Court File and Parties
Ontario Court of Justice
Between:
Michelle Cardarelli — Applicant
— and —
Morgan Fillippilli — Respondent
Before: Justice W. Kapurura
Heard on: October 23, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on: November 7, 2025
Counsel:
- Jane Mukongolo, counsel for the applicant
- Tracey Joanne Hardie, agent for the respondent
Reasons for Judgment
Justice W. Kapurura:
Part One – Introduction
1The following are the court's reasons for a decision regarding a motion brought by the respondent (the father) seeking the return of the parties' two children, LF (5 years old) and LJ (2 years old), from Belleville to Toronto. The court heard the motion on October 23, 2025.
2The parties and the children were residing together in Toronto until September 23, 2025, when the mother left the home following a domestic incident. The mother then relocated to Belleville on September 27, 2025.
3The father sought additional orders for police enforcement of any parenting orders from this court, as well as his costs in the amount of $1,000.00.
4The applicant (the mother) opposed the father's request. She sought a temporary order allowing the temporary relocation of the children to Belleville. She also sought orders for primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility regarding the children.
5Each party filed one affidavit. The father did not file a reply affidavit.
6At the conclusion of the motion, the court granted the father's request for the return of the children to Toronto. It also ordered that the children's primary residence shall be with the mother pending the hearing of the application. The court's reasons were reserved. These are the court's reasons.
7The court did not make a ruling regarding the issues of decision-making responsibility, police enforcement and costs. This decision will address those issues.
8The court had to determine the following issues:
a) What temporary parenting orders are in the children's best interests? In particular:
i) Who should have primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children?
ii) If the court orders that the children's primary residence shall be with the mother, should they be returned from Belleville to Toronto?
b) Should the court make an order for police enforcement of parenting orders?
c) Is the successful party at this motion entitled to their costs? If so, how much should be paid in costs?
Part Two – Brief Background Information and Procedural History
9The parties met in 2015 through a mutual friend. They began cohabiting around 2017. They never married.
10The parties were residing in the father's home, which he shared with his father (the paternal grandfather).
11LF was born in 2020.
12LJ was born in 2023.
13On or about April 25, 2024, the father experienced a catastrophic all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident that resulted in a traumatic brain injury. It also resulted in his inability to use most of his right side.
14The father was working in the construction industry at the time of the accident. It was not anticipated that he would return to his work in the construction industry.
15The father has made progress in regaining his ability to walk and managing much of his day-to-day care. He continues to receive physical therapy, counselling, and has a personal support worker.
16The parties had an argument on September 23, 2025. The mother left the home following the argument. The children were at the babysitter's home when she left. She picked up the children from the babysitter and did not return them home.
17On September 24, 2025, the father was charged with three counts of assault against the mother, in relation to the events of the previous day. He signed an undertaking the same day, with a no-contact condition, except for childcare arrangements with a mutually agreed-upon third party. His firearms1 were seized, and he was prohibited from possessing weapons.
18On September 27, 2025, the mother relocated to Belleville, Ontario, with the children.
19The mother enrolled LF in school upon arrival in Belleville. She attended the Superior Court of Justice in Belleville and spoke with duty counsel. She was advised to issue her family court application in Toronto. She retained counsel in Toronto and attempted to file her application at the Ontario Court of Justice located at 47 Sheppard Avenue East in Toronto. The filing was rejected as her home address was in Belleville.
20On October 9, 2025, the mother issued her application in Belleville. She was given a first appearance court date of November 27, 2025.
21The father was served with the mother's application materials on October 10, 2025.
22On October 12, 2025, the Belleville police conducted a wellness check on the mother and the children at the request of the father.
23On October 15, 2025, the father brought an urgent motion before the Belleville court, on notice, seeking an order directing the police to locate and apprehend the two children and return them to their habitual residence in Toronto. He also sought an order transferring the proceeding to Toronto. Justice N. Tellier ordered the family matter to be transferred to Toronto, where the children were habitually resident. She did not make substantive orders.
24The file was transferred to this court, and this motion was heard on October 23, 2025.
25The father's criminal charges are still outstanding. His next court date was scheduled for October 28, 2025.
Part Three – Parties' Positions
3.1 – The Father's Position
26The father's evidence is summarized as follows:
a. He suffered a catastrophic ATV accident resulting in partial paralysis. He is currently not working.
b. On September 23, 2025, the parties argued. During the argument, the mother assaulted him and the paternal grandfather. She left the home.
c. On September 24, 2025, he was charged with three counts of assault in relation to the September 23, 2025, incident. He denied the charges, stating that his physical limitations do not allow him to use the force described by the mother in her criminal complaint.
d. On September 24 and October 7, 2025, he tried to arrange parenting time with the children through his sister-in-law. The mother refused to allow any form of contact.
e. He called LF's school and learned that the mother had transferred the child from the school.
f. On October 7, 2025, his counsel sent a letter to the mother seeking information about the children. She did not respond. Counsel also left a voice message for the mother on October 9, 2025, and there was no response.
g. The mother's move had disrupted the children's lives. Their only family connection was in Toronto, including their grandfather, who lived in the same home with them before the separation.
h. He only learned of the relocation after he was served with the mother's application materials on October 10, 2025.
i. He was unable to drive. Relocating the children to Belleville would sever his physical contact with them. This was further complicated by his therapy in Toronto and criminal charges, including no-contact orders.
j. The mother had no support network in Belleville to help her care for the children.
k. The children would be subjected to multiple lengthy car trips to facilitate parenting time if the mother were to be permitted to relocate.
l. The mother was residing in a rental property. She did not pay her first and last month's rent because she lacked the financial resources.
3.2 – The Mother's Position
27The mother's evidence is summarized as follows:
a. She was the children's primary caregiver since birth. She was responsible for all aspects of the children's lives, including their daily needs, medical appointments, meals, education and emotional well-being.
b. She was responsible for making all major decisions impacting the children's lives.
c. Following the father's ATV accident in April 2024, his aggression and volatility worsened significantly. His behaviour escalated to hair-pulling, spitting, dragging and shoving.
d. The children and the paternal grandfather witnessed the family violence. She delayed leaving him as she would be unable to support herself and the children.
e. On September 23, 2025, the father physically assaulted her and told her to leave the home. He spat in her face. She left with the children for safety. He sent her pictures of her belongings thrown outside in the rain, accompanied by a laughing emoji. He was arrested and charged with assault.
f. She relocated from Toronto due to ongoing abuse, intimidation, and significant safety concerns. She experienced repeated verbal, emotional, and physical abuse perpetrated by the father. She did not want the children to be exposed to abuse.
g. Her new home in Belleville provided a safe and stable space for the children. Her friend owned the home. LF was enrolled in school, and LJ was enrolled in daycare. The children had established routines and were thriving under her full-time care. They were fully integrated into their new environment, had established community and family support, and were emotionally thriving.
h. She did not have immediate family members living in Belleville.
i. She preferred to have the return issue addressed following resolution of the father's pending criminal charges, as any conviction or restriction imposed might impact his ability to care for the children.
j. The father had not provided consistent care to the children due to his limited mobility and health issues. He was unable to provide day-to-day care to the children without assistance.
k. She summarized other prior incidents of family violence perpetrated by the father as follows:
i. Between 2015 and 2016, the father spat on her, shoved her and threw her clothes into the hallway. He called her names such as 'bitch', 'cunt' and 'stupid.'
ii. Between 2016 and 2017, he screamed at her in the car.
iii. On Thanksgiving 2017, he verbally abused her in the presence of her sister and niece.
iv. In 2018, he berated her. In 2019, he called her 'ungrateful' and 'bitch' after she declined a birthday celebration due to stress.
v. From 2020 to 2022, he engaged in further verbal and emotional abuse, calling her 'useless', 'dumb bitch', 'stupid' and 'cunt'.
vi. In 2022, he forced her to leave the home following an argument.
vii. In 2023, he insulted her on Father's Day weekend and was aggressive.
viii. In January 2024, the parties argued. He forced her and the children (then aged three and ten months) out of the home in a snowstorm. They waited at a bus shelter until he allowed them to return.
ix. Between July and August 2024, he dragged her by the hair out of a room in the presence of their son, LF and the paternal grandfather. She fled with the children to a neighbour's home. He later shoved her into a crib while yelling in front of the paternal grandfather.
x. In early 2025, he exhibited several public outbursts, including yelling at hospital staff at Humber River Hospital, causing a disturbance at a public Ribfest event, and screaming at their neighbours.
l. The paternal grandfather was not a caregiver to the children during cohabitation. He did not cook, clean, or assist with the children. He was not a reliable support person, as he had once driven a vehicle without a licence.
m. She denied perpetrating family violence against the father.
n. She proposed facilitating parenting time by meeting the individual assisting the father with transportation at a halfway point, such as Port Hope, or in Toronto.
Part Four – Primary Residence and Decision-Making Responsibility
4.1 – Legal Considerations
28Subsection 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act (the Act) provides that the court must give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being in determining best interests.
29Subsection 24(3) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider related to the circumstances of the child. It reads as follows:
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each parent, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;
(c) each parent's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child's care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
30Subsection 24(6) of the Act addresses parenting time and day-to-day decisions. It reads as follows:
Parenting time, day-to-day decisions
(6) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom the court allocates parenting time with respect to a child has exclusive authority during that time to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child.
31Subsection 33.1(2) of the Act addresses the importance of the parties protecting children from conflict. It reads as follows:
33.1 Protection of children from conflict
(2) A party to a proceeding under this Part shall, to the best of the party's ability, protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding.
32The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. See: White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736. It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.
33A starting point to assess a child's best interests when making a parenting order is to ensure that the child will be physically and emotionally safe. It is also in a child's best interests when making a parenting order that his or her caregiver be physically and emotionally safe. See: I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615. Also see: Armstrong v. Coupland, 2023 ONSC 5451; J.N. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 5292; A.L.M. v. V.L.S., 2020 ONCJ 502.
34Family violence is defined in subsections 18(1) and (2) of the Act. Subsection 24(4) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider related to family violence.
35A party's failure to protect a child from conflict may be an important consideration in granting primary residence or decision-making responsibility to the other parent. See: Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510; I.A. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 523.
36The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunis, 2022 SCC 22 made the following observations about family violence:
The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis (par. 146).
The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator's parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al."A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth" (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497. (par. 145).
Domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove. Family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence. Thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support (par. 145).
37A temporary motion is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at a trial. The status quo should be maintained until trial unless there is material evidence that the child's best interests require an immediate change. See: Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002; Costello and McLean, 2014 ONSC 7332; Munroe v. Graham, 2021 ONCJ 253; Sain v. Shahbazi, 2023 ONSC 5187.
4.2 – Analysis
38In her affidavit, the mother sought orders for "custody" and sole decision-making responsibility.
39The father did not seek specific orders regarding decision-making responsibility and parenting time. His main request was for the return of the children from Belleville to Toronto.
40The evidence provided by both parties at this interim stage suggested that the parties had exposed the children to family violence during cohabitation.
41The court was unable to determine the following issues at this early stage, given the limited evidence provided:
a. The extent of family violence. Each party claimed that the other was the perpetrator. However, the mother provided detailed evidence to support her claims, as discussed in detail below.
b. The extent of each party's involvement in raising the children. The parties had been residing in the same home with the children before their separation.
42Given the above challenges, the court did not have sufficient evidence to determine an order that is in the children's best interests regarding decision-making responsibility. The issue will require a case conference.
43The court granted primary residence of the children to the mother, for the following reasons:
a. It would have been challenging for the father to meet the children's daily needs due to the following:
i. His injuries were serious. He suffered a brain injury and was unable to use most of his right side.
ii. His mobility was limited.
iii. He continued to receive physical therapy, counselling, and had a personal support worker.
iv. He could not drive.
b. The father was facing criminal charges against the mother. He was prohibited from having contact with her.
c. The court was concerned about some of the incidents of family violence described by the mother, including the following allegations:
i. Around 2015/2016, he spat on her and shoved her. He threw her clothes into the hallway.
ii. He has called her degrading names such as 'bitch', 'useless', 'stupid', and 'cunt.'
iii. She provided text messages sent to her by the father, calling her 'fucking stupid', 'a piece of shit', and 'a sack of shit.'
iv. In January 2024, he forced her and the children out of the home during a snowstorm.
v. Around July/August 2024, he shoved her, and she fled with the children to a neighbour's home.
vi. He assaulted her and spat in her face on September 23, 2025, leading to his current criminal charges.
d. The father exhibited poor judgment. He threatened to call the city authorities on the children's daycare provider following an argument with the mother.
e. The mother was physically capable of meeting the children's daily needs.
44Accordingly, the court made a temporary order granting the mother primary residence of the children.
45The father did not seek an order for temporary parenting time. The court did not make orders regarding his temporary parenting time due to his current criminal conditions. The issue will require a case conference.
Part Five – Relocation
5.1 – Legal Principles
5.1.1 – General Legal Principles
46In Gomez v. Isaza, 2025 ONCJ 324, Justice S.B. Sherr concluded that the decision in Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106, meant that temporary relocation decisions must be based on a child's best interests. Courts should consider the relevant best interests considerations set out in subsections 24(2) to (6) of the Act and the additional relocation best interests considerations set out in subsection 39.4(3) of the Act.
47Subsections 39.4(1) to 39.4(4) of the Act reads as follows:
Authorization of relocation
39.4(1) In this section"family arbitration award" has the same meaning as in the Arbitration Act, 1991.
Same
(2) A person who has given notice of a proposed relocation in accordance with section 39.3 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if,
(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or
(b) no objection to the relocation is made in accordance with subsection 39.3(5) and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
Best interests of the child
(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child's life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
Factor not to be considered
(4) In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child's relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.
48The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the legislative relocation provisions in Barendregt v. Grebliunis, 2022 SCC 22. Although it was a final relocation decision the following considerations set out by the court are applicable to temporary relocation motions:
a. In all cases, the history of caregiving will be relevant. And while it may not be useful to label the attention courts pay to the views of the parent as a separate "great respect" principle, the history of caregiving will sometimes warrant a burden of proof in favour of one parent (par. 123).
b. The court should avoid casting judgment on a parent's reasons for moving. A moving parent need not prove the move is justified. And a lack of a compelling reason for the move, in and of itself, should not count against a parent, unless it reflects adversely on a parent's ability to meet the needs of the child. Ultimately, the moving parent's reasons for relocating must not deflect from the focus of relocation applications — they must be considered only to the extent they are relevant to the best interests of the child (pars. 129-130).
c. Relocation that provides a parent with more education, employment opportunities, and economic stability can contribute to a child's wellbeing. These considerations all have direct or indirect bearing on the best‑interests‑of‑the‑child assessment (par. 171).
5.1.2 – Burden of Proof
49Subsections 39.4(5) to 39.4(8) of the Act provide as follows:
Burden of proof
(5) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.
(6) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.
(7) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
(8) If an order referred to in subsection (5) or (6) is an interim order, the court may determine that the subsection does not apply.
5.2 – Analysis
50The parties in this case were residing in the same home before the mother's relocation. There were no existing parenting orders or agreements in place.
51The court found that both parties bore the onus of proving whether the relocation was in the children's best interests.
52The court found that the mother did not meet her onus of proving that the relocation was in the children's best interests. It ordered a return of the children to Toronto, from Belleville, for the following reasons:
a. The mother claimed that she relocated to Belleville to escape from the father's alleged abuse and intimidation. However, the father is being criminally charged. He is prohibited from having contact with her. There was no evidence that he breached his no-contact conditions. The criminal court order protected her.
b. The relocation to Belleville had a negative impact on the children, as follows:
i. LF was removed from his school in Toronto, to a new school in Belleville.
ii. Both children were removed from the community they had known since birth.
iii. The children lived in the same home with their paternal grandfather before moving to Belleville. They had not contacted him since moving.
c. The children were residing in the same home with their parents before relocation. The father had not had contact since they moved to Belleville.
d. The mother did not comply with the notice requirements pursuant to section 39.3 of the Act.
e. The mother proposed to meet halfway with the father for his parenting time. Her proposal was unreasonable for the following reasons:
i. The father was prohibited from having direct contact with her.
ii. The father did not drive due to his medical challenges.
iii. The paternal grandfather did not have a driver's licence.
iv. The nature of the father's injuries and his ongoing treatment would make it challenging for him to have frequent long-distance travel for his parenting time.
v. The father was unemployed. He would have challenges in meeting the costs of travel.
vi. The mother was also unemployed. It would be challenging for her to afford the travel costs.
vii. The mother proposed that the father's other family members assist with the driving for parenting exchanges. She did not provide evidence from the alleged family members of their willingness to drive a long distance to facilitate the father's parenting time. In her own affidavit, she stated that the father's extended family members and friends have had limited to no involvement in the children's lives.
f. There were potential challenges with the mother's relocation plan as she:
i. Is unemployed. She did not pay rent for the first and last months. Her financial challenges added further instability to her residential arrangements.
ii. Claimed to have a strong support network in Belleville. However, she admitted that she did not have immediate family members in Belleville. She also did not provide specific details of her support network.
iii. Stated that a friend provided her current accommodation in Belleville. The father identified the 'friend' as his neighbour in Toronto. It was not clear how long she would stay in her current home. The court was concerned about further instability to the children if the mother changed her residence again.
53The mother was obviously impulsive in the manner she relocated to Belleville from Toronto, without following the relocation provisions of the Act. Where one parent moves to another city or community with a child without notice to the other parent, the other parent may apply to have the child returned to the home community. See: Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 2012 ONSC 5069.
54For the reasons above, the court ordered the mother to return the children to Toronto from Belleville. The court allowed her fourteen days to return, to accommodate the following:
a. She had been residing in the father's home before moving to Belleville. She could not return to his home.
b. The father was on a no-contact order from the criminal court. She could not return to the same neighbourhood.
c. She required a few days to find accommodation in the Toronto area. The children would require a place to live.
d. Her financial resources were significantly limited. She was unemployed and was not receiving child support.
55The court granted the parties an earlier court date of November 24, 2025, to confirm compliance with the return order and to conference the father's parenting time.
Part Six – Police Enforcement
56The father requested police enforcement of any parenting orders from this court. The court did not rule on this issue at the conclusion of the motion.
57A police enforcement order ought to be granted rarely and only in extraordinary circumstances. It should only be granted in very serious cases where there is solid evidence that such interference by the police is necessary. See: Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709.
58It is an order of last resort to be made sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. It can frighten children and polarize a difficult situation. See: Allen v. Grenier [1997] O.J. No. 1198 (General Div.); Klinkhammer v. Dolan and Tulk, 2009 ONCJ 630; F.(M.) v. M.(C.), 2009 NSFC 15, 72 R.F.L. (6th) 226 (N.S. Fam. Ct.).
59The court declines to grant the father's request for police enforcement for the following reasons:
a. It is not necessary.
b. There is no history of non-compliance with court orders.
c. The children have been exposed to family violence. Police involvement would further traumatize them.
d. The mother deposed that she is willing to comply with any orders from this court, including an order to return the children to Toronto.
Part Seven – Costs
60The father requested costs in the amount of $1,000.00.
61The Ontario Court of Appeal in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 set out that modern costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes: (1) to partially indemnify successful litigants; (2) to encourage settlement; (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants and; (4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2(2) of the Family Law Rules.
62Costs can be used to sanction behaviour that increases the duration and expense of litigation, or is otherwise unreasonable or vexatious. In short, it has become a routine matter for courts to employ the power to order costs as a tool in the furtherance of the efficient and orderly administration of justice. See: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, paragraph 25.
63Costs awards are discretionary. Two important principles in exercising discretion are reasonableness and proportionality. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.
64The father was the successful party.
65The mother acted unreasonably by relocating the children to Belleville without following the notice provisions of the Act.
66Subrule 24(7) of the Family Law Rules states that a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a step in a case may be deprived of all or part of the party's own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party's costs.
67The father's alleged abusive conduct may have contributed to the mother acting impulsively when she moved to Belleville with the children.
68The court will decline to award him costs.
Part Eight – Conclusion
69At the conclusion of the motion, the court ordered that the children be returned to Toronto by November 7, 2025.
70For the reasons provided above, the court will make the following additional orders:
a. The mother's request for sole decision-making responsibility is dismissed, without prejudice.
b. The father's claim for a police enforcement order is dismissed.
c. The father's request for costs is dismissed. Each party shall bear their own costs.
Released: November 7, 2025
Signed: Justice Wiri Kapurura