victim impact statement. As a police officer, he knows he must respond to traumatic and chaotic situations. But as he explained, nothing could ever prepare him for the “emotional weight of witnessing unimaginable loss, especially when it involves children.” He will carry the searing memories of night for the rest of his life and will never forget hearing and seeing Ms Galve calling out for help for her children.
The Toronto Chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) submitted a community impact statement. In it, Ms Carolyn Swinson spoke of the devastation and destruction caused by impaired driving and how this is still one of the leading causes of death on our roadways. Many members of MADD are victims themselves, having lost loved ones to impaired drivers. Each time it happens, they relive their experiences all over again.

The statement of Ms Jennifer Neville-Lake

The Crown submitted that Ms Jennifer Neville-Lake, the mother of the three children Marco Muzzo killed when he drove while drunk, should be able to provide a victim impact statement in Mr. Lehouillier’s sentencing hearing. Mr. Avery opposes its admission. I note that there was no prior connection between Ms Neville-Lake and the Galve-Lavina-Paladugu family.
I have nothing but sympathy for Ms Neville-Lake and what she has gone through every single day since September 27, 2015. I have no doubt that reading about Mr. Lehouillier driving drunk and killing three children impacted her greatly. However, for four main reasons, I cannot admit her statement in this proceeding.
First, I find that allowing another victim of a similar crime to provide a victim impact statement in distinctly separate prosecution does not fall within the expanded definition of a victim in the Code. The Crown provided no material to suggest that Parliament’s intention was to allow any victim of a particular crime to tender one in an entirely independent prosecution.
The legislative summary to Bill C-32 does not suggest such a radical expansion of the definition. In fact, what I read suggested the opposite, namely that Parliament was cognizant of the risk of making the definition of a victim so broad as to overburden the system and slow down proceedings. At the time when the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights was being discussed, then Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler flagged that there “may be a point in which a definition becomes so broad that it can be rendered unworkable.”⁵
Second, to allow what the Crown is asking could open possibilities that, for example, in every sentencing case involving sexualized violence, any victim or survivor could tender a victim impact statement on the basis that reading about the case affected them. This could unduly lengthen court proceedings. While victim impact statements play a significant role in the imposition of a sentence, they should not interfere with the court proceedings and cannot be allowed to “hijack the process.”⁶
Furthermore, section 2 of the Criminal Code defines “victim” as “any person against whom an offence has been committed or is alleged to have been committed” (emphasis mine). As such, permitting a victim from a distinct separate matter to tender a victim impact statement could also up the possibility that a victim who has not been part of any criminal investigation or prosecution might seek to provide a statement.
Third, victim impact statement tendered that fall outside the immediate impact on the victims in the case at hand, can serve to distract from the immediate case and from the court time that has been dedicated to hearing what has happened to them. In fact, this happened here as the first part of the sentencing proceedings comprised argument on the admissibility of Ms Neville-Lake’s statement.
Fourth, there is already a mechanism in place for the type of impact Ms Neville-Lake of about in her statement to come before the court – community impact statements. As was done here with a community impact statements from MAAD, courts can already be informed about the profound ripple effects on the larger community. In fact, MADD had a quote from Ms Neville-Lake in its community impact statements.

Sentencing principles and objectives

In this section of my reasons, I will outline the law that must guide my decision. While I will cover certain aspects of it in my oral reasons, my written reasons include elaboration and reference to specific cases and sections of the Criminal Code.
In Canada, all sentencing decisions are driven by the express principles set out in the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court of Canada and here, in this province, the Court of Appeal of Ontario also provide considerable guidance and direction to sentencing judges. When I refer to the law that I must follow, I am referring to what both the legislation and the courts demand of judges.
There are several objectives that sentencing seeks to achieve. The criminal justice system generally has, as its overarching goal, the protection the public. While there are limits to what the system can realistically do, judges can help protect society by separating offenders from society when necessary – in other words, putting them in jail. Sentencing can also encourage rehabilitation to help ensure that offenders get the help that they need so they do not commit crimes in the future. Courts can require those they are sentencing to take counselling or programming through court orders such as probation or a conditional sentence.⁷
Judges can assist in promoting the protection of the public by means other than jail and probation conditions. For example, in this context, we can impose driving prohibitions under the Criminal Code to forbid people from driving under threat of criminal sanction.
Sentencing judges can also try to protect the public by conveying messages to the community about the seriousness of a crime and the potential consequences for those who do not abide by the law. Deterrence and denunciation are paramount when it comes to sentencing a defendant for impaired driving.
The goal of denunciation is for the sentence to represent a symbolic, collective condemnation of the defendant’s conduct. The objective of general deterrence is to discourage would-be offenders from committing similar crimes. In the context in which I am passing sentence, the hope is that potential drunk drivers will choose not to get behind the wheel and risk causing serious harm or death because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the Mr. Lehouillier.⁸
Each year, drunk drivers cause tremendous suffering and loss of life on Canada’s roadways. Tragically, despite numerous measures meant to prevent this crime from happening, drinking and driving offences remain one of the most common crimes in Canada. The problem continues to demonstrate its intractability.⁹
Thirty years ago, our Supreme Court of Canada wrote:

Every year, drunk driving leaves a terrible trail of death, injury, heartbreak and destruction. …. In terms of the deaths and serious injuries resulting in hospitalization, drunk driving is clearly the crime which causes [a] significant social loss to the country.¹⁰

This no reason to think those words are any less valid today, in 2026, than they were in 1995.¹¹

The moral blameworthiness of drunk driving does not lie only in the consequences, although here, the consequences are substantial. Even when there is no death or injury caused by a drunk driver it is only a matter of luck. Every drunk driver is a potential killer. While consequences matter, the conduct to be deterred – the action society condemns – is getting behind the wheel when one’s ability to drive is impaired.¹²
Cases of drinking and driving occupy a substantial number of criminal cases in courtrooms across our nation every single day. It ought to demoralize to us all that after decades of public education, police RIDE stops, sentences intended to act as a deterrent, and high-profile cases like that of Marco Muzzo, cases like this still occur with alarming regularity. Police enforcement and the legal system can only do so much to effect change. They are no panacea. Without doubt, we take impaired driving much more seriously than we once did, but we remain well short of the promised land.

Mandatory interlock devices

It is within this context that I want to reference something Mr Avery said in his sentencing submissions. He declared that he would gladly give up his primary line of work – representing those charged in impaired driving cases - if interlock devices were to be made a requirement in all vehicles in Canada, leaving him with no clients to defend. In my view, this is a striking statement and one worthy of serious consideration and examination.
Some people might say that potential impaired drivers will always find a way to get around an interlock device – that they are far from fool-proof. Others might say that mandatory interlock devices are too much of a cost for the owner of the vehicle to bear.
To those sentiments, I will offer three points. First, advances in technology could go a long way to reduce the ability for a would-be driver to get around the device. Further, just because some might try to do so does not mean we should throw up our hands in defeat. Even though seat belts are mandatory, not everyone wears them. But they are still mandatory - it is still illegal not to wear them..
Second, while there may be cases in which a potential drunk driver could get around the protections an interlock device provides, there will be many in which they cannot. If Mr. Lehouillier’s car had been equipped with an interlock device, he would not have been able to start his car. It is as simple as that. He snuck out of his trailer unbeknownst to this family. I have heard of no one else around that could have blown into the device for him. He would have had to stay at the trailer that night and he could not have driven down the 401 highway at high rates of speed. He would not have killed Ramone, Jace and Mya. They would be alive today.
Third, all car owners bear the cost of seat belts and air bags and are responsible for their upkeep. There are all sorts of costs associated with driving. We have to have insurance. We have to have a licence to drive and plates attached to our vehicles. When we exercise the privilege of driving, it comes with costs. And any added monetary costs for mandatory interlock devices would pale in comparison to the costs borne every year by Canadians because of the death and destruction on our roadways caused by drunk drivers.
There was a time not that long ago when you could drive without a seat belt. You could even have a child in the car not wearing a seat belt or not secured in a child car seat. It is now the norm to use a seat belt and to place a child securely in the vehicle. To not do so seems unthinkable. Perhaps we will see the day when having vehicles without interlock devices is equally unthinkable.

There is no “one size fits all” in sentencing

I would now like to return to explaining aspects of the law of sentencing. It is often said that there is no “one size fits all” when it comes to criminal penalties. Judges must examine and try to balance several considerations and factors.¹³
One of the most important principles that guides judges is that of proportionality. This means that the sentence must account for the seriousness of the crime and the degree of responsibility of the defendant.¹⁴
I have already reviewed the significant harm and the seriousness of Mr. Lehouillier’s offences. That is one side of the proportionality equation. The other is Mr. Lehouillier’s moral culpability. Anyone who takes the wheel of a vehicle while impaired by drugs or alcohol is a potential killer. Mr. Lehouillier decided to get in his car and drive home that night while impaired. It is a choice that he will regret for the rest of his life. He is responsible for making that choice and must be held accountable. But how he is held accountable depends on several factors.
In assessing his moral responsibility, I must account for Mr. Lehouillier’s age when he made that decision to drive while drunk. When he committed this crime, Mr. Lehouillier was only 19 years old. A defendant’s level of maturity, or lack thereof, will directly impact the assessment of their moral blameworthiness.¹⁵ Further, because of his youth and the fact that he has never committed a criminal offence before, I must exercise a measure of restraint when determining the number of years he will spend in prison.
In addition to his age, the goal of rehabilitation is an important consideration for Mr. Lehouillier.¹⁶ Before this, he had never been in trouble with the law. At some point, he will be released from jail.
Rehabilitation is one of the fundamental moral values that distinguish Canadian society from the societies of many other nations in the world. Importantly, rehabilitation and the protection of the public go hand in hand. The “…objective of rehabilitation is designed to reform offenders with a view to their reintegration into society so that they can become law‑abiding citizens. This … objective [presumes] that offenders are capable of gaining control over their lives and improving themselves, which ultimately leads to a better protection of society.”¹⁷
As I already mentioned, there is no one size fits all when it comes to sentencing. As is often said, sentencing is a human process in which no offender is precisely the same and every case has its own unique features.¹⁸ It is Mr. Lehouillier I am sentencing and the law directs that I consider his life circumstances. I will now turn to a discussion about what I know about him.

Mr. Lehouillier

Mr. Lehouillier is now 20 years old. His mother and father are very supportive of their son and have been present at each court appearance. His older sister, with whom he is also close, has been here when she has been able to be. He also has an older brother. All of his family members describe Ethan as kind, caring, quiet, gentle, respectful, compliant and introverted.
His former employer also wrote a letter of support and echoed much of what Mr. Lehouillier’s family wrote about him. His employer had only good things to say and commented that all his co-workers are shocked by what he did.
Dr. Dilys Haner conducted a psychological assessment of Mr. Lehouillier. The report is lengthy, and I do not intend to repeat its content here. I will, however, review some of the major conclusions the doctor made that are relevant to the factors that may have led Mr. Lehouillier to make the decision to drink and drive, any relevant diagnoses and how to best reduce his chances of offending again.
Dr. Haner reported that Mr. Lehouillier was diagnosed with a learning disability when he was young, and that this hampered his education. Dr. Haner assessed him using various tools and concluded that Mr. Lehouillier has a mild intellectual development disorder. Although knowing that their son had a learning disability, his parents were surprised when they read the report. They knew he had faced many challenges in life, but they had not appreciated the true extent and degree of their son’s intellectual disability.
For most of his life, Mr. Lehouillier has struggled with mental health issues, including depression and anxiety. Dr. Haner assessed him using various tools and concluded that Mr. Lehouillier has persistent depressive disorder and moderate anxiety disorder.
Mr. Lehouillier has had a life-long struggle with feelings of worthlessness. His lack of self-confidence and his self-loathing made him withdraw from others. Mr. Lehouillier is gay. Although his parents never gave any indication that they would not be accepting of a gay son, he was not able to come out to his family.
Dr. Haner diagnosed Mr. Lehouillier as having an alcohol use disorder of moderate severity. He started drinking around the age of 14 to deal with the anxiety and pressures at school brought on by his disability, low mood and anxiety. His reliance on alcohol increased during the pandemic. His parents told Dr. Haner that they had no idea that their son was abusing alcohol and had only ever seen him drunk once.
Mr. Lehouillier told Dr. Haner that on the night of this awful collision, he had been with his family at their trailer park. He had been drinking all day. He had had a troubling interaction with a male friend of his and was struggling to understand why his friend had decided to end their relationship. He was feeling extremely sad and used alcohol to cope with how he was feeling.
Around 11:00 p.m., Mr. Lehouillier went to bed but he could not stop ruminating. He felt helpless, hopeless and worthless. Dr. Haner opined that his intoxication would have made it more difficult to tolerate his feelings, to problem-solve and to make appropriate decisions. He texted a few friends for support, but no one responded. He snuck out of the trailer and went to his van. He told Dr. Haner that he was feeling very badly and that he just “wanted to go home.”
Mr. Lehouillier does not remember everything about the next 40 or so minutes. He recalls listening to loud music to drown out his thoughts. He knows he was driving too fast. He has no memory, he said, about the moments leading up to his collision with the Galve-Lavina- Paladugu van, but he does recall realizing suddenly that something was wrong and that he slammed on his brakes.
Mr. Lehouillier cannot make sense of his decision that night. He had never driven while drunk before. He had been educated at school about the potential consequences of impaired driving. He recounted to Dr. Haner that during those education sessions, he remembers thinking, “that will never be me. I know way better than to do that.”
Mr. Lehouillier feels intense almost overwhelming shame and guilt about killing Ramone, Jace and Mya – and for the suffering he has inflicted on their family and friends. He knows he is solely responsible. He has thought about suicide, and given his circumstances, this does constitute a risk. He told Dr. Haner that what keeps him from killing himself is the love he has for his family.
Dr. Haner reported that Mr. Lehouillier has a very low chance of recidivism. She said he is highly motivated to get help. He told her that never wants to drink alcohol again.
I will again emphasize that Mr. Lehouillier is sincerely remorseful. Before the sentence hearing was over, he apologized to the family and friends of Ramone, Jace and Mya. His level of guilt and shame were palpable. At certain points, I watched the parents and family members when Mr. Lehoullier apologized. I find it understandable why they could not look at him. He has taken away much of their reason for living. I can only hope that one day, they will derive some small comfort from his decision to take responsibility and accountability.

Pre-sentence custody and conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre

Mr. Lehouillier never applied for bail. Since his arrest on May 18, 2025 he has remained in custody at the Toronto South Detention Center. The law entitles him to receive credit for the time he has already spent in jail.
In addition to that quantity of time, the law requires that I consider other factors, such as the quality of Mr. Lehouillier’s time in remand. Our courts have consistently said that an offenders’ sentence can be reduced to reflect particularly harsh conditions during pre-sentencing custody.¹⁹
Anyone who follows the news about our jail system has likely read reports covering cases in which judges have lamented the conditions at the Toronto South Detention Center. No one expects jail to be easy. Inherently, jails are difficult places to be. But it is said that “we send people to jail as punishment, not for punishment.” The state takes away an individual’s freedom – it takes them out of their community, from their family, from their jobs. That is the punishment. The loss of freedom is the intended penalty, and a person sent to jail is not sent there to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading conditions.
This is why many judges have spoken out against the conditions at the Toronto South Detention Center. To provide a flavour of what judges are concerned about, I will list a few of the adjectives judges have used when describing what it is like there:

Shocking;
Deplorable;
Oppressive;
Degrading;
Appalling;
Regressive; and
Inexcusable.²⁰

With respect to Mr. Lehouillier, he experienced frequent lockdowns, which have significant effect on the conditions of detention.²¹ He has been “triple bunked”, meaning three men are in a cell designed for two with one being required to sleep on the floor.²² His access to yard time was restricted and when provided, it was only through a small room with very high windows that in reality, cannot be defined as “outside.”²³ In addition, his access to his lawyer was impacted and appointments were cancelled.²⁴

Other cases involving drunk driving causing death

One tool a judge can use in determining the sentence they will impose is to consider the sentences imposed in other, similar cases.²⁵ Both counsel provided a number of cases for my consideration, and I am grateful for the assistance they provided.
I am not going to describe every case and its disposition in these reasons. I have read them all, and both Crown and defence counsel reviewed those cases during submissions and pointed out the various factors made Mr. Lehouillier’s case similar or distinct. All cases vary according to the circumstances of the offence or the offender – or both.
There are, however, certain cases that I found particularly instructive and there are some key take-aways from those decisions. First, sentences for these types of crimes must reflect the gravity of the harm caused and the offender’s degree of moral blameworthiness. Even in cases in which the defendant is a first offender, a penitentiary sentence will be called for.²⁶
Second, in the last decade or so, sentences have increased because of societal recognition of the carnage and destruction caused by impaired driving.²⁷
Third, these offences can occur in “an almost infinite variety” of ways and by offenders with vastly differently life circumstances. As such, courts have avoided dictating a rigid sentencing range.²⁸ Some of the factors that can direct the number of years someone is sentenced to the penitentiary include:

Whether the offender pleaded guilty or had a trial;
The number of people they killed and injured;²⁹
Whether they were remorseful;
Their age;
Their level of intoxication or impairment;³⁰
Whether the driving was dangerous in addition to the extreme hazards associated with impairment, including their speed;
Whether they had a criminal record or a bad driving record; and
Previous occurrences from which they should have learned the lesson not to drive while impaired or not to drive dangerously.

There are a couple of cases I will briefly review in order to highlight some of the distinctions or similarities between those decisions and the case at hand. Muzzo is a case from 2015. He drove through a red light at high speed and killed three children and one adult and seriously injured two other adults. He had an alarmingly high BAC which was almost three times the legal limit. He had a lengthy driving record. Further, he had considerable financial means and could have, after he flew back on his private jet, hired a limo to take him home. Mr. Muzzo was 29 at the time he killed these four people - 10 years older than Mr. Lehouillier. In addition, he did not have any mental health issues or disabilities. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
In Kummer, the 22-year-old defendant was sentenced to eight years in jail for killing three people when driving while impaired and for injuring two others. His passenger had pleaded with him to slow down. Two 12-year-old boys were killed, as well as an adult. He had been previously convicted of careless driving for a serious incident that should have served as a wake-up call, but it was one he did not heed. I saw no mention in the decision that Mr. Kummer had any mental health issues or disabilities.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently released a decision upholding a 17-year sentence for a man named Mr. Robertson.³¹ Compared to several other cases, this is a high sentence, or as the court said, “unprecedented”. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence noting that the trial judge correctly factored in several aggravating features of that case, including:

Mr. Robertson was being sentenced for two separate sets of charges – the first set occurring two days before the second;
In the second incident, he killed four people, Ms Karolina Ciasullo and her three young daughters;
When he killed this family, he was driving very dangerously, not just speeding at twice the legal limit, but trying to evade capture by the police through a residential neighbourhood;
At the time he was driving, he also had more than the legal limit of THC in his blood;
Two days before this offence, he had been driving, seemed to have lost consciousness and mounted a sidewalk, striking objects near a café. When bystanders tried to assist, he fled and subsequently led the police in a high-speed chase reaching up to 160 km/h in a 60 km zone;
He was driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle, and was driving while his licence was suspended;
He had a driving record that involved 15 convictions over a short period of time, which highlighted his persistent and unabated disregard for the law and public safety; and
He did not heed the lesson he should have learned two days before he killed this family.

Sentence to be imposed

Both the Crown and defence submitted a range of sentence that is supportable in the case law. This is not a case in which either of them attempted to go higher than the authorities permit, or lower. The Crown asked for a sentence at the high end of a range of eight to 10 years. Mr. Avery asked for a sentence between six and eight years.
Today, this courtroom is filled with mourning relatives and friends whose lives will never be the same. The ripple effects of this crime will never end for this family. Mr. Lehoullier’s future will be disfigured by a dreadful feeling of guilt that will never dissipate.
After considering the law, the deaths of Ramone, Jace and Mya, Mr. Lehouillier’s own circumstances and all other relevant factors I am obliged by law to consider, I will impose on Mr. Lehouillier a sentence of eight years in the penitentiary (or 2922 days). From this sentence, I will deduct 351 actual days in pre-sentence custody credited to a total of 526 days (leaving 2396 days).
A driving prohibition commences at the date of sentencing. I impose a driving prohibition of 20 years, so that it will be in effect for 12 years after his sentence ends. The Ministry of Transportation for Ontario will make the decision, after this prohibition period ends, whether Mr. Lehouillier will ever be allowed to drive again.
I further order that Mr. Lehouillier provide a sample of his DNA to the authorities. I will waive the victim surcharge.
Impaired driving is a scourge of our times. That it is so preventable makes the horrors that can result sting that much more. For those present today whose lives, families and friendships have been torn apart – and I include in this the Lehouillier family – we can do little more than wish then some measure of peace as the years go by.

Justice K. Crosbie

When speaking of ranges, it must be kept in mind that judges must have the maneuverability to do justice in each case. The range of sentences imposed in other cases serve as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives. Ranges are not straightjackets, to use the language of our Supreme Court of Canada in Lacasse. More fully, the Lacasse Court explained that: “Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives. However, they should not be considered “averages”, let alone straitjackets, but should instead be seen as historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges, who must still exercise their discretion in each case.” At para. 57. Also see Friesen, at para. 37; and Parranto, at para 38.

Mr. Avery responded in writing and wrote: “The defence submissions on the distinguishability of Robertson made at the sentencing hearing stand.”

Footnotes

Both at the sentencing hearing and today, there were overflow courtrooms to ensure that all family and friends had a place to sit and view the proceedings.
As Justice Fuerst wrote in R. v. Muzzo, 2016 ONSC 2068 at para. 4: “While the criminal justice system can deter and denounce, it is ill-suited to make reparation for harm of the magnitude involved in this case.”
The Crown informed me in court that the children’s father did not prepare a victim impact statement. Even without one, I have no doubt about the extent of the pain and suffering he will endure for the rest of his life.
Mr. Paladugu was unable to read his victim impact statement. Aileen read it for him.
Bill C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1615 (Hon Peter MacKay) [Bill C-32 Debates]; 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1710 (Hon Irwin Cotler).
R. v. Steeves, 2010 NBCA 57 at para. 35. For other cases dealing with a proposed expansion of the definition, see: R. v. Fenton 2018 BCPC 230; R. v. J.A., 2017 ONSC 525; and R. v. Llanos, 2025 ONSC 3986.
The purpose of rehabilitation as a sentencing objective here is to try and address the various internal and external factors that placed Mr. Lehouillier at risk of committing criminal offences in the first place.
R. v. B.W.P., 2006 SCC 27 and R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23
Justice MacPherson wrote in R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39 at para. 15, this problem has continued to demonstrate its “intractability.”
R. v. Bernshaw (1995), 95 C.C.C (3d) 193 at pages 204-205. After reviewing statistics about impaired driving and its toll, the SCC made this observation: “These dry figures are mute but shocking testimony demonstrating the tragic effects and devastating consequences of drinking and driving. The social cost of the crime, great as it is, fades in comparison to the personal loss suffered by the victims of this crime through the death and injury of their loved ones. The gravity of the problem and its impact on Canadian society has been so great that Criminal Code amendments were enacted aimed at eliminating or, at least, reducing the problem.”
In 2012, Justice Trotter reviewed those same passages and commented that there was no reason to think those words were any less valid in 2012. R. v. Luskin, 2012 ONSC 1764 at para, 20.
As Justice MacKinnon explained in R. v. McVeigh (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 6: “…No one takes to the road after drinking with the thought that someone may be killed as a result of his drinking. The sentences should be such as to make it very much less attractive for the drinker to get behind the wheel of a car after drinking. The public should not have to wait until members of the public are killed before the courts' repudiation of the conduct that led to the killing is made clear. It is trite to say that every drinking driver is a potential killer.”
The SCC said in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, that the “fundamental duty of a sentencing judge” is to “engage in an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and circumstances.” In R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 23, the Court further described sentencing as “a highly individualized and discretionary endeavour” and as “an inherently individualized” and “profoundly subjective process.” Further, the Hills Court noted that “[e]ach sentence is to be custom tailored to match the particular offence, as well as the offender.” The Court summarized its message in simple terms: there is no ‘one size fits all” penalty.’ (At para. 62). Also see R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46; and R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9.
As the S.C.C. directed in R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para. 40, whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the objectives [of sentencing], the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality serves two primary functions. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this case, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. (Ipeelee, at para. 36.
In this regard, I found the following passages from the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 instructive: “… While as adults they are morally responsible for their actions, “[f]ull maturity and all the attributes of adulthood are not magically conferred on young [adults] on their 18th birthdays.” … Instead, young adults are more impulsive, emotionally volatile, and susceptible to negative influences and bad judgment. This can make them less blameworthy than more mature adults. … By accounting for immaturity, courts ensure that turning 18 “does not present a cliff edge for … sentencing.” (At para. 35, citations omitted)
As Justices Brown and Rowe stated in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, denunciation and deterrence “cannot be allowed to obliterate and render nugatory or impotent other relevant sentencing objectives.” (At para. 45) The latest direction in this regard from the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that restricting consideration to only two of the several objectives set out in the Code flies in the face of “individualization”. As the Court said: “…[S]triving for exemplarity to the detriment of evidence of the merit of rehabilitation objectives is incompatible with the principle of individualization.” (R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 51)
R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 51
Former Chief Justice Lamer convincingly wrote in R. v. M. (C.A.) (1996), 1 SCR 500 that “[s]entencing is an inherently individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.” (At para. 92)
R. v. Reid, 2026 ONSC 136; R. v. Marshall ,2021 ONCA and 344; and R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. In R. v. Persad, 2020 ONSC 188, Justice Schreck explained the justification and legal authority for considering the conditions of pre-trial custody beyond that of which is covered by section 719 of the Criminal Code. He stated: “It is now well established that particularly harsh pre-sentence incarceration conditions can justify credit beyond the ordinary credit for pre-sentence custody …. This follows from the principles of individualization, parity and proportionality. Where an offender has been subject to particularly harsh pre-sentence custody, he has been subject to consequences resulting from the offence that have a more significant impact on him. Like collateral consequences such as immigration consequences, this additional impact must be considered to ensure that the sentence is proportionate and tailored to the individual circumstances of the offender.” [Citations omitted]
Persad, at para. 31. R. v. Shaikh and Tanoli, 2024 ONSC 774 at para. 73: “The biggest problem at the Toronto South is that there have been frequent lockdowns, both partial and full. During those lockdowns, inmates have restricted access to everything: rehabilitation programs; religious observance; fresh air; showers; cleaning products; laundry; visits and telephone calls with loved ones; and meetings and telephone calls with their lawyers. Inmates are locked up in small spaces for hours, sometimes days on end. Prison is already an anxiety producing environment. The lockdowns have the impact of exacerbating these problems and tensions frequently spill over into actual conflicts. I have been hearing these stories, and many varieties of them, for years. Conditions got worse during COVID (which is not wholly unexpected), but they have not improved much since. The most disturbing feature is that the reason for the lockdowns, almost exclusively, is staff shortages. Based on what I have been seeing in numerous cases over that year or two, the lockdowns at the Toronto South are typically between 50 to 60% of the total days in custody. This is shameful….”
R. v. Tewolde, 2020 ONSC 532, at para. 25
In the recent report from the Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mr. Ivan Zinger wrote that “…double-bunking inherently carries an increased risk for agitation, tension, and violence. This can have serious consequences, … and contrasts with internationally accepted norms for prisoner cell accommodation. As my Office has asserted in the past, double-bunking is not an appropriate or sustainable solution to crowding pressures.” (Office of the Correctional Investigator Annual Report 2023-24) If this is the case for double-bunking, it logically follows that triple-bunking is worse.
“The Toronto South cells are solid concrete. There are no windows. There is no yard. There is merely a small area off the cell block which is bounded by concrete, and uncovered at the very top, so there is some air that can come in that way. During lockdowns, even that “privilege” is lost.” Shaikh and Tanoli at para. 74.
I have also considered what Dr. Haner has said about Mr. Lehouillier and what his future time will be like in prison. She commented that he is considerably more vulnerable than other inmates and described him as a: “[s]mall, weak, intellectually disabled, gay man with limited social prowess or experience”.
There are many benefits to be derived from examining case law, both from appellate courts and trial courts. One of the functions of appellate courts is to provide guidance to trial judges about, for example, what principles and factors judges should consider when fashioning an individualized sentence. Case law additionally helps define the range for certain types of offences.
R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241 at para. 11
Robertson, at para. 66. See R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488 and R. v. Junkert, 2010 ONCA 549
R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511 at para. 73; and Robertson at para. 53.
See section 320.22(a) of the Code
See section 320.22(e) of the Code
R. v. Robertson, [2026] ONCA 1692 at para. 66. As this decision was released after I had heard submissions, I contacted the parties to provide them the opportunity to make further submissions. The Crown said it would do so in writing. The further submission said: In R. v. Robertson the Court of Appeal reinforces that the 2018 sentencing reforms “direct courts to impose higher sentences than those found in earlier cases decided under lower statutory maximums.” This does not change the Crown position, but it does support the view that the sentence should be in the upper end of the 8-10 year range for these offences and this offender.” [Emphasis mine]

Footnotes

Both at the sentencing hearing and today, there were overflow courtrooms to ensure that all family and friends had a place to sit and view the proceedings.
As Justice Fuerst wrote in R. v. Muzzo, 2016 ONSC 2068 at para. 4: “While the criminal justice system can deter and denounce, it is ill-suited to make reparation for harm of the magnitude involved in this case.”
The Crown informed me in court that the children’s father did not prepare a victim impact statement. Even without one, I have no doubt about the extent of the pain and suffering he will endure for the rest of his life.
Mr. Paladugu was unable to read his victim impact statement. Aileen read it for him.
Bill C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1615 (Hon Peter MacKay) [Bill C-32 Debates]; 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1710 (Hon Irwin Cotler).
R. v. Steeves, 2010 NBCA 57 at para. 35. For other cases dealing with a proposed expansion of the definition, see: R. v. Fenton 2018 BCPC 230; R. v. J.A., 2017 ONSC 525; and R. v. Llanos, 2025 ONSC 3986.
The purpose of rehabilitation as a sentencing objective here is to try and address the various internal and external factors that placed Mr. Lehouillier at risk of committing criminal offences in the first place.
R. v. B.W.P., 2006 SCC 27 and R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23
Justice MacPherson wrote in R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39 at para. 15, this problem has continued to demonstrate its “intractability.”
R. v. Bernshaw (1995), 95 C.C.C (3d) 193 at pages 204-205. After reviewing statistics about impaired driving and its toll, the SCC made this observation: “These dry figures are mute but shocking testimony demonstrating the tragic effects and devastating consequences of drinking and driving. The social cost of the crime, great as it is, fades in comparison to the personal loss suffered by the victims of this crime through the death and injury of their loved ones. The gravity of the problem and its impact on Canadian society has been so great that Criminal Code amendments were enacted aimed at eliminating or, at least, reducing the problem.”
In 2012, Justice Trotter reviewed those same passages and commented that there was no reason to think those words were any less valid in 2012. R. v. Luskin, 2012 ONSC 1764 at para, 20.
As Justice MacKinnon explained in R. v. McVeigh (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 6: “…No one takes to the road after drinking with the thought that someone may be killed as a result of his drinking. The sentences should be such as to make it very much less attractive for the drinker to get behind the wheel of a car after drinking. The public should not have to wait until members of the public are killed before the courts' repudiation of the conduct that led to the killing is made clear. It is trite to say that every drinking driver is a potential killer.”
The SCC said in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, that the “fundamental duty of a sentencing judge” is to “engage in an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and circumstances.” In R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 23, the Court further described sentencing as “a highly individualized and discretionary endeavour” and as “an inherently individualized” and “profoundly subjective process.” Further, the Hills Court noted that “[e]ach sentence is to be custom tailored to match the particular offence, as well as the offender.” The Court summarized its message in simple terms: there is no ‘one size fits all” penalty.’ (At para. 62). Also see R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46; and R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9.
As the S.C.C. directed in R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para. 40, whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the objectives [of sentencing], the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality serves two primary functions. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this case, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. (Ipeelee, at para. 36.
In this regard, I found the following passages from the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 instructive: “… While as adults they are morally responsible for their actions, “[f]ull maturity and all the attributes of adulthood are not magically conferred on young [adults] on their 18th birthdays.” … Instead, young adults are more impulsive, emotionally volatile, and susceptible to negative influences and bad judgment. This can make them less blameworthy than more mature adults. … By accounting for immaturity, courts ensure that turning 18 “does not present a cliff edge for … sentencing.” (At para. 35, citations omitted)
As Justices Brown and Rowe stated in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, denunciation and deterrence “cannot be allowed to obliterate and render nugatory or impotent other relevant sentencing objectives.” (At para. 45) The latest direction in this regard from the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that restricting consideration to only two of the several objectives set out in the Code flies in the face of “individualization”. As the Court said: “…[S]triving for exemplarity to the detriment of evidence of the merit of rehabilitation objectives is incompatible with the principle of individualization.” (R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 51)
R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, at para. 51
Former Chief Justice Lamer convincingly wrote in R. v. M. (C.A.) (1996), 1 SCR 500 that “[s]entencing is an inherently individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.” (At para. 92)
R. v. Reid, 2026 ONSC 136; R. v. Marshall ,2021 ONCA and 344; and R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. In R. v. Persad, 2020 ONSC 188, Justice Schreck explained the justification and legal authority for considering the conditions of pre-trial custody beyond that of which is covered by section 719 of the Criminal Code. He stated: “It is now well established that particularly harsh pre-sentence incarceration conditions can justify credit beyond the ordinary credit for pre-sentence custody …. This follows from the principles of individualization, parity and proportionality. Where an offender has been subject to particularly harsh pre-sentence custody, he has been subject to consequences resulting from the offence that have a more significant impact on him. Like collateral consequences such as immigration consequences, this additional impact must be considered to ensure that the sentence is proportionate and tailored to the individual circumstances of the offender.” [Citations omitted]
Persad, at para. 31. R. v. Shaikh and Tanoli, 2024 ONSC 774 at para. 73: “The biggest problem at the Toronto South is that there have been frequent lockdowns, both partial and full. During those lockdowns, inmates have restricted access to everything: rehabilitation programs; religious observance; fresh air; showers; cleaning products; laundry; visits and telephone calls with loved ones; and meetings and telephone calls with their lawyers. Inmates are locked up in small spaces for hours, sometimes days on end. Prison is already an anxiety producing environment. The lockdowns have the impact of exacerbating these problems and tensions frequently spill over into actual conflicts. I have been hearing these stories, and many varieties of them, for years. Conditions got worse during COVID (which is not wholly unexpected), but they have not improved much since. The most disturbing feature is that the reason for the lockdowns, almost exclusively, is staff shortages. Based on what I have been seeing in numerous cases over that year or two, the lockdowns at the Toronto South are typically between 50 to 60% of the total days in custody. This is shameful….”
R. v. Tewolde, 2020 ONSC 532, at para. 25
In the recent report from the Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mr. Ivan Zinger wrote that “…double-bunking inherently carries an increased risk for agitation, tension, and violence. This can have serious consequences, … and contrasts with internationally accepted norms for prisoner cell accommodation. As my Office has asserted in the past, double-bunking is not an appropriate or sustainable solution to crowding pressures.” (Office of the Correctional Investigator Annual Report 2023-24) If this is the case for double-bunking, it logically follows that triple-bunking is worse.
“The Toronto South cells are solid concrete. There are no windows. There is no yard. There is merely a small area off the cell block which is bounded by concrete, and uncovered at the very top, so there is some air that can come in that way. During lockdowns, even that “privilege” is lost.” Shaikh and Tanoli at para. 74.
I have also considered what Dr. Haner has said about Mr. Lehouillier and what his future time will be like in prison. She commented that he is considerably more vulnerable than other inmates and described him as a: “[s]mall, weak, intellectually disabled, gay man with limited social prowess or experience”.
There are many benefits to be derived from examining case law, both from appellate courts and trial courts. One of the functions of appellate courts is to provide guidance to trial judges about, for example, what principles and factors judges should consider when fashioning an individualized sentence. Case law additionally helps define the range for certain types of offences.
R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241 at para. 11
Robertson, at para. 66. See R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488 and R. v. Junkert, 2010 ONCA 549
R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511 at para. 73; and Robertson at para. 53.
See section 320.22(a) of the Code
See section 320.22(e) of the Code
R. v. Robertson, [2026] ONCA 1692 at para. 66. As this decision was released after I had heard submissions, I contacted the parties to provide them the opportunity to make further submissions. The Crown said it would do so in writing. The further submission said: In R. v. Robertson the Court of Appeal reinforces that the 2018 sentencing reforms “direct courts to impose higher sentences than those found in earlier cases decided under lower statutory maximums.” This does not change the Crown position, but it does support the view that the sentence should be in the upper end of the 8-10 year range for these offences and this offender.” [Emphasis mine]

R. v. Lehouillier, 2026 ONCJ 280

Case Summary

Introduction

The harm Mr. Lehouillier caused

The statement of Ms Jennifer Neville-Lake

Sentencing principles and objectives

Mandatory interlock devices

There is no “one size fits all” in sentencing

Mr. Lehouillier

Pre-sentence custody and conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre

Other cases involving drunk driving causing death

Sentence to be imposed

Footnotes

R. v. Lehouillier, 2026 ONCJ 280

Case Summary

Introduction

The harm Mr. Lehouillier caused

The statement of Ms Jennifer Neville-Lake

Sentencing principles and objectives

Mandatory interlock devices

There is no “one size fits all” in sentencing

Mr. Lehouillier

Pre-sentence custody and conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre

Other cases involving drunk driving causing death

Sentence to be imposed

Footnotes