Real Estate Law - OCA

The appellant condominium corporations appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The appellants sought a declaration that the respondent developers acted oppressively by failing to provide a cost-sharing agreement for shared facilities between the residential condominiums and the commercial freehold ground floor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to establish a breach of reasonable expectations or oppressive conduct, as the absence of a cost-sharing agreement was fully disclosed to purchasers.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the respondents were privies to a prior foreclosure proceeding against the elder Marinos.

The appellant argued the respondents were independent debtors without a community of interest.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the respondents were privies and that issue estoppel applied against the appellant, dismissing the appeal.

The moving party, a commercial tenant who built a store on the subject property, sought a stay of an order approving the sale and vesting of the property free and clear of its interests pending appeal.

The court granted the stay to preserve the status quo, finding the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if its appeal became moot.

To alleviate prejudice to the responding party mortgagee, the moving party was ordered to continue paying rent into trust and to deposit a $100,000 letter of credit.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that extinguished their title to two strips of land between adjoining properties due to the respondents' adverse possession, and awarded damages for trespass.

The trial judge found that a fence and sidewalk were constructed based on a mutual mistake regarding the property line.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on adverse possession or trespass damages.

The respondents agreed to grant a permanent easement for the appellants' roof overhang.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment holding them liable in negligence and nuisance for water damage to the respondent's basement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made three fatal legal errors: improperly shifting the burden of proof by finding a 'presumption of negligence', imposing a non-existent duty on the appellants to assert a claim against the city on behalf of the respondent, and applying a material contribution test for causation instead of the standard 'but for' test.

The self-represented appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his solicitor negligence action against the respondent.

The appellant claimed the respondent's negligence caused properties to be sold at depressed prices under power of sale, preventing him from recovering his investment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant knew of the power of sale proceedings but took no steps to protect his unsecured investment.

The court confirmed there was no legal basis for the respondent to register a lien on the properties, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent leave to issue a writ of possession for a property.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by refusing her request for an adjournment as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion based on the case's chronology.

On the merits, the court upheld the order as the appellant had no legal interest in the property, though she was permitted to continue a separate action regarding fraud allegations.

The appellants purchased a house from the respondent vendors and subsequently discovered defects.

They sued the vendors for fraud and the home inspector for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against all defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellants' expert evidence was insufficient to ground a fraud claim against the vendors, and that the home inspector's report clearly identified defects and limitations.

The court also rejected the appellants' claim of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action against the respondent lawyers arising from a failed life lease project.

The appellants argued the lawyers failed to advise them of legal uncertainties regarding life leases and were in a conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual finding that any failure to advise did not cause the appellants' losses, as they would have proceeded with the project regardless.

The court also upheld the trial judge's damages calculation, which deducted the increased value of the excavated property from the project costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting possession of mortgaged property, specifically challenging the determination of the mortgage quantum and the disposition of a share.

The respondent conceded that the order regarding the share disposition could not stand.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quantum determination, noting the appellants had participated in a full hearing on the issue without objection.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the share disposition, but otherwise dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to correct a formal judgment regarding a mortgage principal amount, challenge a costs order, and request a stay of enforcement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part solely to correct the principal amount in the formal order.

The remainder of the appeal was dismissed, as the costs order was appropriate and the stay request had been addressed in subsequent orders.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order that struck their claim against a corporate representative personally and imposed conditions on an injunction restraining mortgage enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed no personal cause of action against the representative and that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in requiring the appellants to pay renewal fees and monthly mortgage payments as a condition of equitable relief.

The Regional Municipality of Peel appealed a trial judgment finding it solely responsible for flood damage to the plaintiffs' homes caused by sewer backups during heavy rainfalls in 1995 and 1996.

The Region argued that the City of Brampton's storm sewer system was deficient and contributed to the flooding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the flooding was caused by a failure of the sanitary sewer system, which the Region took over responsibility for in 1974.

There was no evidence that Brampton's storm sewer system was negligently operated or caused the flooding.

The appellant appealed an order appointing a receiver over its social housing projects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The respondent was the only entity with a direct financial interest, and the appellant was insolvent.

The court agreed that a receiver was appropriate to protect the social housing stock, even pending the determination of the appellant's separate motion regarding disputed subsidies.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding it had trespassed by appropriating 210 square metres of the respondents' land to construct a berm for a Tim Hortons.

The trial judge ordered an injunction to remove the encroachment and directed a trial on damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trespass finding or the injunction, noting the appellant offered no evidence that removing the encroachment would be oppressive.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application regarding a commercial lease dispute.

The application judge had concluded the matter could not be decided on application and dismissed it without prejudice to the appellant's right to commence an action.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the main issue—whether the landlord's failure to sign and return an amending agreement amounted to a failure to reach a binding agreement—could not be decided on application.

However, the Court revised the procedural remedy, ordering the trial of an issue rather than requiring a new action to be commenced.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant purchased contaminated property at a reduced price.

The respondent, who caused the contamination, agreed to remediate the property to a specified standard and indemnify the purchaser for any loss arising from the contamination.

The appellant later sold the property at a profit but claimed damages under the indemnity for reduced profit due to 'contamination stigma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant suffered no loss as the reduced purchase price already accounted for the stigma, and the indemnity agreement did not cover this diminution in value.

The appellant closed an access road leading to the respondents' landlocked cottage properties after the respondents refused to pay an increased annual user fee.

The appellant argued it could close the road without a court order under the Road Access Act because the respondents had 'alternate road access' via an unopened municipal road allowance or by paying the requested fee for the existing road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'alternate road access' requires an existing, different road, and neither an unopened road allowance nor the same road subject to a fee qualifies.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent Bank had not misrepresented whether their mortgage was life insured.

At the outset of the appeal, an agent for the appellants' counsel requested an adjournment due to counsel's medical condition.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment, noting the age of the appeal, the unsatisfactory form of the request, and the prejudice to the respondent.

On the merits, the Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that the appellants knew the mortgage was not life insured.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for a declaration of ownership of a property he lost in power of sale proceedings.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding there had been an appraisal and that the property's development potential was not properly marketed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion on the appraisal was supported by evidence and the marketing argument was not raised at trial.