Court of Appeal

The appellant dismissed the respondent, a 55-year-old professional engineer with approximately two decades of management experience, without cause on December 16, 2016.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent, awarding 12 months' salary, benefits and pension contributions in lieu of notice, and a $12,000 discretionary bonus for the year of termination.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the notice period should be reduced to 8 to 10 months and challenging the bonus award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the motion judge's determinations were entitled to deference.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his counterclaim against his former counsel, Lang Michener LLP.

The counterclaim alleged negligent advice regarding a potential claim against his professional liability insurer (LawPro) for coverage of an Italian judgment based on fraud.

The motion judge found no coverage existed under the policy because the Italian judgment was based on fraud rather than professional negligence or error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the Italian court had explicitly declined jurisdiction over professional liability claims and the judgment was based on extra-contractual fraud, not professional services.

The court also upheld the costs award of $45,000 against the appellant.

The appellant, a hotel owner, sought recovery for fire damage to its building caused by a fire in the respondents' leased restaurant space.

The appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action in the appellant's name.

The respondents argued that the lease terms barred the insurer from pursuing the claim.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the landlord's covenant to insure and the tenant's contribution to insurance costs triggered the principles established in the Supreme Court trilogy, preventing subrogation against the tenant.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the lease contained explicit "notwithstanding" language that overcame the trilogy principles and preserved the tenant's liability for its own negligence.

Crown appeal from a successful defence summary conviction appeal.

The respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on circumstantial evidence including observations of impairment, prescription pill bottles found in the vehicle, and the effects of the drugs matching the respondent's behaviour.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, finding insufficient evidence that the pill bottles contained the drugs on their labels or that those drugs were in the respondent's system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying an incorrect standard of review and substituting its opinion for that of the trial judge.

The conviction was restored.

The appellants, a developer, appealed from a summary judgment that dismissed claims for conspiracy and negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against appraisers, and ordered a mini-trial on claims of negligence, inducing breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the conspiracy and misrepresentation claims, finding no reasonable reliance and no evidence of conspiracy.

The court also set aside the mini-trial order and dismissed the remaining claims, finding they had no possibility of success due to lack of reliance, absence of unlawful conduct, and expiration of the limitation period.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant had bitten off the complainant's ear during an altercation at the complainant's residence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the description of the attack and his drinking habits; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about the cause of the injury without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, that any inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine the core allegations, and that the trial judge did not speculate but rather accepted the complainant's uncontradicted testimony.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a pharmaceutical patent dispute.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs in the cause was not appropriate and awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis: $15,000 from Takeda and $25,000 from Abbott, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug charges.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis that there was no forensic evidence connecting the accused to illicit items in a safe, concluding that the accused lacked the requisite knowledge of the presence of drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error of law, as constructive possession can be proven by circumstantial evidence without forensic evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for compensation regarding Block 203, a land parcel transferred to the City of Brampton pursuant to a Subdivision Agreement.

The appellant argued that Block 203 was conveyed on condition that it be used as a road and sought compensation after the City did not use it for that purpose some 20 years later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the Subdivision Agreement contained no condition requiring reconveyance or compensation for Block 203, unlike other parcels covered by the agreement.

The court also dismissed the appellant's challenge to the costs award of $53,667.

The appellant, Sikh Spiritual Centre Toronto, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside a consent order dated February 4, 2016 that enforced a settlement agreement between three not-for-profit charitable corporations operating Sikh temples.

The settlement concerned repayment of loaned monies.

The appellant argued the settlement was entered into without proper authority and was improvident.

The motion judge found the Director who authorized the settlement had proper authority from the Board of Directors and that the settlement was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors and declining to interfere with the discretionary costs award.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding that it had improperly used a post-tender addendum process as a form of "bid shopping" after accepting the respondent's bid.

The trial judge found that a contract had been formed when the municipality's council resolved to award the contract to the respondent, and that the subsequent re-tendering process and award to another bidder constituted a breach of the municipality's contractual obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that all bidders must be treated fairly in the tender process and that once a bid is accepted and a resolution issued, the municipality is obligated to issue a purchase order incorporating the agreed contract terms.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of historical sexual assault against two teenage nieces committed between 1976 and 1986, and received a global sentence of six years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence regarding his 2009 convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly given the striking similarities in the circumstances of the incidents despite some dissimilarities in the nature of the acts.

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, cocaine, and drug proceeds, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant possessed a Browning semi-automatic handgun, cocaine, and a scale that were discovered in the snow outside a bedroom window after the appellant fled a police-surveilled apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have inferred that he personally placed these items outside, contending that others could have thrown them or that a young person who also fled could have dropped them.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding that the trial judge's inference was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's clothing capacity, his crouching action near the items, and the lack of opportunity for others to have disposed of them.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision and costs order from the Superior Court.

The motion judge had awarded the appellant $118,954.95 in damages for breach of contract arising from the respondents' refusal to close on a property purchase, but awarded no costs.

The appellant challenged both the calculation of the $43,000 property value difference and the denial of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on damages but allowed the appeal on costs, finding the motion judge erred in principle by depriving the successful party of all costs without exceptional circumstances justifying such a punitive order.

The applicants sought leave to appeal their convictions under the Environmental Protection Act following a 14-day trial and a subsequent appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicants were convicted of nine provincial offences related to discharging contaminants into the environment and failing to comply with lawful orders issued following catastrophic propane explosions at their facility that killed one employee and displaced approximately 12,000 residents.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, which requires identification of a pure question of law that is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The court found that the two grounds of appeal raised by the applicants were fact-laden and did not identify pure questions of law transcending the unique factual circumstances of the case.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Glen Davis in a Toronto parking garage.

The appellant's nephew orchestrated the murder and recruited the appellant and others to carry it out.

The appellant's defence was that he had a last-minute change of heart and did not shoot Davis, but rather his co-accused did.

The appeal raised three grounds: that the trial judge unjustifiably curtailed cross-examination of key Crown witnesses; that the trial judge erred in giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction; and that the trial judge erred in his charge regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that despite some questionable interventions, the trial was fair and the conviction was supported by compelling evidence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm under section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mens rea component by relying on the respondent's lack of deliberate intention to create danger and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the established test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, properly considered whether the respondent had deliberate intention to cause danger, and appropriately applied the modified objective test in concluding there was no marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

He contended that the arresting officer violated his Charter rights by failing to consider whether residual mouth alcohol could have distorted the accuracy of the approved screening device (ASD) test result.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while officers should consider residual mouth alcohol as a matter of good practice, the failure to do so does not constitute a Charter violation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest and make an evidential breath demand based on the information available to her at the time.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that the insurer had no duty to defend based on exclusions in the Commercial General Liability Policy.

The appellants argued that the care, custody, or control exclusion did not apply because some damage may have occurred after the vines left their care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the pleadings alleged the defect was caused by the appellants' negligent treatment while the vines were in their care, custody, or control, triggering the exclusion.

Additionally, the court found that an alternative exclusion for damage resulting from fungi or spores also applied.