Court of Appeal

The appellant, principal of a hotel corporation that defaulted on mortgage financing, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding interpretation of a forbearance agreement.

The appellant argued that under the forbearance agreement with the respondent lender, the debt was limited to $8.5 million (the amount paid to discharge the original mortgage), rather than the full $17 million outstanding.

The appellant also sought relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that the forbearance agreement clearly assigned the full $17 million debt and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted as the transaction was not unconscionable and the result was not disproportionate.

The appellants brought an appeal from a motion judge's decision dated December 6, 2018.

At the hearing, the appellants, who were self-represented, indicated their intention to withdraw the appeal.

After being advised of the consequences—that dismissal as abandoned would result in the motion judge's decision standing and the appeal not being heard—the appellants confirmed their understanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of numerous sexual offences against various family members.

On appeal, the appellant challenged convictions relating to two victims, arguing the trial judge failed to address their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed credibility and reliability considerations in his reasons.

However, the court accepted the Crown's concession that the trial judge erred in considering pre-undertaking conduct when convicting on one count of breaching an undertaking, and set aside that conviction and stayed the charge.

The court also accepted the Crown's concession regarding pre-sentence custody credit, awarding an additional 503 days at a 1.5:1 rate.

The appellant sought an assessment of 30 accounts totalling over $600,000 from his former counsel over approximately two and a half years of representation in a family law proceeding.

Of these accounts, 26 were paid in full and four remained unpaid.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to establish special circumstances warranting assessment of the paid accounts under section 11 of the Solicitors Act, and declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction to assess the unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant claimed his lawyer failed to properly prepare him for trial, made improper admissions, failed to present relevant evidence, and colluded with the Crown.

The Court of Appeal rejected all allegations, finding that defence counsel's performance met the standard of reasonably competent counsel.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his fine and compensation orders based on impecuniosity, but the Court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on multiple offences including theft, threatening, fail to stop, and break and enter.

The sentencing judge accepted the defence range of 18-24 months and imposed a sentence of 21 months after deducting pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge made a mathematical error in calculating the sentence and failed to expressly consider the appellant's Indigenous background.

The court reduced the total sentence to 17 months, including five months credit for pre-sentence custody, by reducing the sentences for theft and threats by four months on each count.

The appellant appealed her convictions for counselling murder, criminal harassment, and breaching court orders arising from a prolonged campaign of harassment against her former domestic partner and his new wife.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sought to incite her brother and ex-husband to murder her former partner by falsely claiming he had sexually assaulted her daughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence of 10 years effective on the counselling murder charge, finding no legal error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary rulings, or sentencing analysis.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment followed by 3 years probation.

The case involved a single issue: whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse.

The complainant testified she was asleep when the appellant penetrated her; the appellant claimed consent.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, accepted the complainant's testimony, and found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, failure to consider intellectual limitations, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis and that the sentence was well within the applicable range.

An appeal concerning a freedom of religion challenge to the medical and legal criteria for determining death.

The appellant's substitute decision-makers sought to prevent the withdrawal of life support and to rescind a death certificate based on the appellant's religious belief that death occurs only when the heart stops beating, not upon total brain death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's conclusion that the claim could not succeed.

However, the court provided important guidance on the proper analytical approach to Charter rights and Charter values, clarifying that the appellant should have been presumed to be a Charter rights holder for purposes of the substantive analysis, and that the application judge erred in her methodology regarding freedom of religion analysis and Charter values application to the common law.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision upholding a Crown wardship (extended care) order for four children.

The parents appealed, seeking return of the children to their care and challenging the access order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request based on alleged inappropriate text messages from Society workers, finding that even if the workers were discredited, ample independent evidence supported the protection finding and extended care order.

The court upheld the appeal judge's decision, which maintained the extended care order while granting access to the parents, finding this arrangement best served the children's interests.

This appeal concerns the applicable scale of costs when a municipality unsuccessfully appeals an expropriation matter to the courts.

The Ontario Municipal Board ordered compensation to the property owner.

The municipality appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal but awarded only partial indemnity costs of $7,500 rather than full indemnity costs of $23,586.84.

The Divisional Court declined to apply section 32(1) of the Expropriations Act, ruling that ordinary court costs rules applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the principle reflected in section 32(1) should apply to court proceedings, entitling the successful respondent to full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a young woman with an intellectual disability.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the majority held that the trial judge's reasons were deficient in several respects: the trial judge failed to adequately address the complainant's reliability, particularly her heightened suggestibility as established by expert evidence; the trial judge appeared to find the complainant's evidence self-corroborating when it was not; and the trial judge failed to explain why the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The majority concluded these deficiencies, taken together, foreclosed meaningful appellate review and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The dissent argued the trial judge's reasons were adequate and that the trial judge was clearly alive to the reliability issues.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from a conviction on four counts of threatening his professor and family members.

The trial judge provided thorough reasons with careful credibility findings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal and rejected the applicant's motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no proper basis for leave, no legal errors by the lower court, and that the issues did not transcend the facts of the case or raise matters of significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision ordering his continued detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for reasons of mental disorder in 2008 and 2011.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on three grounds: (1) the Board improperly used the appellant's request for discharge as evidence of lack of insight; (2) the Board's analysis on whether the appellant would pose a significant risk to public safety was insufficient and conflated risk of mental health relapse with risk to public safety; and (3) the Board improperly included a finding that the appellant had sexually assaulted a minor when he had been acquitted of that charge.

The appellant was entitled to a new hearing before the Board.

The appellant appealed his conviction for shooting a handgun at a person on a residential street in Ottawa.

The trial judge admitted but gave no weight to the appellant's alibi evidence because it was disclosed late (on the second day of trial, nearly a year after the alleged offense) and because the trial judge disbelieved the explanation for the late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly drew an adverse inference regarding the late alibi disclosure and properly rejected the credibility of the explanation offered by the appellant's brother.

An appeal by Royal Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (RSA) from a trial judge's decision that RSA was responsible to provide insurance coverage to the estate of Steven Devecseri, who was killed in a motorcycle accident in 2006.

Devecseri had alcohol in his system at the time of the accident, which breached both his M2 driver's licence restrictions and his insurance policy terms.

RSA did not learn of the alcohol consumption until 2009 during discovery proceedings, at which point it took an off-coverage position.

The trial judge found that RSA waived its right to deny coverage by failing to obtain the coroner's report in 2006 and by defending the claim without taking a reservation of rights.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that RSA did not waive coverage and was not estopped from denying coverage because it lacked actual knowledge of the policy breach until 2009.

The appellant, a real estate development company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents regarding a request for proposals for the redevelopment of Toronto waterfront property.

The appellant's proposal was disqualified for listing an ineligible person as an advisor.

When the appellant requested reconsideration, the sponsors declined to rescind the disqualification.

The appellant argued the sponsors owed a duty of fairness in the reconsideration process and that the fairness monitor was inadequately involved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the reconsideration process on a factual basis, without deciding the legal question of whether a duty of fairness was owed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of civil contempt for breaching a parenting order.

The motion judge found that the appellant had intentionally picked up the children from school on a day when he was not entitled to do so, contrary to the court order governing transitions.

While the Court of Appeal found that the three elements of civil contempt were established beyond a reasonable doubt, it held that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider whether to exercise her discretion to decline to make a contempt finding.

The Court emphasized that the contempt power is discretionary and should be exercised as a last resort, particularly in high-conflict matrimonial cases involving children.

The appeal was allowed and the contempt finding was set aside.

An NCR accused appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with discretionary community living privileges.

The appellant argued he posed no significant risk to public safety, citing 15 years without violent behaviour, and sought an absolute discharge or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board properly considered all relevant factors under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded the appellant continues to pose a significant threat to public safety based on his mental illness, lack of insight, substance abuse issues, and criminal history.

The court emphasized that absence of violent behaviour does not eliminate risk of serious psychological harm, and that Part XX.1 is designed to protect public safety before violence occurs.