Court of Appeal

This motion concerned an application by a non-lawyer, Mr. Drizen, for leave to represent the corporate appellant, GlycoBioSciences Inc., in an appeal, pursuant to Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding parties also brought a motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the non-lawyer's motion for leave, emphasizing that corporate representation by a non-lawyer is exceptional and discretionary.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet the burden of establishing that leave should be granted, noting concerns about the corporation's financial affairs, past litigation conduct, and the non-lawyer's performance, which did not support an access to justice argument.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action, primarily sounding in defamation, under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff (appellant) had not discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in his consideration of the respondents' defences to the defamation claims and in his weighing of the public interest in the expressions against the plaintiff's interest in proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the action had substantial merit and the respondents had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was permitted to proceed in its entirety.

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jordan Osborne, appealed his first-degree murder conviction on two grounds: the voluntariness of his police statement and alleged abuse of process by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police statement was voluntary, concluding that no implicit inducement or misrepresentation rendered it involuntary, and that the confession was made due to the strength of the case.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding no inconsistency in the Crown's position at trial compared to a co-accused's guilty plea, and no compromise to trial fairness or judicial integrity.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by not putting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury, failing to correct improper Crown comments, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal found there was an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, which should have been put to the jury.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the unusually harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention (lockdowns and triple-bunking) as a mitigating factor, relying on fresh evidence.

The Crown did not oppose the admission of fresh evidence but asserted the original sentence was fit.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and found it warranted a two-month reduction in the appellant's sentence for sexual abuse offences committed against his stepdaughter.

This appeal arose from a failed residential real estate transaction where the appellant purchasers breached the agreement.

The respondent vendors obtained summary judgment for damages, which the appellants challenged, arguing that the vendors failed to mitigate damages by selling the property at an improvident price and that the matter was unsuitable for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that a trial was unnecessary.

The appellate court found that the appellants failed to satisfy their onus to establish improvident sale, noting their failure to adduce expert evidence or cross-examine on affidavits during the summary judgment motion.

This case involves cross-appeals from a conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The appellant, E.N., appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 276 application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant and in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 276 ruling or credibility assessment, which was entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years of probation, arguing it was demonstrably unfit due to errors in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge made no reviewable error and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, having properly applied sentencing principles including denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondents (defendants in the original action) on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant (plaintiff) sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that removed his counsel of record.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that an order for the removal of counsel is interlocutory and must be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay charges against the respondent, Elijah Jacques-Taylor, under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The application judge found a net delay exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling, after deducting defence delay and a period for COVID-19 backlog.

The Crown argued errors in applying the contextual approach to initial date setting, failing to deduct delay from a co-accused's unavailability, and implying the Crown should have severed the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the contextual approach was correctly applied, delay from a co-accused is not automatically attributed to all, and the Crown had tools to address delay without necessarily severing.

The moving parties, Maryanne Carmela Bogdan and Clinton DesJarlais, sought to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal who denied their motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court had dismissed their motions, which claimed they were the actual parents of a child, asserted fraudulent US court orders, and sought to declare Douglas Leonard's second marriage a nullity.

The Superior Court found no jurisdiction as the child resided in Michigan and was subject to Michigan orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Motion Judge's decision to refuse an extension, noting the obvious lack of merit in the appeal, particularly regarding jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act and the marriage declaration.

The motion to set aside the order of the Motion Judge was dismissed.

The appellant, Marguerite Crete, appealed a motion judge's declaration that a snow removal provision in her lease was not inconsistent with the Residential Tenancies Act, making her responsible for snow clearing in areas exclusively used by her.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the snow removal provision was not inconsistent with the RTA, despite finding errors in the motion judge's interpretation of certain RTA sections.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the tenant's responsibility for snow clearing in exclusively used areas.

The appellant challenged an application judge's determination of liability and damages for failure to timely discharge a mortgage, which allegedly deprived the respondent of financing for a secondary property purchase.

The appeal raised four issues: causation (respondent's reliance on equity), remoteness (loss on secondary transaction), mitigation (promptness of court application), and date of damage assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the loss was foreseeable given the appellant's knowledge of the respondent's real estate business, that the respondent adequately mitigated, and that the date of assessment was appropriately chosen.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences and possessing child pornography, receiving a 10-year prison sentence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in a complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant did not meet the factual threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge properly characterized the inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence as "peripheral" distinguishing the case from precedents where inconsistencies were deemed "profound."

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to extinguish spousal support arrears and costs, and to be reimbursed for support paid.

He alleged the original support orders were based on the respondent's false claims and an incorrect premise about his business involvement.

The motion judge found no new evidence and no jurisdiction as the matter was finally adjudicated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that no new evidence was adduced, only additional case law, and that the spousal support issue had been finally resolved in prior proceedings, including a previous appeal.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from police, arguing errors in principle and demonstrable unfitness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the respondent's prior custodial sentences and mischaracterized her criminal record as unrelated.

The Court concluded that the original six-month custodial sentence was demonstrably unfit given the gravity of the offences and the respondent's high degree of moral responsibility and history of defying authority.

The appeal was allowed, and an additional 18 months less a day of incarceration was imposed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, reversing a Divisional Court decision that had quashed an umpire's assessment of actual cash value (ACV) for a fire-damaged business premises under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The Court found that the Divisional Court erred by giving undue weight to market value and by failing to defer to the umpire's reasonable assessment.

It clarified that "actual value" means the value to the insured, which can exceed market value, and that repair estimates are relevant to ACV.

The umpire's pragmatic approach in choosing between parties' proposed ACV amounts was upheld as non-arbitrary, reinforcing the deferential standard of review for such appraisals.

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. (GRE) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice requiring it, as a non-party, to produce financial documents for the valuation of shares held by a deceased in estates litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's discretionary decision.

The court found the documents relevant to the estate's valuation and the validity of the deceased's will, and that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's application of the Rule 30.10 test, emphasizing deference to the lower court's discretion and the effectiveness of the established Confidentiality Protocol in addressing GRE's concerns about privacy and business interests.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal from a summary judgment order in a real estate dispute.

The appellants (purchasers) argued that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate for meaningful appellate review, specifically regarding the breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS), the improvidence of the subsequent sale, and the enforceability of a 20% contractual pre-judgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient, as they merely summarized positions and stated conclusions without providing insight into the reasoning or factual findings.

This appeal concerns a partial stay of proceedings granted by a trial judge due to Charter violations arising from an unauthorized "no-knock" police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in granting a partial stay based on a factual misapprehension and in rejecting alternative remedies.

The Court concluded that while the police misconduct was serious, a stay was not warranted given the lack of evidence of a systemic problem and the availability of alternative remedies like a strong judicial reprimand and potential sentence reduction.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, vacating the stay, and the accused's cross-appeal was dismissed.