Court of Appeal

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer.

He appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in rejecting evidence regarding an alternate suspect, and (2) that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability through aiding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly excluded the alternate suspect evidence as lacking sufficient probative value, and that while references to aiding may have been unnecessary, the jury charge read as a whole would not have misled the jury regarding the requirement that the appellant be a principal or joint principal with the requisite mental state.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of possession of controlled substances and possession for the purpose of trafficking based on evidence seized from his residence and vehicle pursuant to search warrants.

The central fact in the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrants was false: the police believed the appellant had sent a text message setting up a drug transaction, but it was actually sent by an employee.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the search warrants invalid, as the false information was the central basis for the residence search, and the remaining evidence was insufficient.

The court also found the warrant overbroad and the execution improper.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence and set aside the convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all outstanding motions brought by the appellant in a matter that originated as a Small Claims Court action for professional negligence in dental treatment.

The appellant had persistently brought multiple motions and proceedings before various courts over several years, repeatedly failing to comply with procedural requirements and time limits.

The court found that the appellant's conduct constituted a frivolous, vexatious abuse of process and imposed restrictions on future filings, requiring leave of court and proof of service on respondent's counsel, as well as satisfaction of outstanding costs orders totalling $3,500.00.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm under section 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

The primary ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's admission of a prior inconsistent statement made by a defence witness for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in conducting an analysis regarding whether the statement could be used for its truth (a matter neither party had addressed), this did not constitute reversible error.

The trial judge had only used the statement for the proper purpose of assessing the witness's credibility and had not relied upon it for its truth in reaching the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for making a threatening gesture (throat-cutting gesture) and his sentence of eight months imprisonment followed by 18 months' probation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant made a throat-cutting gesture was fully supported by evidence, including the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statement.

The gesture was made with the requisite intent to threaten.

The sentence was upheld as appropriate given the seriousness of the offence, the vulnerability of the witness, and the need to protect the judicial process.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for convictions of aggravated assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The sentencing judge had found the appellant to be a dangerous offender under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that a determinate sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's analysis and conclusion that the appellant's proposed release and treatment plans could not adequately protect the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences against his step-sister, who was significantly younger.

The trial judge found the appellant had been in a position of trust and had exploited the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's interventions during trial, and (2) misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding moral damages of $60,000 for breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith in the manner of dismissal, along with general damages of ten months' salary in lieu of notice and $25,000 for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants contended the moral damages award should be reduced to $20,000, arguing the trial judge considered irrelevant factors and that the award duplicated the sexual harassment damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the manner of dismissal holistically, including pre- and post-termination conduct that constituted bad faith.

The court held that moral damages and Human Rights Code damages serve different purposes and do not constitute double recovery.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the victim's identification evidence—based on his knowledge of the appellant, recognition of his voice, identification of a can of bear mace previously in the appellant's possession, and recognition of the appellant when his mask was pulled off—provided a reasonable basis for conviction.

The court also found the trial judge's reasons adequate, demonstrating a proper understanding of the evidentiary record and the dangers of identification evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Karina Neff.

He did not deny killing the deceased but claimed he lacked the mens rea for murder and was therefore guilty of manslaughter.

The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in admitting a video-recorded statement of a witness with a disability under section 715.2 of the Criminal Code when the witness could not confirm the truth of the statement from present recollection; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for mistrial after the Crown made prejudicial remarks in closing address regarding the defence's expert evidence and the issue of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adoption test under section 715.2 is the same as under section 715.1 and does not require present recollection, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing a mistrial and addressing any prejudice through corrective jury instructions.

An applicant convicted of two counts of first degree murder sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying his application for appointed counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued material changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial denial.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated material changes, including: the inmate duty counsel program's refusal to assist; provision of previously missing financial documents to Legal Aid; and evidence addressing concerns about a property foreclosure proceeding.

The court determined both criteria under s. 684(1) were satisfied: it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the complexity and arguability of the appeal, and the applicant lacked sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

Counsel was appointed.

The appellant was convicted after a 21-day jury trial of 32 charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The convictions arose from a pattern of domestic abuse spanning over 10 years, including facilitation of sexual assault by strangers and assaults with various weapons.

The appellant appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and multiple errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance or errors in the charge to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault for anally penetrating a 19-year-old co-worker at a workplace Christmas party without consent.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed on the basis that the sentence was unfit, particularly given that a sentence of six months or more would trigger immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, resulting in loss of the right to appeal a removal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and holding that the trial judge did not err in first determining an appropriate sentence and then considering whether immigration consequences warranted reduction.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly emphasized denunciation and the harm caused by drug trafficking in the community.

The court noted that the trial judge appropriately gave considerable weight to the fact that the appellant had trafficked while on bail for a prior trafficking offense.

Although rehabilitation was not entirely disregarded, it played a secondary role in the sentencing decision.

The sentence was found to be fit, and the appeal was dismissed.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 20, 2016.

The hospital had recommended a conditional discharge, but the Board imposed a detention order with conditions.

The appellant challenged the Board's decision on multiple grounds, including the refusal to order a conditional discharge and the failure to order a second opinion or independent assessment in light of a potential treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in the Board's reasoning regarding the appellant's non-compliance with essential drug treatment and the requirement for hospital-approved residence.

The appellant applied for an order assigning counsel to act on his behalf on appeal under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown acknowledged he lacked sufficient means to retain legal assistance.

The court considered whether it appeared desirable in the interests of justice that the appellant should have legal assistance.

The appellant faced a conviction appeal on a multi-count sexual assault indictment.

The court found merit in the argument that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the jury in assessing credibility, which was central to the case.

The court rejected arguments regarding propensity reasoning and the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The court also found no merit in the sentence appeal ground.

The court ordered that counsel be assigned to advance the credibility ground only.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its unjust enrichment claim against the respondents on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew or ought to have known of all material facts giving rise to the claim by January 2012, when the respondent admitted under cross-examination that Silverwood had supplied flooring for the M5V Project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's testimony that profits were less than the management fee removed the possibility of damage from the appellant's mind, and that the appellant only discovered the actual damage when the respondent later admitted in 2015 that the project had made at least $200,000 in profit.

The action commenced in September 2015 was therefore within the limitation period.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside minutes of settlement in matrimonial proceedings.

The parties had been in a common-law relationship from 1985 to 1999 and had two adult children.

They lived in Canada, England, and Ireland before separating.

The appellant sought to set aside a 2006 settlement agreement on grounds of non-disclosure of assets, including a Spanish property and stock options.

The trial judge found that while the respondent had failed to disclose certain assets, the agreement was fair and the non-disclosure was not material to the appellant's decision to settle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference with an 11-year-old child.

The respondent, then 25 years old, had befriended the victim, engaged in grooming behaviour via text and telephone, and subsequently raped her.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 15 months credit for presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper effect to the principles of deterrence and denunciation, by failing to recognize that the respondent had sought out a young girl, and by failing to consider the significant impact of the offence on the victim as a separate aggravating circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 33 months' imprisonment (resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years after credit for presentence custody).