Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board dated January 5, 2017, which ordered his detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care – Provincial Forensic Division.

The appellant did not challenge the Board's finding that he posed a significant threat to public safety but argued that his transfer from CAMH to Waypoint was not necessary and appropriate for managing that risk.

He contended that the Board failed to consider the context of his behaviour and that the announcement of his transfer triggered his deterioration.

He also argued the Board did not give sufficient weight to the disruption of his therapeutic and familial relationships.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and amply supported by evidence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in a child protection matter.

The appellant, a foster-to-adopt mother, sought costs against the respondent child protection agency (Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell) for both the appeal before the Court of Appeal and the prior appeal before the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that exceptional circumstances existed because the agency had acted unfairly in appealing the motion judge's decision granting her status in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, finding that the agency's decision to appeal did not warrant a costs award, particularly as the court's decision provided guidance on relevant factors for adding parties in child protection proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The conviction was based on the appellant's assault of a bar patron with a pool cue, causing serious and permanent injuries.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's acceptance of the bar owner's identification evidence and the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant admitted to the assault.

The appellant also challenged the dangerous offender designation, arguing that the two incidents relied upon did not constitute a sufficient pattern of repetitive or persistent aggressive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's decision on a franchise dispute under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in preventing cross-examination regarding the respondent's financing arrangements with Toronto Dominion Bank and in permitting counsel to reference the bank's judgment against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the source of funds paid by the franchisee to the franchisor is irrelevant to the statutory entitlement to refund under the Act.

The court affirmed that Ontario's legislated payback scheme requires the franchisor to refund all money received from the franchisee, regardless of how those funds were obtained.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated October 16, 2016.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge from a conditional discharge, arguing the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Board upheld the conditional discharge, finding the appellant remained a significant threat based on expert evidence that absolute discharge would lead to medication non-compliance and increased marijuana use, resulting in decompensation and threatening behavior.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable and supported by evidentiary foundation.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment dated July 4, 2016.

The appellant had been served with a statement of claim alleging he had provided an oral personal guarantee for $50,000 on a loan agreement.

The appellant failed to defend the action and was noted in default, resulting in a default judgment being entered.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the appellant had acknowledged his debt through communications with the respondent and had deliberately delayed responding to the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no overriding or palpable error or error of law in the exercise of discretion.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sexual assault conviction from the Summary Convictions Appeal Court.

He raised four issues: (1) admission of fresh expert evidence regarding the complainant's medical condition; (2) admission of the complainant's undisclosed criminal record; (3) admissibility of the complainant's videotaped hearsay statement under the Khelawon framework; and (4) whether a Charter s. 11(b) delay violation occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and holding that the Jordan framework did not apply retroactively to trials completed before its release.

The appellant sought to set aside a chambers judge's decision dismissing her motion to perfect her appeal without filing a transcript of proceedings from a 20-day jury trial.

The appellant argued financial inability to obtain transcripts and sought leave to file a digital audio recording instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's decision, finding that transcripts were necessary given the fact-driven nature of the issues on appeal.

The court acknowledged that while modern technology may eventually allow for more flexible procedures, such experimentation should occur with consent of all parties and active judicial management.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants successfully appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice that had reinstated a default judgment and permitted the sale of certain property.

The appeal was allowed because the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts concerning the appellants' alleged default and participation in the action when attending before the court without notice to the appellants.

The appellants were self-represented throughout most of the proceedings and only retained counsel a few months before the appeal was argued.

The court awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity basis, finding their claim for substantial or full indemnity costs to have no basis and their partial indemnity claim to be excessive and disproportionate.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's orders awarding the respondent ongoing spousal support of $25,000 per month in a 26-year marriage and costs of $250,000.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by not explicitly providing for a review of spousal support upon retirement; (2) the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent had no beneficial interest in business shares transferred during the marriage; (3) contingent on ground two, the spousal support award was excessive; and (4) the trial judge's costs award was based on a purely mathematical approach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusions.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motion judge's decision finding that an unknown driver caused or contributed to a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant challenged the motion judge's credibility findings regarding a witness and argued the judge engaged in speculation rather than rational inference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's approach, noting that the judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings based on the whole of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

An appeal from a motion judge's order rectifying a will to correct a drafting error.

The estate trustee sought to correct the will to reflect the deceased's intention to liquidate sufficient shares to provide two children with $1 million each.

The widow, who did not challenge the will and elected to take under it, appealed the rectification order and sought leave to appeal the costs disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle and that the factual findings were amply supported by evidence.

Leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The trial judge found that while the appellant initially acted in self-defence during an altercation with an intruder in his apartment, he went beyond the limits of self-defence by continuing to strike the victim with a metal object after the threat had diminished.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the significant mitigating factors arising from the appellant's initial justification in self-defence and the victim's role as an aggressor and trespasser.

The sentence was reduced from six years to time served (approximately two and one-half years).

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm and drug-related offences and his sentence of four and a half years custody.

He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, primarily arguing that trial counsel failed to seek exclusion of evidence obtained during an allegedly unlawful detention and search.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's decision not to pursue a Charter application was reasonable and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also rejected the appellant's other claims of ineffective assistance regarding disclosure, witness testimony, and counsel's absence on the first day of trial.

Both the conviction appeal and leave to appeal sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was consent.

The complainant testified she did not consent to sexual intercourse that occurred in her dormitory room.

The appellant did not testify but provided a police statement claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the appellant's statements unbelievable, convicting him based on the circumstances of the incident and the appellant's pattern of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following conviction on four counts: sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault against his biological daughter when she was 13-14 years old.

He was sentenced to eight years in penitentiary.

The Crown opposed bail on public interest grounds, arguing that the seriousness of the offence and length of sentence warranted detention.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding that the grounds of appeal were sufficiently strong to meet the threshold under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, particularly given the incomplete reasons for conviction and the appellant's lengthy history of bail compliance without incident.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claims against multiple respondents related to alleged breaches of exclusion and limitation of liability clauses in entertainment contracts.

The appellant raised an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias based on comments made by the motion judge regarding a public policy argument.

The Court of Appeal rejected the bias allegation, finding the judge's comments were directed at the merits of the unsupported public policy claim, not at the appellant's indigenous culture or beliefs.

The Court upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contractual provisions and rejection of the unconscionability argument.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment finding its building in St. Thomas unsafe under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The applicant also sought an injunction to prevent demolition pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions.

The court found that the applicant had not formed an unequivocal intention to appeal, the delay in bringing the motion was not adequately explained, there was significant prejudice to the respondents due to the unsafe condition of the building and public safety concerns, and the appeal lacked merit as the application judge's findings were well-reasoned and supported by evidence.