Human Rights - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a warrantless search of their apartment and a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search unconstitutional but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by failing to consider the searching officer's misleading testimony and by improperly emphasizing objective grounds while diminishing the lack of subjective grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed material errors in his Charter analysis, excluded the evidence, and substituted verdicts of acquittal on all charges.

The appellants, current and former uniform members of the Waterloo Regional Police Service, appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their proposed class action for want of jurisdiction and denying certification.

The appellants alleged systemic gender-based workplace discrimination and harassment, including breach of Charter rights and breach of the duty of fair representation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the appellants' claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators under the Police Services Act and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court noted that the collective agreement permits group grievances and arbitrators possess broad remedial powers.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The defendant brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a breach of contract action.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached a settlement agreement by giving testimony before the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the environmental impact of the plaintiff's proposed development.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that although the testimony constituted expression relating to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff had satisfied the merits and public interest hurdles under section 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden under section 137.1(4)(a) regarding substantial merit and that the motion judge erred in interpreting "substantial merit" as referring to the seriousness of the subject matter rather than the potential merits of the claim.

The Court also found insufficient evidence of damages to satisfy the public interest balancing under section 137.1(4)(b).

The appellant sought habeas corpus relief and Charter remedies regarding his immigration detention.

The application judge dismissed the habeas corpus application but granted section 24(1) relief for a section 12 Charter breach, ordering the appellant's transfer from a maximum security provincial facility to an immigration detention centre.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a section 12 breach and that the application judge erred in his analysis of the legal test and evidentiary foundation required for such a claim.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of dangerous driving after his dump truck collided with the Burlington Skyway Bridge on the Queen Elizabeth Highway.

The collision occurred when the trailer box rose higher than the bridge's clearance because the Power Take-off (PTO) system was left engaged.

The appellant was detained in a police cruiser for approximately 2.5 hours at the accident scene, during which police detected the smell of alcohol on his breath.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to the alcohol detection, arguing the detention was arbitrary and his Charter rights were violated.

The trial judge excluded breath sample evidence but admitted the evidence of the smell of alcohol.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to one year in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 14 counts of fraud arising from his guilty plea.

He asserted that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as an unrepresented person and deprived him of his right to counsel, contrary to s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing further adjournments for retaining counsel and that the trial judge ensured the appellant understood his guilty plea through a full plea inquiry.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted by jury of two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a two-vehicle collision.

She appealed on multiple grounds, including Charter violations, credibility assessments, jury charge errors regarding straddle evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter breaches, no reversible credibility errors, and no miscarriage of justice despite some improper prosecutorial conduct.

The appellant, a Jamaican citizen and former permanent resident of Canada, was detained for five years by the Canada Border Services Agency pending removal to Jamaica following a removal order based on serious criminality.

The appellant brought a habeas corpus application and sought Charter damages under sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his detention was arbitrary, indefinite, and constituted cruel and unusual treatment.

The application judge dismissed the Charter damages claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no breach of the Charter rights and clarifying that Charter damages claims cannot be joined to habeas corpus applications.

The appellant attended a Kiss concert at the Canadian Tire Centre in Ottawa and was removed by security staff.

He commenced an action claiming damages for discrimination, harassment, intentional infliction of nervous shock, mental distress, loss of income, loss of reputation and loss of business.

Claims against McGhee Entertainment and Kiss were dismissed for failing to disclose a cause of action.

A motion to dismiss against Gene Simmons was granted on the basis that the sole claim was for discrimination, which is prohibited from proceeding as a standalone action under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The appellant appealed the dismissal order against Simmons without asserting any alleged error of law.

Simmons brought a motion to quash the appeal as devoid of merit.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR accused person's Charter rights.

The appellant sought systemic remedies from the Board for violations of his section 8 Charter right arising from unauthorized seizure of urine samples.

The Board found the Charter violation but declined to grant systemic remedies, determining it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, holding that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine Charter issues and grant individual remedies, it does not have jurisdiction to impose broad systemic or institutional orders.

The Board's mandate is limited to supervising individual NCR accused persons and ensuring their conditions are least onerous and restrictive consistent with public safety.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of 28 counts of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a Ponzi scheme involving three accused persons and losses exceeding $2,000,000.

He appealed his convictions and sentence on grounds of delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that while the total delay of 59½ months exceeded the presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework, it was justified by defence delay, discrete events (including the co-accused's illness), case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on the parties' reasonable reliance on the Morin framework.

The jury instructions were found to be fair and balanced when reviewed as a whole.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision finding that frequent lockdowns at Maplehurst Correctional Complex violated the Charter rights of two remanded inmates under section 12 (cruel and unusual treatment).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had significantly overstated the frequency, duration, and impact of lockdowns affecting the respondents.

The court concluded that while lockdowns occurred more frequently than ideal, they did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual treatment.

The court also found procedural unfairness in the award of damages without notice to the parties and rejected alternative arguments based on sections 7 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by two separate juries of two murders committed in January 2008.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four pre-trial evidentiary rulings: (1) the admissibility of his statements to police on April 15 and 16, 2008; (2) the admissibility of shotgun shells found during a lawful traffic stop on January 15, 2008; (3) the admissibility of a statement made on February 19, 2008 regarding ammunition; and (4) the admissibility of bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all evidentiary rulings and dismissed the appeals.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding moral damages of $60,000 for breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith in the manner of dismissal, along with general damages of ten months' salary in lieu of notice and $25,000 for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants contended the moral damages award should be reduced to $20,000, arguing the trial judge considered irrelevant factors and that the award duplicated the sexual harassment damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the manner of dismissal holistically, including pre- and post-termination conduct that constituted bad faith.

The court held that moral damages and Human Rights Code damages serve different purposes and do not constitute double recovery.

The appellant was charged with several offences following execution of a search warrant at a residence that uncovered a marijuana grow-operation and a handgun.

At trial, the appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant under a sub-facial analysis, arguing that the information to obtain contained erroneous information and that police conduct in seeking the warrant was subversive of the pre-authorization process.

The trial judge found the warrant was valid after excising improper portions of the information to obtain, and declined to exercise a residual discretion to quash the warrant despite identifying deficiencies in the affiant's conduct.

The appellant was convicted and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying a "clearest of cases" standard rather than a lower threshold for setting aside a valid warrant based on subversion of the pre-authorization process.