Court of Appeal

The applicant sought review of a detention order denying judicial interim release pending extradition proceedings to the United States for unauthorized use of a computer.

The applicant argued the application judge erred in principle and that material changes in circumstances warranted variation of the order.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors in the application judge's analysis of flight risk, public protection, and public confidence grounds.

The court rejected the argument that fresh evidence regarding the charges constituted a material change in circumstances.

The application was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the serious nature of cybercrime and the applicant's significant flight risk.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 22 months imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant raised issues regarding DNA testing of the complainant's underwear and challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding his alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

On sentencing, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, but concluded the error did not justify a lesser sentence given the victim's young age, the breach of trust, the serious impact on the victim, and the appellant's prior criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The applicant sought to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay and requested a 30-day extension of time to perfect his appeal from Superior Court orders dated June 11 and August 7, 2013.

Justice Cronk dismissed the motion and granted the respondent's cross-motion prohibiting the applicant from bringing further motions in the proceeding, except for a motion to a full panel to review Cronk J.A.'s decision.

This panel decision confirms Cronk J.A.'s order, finding no merit to the applicant's submissions regarding lack of competent jurisdiction or denial of due process.

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

The appellant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and one count of gross indecency relating to a complainant (TS) for events that occurred in 1978 when the complainant was 16 years old and the appellant was her skating coach.

He received a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the admission of reply evidence from the complainant's boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessments and determining that the reply evidence was properly admitted as it addressed a live issue that arose from the defence case.

Appellants purchased a franchise from the respondent and sought rescission under section 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 on the basis that no proper disclosure document was provided.

The motion judge found the disclosure deficient but held that the appellants received sufficient information to make an informed decision and that deficiencies were not significant or misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that material deficiencies in the disclosure document—specifically the absence of two required director signatures and failure to provide current audited financial statements—rendered the purported disclosure document invalid under the Act and Regulation.

The appellants were entitled to rescission under section 6(2).

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking his claim for negligent investigation against the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The motion judge relied on section 9 of the Law Society Act, which provides statutory immunity for actions against Law Society officials and, by extension, the Law Society itself.

The appellant argued that Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada had been superseded by Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, which established the tort of negligent investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory immunity in section 9 of the Law Society Act remains binding and that Hill did not operate to extinguish such immunity.

The court also noted that only a five-judge panel could revisit the binding precedent of Edwards, which the appellant did not seek.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and masking his face, and was sentenced to a global sentence of twelve years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, seeking leave to appeal and relying on fresh evidence regarding his personal history, including his status as a Crown ward and his victimization by physical and sexual abuse while in state care.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by failing to obtain or consider information about the appellant's personal circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to ten years' imprisonment, finding that the sentencing judge's error impacted the fitness of the sentence and that the appellant's personal circumstances were relevant to assessing his moral blameworthiness.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his appeal to the Superior Court from his conviction in the Ontario Court of Justice for uttering threats to cause death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the test on both branches: there was no question of law with arguable merit and significance to the administration of justice, and there was no clear error in the decision below.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding solicitor-client privilege, finding that such privilege did not apply to the communications in question and that the summary conviction appeal judge was not required to address the issue in his reasons.

The appellant sought a review of a decision by Justice MacPherson denying an extension of bail.

The appellant moved for appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code and for an adjournment of the review, citing medical evidence of unfitness to self-represent.

The court found the review moot because the appellant had been released from custody by the Vanier Institute.

The court dismissed the application and imposed restrictions on the appellant's ability to bring further motions without written permission, finding her conduct vexatious and an excessive drain on judicial resources.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and assault following his arrest by Toronto Parking Authority security guards in a parking lot.

For the first time on appeal, the appellant raised Charter violations by police, claiming the police illegally continued an unreasonable citizen's arrest and conducted an unlawful search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not raise new Charter issues for the first time on appeal because he had expressly conceded at trial that police had not violated his Charter rights.

The court found the appellant failed to meet the preconditions for raising new issues on appeal, including an incomplete evidentiary record and uncertainty regarding whether the failure to raise the issue was tactical.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the assault charge.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder of his common law partner and sentenced to 17 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

Amicus raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial when new evidence emerged during jury deliberations regarding the blue bathrobe used as a murder weapon, and (2) the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of the officer-in-charge regarding information from a confidential informant about the appellant's alleged ties to organized crime.

The appellant also raised additional arguments regarding Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the new evidence, the evidentiary rulings, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and breach of probation.

The victim was his teenage daughter, from whom he had been estranged for many years before reconnecting in 2010.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments and claimed the trial judge applied inconsistent standards of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were entitled to deference and were supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, as was the abandoned sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judgment in a matrimonial case.

The trial judge had imposed a restraining order, prohibited the appellant from initiating further court proceedings without leave, awarded costs of $52,899.32 to the respondent, and the appellant alleged judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and designed to clarify evidence and maintain trial control in a high-conflict case involving a self-represented litigant.

The restraining order was justified by findings of persistent abusive behaviour and threatening communications.

The prohibition on further proceedings was grounded in the litigation history and the appellant's admitted future litigious intentions.

The costs award was properly reasoned and not plainly wrong.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to strike out and declare void Personal Property Security Act registrations filed by the respondent.

The appellant argued that without a signed security agreement, the PPSA registrations were invalid.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the motion judge's order was interlocutory, not final.

The court held that the order did not finally dispose of the real matter in dispute between the parties, which concerned the equipment's deficiencies and the parties' respective obligations, rather than the validity of the security interest itself.

The appeal was quashed with costs, and the appellant was directed to pursue an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and a Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation for damages arising from sexual assault.

The corporation cross-claimed against the estate for contribution and indemnity.

The motion judge applied section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the two-year limitation period ran from service of the plaintiff's claim on the corporation.

The estate appealed, arguing section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied, with the limitation period running from the priest's death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applies to cross-claims and prevails over section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 by virtue of section 19(4) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The cross-claim was statute-barred.

An appellant appealed a disposition decision of the Ontario Review Board dated June 7, 2016, which declined to modify the conditions of his detention order to provide broader community access privileges.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for second degree murder and was detained at a mental health facility.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board failed to consider readily available and relevant information from the original NCR hearing; and second, that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the NCR hearing information was not material to the narrow issue before the Board regarding whether the appellant's risk could be managed through modified detention terms.