ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Amber Crystal Tiveron
Applicant
— AND —
Eric Richard Collins
Respondent
Before Justice Joanne Beasley
Heard on November 19 and 20, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on March 13, 2026
Katherine Robinson and Trinity Thrower agent counsel for the applicant
Eric Richard Collins...................................................................... acting on his own behalf
1Ms. Tiveron commenced a Motion to Change on July 27, 2022, seeking updated child support, arrears, and to address a restraining order.
2Evidence consisted of Ms. Tiveron’s trial affidavit sworn September 12, 2025, oral testimony from both parties, and Mr. Collins’ document briefs including pay summaries, tax returns, bank statements, recordings and audio transcripts. Ms. Tiveron tendered and relied upon multiple email communications from Mr. Collins, notably dated January 13, 2024; October 3, 2024; and April 29, 2025, alleging abusive and threatening content.
Background
3Mr. Collins and Ms. Tiveron were in a three-year relationship and have three children together: Danica Ferrera Collins born […], 2008 and twins Chloe Leona Collins and Breanna Leigh Collins born […], 2011.
4They separated in late 2012 and the various issues between them were litigated and resolved with the 2014 judgment of Zisman J. found at 2014 ONCJ 574. The parties have a lengthy and contentious litigation history, involving multiple motions and appeals over several years. Both parties report significant emotional and financial strain arising from the court proceedings.
5The children have experienced notable stress because of the prolonged conflict. The children reside with their mother. Parenting time issues were resolved on March 22, 2024. Mr. Collins appealed the March 22, 2024 Order to the Court of Appeal, but after an administrative motion, his appeal was not allowed to proceed. No parenting time has occurred since at least early 2024.
6A restraining order issue remains outstanding and will be addressed separately in these reasons.
7In 2014, the parties participated in a trial. In that judgment, the court made various orders, some on consent. One of the orders made on consent was paragraph 24 of the Final Order of Justice Zisman dated October 29, 2014, which provides for child support for three children based upon an attributed annual income for the Respondent Mr. Collins of $30,000.00 per year, notwithstanding that his line 150 income was less than this.
8Paragraph 20 of Justice Zisman’s Order dated October 29, 2014 imposed a restraining order against Mr. Collins. Justice Zisman later made a Final Order on October 16, 2017, on consent. That Order permitted Ms. Tiveron to relocate to Brantford, changed the parenting schedule, and provided that the children would be exchanged at a midway point by a third party. Paragraph 7 of the 2017 Order, which terminated the 2014 restraining order, was struck out on the face of the issued Order. The accompanying endorsement stated that the Order was granted as requested and that the restraining order was terminated. A separate endorsement sheet formally terminated the restraining order.
9At the start of this Motion to Change, Ms. Tiveron sought to have Mr. Collins found in contempt of the 2014 restraining order. She later amended her claim when she confirmed that the 2014 restraining order had been terminated in 2017. She explained that she believed the 2014 order still existed because paragraph 7 of the 2017 Order was struck out on its face. Mr. Collins alleges that she misled the Court. The Court finds that her mistake was reasonable given the passage of time and the confusing appearance of the struck‑out paragraph. There is no existing restraining order, and therefore no order for Mr. Collins to be in contempt of. Ms. Tiveron acknowledges this.
The Parties’ Joint Business Activities (2017–2021)
10In 2017, Mr. Collins began an online business selling pesticides imported from China, in addition to his work as a long-distance truck driver. Starting in 2019, Ms. Tiveron was listed as a director and shareholder of one of the corporations and was a joint owner of the corporate bank account from 2019 to March 2021. Her involvement formed part of an informal agreement between the parties related to additional child support.
11Ms. Tiveron was engaged by Mr. Collins to assist with relabelling, packaging, and preparing pesticide shipments. Product inventory was stored at his apartment and/or a warehouse, which she attended once or twice per month, often coinciding with parenting‑time exchanges. She received income for her work and used a cell phone paid for through Mr. Collins’ business.
12The evidence before the Court is insufficient to determine the actual income division or tax reporting of the pesticide‑related earnings for 2018–2021.
13Ms. Tiveron’s involvement in the business ended prior to 2022. Support is not sought for any period prior to 2022, and the retroactive claim for those years was formally withdrawn on July 6, 2023.
14Mr. Collins asserted that these business operations did not provide him with any net personal financial benefit and ceased operating in 2024. Ms. Tiveron disagreed. She seeks to add back personal expenses and revise unreasonably claimed business expenses to determine an appropriate income for child support purposes.
15Although child support is only sought from 2022 forward, the pre‑2022 business operations are relevant to the Court’s understanding of:
(1) Mr. Collins’ historical business patterns and use of corporate structures;
(2) the credibility of his reported income and expenses; and
(3) the financial context leading into the 2022–2025 period that is directly at issue.
Issues
16The issues at trial on November 19–20, 2025 were:
(1) Has there been a material change in circumstances?
(2) Should income be imputed to Mr. Collins?
(3) Should rental and utility expenses be added back to Mr. Collins’ income?
(4) Should Mr. Collins’ Schedule III deductions for meals as a truck driver be allowed as claimed or reduced?
(5) Should Mr. Collins include apartment roommate payments as rental income to determine his income for child support purposes?
(6) Should corporate losses be deducted when determining Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes?
(7) What are the arrears owed by Mr. Collins?
(8) Should there be a Restraining Order against Mr. Collins?
Ms. Tiveron’s Position
17Ms. Tiveron seeks to set Mr. Collins’ income for 2022 at $77,254; for 2023 at $63,423; for 2024 at $51,067 and for 2025 at $66,000 with arrears of child support owed fixed at $17,746.50 as of September 2025. She seeks to set ongoing support at $1,307 based on an imputed income of $66,000. She relies on sections 16 and 19 of the Child Support Guidelines arguing that Mr. Collins’ claimed deductions for meals and corporate expenses are excessive and unsupported. She expresses skepticism about corporate losses, add‑backs, and unreasonable expense deductions.
18Ms. Tiveron seeks a restraining order under s.35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
Mr. Collins’ Position
19Mr. Collins asks the Court to set his income for child support purposes as $44,000 annually and allow his meal expense to be deducted.
20Mr. Collins is a long-distance truck driver. He has always driven for Highlight Motor Freight. At times, he has been an employee, and at other times, he has operated as a self-employed truck driver through his solely owned corporation, under a contractual arrangement.
21Mr. Collins describes his work as long-haul trucking, paid on a per-mile basis with a safety premium. He details his weekly driving patterns, hours of service, and the operational constraints that, he says, require him to purchase most meals on the road and effectively “live in the truck.”
22Mr. Collins presented multi‑year calculations comparing his gross income to what he says is his support‑relevant income. These calculations included Schedule III meal deductions using the TL2 simplified method (three meals per day at $23 each, with an 80% allowance for long‑haul drivers) and produced year‑specific estimates.
23He asserts these figures are supported by his pay stubs, settlement reports, and both his personal and corporate tax filings.
24Mr. Collins states that, in addition to his work as a truck driver, he operated a Amazon business selling pesticides from his three‑bedroom apartment up until early 2024. He asserts that he did not earn any income from the sales business personally. He asserts that the rent associated with the apartment space used for that business was paid as a legitimate business expense. He resists any adjustment to his claimed expenses deductions.
25Mr. Collins testified that the Amazon business was significantly disrupted during the COVID‑19 pandemic due to supplier price increases of approximately 25–50%, warehouse shutdowns, and unsold inventory.
26Mr. Collins claims corporate losses, and the eventual wind‑down or dissolution of the sales business by 2024. He further states that the corporations had negative balances and outstanding CRA/HST liabilities that resulted in a consumer proposal.
27Regarding the former Amazon business, Mr. Collins asserts that revenues were reinvested into inventory and operations. He claims that Ms. Tiveron retained profits while he recovered only capital. The years before 2022 are not at issue before me and no evidence confirms his statements.
28He also described having roommates contribute to rent in the multi‑bedroom apartment after the children stopped attending parenting time in 2023-2024. He characterizes these contributions as cost‑sharing rather than profit or income.
29Mr. Collins asks the Court to dismiss Ms. Tiveron’s Motion to Change. He seeks a final child‑support order based on $44,000 per year come and allowable deductions under the Guidelines, with arrears set to zero and recalculated by the Family Responsibility Office as of July 1, 2022.
30Mr. Collins seeks costs against Ms. Tiveron, alleging that she withdrew her retroactive support claim in 2023 and engaged in litigation conduct that he characterizes as an abuse of process.
Issue: Has there been a material change in circumstances?
31Yes, there has been a material change in circumstances.
32This is a motion to change. Mr. Collins was not working in 2014. It was anticipated that he would return to work as a truck driver. In June of 2014, the parties agreed on temporary support based on an attributed income of $30,000 year for Mr. Collins, notwithstanding that his line 150 income was less. Justice Zisman’s final decision and Order of October 29, 2014 included, on consent, that child support would never be based on an income less than $30,000.
33There are 3 paragraphs of the October 29, 2014 Order addressing annual disclosure. Paragraphs 25 and 38 are the standard annual disclosure paragraphs. Paragraph 26 provides that either party may review the quantum of child support. It goes on to say: “However, child support for the children shall never be based on an income for the Respondent of less than $30,000.00 per year, regardless of whether the Respondent earns less than this amount or is unemployed. Until the parties reach an agreement in writing, the child support payable under this Order shall continue.” Mr. Collins submits that there should be no change in child support as the parties have not agreed to a change. I disagree.
34Mr. Collins has never increased his support payments since the 2014 Final Order was issued, despite his income increasing and requests by Ms. Tiveron to do so.
35The more common adjective used when an income for support purposes is determined, rather than being the payor’s Line 150 income, is “imputed”. I find no significance that the parties and the Orders used the word “attributed”. The Merriam -Webster Thesaurus provides that attributed and imputed are similar words and are synonyms of each other.
36Ms. Tiveron brought a motion to change on July 18, 2022, seeking retroactive support, which claim was later withdrawn, and a prospective change in support as of July 1, 2022.
37A determination of the effective date of notice is needed to assess the date for any change in support. In this case, the change in support is prospective, as of July 1, 2022, after the date that the Motion to Change was issued. Motions to change support are governed by subsection 37 (2.1) of the Family Law Act . Any support claimed after an application is issued is prospective support, not retroactive support. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.).
38A temporary child support order was made by Justice K.A. Baker on June 8, 2023 in the amount of $1,188 per month as of December 1, 2022 based on income for Mr. Collins of $59,824. Mr. Collins appealed the June 8, 2023 Order, and this appeal was dismissed after a hearing at the Superior Court of Justice. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was not allowed to proceed after an administrative motion. Mr. Collins is in arrears of that Order and various costs orders.
39Mr. Collins has not consistently paid the child support owing under the June 8, 2023 Order, and the arrears as of September 10, 2025 were $13,198.99 plus $159.01 in interest, for a total of $13,358 under that Order.
40Ms. Tiveron has met the threshold of establishing a material change in circumstances. Mr. Collins’ income has increased since the 2014 Order. Mr. Collins’ failure to provide annual disclosure would allow the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs.
41There is a presumption of increasing Mr. Collins’ child support as of July 1, 2022. Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes must be determined from 2022 forward to determine the appropriate level of child support.
42Mr. Collins provided substantial financial disclosure in the form of Form 13.1 financial statements, personal tax returns, corporate returns, payroll statements, bank information etc.. Some additional information would have been informative, including details as to the expenses claimed on his personal and corporate income tax returns, his communications with the Canada Revenue Agency about his returns, claims and debt.
43A review of his financial statements and returns raises questions. They are inconsistent and vague, particularly with respect to expenses.
Comparison of financial statements
44Mr. Collins filed Form 13.1 financial statements throughout the litigation. His finances are confusing and intermingled. The inconsistencies and lack of clarification renders much of his evidence unreliable.
45Mr. Collins is a long‑distance truck driver and has consistently derived income through the same company. At times he has been an employee; at other times he has provided services through his own corporation, 11132571 Canada Inc., operating as AmeriCan Exports. The changing income structure, the intermingling of income and expenses and the unsubstantiated expenses of the pesticide sales business render the determination of Mr. Collins’ income for support purposes challenging. Mr. Collins’ financial disclosure and income claims are inconsistent.
46Mr. Collins stated that his 2021 was $73,226 in his August 26, 2022 financial statement. His CRA 150 income for 2021 was $49,471.
47Mr. Collins’ August 26, 2022 financial statement claimed self-employment income with monthly income before expenses of $27,426.41 with a monthly net income claimed of $3,900. Mr. Collins’ annual income was claimed at $46,800. He provided no explanation for gross income of $27,426.41 per month versus net income of $3,900 per month. I note that he did receive a subcontractor payment from his company in the amount of $27,426.41 on August 8, 2022. It is not claimed on his 2022 income tax return.
48On subsequent financial statements, Mr. Collins claimed monthly income of approximately of $4,000, before and after expenses.
49Mr. Collins’ financial statements have claimed no business interests, one of his businesses or both.
50Debts claimed on his financial statements included Bestegg $16,000, other debts from nil to $2,700, 9 accounts in the USA of $18,000 to $24,447, overdue support of $900 initially and up to $28,789, CRA personal income tax of $7,000 to $14,313, and reduced to $11,600, and then increased to $26,597 CRA director liability payroll, HST and GST increasing from $7,400 to $9,500 and $22,000 and then to $22,218 and IRS of $3,150 reducing to $1850. By 2025, a Business Supplier Veseris debt of $12,495 and a Judgment of $8,000 were added as additional debts.
51Mr. Collins’ financial statements lack credibility and consistency. He provided no explanation for the expenses claimed to derive monthly income in his August 26, 2022 or in later financial statements as to why gross and net income were claimed as the same amount. Food expenses claimed do not correlate to claimed meal expenses on tax returns. Debt includes HST/GST paid to him when he earned truck driving income through his company and was not paid to Revenue Canada. He used these funds for personal use.
52Mr. Collins also provided various income tax returns.
53Mr. Collins’ 2019 NOA line 150 income was $33,099. There is no explanation for the income determination.
54In 2020, 11132571 Canada Inc earned income from Amazon sales (87%) and long-haul truck driving (13%). Total revenue was $996,400. After inventory purchases and significant freight costs of $536,412, gross profit of $488,548 was claimed. He claimed operating expenses of $3,377 amortization of tangible assets, $3,591 insurance, $4,975 interest and bank charges, $6,756 business taxes, membership etc., $1,541 office expenses, $300 professional fees, $15,020 rental, $99,641 salary and wages, $2,207 supplies, $2,914 utilities, $145,027 selling expenses, $11,780 vehicle expenses, $103,478 general and administrative expenses for total of $400,607. The business claimed a profit of $59,381.
55There are a number of items that appear unreasonable and would require further explanation if a determination of 2020 income for support purposes needed to be made, including:
(1) $99,641 was claimed as salary. No explanation as to who earned this income. Ms. Tiveron claimed a nil income in 2019, $38,579 in 2020 and $19,235 in 2021. The source of her income is not in evidence before me.
(2) $145,027 was claimed as selling expenses. There is no explanation what expenses are claimed under this category.
(3) Rental costs of $15,020 claimed and unclear as to whether the cost was storage rental or Mr. Collins’ apartment.
(4) No explanation for $103,478 for general and administrative expenses was provided. It appears excessive.
(5) Should amortization of $3,377 be claimed back to determine income for child support purposes?
(6) Should all or part of the vehicle costs of $11,780 be added back?
56In 2020, with a gross revenue of $996,400 and a gross profit of $488,000, Mr. Collins’ company claimed $59,000 as profit. Mr. Collins’ 2020 NOA line 150 income was $25,566. No explanation is provided as to the particulars of the income calculation. No income derived from the business appears to have been included on his income tax return.
57In 2021, Mr. Collins claimed only T4 income of $48,000. No income from the Amazon business was claimed on his personal income tax return. He did claim a meal expense, which was revised by CRA to $6,043. I will address meal claims later.
58The 2021 Income Tax Return for 11132571 Canada Inc – Amazon seller (87%) and long-haul truck driving (13%). Total revenue was $343,494. He claimed the following expenses against this income: opening inventory of $131,021, purchases/cost of materials of $13,444, freight cost of $13,444 for a cost of sales of $144,465. His gross profit was claimed as $195,019. He claimed operating expenses of $3,035 amortization of tangible assets, $3,502 insurance, $2,425 interest and bank charges, $5,984 business taxes, membership etc., $685 office expenses, $1,800 professional fees, $19,103 rental, $2,029 repairs and maintenance, $51,256 salary and wages, $1,207 supplies, $2,437 utilities, $37 travel expense, $108,687 selling expenses, $1,408 computer-related expenses, $25,226 sub-contracts, $2,684 withholding expenses, $2,619 vehicle expenses, $13,748 general and administrative expenses for total of $247,608. The business claimed a loss of (-$48,577).
59There are a number of items that appear unreasonable and would require further explanation if a determination of 2021 income for support purposes needed to be made, including:
(1) $51,256 was claimed as salary and $25,226 as sub-contracts. There is no explanation as to whom salary and wages, or sub-contracts, are paid. It is not known if any of these amounts were paid to Mr. Collins, Ms. Tiveron or to third parties. Mr. Collins’ evidence included that at times, mostly after Ms. Tiveron’s involvement ended, some friends assisted with the business.
(2) Rental costs of $19,103 claimed and unclear as to whether the cost was storage rental or Mr. Collins’ apartment.
(3) No explanation for $13,748 for general and administrative expenses was provided.
(4) No explanation of $108,687 selling expenses was provided. Freight was claimed separately.
60In 2021, with gross profit of $195,019, Mr. Collins claimed that the pesticide sales business had a loss of (–$48,577). Mr. Collins’ 2021 NOA line 150 income was $48,000, which was only his T4 income as a truck driver. He also deducted meal expenses.
61For most of the period of retroactivity, Mr. Collins was employed by a company which he controlled, 11132571 Canada Inc, o/a AmeriCan Exports, and sub-contracted his truck driving services to Highlight Motor Freight Inc. in addition to the pesticide sales business.
62In 2022, Mr. Collins only claimed income from employment as a long‑haul truck driver with Highlight Motor Freight on his income tax return. His meal expense is deducted. His 2022 NOA line 150 was $37,570.
63The 2022 Income Tax Return for 11132571 Canada Inc showed total revenue was $187,595. The cost of sales was $101,638. The gross profit was claimed as $85,957. He claimed operating expenses of $3,834, general and administrative expenses of $60,490, $2,473 for utilities, amortization of tangible assets of $2,158, insurance of $3,639, bank charges of $1,321, interest on long term debt of $649, small tools of $ 61, business taxes etc of $12, memberships of $3,165, office expenses of $450, legal fees of $267, real estate rental of $13,612, repairs and maintenance of $1,207, computer related expenses of $1,285, other expenses of $5,366, supplies of $187, vehicle expenses of $823 for total of $97,163. The business claimed a loss of (-$11,196).
64Mr. Collins’ financial disclosure included a statement that his company paid him as a sub-contractor the sum of $27,426.41 on August 8, 2022. He also included a director’s salary pay stub for $1,950 gross with CPP and tax deductions dated July 24, 2022. This income was not claimed on his personal income tax return.
65In 2023, Mr. Collins claimed truck driving income through his business. He asserted that his trucking income was effectively flow‑through and that corporate losses did not produce any personal gain.
66The 2023 Income Tax Return for 11132571 Canada Inc showed total revenue was $70,388. He claimed the following expenses against this income: $58,578 for trades and sub-contracts, opening inventory of $4,854, freight cost of $87 for a cost of sales of $63,519. His gross profit was claimed as $6,859. He claimed operating expenses of $3,834, general and administrative expenses of $3,834, $2,715 utilities, amortization of tangible assets of $6,226, insurance of $1,787, bank charges of $584, business taxes etc of $12, memberships of $363, office expenses of $85, legal fees of $280, real estate rental of $2,112, repairs and maintenance of $11, computer related expenses of $378, other expenses of $932, vehicle expenses of $300 for total of $19,619. The business claimed a loss of (-$12,750).
67In 2023, with gross profit (before sub-contract expense) of $65,437, the business claimed a loss of ($-12,750). No details were provided for any of his expenses including sub-contractors.
68His 2023 income tax return claimed a gross and net business income of $56,561. A meal expense was then deducted.
69In early 2024, Mr. Collins asserts that the Amazon sales business ceased operations.
70On his 2024 income tax return, Mr. Collins claimed T4 income of $41,944, commission income of $6,705 (truck driving income) for a Line 15000 Total of $48,649. He claimed a non-capital loss for other years of $20,475, which reduced his taxable income to $20,069. He claimed business income under the business name Eric Collins, with gross and net business income of $6,705 which was identified as commission income on his income tax return.
71Mr. Collins produced a 2024 Income Tax Return for 15324921 Canada Inc showing a nil return.
72For 2024, 11132571 Canada claimed a loss of (-$3,471) plus non-capital loss for previous year of (-$61,339) and a current year non-capital loss of (-$34,810). Total revenue was $11,113. He claimed the following expenses against this income: $12,698 for trades and sub-contracts, $23 transfer fee, $191 general and administrative expenses, $1,672 utilities for a total of $14,584.
73For 2025, based on settlement reports and pay cycles that carried some late‑2024 work into early 2025, Mr. Collins presented a year‑to‑date average gross of $49,555.78, with estimated TL2 meals of approximately $7,200.
74Ms. Tiveron asserts that the 2025 settlement reports show an average bi-weekly pay for Mr. Collins of $2,505.88, or $31.32 per hour (based on an 80-hour pay period), which is equal to $65,152.88 for the year, plus vacation pay of $1,115.03 paid in January 2025, for a total of $66,267.91.
75Ms. Tiveron’s evidence included the Government of Canada’s Job Bank listing for “Truck Driver” near Toronto as of December 3, 2024. Ms. Tiveron asserts that an hourly rate of $31.32 per hour is consistent with the range of earnings for a truck driver with the Respondent’s level of experience in the GTA based on the Labour Market Information from the Government of Canada. For the Toronto region, the median to high range was $25 to $35 per hour. The wage report was not specifically a long-haul truck driver position travelling into Canada and the United States. I find the wage survey report shows a minimum wage for Mr. Collins, given his experience and that he is a long-distance truck driver.
76Mr. Collins insists none of his expenses provided personal benefits to him; all were legitimate business expenses verified through QuickBooks or his accountant.
77I find that Mr. Collins’ financial records lack credibility and cannot be relied upon in determining his income for child support purposes.
78None of the expense categories for the numbered company have been broken down or explained by Mr. Collins. Mr. Collins claims no income from the businesses even though he received funds from them. It is not reasonable for Mr. Collins to assert that he derived no benefit from the pesticide sales business he operated from 2017 to 2024.
Issue: Should income be imputed to Mr. Collins?
79Yes.
80Mr. Collins asserts that his income for child support purposes should be $ 44,000 before meal deductions. I disagree
81Income for support purposes is presumptively the Payor's income as it appears on his/her Line 150 Total Income of his/her income tax return, subject to section 17-20 of the Guidelines and is adjusted in accordance with Schedule III (section 16). The Court has the power to impute income in various circumstances as set out in section 19.
82Section 17 addresses where a pattern of income would be the fairest determination of a payor’s income. Section 17(2) addresses where a non-recurring capital or business investment loss has occurred. Section 20 addresses non-resident situations.
83Section 18 applies where a parent or spouse is a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the parent’s or spouse’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the parent or spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the parent’s or spouse’s annual income to include:
(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or
(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the parent or spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporation’s pre-tax income.
84Section 18 (2) provides that in determining the pre-tax income of a corporation for the purposes of subsection 18(1), all amounts paid by the corporation as salaries, wages or management fees, or other payments or benefits, to or on behalf of persons with whom the corporation does not deal at arm’s length must be added to the pre-tax income, unless the parent or spouse establishes that the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.
85Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines allows a court to impute income in certain circumstances. The onus is on the Support Payor to demonstrate
- (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,
(a) the parent or spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse;
(b) the parent or spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax;
(c) the parent or spouse lives in a country that has effective rates of income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada;
(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these guidelines;
(e) the parent’s or spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income;
(f) the parent or spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;
(g) the parent or spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;
(h) the parent or spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and
(i) the parent or spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.
Reasonableness of expenses
(2) For the purpose of clause (1) (g), the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act (Canada).
86In Homsi v Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the onus is on the party seeking to impute income to establish an evidentiary basis that the other party is intentionally under-employed or unemployed.
87I find that Ms. Tiveron has met this onus. Mr. Collins has personal benefit from some of his claimed expenses. Other expenses are not clarified at all.
88It is difficult to determine an income for support purposes when particulars of the expense categories are not provided. Mr. Collins has not provided sufficient particulars.
89A self-employed person has the onus of clearly demonstrating the basis of his or her net income. This includes demonstrating that the deductions from gross income should be taken into account in the calculation of income for support purposes. See Whelan v. O’Connor, [2006] O.J. No. 1660, (Ont. Fam. Ct.). This principle also applies where the person’s employment income is derived from a corporation that he or she fully controls. See: MacKenzie v. Flynn, 2010 ONCJ 184.
90The self-employed have an inherent obligation to put forward not only adequate, but comprehensive records of income and expenses, from which the recipient can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established. See: Meade v. Meade (2002), 31 R.F.L. 5th 88 (SCJ). This includes the obligation to present information in a user-friendly fashion. A recipient should not have to incur the expense to understand it. See: Reyes v. Rollo (SCJ).
91A review of the case-law respecting business deduction claims reveals a general theme that in determining whether expenses should be added back into a parent’s income for child support purposes, an important consideration is whether there is a benefit derived from the business expenses that employed people would have to cover from their personal income. See: Izyuk v. Langley, 2015 ONSC 2409.
92The self-employed person has an obligation to put forward adequate and comprehensive records of income and expenses, so that a proper determination of the amount of child support can be established. The onus rests on the parent seeking to deduct expenses from income to provide meaningful documentation supporting those deductions, failing which an adverse inference can be drawn. See Meade v. Meade, 31 R.F.L. (5th) 88, [2002] O.J. No. 3155, 2002 CarswellOnt 2670 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Orser v. Grant (2000), 96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 644, Respondent Eric Richard Collins000] O.J. No. 1429, 2000 CarswellOnt 1354 (Ont. S.C.). As Justice Frances P. Kiteley summarized in Meade v. Meade, supra,:
“[81] It is inherent in the circumstances of those who are self-employed or who have irregular income and expenses, that they have a positive obligation to put forward not only adequate, but comprehensive records of income and expenses. That does not mean audited statements. But it does mean a package from which the recipient spouse can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established. Where disclosure is inadequate and inferences are to be drawn, they should be favourable to the spouse who is confronted with the challenge of making sense out of financial disclosure, and against the spouse whose records are so inadequate or whose response to the obligation to produce is so unhelpful that cumbersome calculations and intensive and costly investigations or examinations are necessary.”
93The onus rests upon the parent seeking to deduct expenses from income to provide meaningful supporting documentation in respect to those deductions, failing which an adverse inference may be drawn. See: Orser v. Grant, [2000] O.J. No. 1429 (S.C.J.)
94When an individual solely owns a corporation, they control how much they are paid, whether through salary or dividends. They need to show what they pay themselves is a reliable indicator of what they are actually earning. See: Crightney v. Garcia, 2024 ONCJ 431.
95The Court has held that “the party claiming the deductions as against income has an obligation to explain the reasons for the expenses and how they were calculated, and must provide documentary proof of the expenses in an organized manner so that the court can make a proper determination as to the reasonableness of the expense from the standpoint of the child support calculation.” Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, at para 60.
96The Court further states that, “if the party seeking to deduct business expenses from income fails to provide meaningful supporting documentation or other evidence in respect of those deductions, an adverse inference may be drawn by the Court in making the income determination. Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, at para 60
97Favero v. Favero, 2013 ONSC 4216 and Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548 confirm that deductions must be proven and reasonable; failure to provide documentation permits adverse inferences. Mr. Collins’ has failed to provide details and explanations.
98The Payor has the burden to show that the approach under section 16 of the Guidelines is not the "fairest determination" of his/her income. See Howe v. Tremblay, [2007] O.J. No. 4043, 44 R.F.L. (6th) 140 (Ont. SCJ).
99Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. See: Drygala v. Pauli, [2002] O.J. No. 3731, Ont. C.A.).
100Mr. Collins asserts that his truck driver schedule was reduced so he could be available for his parenting time. Mr. Collins was able to conduct the pesticide sales business in addition to his truck driving work. The sales business ended in 2024. No parenting time has occurred since 2024. Mr. Collins has not changed his work schedule. There is an argument that he is underemployed. He is a long-distance truck driver, and he asserts his income is an average of $ 44,000 before deduction of meal expenses. I find this to be unreasonable.
101Mr. Collins has claimed his truck driving income as an employee and under a driver-inc model. He has intermingled the driving income and the pesticide sales income. One year, he claimed some of his truck driving income as commission income operating under his own name. His convoluted approach to his income makes quantifying his income for support purposes difficult.
102Section 19(1)(h) provides for an imputation of income where the parent or spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax.
103Section 19(1)(g) provides for an imputation of income where the parent or spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income. Section 19(2) clarifies that the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act (Canada).
104Section 19(1) (g) permits the court to add back “unreasonable” business expenses to a person’s income for child support purposes, and to then “gross up” that income by imputing an additional layer to reflect the tax savings on the expense that was unreasonably deducted. See Martins v Benson, 2016 ONSC 7535, at para 25. I will add back the expenses of rent and utilities, as requested by Ms. Tiveron, to Mr. Collins’ income in an effort to determine the money available to Mr. Collins for the payment of child support. These amounts will be grossed up.
105A deduction may be quite legitimate and proper according to the Income Tax Act, but under the Child Support Guidelines, the issue is whether the deduction permitted by the Income Tax Act results in a fair recognition of the actual income available for the benefit of their children.
106When examining this issue in Osmar v. Osmar; [2000] O.J. No. 2058, Justice David Aston stated the following at paragraph 5:
“In my view, the Guidelines require the court to examine expenses from the perspective of balancing the business necessity against the alternative of using those funds for child support. The court should respect the right of self-employed persons to run their business as they see fit, but may, nevertheless, question whether particular expenses ought to be indirectly subsidized by lower child support.”
Issue: Should rental and utility expenses be added back to Mr. Collins’ income?
107I will add back and gross up the rental and utility expense claimed by Mr. Collins to his 2022, 2023 and 2024 income. The amounts will be grossed up to determine Mr. Collins’ income for support purposes.
108Ms. Tiveron asks the Court to base Mr. Collins’ income on limited add-backs, being the rental and utility expenses, non-deduction of the meal expense claim and his truck driving income only. The result is consideration of an income for child support purposes much less than what the children are entitled to. The pre-2022 business operations and the restraining order analysis is relevant to the imputation of income analysis. A review of all of the claimed business expenses would likely result in a much higher income for child support purposes.
109Mr. Collins claims both rent and utilities as expenses, relating to his primary residence. Neither of these expenses are reasonable when viewed in the context of Mr. Collins as a truck driver who confirmed that he does not require a home office.
110I note that in Mr. Collins’ calculations for his income, he adds back a rental expense of $8,200 of $ 13,612 in 2022. He does not add back any portion in 2023 or 2024.
111I note that in Mr. Collins’ calculations for his income, he adds back utility expenses of $1,033 of $2,715 in 2022. He does not add back any portion in 2023 or 2024.
112He deducts CPP each year in determining his income for child support purposes. This is not an appropriate deduction.
Issue: Should Mr. Collins’ Schedule III deductions for meals as a truck driver be allowed as claimed or reduced?
113I will not allow Mr. Collins to deduct his meal expense entitlement from his income for child support purposes. I find that his sworn financial statements are inconsistent and not reliable.
114Ms. Tiveron objects to Mr. Collins deducting any meal expense in the determination of income for child support purposes. She asserts that a meal expense deduction does not fairly reflect all the money available to Mr. Collins for the payment of child support. Her position is that Mr. Collins would be required to spend money on food anyway, he has not established the amount actually spent on meals, and his meals should not take precedence over his paying child support to allow her to put food on the table for our three children. She notes that Mr. Collins receives credit through the CRA for having reduced taxable income and, therefore, pays less in tax; reducing the child support that Mr. Collins is required to pay is solely for Mr. Collins’ benefit and does nothing to benefit the children.
115Ms. Tiveron‘s evidence included that she is having significant financial difficulty because Mr. Collins is in arrears of child support, has not paid proper child support and has not paid the costs orders of over $38,000 which are outstanding against him. She asserts that Mr. Collins has continuously and needlessly drawn out these proceedings by appealing multiple orders to the Superior Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.
116Ms. Tiveron earns approximately $46,000 per year and has the 3 children from the relationship and an additional child in her household. She has the 3 children from the relationship in her care exclusively and has all of the financial burden of raising them, other than Mr. Collins’ child support obligation which is in arrears.
117Mr. Collins is a long-distance truck driver, sometimes earning income as a T4 employee and sometimes in a driver-inc model. He is entitled to deduct meal expenses in both situations on his income tax returns. Mr. Collins asserts that the claimed meal expenses should be deducted from his income for child support purposes. I disagree.
118He has deducted meal expenses from his income. Section 8(1)(g) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) provides that “[in] computing a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from an office of employment, there may be deducted such of the following amounts as are wholly applicable to that source or such part of the following amounts as may be reasonably regarded as applicable thereto,…..
g. “where the taxpayer was an employee of a person whose principal business was passenger, goods, or passenger and goods transport and the duties of the employment required the taxpayer, regularly,
i. To travel, away from the municipality where the employer’s establishment to which the taxpayer reported to work was located and away from the metropolitan area, if there is one, where it was located, on vehicles used by the employer to transport the goods or passengers, and
ii. While so away from that municipality and metropolitan area, to make disbursements for meals and lodging, amounts so disbursed by the taxpayer in the year to the extent the taxpayer has not been reimbursed and is not entitled to be reimbursed in respect thereof Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.1 (5th Supp), at s.8(1)(g)
119Schedule III adjustments for transport employees under s.8(1)(g) of the Income Tax Act allow for meal deductions. The meal deduction is still subject to whether the expense claimed is unreasonable under s 19(1)(g) of the Guidelines.
120Transport employees have two options to claim meal expenses. One method is the actual expense and receipts are required. The other option is the simplified method.
121In his testimony, Mr. Collins was asked if his claimed meal expenses were as allowed under the simplified method or actually incurred. His answer was consistently that the expenses were actually incurred. He provided no proof that the expenses were incurred. He provided no receipts. He redacted low amount purchases in his bank account statements which meant that no meal purchases could be verified.
122Despite his evidence, it is clear that Mr. Collins has used the simplified method otherwise actual receipts would have been provided with his income tax returns and available for the Court.
123Mr. Collins’ evidence is that the meal costs were actually incurred. His evidence is wrong. I accept that he used the simplified method, which is allowed under the Income Tax Act.
124Mr. Collins argues that his income should be determined strictly under sections 16 and Schedule III of the Child Support Guidelines, which permit deduction of transport employees’ meal expenses under s.8(1)(g) of the Income Tax Act. He asserts that these deductions cannot be “imputed” back under s.19 because they are legislatively authorized. He cites Shaw v. Przybylski, 2014 ABQB 667, and Nawrocki v. Nawrocki, 2014 ONCJ 495, confirming that truck drivers may use the “Simplified Method” for meal deductions without receipts.
125He relies on four years of pay records and tax returns showing variable income paid on a “cents per mile” basis, plus ancillary tasks. He references case law such as O’Dell v. Kragh, 1999 SK KB; D.A.T. v. S.L.P., 2018 NBQB 135; and Peters v. Peters, 2015 ONSC 4006, which uphold meal deductions for long-haul drivers. He argues that adjustments are only warranted for non-compliance with the Income Tax Act, citing Sahi v. Sahi, 2023 BCSC 736, where deductions were reduced due to improper claims.
126I agree that meal expenses may be deducted by Mr. Collins on his income tax return. The issue is whether the amount claimed is reasonable when determining the money available to the parent or spouse for the payment of child support.
127The Court has held that “in determining whether business expenses claimed by a party are unreasonable, the court must balance the business necessity of the expense against the alternative of using those monies for the purposes of child support.” Favero v. Favero, 2013 ONSC 4216 at para 105
128Mr. Collins’ Schedule III meal deduction claims for 2022–2024 are significant: approximately $13,904 (2022), $12,852 (2023), and $7,720 (2024), amounting to roughly 22% of reported truck driving income. Mr. Collins did not provide contemporaneous logs of eligible travel days, employer reporting locations, or receipt evidence to demonstrate compliance with ITA s. 8(1)(g). He relies instead on the general permissibility of the simplified method, even though his evidence is that the expenses were actually incurred.
129The Guidelines permit consideration of reasonableness apart from tax permissibility (CSG, s. 19(2)). In the absence of organized proof correlating claimed travel days to deductions and given the quantum relative to income, the Court draws an adverse inference that the full amounts claimed do not fairly represent Mr. Collins’ disposable income available for child support (Szitas, at para. 60; Favero, at para. 105). The Court accepted that some meal expense is appropriate for long‑haul drivers for income tax purposes.
130In 2021, Mr. Collins claimed only T4 income of $48,000. No income from the Amazon sales business was claimed on his personal income tax return. He did claim a meal expense, which was revised by CRA to $6,043 after audit.
131His claim for trip and expenses summary for eligible travel periods for long-haul drivers was for 208 days, 104 trips, with the average number of hours per trip being 48 hours. He initially claimed 624 meals with a Canadian cost of $14,352. 80% of the meal cost is eligible to be claimed under the simplified method, which would be $11,481. At some point, the meal expense was changed to $11,703.
132Mr. Collins’ 2021 income tax return was the subject of audit or re-assessment. The meal claim was revised to 262 meals at $23 US with an exchange rate of 1.2535 for $7,554, 80% being $6,043. This was 12.5% of his claimed income.
133Mr. Collins has not provided his final 2021 Re-Assessment. His T4 income was $48,000 and his allowed meal claim was $6,043. He did not provide any of the CRA correspondence.
134Mr. Collins’ claimed meal costs are approximately 22% of his truck driving income and I find that to be unreasonable.
135A review of the food costs claimed in Mr. Collins’ sworn financial do not correlate to his claimed meal expenses. His August 26, 2022, financial statement claimed grocery costs of $500 and meals outside the home of $400 per month. In his April 24, 2023 grocery costs of $ 200 per month and meals outside the home of $ 1,085 per month were claimed.
136Mr. Collins’ March 14, 2024 financial statement claimed food costs of groceries of $300 and meals outside the home of nil per month and $899 per month for “Employment Expenses Schedule III”.
137In his November 18, 2024 and April 22, 2025 financial statements Mr. Collins claimed food costs were groceries of $250, meals outside the home of $80 per month and $858 and $759 per month for “Employment Expenses Schedule III” respectively.
138Ms. Tiveron asserts that Mr. Collins claims total food expenses are $1,089 per month for one person in April 2025, whereas the budget in her household is just $800 for her, her partner and the three children. She questions the veracity of his claimed food costs and the reasonableness.
139Ms. Tiveron cross‑examined on the absence of meal receipts, the maximum level of the claims, and the lack of medical corroboration for Mr. Collins’ assertions about the impracticality of cheaper food while on duty, inviting the Court to discount some or all of the claimed meals. Mr. Collins replied that the simplified method does not require receipts and that the claimed volumes reflect his actual days away. On the evidence before me, I find as fact only that such claims were made as stated and are linked to his long‑haul pattern on the simplified method. Canada Revenue reduced his claim to 12.5%, half of his original claim, in 2021.
140I will determine Mr. Collins’ income without deduction of his claimed meal expenses for child support purposes. While some meal expenses are allowed to Mr. Collins as a long-haul truck driver, for the purposes of income available for child support, I find that no deduction should be allowed. Mr. Collins’ financial disclosure is not reliable. It is inconsistent and he has not claimed business income. He has deducted personal benefit expenses from business income. He has not established any of his actual meal expenses. His financial statement food expenses are not consistent with his income tax meal expense deductions. In comparison to a household of one and the family of 5 or 6 with the new baby in the home of Ms. Tiveron, the meal expense claimed is not reasonable.
Issue: Should Mr. Collins include apartment roommate payments as rental income to determine his income for child support purposes?
141I will not add rental income received for rooms in his apartment to Mr. Collins in determining his income for child support purposes
142Ms. Tiveron relied upon the case of Bartlett v Bartlett, 2004 ONCJ 276, to ask the Court to include the rental income in Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes. In Bartlett, the issue was mobility. Paragraph 7 recites the father’s employment and subletting income, but there is no analysis of that income for child support purposes.
143Mr. Collins rents his apartment. He rents a three‑bedroom plus den apartment for $2,100 per month plus utilities. After the children stopped staying over at his residence, he took two roommates, each paying $700–$850. Mr. Collins asserts that these payments are merely offset shared rent, not income or profit.
144The case law regarding rental income typically relates to owned properties where the person receiving the rent is responsible and benefitting from the paydown of a mortgage along with the sharing of expenses for the home.
145In Evans v. Evans, 2023 ONSC 3919, the court summarized the principles including the where a party has rental income or rental losses as follows:
(1) Evidence is required in order for the court to assess whether any reductions to other earned income are appropriate in the circumstances due to rental losses.
(2) Evidence is required for courts to assess whether an amount less than the gross rental income should be included in income for support purposes.
(3) Whether the “Schedule of Rental Activities” in a party’s tax return will suffice as evidence will depend on the other evidence in the case and the credibility of the parties overall.
(4) The onus is on the party claiming expenses against gross rental income to show that those expenses are reasonable within the meaning of the Guidelines.
(5) Expenses deducted against gross rental income could include “hard costs” such as mortgage, taxes, and insurance, or in some cases expenses for ongoing repairs and maintenance. This will depend upon the evidence and the circumstances.
(6) The issue becomes somewhat more complicated when dealing with rental income from a personal residence. In those cases, courts will consider whether a party would have paid the expenses claimed on a party’s income tax return regardless of whether rental payments were made—the focus should be an attempt to do justice to both parties and less on mathematics: Rodney v. Brown, 2019 ONCJ 841, at paras. 86-89, citing Taillefer v. Taillefer, [2012] O.J. No. 5676, at para. 29.
(7) In Evans, neither party provided supporting documentation of rental expenses and the gross rental incomes were imputed to them.
146Without a profit analysis (gross rent minus proportionate rent, utilities, internet, cleaning, etc.), I cannot conclude the rental inflows are pure income; equally, I cannot determine if there is a profit. Mr. Collins is not claiming the rental income on his income tax return.
147For the purposes of determining income for child support purposes for Mr. Collins, I will not take into account the rental income. The amount of profit would be a guess. There would be no change to the income available for the support of the children if Mr. Collins was paying a fraction of his rental expense to rent accommodations. Mr. Collins resides in a rental apartment. The rents received are less than his rent. He is not benefiting from the sharing of mortgage costs or acquiring equity in a property.
148At times, Mr. Collins has provided transport driver services to Highlight through his company, rather than as a direct employee. He was paid HST by Highlight, which he was obligated to pay to Revenue Canada. He did not do so. He claims CRA debt in each of his Financial Statements which includes his HST, I have not included the HST that he has been paid, and used for personal purposes, as income.
Issue: Should corporate losses be deducted when determining Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes?
149Corporate losses will not be deducted from Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes.
150Mr. Collins seeks to reduce his income by $9,038 in 2022, $6,759 in 2023, and $20,475 in 2024 on account of corporate losses for 11132571 Canada Inc which do not correspond to his earnings for his truck driving work.
151Section 17(2) of the Child Support Guidelines addresses where a non-recurring capital or business investment loss has occurred.
152In the case of Nixon v Lumsden, 2020 ONSC 147, at paragraph 156, Justice Audet states that, “The courts have shown a marked reluctance to allow employees to deduct business losses from employment income for child support purposes and have frequently refused to deduct the loss from their income.”
153The Court of Appeal’s decision in Ritchie v Ritchie, 2018 ONCA 486, upheld the trial judge’s decision not to include business losses in the party’s income for support purposes. The trial judge concluded that the party’s line 150 income did not represent his true income, and even if he was determined to operate his businesses at a loss, the court was not bound to accept his “business judgement” to determine his income for support purposes. In that case, the support payor had not provided full particulars of their financials.
154Mr. Collins has not claimed the business income. I do not accept that the expenses claimed against the business income are reasonable or accurate. The business income has never been part of his income for support purposes. The business losses do not relate to Mr. Collins’ work earning money as a truck driver. I find that Mr. Collins cannot use his unrelated expenses and claimed losses to reduce his income for support purposes.
Issue: What are the arrears owed by Mr. Collins?
155Mr. Collins owes child support arrears in the amount of $25,350.50 for the period from July 1, 2022 until February 1, 2026, less payments made since September of 2025.
156Mr. Collins objects to any arrears being determined and asserts that the costs orders should not have been rendered. I disagree.
157I calculate Mr. Collins’ 2022 income for child support purposes at $77,254 for 2022, calculated at employment income of $37,571 with addback of $11,900 meals, $13,612 real estate rental and $2,473 utilities, with such expenses grossed up. This is consistent with the 2022 income position of Ms. Tiveron.
158In 2022, Mr. Collins’ declared income was $49,471 (37,571+11,900) from truck driving. No income was claimed from the Amazon sales business even though there is evidence of a sub-contractor payment of $27,426.41 on August 8, 2022 and director’s salary pay remittance stub of $1950 on July 24, 2022. It is not clear if the director’s salary was a recurring amount but the statement indicates dates of July 11, 2022 and July 24, 2022. These amounts are not reflected on his income tax return.
159Mr. Collins’ child support obligation for July 1, 2022 to the end of the year is $9,198, 6 months x $1,533. Mr. Collins paid $4,136 from July to December 2022. The difference owing is $5,062.
160I calculate Mr. Collins’ 2023 income for child support purposes at $63,423 calculated as $56,562 employment income with add back of $ 2,112 real estate rental and $ 2,715 utilities, with such expenses grossed up. No deduction for meals is allowed. This is consistent with the 2023 income position of Ms. Tiveron.
161In 2023, with gross profit (before sub-contract expense) of $65,437, the business claimed a loss of ($-12,750). No income from the business was claimed by Mr. Collins.
162Mr. Collins’ child support obligation Mr. Collins for 2023 is $15,204,12 months x $1,267. Mr. Collins paid $5,345.50 in 2023. The difference owing is $9,858.50.
163I calculate Mr. Collins’ 2024 income for child support purposes at $51,067, calculated as $41,944.06 employment income, $ 6,705 commission being self-employment truck driving income, with an add-back of $1,672 utilities, with such expenses grossed up. No deduction for meals is allowed. This is consistent with the 2024 income position of Ms. Tiveron.
164For 2024, 11132571 Canada claimed a loss of (-$3,471) plus non-capital loss for previous year of (-$61,339) and a current year non-capital loss of (-$34,810). Total revenue was $11,113. He claimed the following expenses against this income: $12,698 for trades and sub-contracts, $23 transfer fee, $191 general and administrative expenses, $1,672 utilities for a total of $14,584. No income from the business was claimed by Mr. Collins.
165The 2024 income position of Ms. Tiveron is less than other years and less that the wage survey income for truck drivers. I have accepted the lower income for that year, even though Mr. Collins could have increased his truck-driving efforts as the children were not exercising parenting time and he claimed no business income.
166Mr. Collins’ child support obligation for 2024 is $11,988, 12 months x $999. Mr. Collins paid $11,368.50 in 2024. The difference owing is $619.50.
167For 2025 and future years, I find that Mr. Collins’ income for support purposes is $66,000, which I find to be a minimum income for Mr. Collins as a long-haul truck driver.
168The 2025 settlement reports show an average bi-weekly pay for Mr. Collins of $2,505.88, or $31.32 per hour (based on an 80-hour pay period), which is equal to $65,152.88 for the year, plus vacation pay of $1,115.03 paid in January 2025, for a total of $66,267.91. This wage is also consistent with the truck driver wage survey produced by Ms. Tiveron.
169Mr. Collins’ child support obligation for 2025 is $15,804, 10 months x $1319 and 2 months x $1317. Mr. Collins paid $9,944.50 up to September 1, 2025. The difference owing is $5,859.50.
170Mr. Collins’ child support obligation for January through March 2026, 3 months x $1317. The amount owing is $3,951. Payments have continued to be made since September 1, 2025 and will be credited against support arrears.
171Ms. Tiveron seeks an order that Mr. Collins’ income be imputed at $66,000 for 2025 and future years, based on the average of his settlement reports, his averaged hourly rate and the 2024 wage survey report.
172Mr. Collins asserts that he did not earn income from the Amazon pesticide sales business. Mr. Collins asks the court to believe that he was operating a pesticide sales business for 7 years, with significant sales and unexplained expenses, and he derived no income from the business. In 2022, there is a director’s salary pay stub and a sub-contractor payment document in favour of Mr. Collins, yet no income from the business was claimed on his personal income tax return. His position is untenable.
173He asks the court to believe that he is only in receipt of truck driving income at this time and that he is not operating an Amazon sales business. In past years, the Amazon sales business reported significant income, much greater than Mr. Collins has ever claimed as a truck driver. Mr. Collins has never claimed any sales business income. I find that Mr. Collins has no credibility with respect to the financial disclosure to determine his income for child support purposes.
174Between 2022 and 2024, Mr. Collins did not claim the pesticide sales business income. Ms. Tiveron is not asking that the Court impute income to Mr. Collins on the basis that he earned income from the pesticide business for this period.
175Ms. Tiveron’s evidence was that she had promised not to go after Mr. Collins’ pesticide sales income. She is basically asking the Court to allow her to maintain that promise.
176Ms. Tiveron relies on only Mr. Collins’ truck driving income as his income for child support purposes. Asking the Court to not include Mr. Collins’ income from the pesticide business is a difficult request.
177The case of Henderson v. Micetich, 2021 ABCA 103 confirmed that child support is the right of the child, which cannot be bargained away by the parents. Child support is based on the payor’s income and will vary as the payor’s income varies. Retroactive child support simply holds payor parents to their existing (and unfulfilled) legal obligations” (para 25).
178In 2022, Mr. Collins claims that the cost of sales was $101,638 and he claimed $60,490 in general and administrative expenses. No trades or sub-contract expenses were claimed. None of the expenses were clarified.
179In 2022, no trades or sub-contract expense was claimed personally, despite the document showing a sub-contractor payment to Mr. Collins of $27,426.41 on August 8, 2022. He also earned a Director’s salary that year, likely $1,500 every 2 weeks. Trades and sub-contracts expense was claimed at $58,578 in 2023 and $12,698 for 2024, which is only for a 3-month period. There is no explanation as to who the funds were paid to or whether Mr. Collins received the funds.
180In 2023, the general and administrative expenses were $3,834 and in 2024, $191. There is no explanation for the reduction from 2022 to the later years.
181Vehicle expenses were also deducted each year from the business income. The amounts appeared excessive for the Amazon sales business and nothing substantiated the deduction as a legitimate business expense.
182As noted previously, in 2020, Mr. Collins claimed that the cost of sales, including freight, was $536,412. He claimed expenses for salary and wages of $ 99,641, rent of $15,020, utilities of $2,914, selling expenses of $145,027 and general and administrative costs of $103,478. In 2021, Mr. Collins claimed that the cost of sales, was $144,465. He claimed expenses for salary and wages of $ 51,256, rent of $19,103, utilities of $2,437, selling expenses of $108,687 and general and administrative costs of $13,748. No particulars of any expense were identified. No income from the business was claimed personally.
183It is not reasonable to conclude that Mr. Collins operated a business that had sales as high as a million dollars one year and that he did not profit from it. His changes as to how the income and expenses were claimed, none of which have been substantiated, is not reliable.
184Given the discussion for a restraining order which follows, I will accede to Ms. Tiveron’s position that Mr. Collins’ income from truck driving only be considered for child support purposes. Otherwise, it would be appropriate to impute an income substantially higher. Mr. Collins has failed to explain his claimed expenses, receipt of unclaimed subcontractor income and director wages and deduction of unsubstantiated expenses which likely had a personal benefit.
185I will say that a truer picture of Mr. Collins’ income for child support purposes would have included substantial amounts derived from the Amazon sales business. If that had been included, I may have allowed some meal deduction, but not more than the 12.5% that Revenue Canada allowed in 2021.
186Mr. Collins is the one who has the obligation to make full and frank disclosure of his income. He has not done so. He has not been consistent in how he claimed his income, identified his expense categories, etc.. Mr. Collins has intermingled and conflated his finances. It was his obligation to explain his income and he has failed to do so.
Issue: Should there be a Restraining Order against Mr. Collins?
187I find that a restraining order is appropriate.
188The parties agree that the legal test is whether Ms. Tiveron has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety. Section 35(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act authorizes restraining orders where a person has reasonable grounds to fear for their own safety or the safety of a child in their custody. Courts recognize that fear may relate to psychological as well as physical safety, and that fear may be subjective if legitimate. Courts also caution that restraining orders have serious consequences and must be supported by compelling facts.
189Mr. Collins submits that a restraining order should not be based on historical allegations. The question for the Court is whether a restraining order is necessary at this time.
190Both parties allege misconduct by the other. Ms. Tiveron states that Mr. Collins’ communication is threatening, belittling, and intimidating. She fears a return to past patterns of abuse if communication is not limited. She denies interfering with the children’s relationship with their father and denies encouraging dishonesty or escalating conflict.
191Mr. Collins alleges that Ms. Tiveron engages in coercive control. He relies on her mistaken position that the 2014 restraining order remained in force in 2022, her inconsistent approach to COVID-19 protocols, her enrolment of the children in an out-of-district school using her parents’ address, and her behaviour, which he considers to be obstruction of his communication and parenting time with the children. He submits that her request for limits on communication and police enforcement demonstrates her intent to control him. He also submits that she does not genuinely fear him, citing her serving as a reference for his firearms license application.
192The record shows long‑standing and entrenched conflict, and both parties attribute responsibility to the other. The breakdown of the children’s relationship with Mr. Collins is central to the litigation.
193Mr. Collins asks the Court to dismiss the request for a restraining order, emphasizing the impact such an order may have on his employment and cross‑border work. He asserts that he has not contacted Ms. Tiveron since the children stopped seeing him in 2024.
194Mr. Collins argued that Ms. Tiveron does not have a legitimate fear for her safety. The fear would need to be a reasonable and objective fear, and if subjective, would need to be legitimate and not the product of her coercive control over Mr. Collins or the children, or the product of parental alienation tactics, or reactive abuse perpetrated by her, or based on false and meritless allegations.
195Ms. Tiveron relies on several communications from Mr. Collins. These include:
(1) a January 13, 2024 email containing insults, predictions of serious harm or death, and demands regarding parenting time;
(2) an October 3, 2024 email containing further insults, blame, and warnings of “severe consequences”;
(3) an April 29, 2025 email threatening her with criminal prosecution in the context of settlement discussions.
196Mr. Collins admits to sending these emails. He denies that they were threatening and characterizes them as expressions of anger or warnings of litigation consequences. He relies on earlier text messages from 2019 to demonstrate context, asserting that he used strong language to compel Ms. Tiveron to manage a financial issue. He denies that any messages referenced harm beyond legal consequences.
197Mr. Collins’ email to Ms. Tiveron on January 13, 2024, includes the following excerpts:
(1) “You are the loser. You are the horrible parent. You are a fraud. You are an extreme narcissist and a sociopath. You corrupt our children and then you abuse them in my name while you are beating them or yelling at them for the s*** that you did.”
(2) “If you do not reverse this you’re going to lose your life. The next 7 years of your life will be bad, and then shortly after that you will die, or you will be dying for the rest of your days, even if that means another 20 years. This is my prediction for you and believe me buddy it will come true if you do not put the children first.”
(3) “If you continue going to court I will continue to fight for the children’s rights and if I do not succeed you will have done everything for nothing and our children will be hurt and and suffer and when one of them has a drug overdose or teen pregnancy or gets beat up by their boyfriend or has nowhere to live I will come straight to your door and give you the rope to hang yourself.”
(4) “Now, starting today you will bring the three children to me every other Saturday morning. Or, you won’t and you will find out what happens to you.”
198Mr. Collins introduced text messages between the parties from August 20, 2019, into evidence, where the parties are discussing the cost of Ms. Tiveron’s phone bill that was being paid by Mr. Collins’ company and was part of her employment benefits for the pesticide sales business. Mr. Collins says the following to Ms. Tiveron:
(1) “This is it Amber. Today is the last f***** day if you spend one more dollar than what you have outside of that budget your f*****”
(2) “This is the very last warning I’m going to give you. You better make all of those sacrifices and you better make them now”
(3) c) “Selfish f***** loser”
(4) “I threaten you because that is the only way that you become compliant and take responsibility for your actions”
(5) “You have no choice but to comply with everything that I tell you to do regarding this financial problem. Absolutely no choice because if you don’t fix the problem I’m dropping the hammer on you enough is enough I’m sick of you f***** treating our children like s***”
199Mr. Collins testified that he does not consider any of his communications to Ms. Tiveron to be threatening, even when they reference her death. Mr. Collins’ evidence is that that if Ms. Tiveron feels threatened, she is aware that the threat is for Mr. Collins to return to court, despite this not being included in his emails. His communications were attempts at accountability rather than threats.
200Ms. Tiveron testified that Mr. Collins’ communications leave her anxious and fearful. Mr. Collins’ evidence shows little insight into the impact of his language. He maintains that he was responding to behaviour he considers unacceptable and that his messages were justified in context. He denies that his references to death constitute threats.
201The Court finds that Mr. Collins’ communications, including those predicting harm or death, can reasonably be perceived as threatening. The January 13, 2024 email crosses the line from hostile communication into threatening statements, particularly when combined with demands and warnings. The messages from October 2024 and April 2025 reinforce a pattern of intimidation. Mr. Collins’ reliance on his intent ignores the psychological impact of these communications.
202Ms. Tiveron’s fear is reasonably connected to Mr. Collins’ own words. The Court is satisfied that Mr. Collins has no appreciation of the impact of his conduct and that Ms. Tiveron experiences ongoing distress and fear as a result.
203I find that a restraining order is necessary to protect Ms. Tiveron’s emotional, psychological, and physical safety.
204Section 35(1) of the CLRA authorizes interim or final restraining orders where a person has reasonable grounds to fear for her own safety or that of any child in their lawful custody. The order may restrain contact and proximity and may include appropriate exceptions (CLRA, s. 35(2)).
205Ontario courts recognize that fear may be subjective if legitimate, and may relate to psychological as well as physical safety (McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254 at para. 31; Lawrence v. Bassett, 2015 ONSC 3707 at para. 16). Conversely, courts caution that restraining orders carry criminal enforcement consequences and should not be granted in the absence of compelling facts linking a person’s words or actions to a legitimate fear (Gauthier v. Lewis, 2021 ONSC 7554 at paras. 33–35; see also Grundy v. Dickie, 2022 ONSC 3629 at paras. 21–22).
206In Fuda v Fuda, 2011 CarswellOnt 16, 2011 ONSC 154, Justice McDermot said: In other words, where an Applicant has a “legitimate fear” for his or her safety, even where that is somewhat subjective, a restraining order should go where there are compelling facts leading to that fear.
207In McCall v. Res, 2013 CarswellOnt 5865, 2013 ONCJ 254 (Ont. C.J.), Justice Spence made the following statement about the “fear” component of the restraining order test: The fear must be reasonable; the fear may be entirely subjective so long as it is legitimate; and the fear may be equally for psychological safety, as well as for physical safety.
208The Children’s Law Reform Act and the Divorce Act require the Court to consider any family violence and its impact when determining the best interests of a child and their parenting schedule in the Children’s Law Reform Act, Section 24(3)(j). It is an expanded definition of family violence and recognizes the pattern, incidents and impact of family violence. Section 24(4) details factors relating to family violence and directs the court to take into account:
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
209The expanded definition of family violence assists the Court in assessing the risk to a person’s safety. Courts have confirmed that coercive and controlling behaviour may consist of multiple acts that, when considered together, form a pattern that undermines a person’s autonomy or wellbeing. Fear for emotional and psychological safety is sufficient to justify a restraining order.
210In McLellan v. Birbilis, 2021 ONSC 7084, Justice Nicole Tellier writes the following about the new definition of family violence at paragraph 27:
The new definition provides a non-exhaustive list of conduct that constitutes family violence. This assists the court in identifying the nature and extent of the family violence. The definition does not preclude the court from finding that other conduct fits withing its meaning, such as cyber-bulling for example.
211Justice Sherr agreed in SB v JIU, 2021 ONCJ 614, 2021 CarswellOnt 17951, paragraph 28.
212In V.K.G. v I.G., 2023 ONSC 6329, 94 R.F.L. (8th) 283, Justice Chappel defined the concept of “coercive and controlling behavior” as a form of family violence. Parenting issues were alive in that case. At paragraph 112, Justice Chappel finds that the expanded definition of “family violence” is “far-reaching, and the list of examples of conduct that fall within its scope is non-exhaustive; it simply catalogues some of the most prevalent forms of family violence. The definition goes far beyond acts of physical aggression towards individuals or objects and extends to actions that undermine a person’s physical, emotional and financial autonomy or their general psychological or emotional wellbeing.”
213At paragraph 117, Justice Chappel addresses coercive control:
17] The concept of “coercive and controlling behaviour” is distinct from other forms of family violence in that it can consist of many different types of acts occurring over time which, in isolation, do not seem abusive or significant, but which paint a picture of a very destructive relationship when viewed in their totality. Accordingly, the significance of the individual incidents can only be truly understood in the context of the larger picture. In addition, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour is particularly concerning because it is easier to inflict in its various forms post-separation than other types of family violence. Further to the principles of legislative interpretation discussed above, the concept of “coercive and controlling behaviour” should be interpreted in a large and liberal manner that best ensures the attainment of the objects of the family violence provisions of the legislation, which are to protect and promote the safety and wellbeing of family members. To date, the caselaw reflects such a broad and purposive approach to the scope of this type of family violence. As I discussed in M.A.B. v. M.G.C., at para. 183, a general review of this caselaw indicates that “coercive” behaviour includes conduct that is threatening, intimidating or exerts inappropriate pressure on the other person. Behaviour is broadly being considered as “controlling” if its intent or effect is to inappropriately manage, direct, restrict, interfere with, undermine or manipulate any important aspect of the other person’s life, including their important relationships and their physical, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, social and financial autonomy or wellbeing.
214Justice Chappel continues on to say that it is well established in the law respecting restraining orders that that notion of fearing for one’s safety or that of another person extends not only to physical safety, but also to the person’s emotional and psychological safety (Lawrence v. Bassett, 2015 ONSC 3707(S.C.J.), per Kiteley J.; Tiveron v. Collins, 2017 ONCA 462(C.A.); Stephens v. Somerville, 2021 ONSC 1958(S.C.J.), per Mitrow J.; Reis v. Lovell, 2022 ONSC 1201(S.C.J.), at para. 52; S.V.G. v. V.G., at para. 101). (paragraph 118)
215In the case of McCall v Res, 2013 ONCJ 254 Justice R. Spence states that the relevant factors for a court to consider in granting a restraining order are that the fear must be reasonable, the fear may be entirety subjective so long as it is legitimate, and the fear may be equally for psychological safety, as well as physical safety. McCall v Res, 2013 ONCJ 254 at para 31
216In Lawrence v Bassett, 2015 ONSC 3707 the court affirmed the criteria as set out in McCall v Res. Justice Kiteley found that based on email communications between the parties, “the Applicant had reasonable grounds to fear that, if the order was not made, her psychological and emotional safety were at risk: his threats constituted a weapon to deter her from proceeding to court and jeopardized her right to seek recourse from the court. As indicated above, subjective fear is sufficient so long as it is legitimate. In this case, the fear raised is not entirely subjective but is corroborated by the content of emails.” Lawrence v Bassett, 2015 ONSC 3707 at para 16
217The safety risk is not only physical. Emotional and financial safety can also necessitate the protection of a restraining order. A restraining order is needed here.
218I am ordering that Mr. Collins attend a Partner Assault Response program, a PAR program. He lacks awareness of the impact of his conduct and communication. A PAR program should assist him in understanding his conduct and its impact on others.
219Ms. Tiveron seeks an order prohibiting Mr. Collins from initiating communication except in emergencies, limiting responses to one message of 100 words, and barring him from attending within 100 meters of her residence except for scheduled parenting exchanges.
220In Tiveron v Collins, 2017 ONCA 462, Mr. Collins’ appeal of the 2014 Final Order, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Applicant’s reasonable and legitimate fear for her emotional and psychological safety due to Mr. Collins’ actions met the threshold for upholding the issuance of a restraining order. The court referred to the Appellant’s trial testimony and the threatening and intimidating emails and text messages sent by Mr. Collins to the Applicant. Tiveron v Collins, 2017 ONCA 462 at paras 11-13.
221The 2014 Final Order imposed similar restrictions and included a restraining order, lifted on consent in 2017 to permit Ms. Tiveron’s relocation.
222Since then, Mr. Collins resumed abusive and threatening communications, including emails predicting Ms. Tiveron’s death (January 13, 2024), warnings of “severe consequences” (October 3, 2024), and threats of criminal prosecution (April 29, 2025).
223Mr. Collins’ evidence demonstrates that he does not understand or chooses not to acknowledge the impact of his aggressive, intimidating and threatening correspondence; rather, he asserts that he is only acting in response to Ms. Tiveron’s unacceptable behaviour. Ms. Tiveron’s oral testimony confirmed that of her Trial Affidavit, in that she is left living in distress, constantly anxious about when she will receive another threat, and fearful that Mr. Collins may act on his threats against her. Ms. Tiveron’s fear is reasonably tied to Mr. Collins’ words in his demanding and threatening correspondence, and his lack of accountability taken for same.
224Mr. Collins submits that he stopped communicating with Ms. Tiveron in January 2024 when the children stopped their parenting time. He asserts that since there is no communication, there is no justification for a restraining order. Mr. Collins acknowledges the January 13, 2024 message was abusive but argues it did not threaten harm if court proceedings continued and that he has refrained from further messages for an extended period. The evidence indicated that Mr. Collins communicated with Ms. Tiveron inappropriately in April of 2025.
225The Court assesses the communications in context. The January 13, 2024 message, on its face, crosses the line from intemperate language into statements reasonably perceived as threatening, particularly when read with the directive demands regarding parenting time and the prediction of death if Ms. Tiveron did not “put the children first.” The October 2024 and April 2025 communications reinforce a pattern of intimidation. Mr. Collins’ position that these were mere expressions of litigation frustration does not mitigate the legitimate psychological impact on Ms. Tiveron.
226I find that a restraining order is necessary.
ORDER
227Commencing April 1, 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall pay child support to the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron in the amount of $1,307 per month for the three children, Danica Ferrera Collins born […], 2008 and twins Chloe Leona Collins and Breanna Leigh Collins born […], 2011 based on Respondent Eric Richard Collins’ annual imputed income of $66,000 and the Child Support Guidelines.
228The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall pay child support arrears to the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron $25,350.50 for the period July 1, 2022, to March 31, 2026, with credit to the Respondent Eric Richard Collins for any payments made after September 1, 2025, as calculated by the Family Responsibility Office.
229A Support Deduction Order shall issue.
230The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall be restrained from initiating any communications with the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron, absent an emergency regarding the children, Danica Ferrera Collins, Danica Ferrera Collins born […], 2008 and twins Chloe Leona Collins and Breanna Leigh Collins born […], 2011, pursuant to section 35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
231The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall be restrained from responding to a communication regarding the children Danica Ferrera Collins born […], 2008 and twins Chloe Leona Collins and Breanna Leigh Collins born […], 2011 from the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron with more than a single email or text message, which shall be limited to no more than 100 words per message pursuant to section 35 the Children’s Law Reform Act.
232The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall be restrained from attending within 100 metres of the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron’s residence at […] Drive, Brantford, Ontario, or any location where the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron is known to be, except for pre‑arranged parenting time transfers for the children Danica Ferrera Collins born […], 2008 and twins Chloe Leona Collins and Breanna Leigh Collins born […], 2011 pursuant to section 35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
233The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall be restrained from annoying, molesting, or harassing the Applicant Amber Crystal Tiveron pursuant to section 35 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.
234The Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall attend and complete a PAR program, the Partner Assault Response Program, before initiating any Motion to Change.
235If costs are sought and awarded, the Respondent Eric Richard Collins shall pay the costs in full before initiating any Motion to Change.
236All other claims are dismissed.
Costs
237Any party seeking costs may make written submissions to the court, to be submitted no later than 14 days from today.
238Responding submissions may be submitted no later than 14 days after being served with the submissions.
239Submissions shall be a maximum length of two pages – double spaced, 12 point font, normal margins. Bill of costs and Offer to Settle may be attached to the costs submission without counting to the page limits.
240No reply submissions permitted.
Released: March 13, 2026
Signed: Justice Joanne Beasley