Court of Appeal

Appeal from conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum correcting an error in the prohibition order.

The trial judge had failed to specify the duration of the prohibition order.

The Court varied the order to impose a 15-year term to the prohibition order as a whole, in accordance with the appellant's request and the Crown's concession.

Two purchasers of condominium units in Trump Tower sought to rescind their agreements of purchase and sale and recover their deposits based on material changes to a hotel unit maintenance agreement disclosed years after the initial purchase agreements.

The respondent developer argued that the purchasers' notices of rescission did not comply with statutory requirements because they used the word "terminate" rather than "rescind" and did not explicitly reference the relevant statutory provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, holding that the Condominium Act, as consumer protection legislation, must be interpreted generously in favour of consumers.

The court found that the notices sufficiently conveyed the purchasers' intention to undo the transactions based on material changes, and that the ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied to claims for return of deposits.

Minority shareholders appealed a trial judgment finding oppressive conduct by majority shareholders in a real estate development company.

The trial judge found that the majority had issued too many shares in response to cash calls when the minority shareholder refused to participate, thereby diluting the minority's ownership interest.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the shareholders' agreement and the calculation of share dilution, with minor adjustments to the valuation calculations.

The court also set aside punitive damages against one defendant due to inadequate notice in the pleadings, and dismissed the appellants' costs appeal.

The appellant, a grandchild of the deceased, appealed the dismissal of her application to remove the named executors and trustees of the deceased's estate.

The executors were the deceased's two sons.

The appellant claimed the executors would not treat her fairly and had breached their fiduciary duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence supporting the appellant's claims.

The court noted that the key property at issue had been sold, the executors had honored the deceased's non-binding request regarding the cottage, and the mere existence of friction between the executors and the appellant's mother did not justify removal.

The deceased was aware of existing tensions but nonetheless named the respondents as executors.

The appellant challenged an order permitting an FBI "clean team" to examine seized computer servers and prepare a report to assist the court in determining what material should be sent to the United States under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The servers were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant in connection with an investigation into alleged copyright infringement.

The court held that while the application judge had jurisdiction under section 15(2) of the Act to make such an order, the application judge erred in failing to consider the effect on the appearance of fairness and judicial impartiality of having an entity closely associated with one of the adversaries examine the material and prepare the report.

The court set aside the order and held that any entity retained to assist the judge should be independent of the interested parties, absent compelling circumstances such as unique expertise.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed his appeal of a small claims court judgment.

The small claims court had awarded damages to the respondent arising from a margin trading account dispute, finding the appellant's defence had no basis in fact or law.

The Divisional Court upheld the judgment, and the appellant failed to file his notice of motion for leave to appeal within the prescribed 15-day period.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The panel affirmed this dismissal, finding the defence had no merit and the appeal lacked any scintilla of merit.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against the respondents.

The central issue was whether the appellant was the sole or majority shareholder of John Bordynuik Inc. of Delaware and therefore entitled to bring claims on behalf of or as an assignee of that company.

The motion judge found that the respondent John Bordynuik was not obliged to give up his shares in the Delaware Company when he purchased his majority interest in JBI Inc. of Nevada.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, accepting her interpretation of the documentary evidence, including an email and share ledger, over the appellant's interpretation of a Settlement Agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court refusing to grant a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order refusing the stay was interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable as of right.

The court distinguished the case from Hopkins v. Kay, where the refusal of a stay had the effect of finally determining the court's jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed with costs fixed at $10,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his civil action seeking damages against his former spouse and her parents for alleged fraudulent concealment of assets.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's claim for damages was premised on an alleged entitlement to an equalization payment governed by the Family Law Act, which can only be pursued in family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting that while the appellant's equalization claim was time-barred under the Family Law Act, he was not necessarily without recourse if he could satisfy the criteria for an extension of time and pursue the matter through family law proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and related charges involving alleged sexual abuse of his stepson when the victim was nine or ten years old.

The victim reported the allegations approximately eight years later.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the grounds that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in various aspects of his credibility assessment and reasoning.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the verdicts were reasonable, the trial judge properly assessed credibility, and there were no errors in the application of the relevant legal principles.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision by Justice Douglas K. Gray dated April 14, 2016.

The Court of Appeal determined that this was not a case warranting substantial indemnity costs, as both parties had pursued and defended their positions vigorously.

The respondents claimed partial indemnity costs of $17,354.08, but the court awarded costs to the respondents in the reduced amount of $13,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his six-year-old son and sentenced to five years imprisonment with ancillary prohibition orders.

He appealed against conviction and sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal aspects of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidence of collusion between the complainant and his mother and no error in the admission of similar fact evidence regarding the appellant's prior conviction for sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl.

The Court granted a limited sentence appeal, varying the prohibition order by deleting a provision regarding communication with persons under 16 and reducing a lifetime proximity ban to 15 years, following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.R.J.

The appellant was convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police entered his home without a warrant, ostensibly to check on the welfare of his autistic son who had wandered to a nearby intersection.

The police discovered a marijuana grow operation in the basement.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the police's initial warrantless entry into the home breached section 8 of the Charter and that the trial judge erred in applying R. v. Godoy beyond its limited scope.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under section 24(2), as the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge who refused leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim by striking certain defences and counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to provide explicit reasons for denying leave to amend and that leave should only be denied in the clearest of cases.

The court allowed the appeal and varied the order to grant leave to amend.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.

The appellant, a father, appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his mortgage action against his son and daughter-in-law.

The trial judge had found the mortgage unenforceable on three grounds: duress, sham, and failure to prove advances.

The Court of Appeal reversed on the first two grounds, finding no duress and that the mortgage was not a sham.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the father failed to prove that funds advanced through a company were made under the mortgage, as opposed to being income to the son.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 20 months imposed by the trial judge for his involvement in a commercial conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the commercial nature of the enterprise and the appellant's level of involvement.

The court also found that the trial judge adequately considered the parity principle in distinguishing the appellant's sentence from that of a co-conspirator who received 30 months.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of an Offer to Lease.

The appellant moved into the respondent's rental property but vacated after three weeks, claiming either no contract existed or the respondent had fundamentally breached it.

The trial judge found a binding agreement existed, rejected claims of fundamental breach, and awarded damages of $233,146.30 with 12% annual interest compounded monthly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on liability and the discretionary award of interest.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing the appellant's action for domain name disputes and an order dismissing the appellant's motion to strike paragraphs of the respondent's statement of defence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to adjourn the summary judgment motion, no error in dismissing the motion to strike, and no basis to interfere with the costs award.

The court found that the appellant had registered domain names confusingly similar to the respondent's marks in bad faith and had engaged in unethical and deceptive conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision that structured settlement annuity payments received by the appellant should be treated as property rather than income under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge had found that the annuity payments fell within the definition of property and were not excluded property under section 4(2)3 of the Act, and therefore should not be treated as income for spousal support purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that structured settlement annuity payments should be treated as income, not property, for purposes of the Act.