Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown's case relied on evidence that the appellant was driving at a very high rate of speed (40-50 km/h above the speed limit) and possibly racing another vehicle when he entered an intersection where a collision occurred with a vehicle making a left turn.

The appellant argued he was driving only somewhat over the speed limit and that the accident resulted from the other driver's illegal left turn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all four grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions on the fault component of dangerous driving were consistent with R. v. Roy, the expert evidence was properly admitted, the instruction regarding Highway Traffic Act convictions was harmless, and the verdict was reasonable.

An appeal concerning the disqualification of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer's transfer between law firms.

The lawyer, who had worked extensively on an insurance coverage dispute for the plaintiff, transferred to the defendant's law firm where he would work closely with opposing counsel.

The court addressed whether an ethical screen could adequately protect the former client's confidential information given the intense working relationship between the two lawyers.

The appeal court upheld the disqualification, finding that while the firm had achieved technical compliance with professional guidelines, the spirit of those guidelines was absent and the presumption of inadvertent disclosure could not be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The appellant appealed an order made by Justice Conway of the Superior Court of Justice regarding production of materials and privilege issues.

The appellant did not attend the motion before Conway J., although properly served.

The respondents did not object to the order.

The Court of Appeal found that the issues were best litigated before Conway J. in the context of the ongoing proceeding, as she was in a better position to tailor an order to the specific circumstances and issues relating to production orders and protection of privileges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent estate trustee and the non-party respondent.

This is a procedural appeal concerning the construction of the trial record.

The respondents sued the appellants for misappropriation of funds from an apartment building.

At trial, the trial judge relied on expert accounting evidence from the respondents' expert and refused to allow the appellants to adduce their own expert evidence late in the trial.

On appeal, the appellants sought to include in their appeal book both their own expert's report and portions of the respondents' expert's report that had not been made exhibits at trial.

A chambers judge ordered these materials excised from the appeal book.

The appellants appealed this decision to the panel.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault, argued that he had reached a treatment impasse at Waypoint and sought an independent assessment and transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence did not substantiate the existence of a treatment impasse and that the Board's decision to maintain detention at Waypoint was well-supported by evidence regarding the appellant's risk to public safety, including his history of water intoxication, threats to staff, and previous elopement from other facilities.

An insurance broker appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against an insurer for indemnification.

The broker had arranged insurance for a client's vehicle but failed to properly communicate the vehicle model to the insurer, resulting in a policy issued for the wrong vehicle.

When the client's vehicle was damaged in an accident, the insurer denied coverage.

The broker's errors and omissions insurer paid the client's claim, and the broker sought recovery from the insurer.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's reasons insufficient for appellate review as they did not address the key contractual indemnification provisions.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was directed to trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment concerning the disposition of approximately $53,000 in proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The trial judge found the husband was the sole owner because the wife had gifted her interest to him to avoid creditors.

The trial judge also found the wife's equalization claim was statute-barred, having fixed the date of separation at December 21, 1996, with the application issued in August 2010.

In the alternative, the trial judge found an equal division would be unconscionable due to the wife's reckless depletion of family property, the husband's payment of all acquisition costs and expenses, and the wife's abusive and controlling behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding the date of separation or ownership of the matrimonial home.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge from the North Bay Regional Health Center.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to focus on whether he posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public as required by s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and that the Board erred in failing to consider whether a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act could mitigate residual risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable given the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, his history of violence, and the evidence that he would discontinue medication if absolutely discharged.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when attacked by a rival gang member in a provincial jail.

The plaintiff sued Ontario and others, alleging that a correctional officer was negligent in placing the plaintiff and the assailant in the same unit despite the jail's policy of separating members of the same gang.

The trial judge found for the plaintiff.

On appeal, Ontario argued that the policy negated any duty of care and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of care and finding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the policy did not negate the common law duty of care, that the correctional officer breached the standard of care by failing to consider inmate incompatibility, and that the negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.

The appellant appealed a change order made by the motion judge on June 10, 2016, which modified access arrangements for a seven-year-old child.

The original access order was made following a two-day trial on February 28, 2014.

The motion judge initially granted enhanced overnight access to the father on Monday and Thursday in alternate weeks to address the child's concerns about evening change-overs, but subsequently revised the order to Thursday overnights only in alternate weeks after the mother objected on child support grounds.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in principle by considering child support implications rather than the best interests of the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's revised endorsement, which was intended to address the presenting issue of evening change-overs while maintaining the overall joint custody arrangement established at trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice and moved to admit fresh evidence demonstrating that the respondent was under administration in the UK after the statement of claim and in liquidation after judgment.

The appellant argued this fresh evidence showed the respondent was not entitled to pursue the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it sufficiently clear from existing exhibits that the claim was a subrogated claim brought by the respondent's credit insurer and therefore not caught by bankruptcy proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his Summary Conviction Appeal by Justice Ferguson, which upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Armstrong at trial.

The primary issue concerned whether the trial judge was obliged to demonstrate an appreciation of the potential impact of interpreter use on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges must bear in mind the effect of testifying through an interpreter on credibility assessment, no specific formulation is required and the approach depends on the circumstances of each case.

The court found no evidence in the trial record that the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's use of an interpreter.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that partially dismissed his summary judgment motion.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's slander claim but refused to dismiss the respondent's sexual assault claim, finding no settlement had been reached and that the respondent's claim was not statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no settlement occurred and that the Sexual Violence and Harassment Action Plan Act, 2016 amendments should not apply retroactively.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and misapplied the law regarding settlement.

However, the court declined to make its own findings on the settlement issue due to significant credibility disputes and directed the matter proceed to trial on all issues.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal allowed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants were successful in their appeal from a Superior Court decision dated February 1, 2016.

The court awarded costs of the motion in the court below and of the appeal to the appellants on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent did not submit costs submissions within the deadline.

The court fixed the appellants' costs at $20,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a partial summary judgment motion.

The appellants (lenders) and respondents (Deloitte) agreed on the quantum of costs for both the motion below and the appeal but disagreed on timing of payment.

The respondents argued costs should remain in the cause based on an alleged agreement that no money change hands on interlocutory motions until final resolution.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding it inconsistent with the respondents' own prior positions and earlier costs orders in the litigation.

The court determined that the motion judge erred in granting partial summary judgment and that costs should be fixed and payable immediately.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 22 months' imprisonment following a home invasion robbery.

The appellant claimed self-defence after striking the intruder with a shovel, causing significant injuries.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant had the intruder under control and administered a gratuitous beating.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding bear spray effects, the timing of acquiring the shovel, and the number of blows struck.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 22-month sentence was within the appropriate range for aggravated assault by a first offender.

The appellant was convicted of one count of break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, two counts of break and enter and commit an indictable offence, and three counts of possession of break-in instruments, arising from three Subway restaurant break-ins in Sault Ste.

Marie over five days in July 2012.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to connect the appellant to all three incidents.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in his use of the appellant's criminal record and made material misapprehensions of the evidence regarding DNA on a balaclava, the appellant's cast on his right arm, and glass particles on his clothing.

These errors were essential to the trial judge's reasoning process and undermined the fairness of the trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that quashed convictions for minor traffic offences on the ground that officers had amended certificates of offence after serving offence notices but before filing the certificates with the court.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Provincial Offences Act does not expressly authorize such amendments, nothing in the statute precludes officers from correcting information on certificates before filing.

The validity of proceedings is preserved under section 90 of the Provincial Offences Act where the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by minor clerical corrections.

The convictions were restored.

The appellants challenged a motion judge's discretionary decision to extend the limitation period under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act and permit the respondents to add the appellants as named defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision, which was based on a finding of special circumstances.

Although there was a lengthy unexplained delay, the motion judge found it was outweighed by other factors, and there was no actual prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.