Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The parties separated after a 15-year marriage.

The trial judge granted the respondent a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the matrimonial home on a resulting trust and dismissed the appellant's claims for unequal division of net family property and retroactive support.

The appellant appealed, seeking an interest in the respondent's RRSP and retroactive support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not pleaded the RRSP trust claim at trial and that the trial judge made no errors in denying retroactive support based on the parties' conduct and circumstances.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent a 45% interest in a commercial property via constructive trust, retroactive spousal support, and prejudgment interest on an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the limitation period for the unjust enrichment claim was tolled due to the appellant's fraudulent concealment of the property's true ownership.

The court also upheld the awards for retroactive spousal support and prejudgment interest, noting the appellant's history of non-disclosure and failure to pay adequate support.

The appellant father appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside an uncontested family law order.

The respondent mother had previously obtained custody, support, and equalization after the appellant failed to participate and was noted in default.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to set aside because the appellant failed to file a financial statement and there was no evidence the result would have been different.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the fundamental obligation to make financial disclosure and rejecting the appellant's attempt to rely on unsworn financial information filed for the first time on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order striking his motion to vary, arguing he had insufficient notice and should have been allowed to file materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, noting the appellant had ample time and had failed to pay trial costs, a contempt fine, equalization, and failed to comply with disclosure obligations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to delete a requirement that the appellant prove payment of all support obligations up to January 1, 2014 before bringing a future motion to vary, as the ability to pay is the very subject matter of such a motion.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge dismissing their motion to expedite the hearing of two leave to appeal motions.

The underlying matters related to a Crown wardship order and a Habeas Corpus application.

The moving parties argued that as Aboriginal people, they had a right to have matters heard in a court of equity applying Aboriginal law, and that the children's aid society had no authority to apprehend their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's procedural ruling that the matters were not properly before the court.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to set aside minutes of settlement in a family law proceeding.

He argued the motion judge erred in making credibility findings based on affidavit evidence, demonstrated bias, and that the absence of a recording of the motion argument denied him natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to determine the matter on the affidavits, the judge's criticism of the appellant did not signal bias, and there is no legal requirement for motion arguments to be transcribed.

The appellant father appealed a decision dismissing his appeal of an order that denied him leave to bring a Status Review Application regarding his two children, who were Crown wards placed for adoption.

The appellant argued the appeal judge made factual errors, misapprehended a letter from a community association, and that his Charter rights were breached due to a denial of Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors, no Charter breach, and that the appellant could not meet the test for granting leave to bring a Status Review Application.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order that granted the respondent father generous access to their children, arguing that the father had attempted to kill her during a vacation in Jamaica.

The trial judge had found the mother's allegations not credible, relying heavily on hearsay evidence from a blood expert who testified at the father's Jamaican criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence without threshold reliability, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through uneven scrutiny of the evidence, and failed to properly assess the best interests of the children, particularly regarding domestic violence.

A new hearing on custody and access was ordered.

The appellant mother appealed a finding of contempt for failing to comply with an access order regarding the parties' daughter.

The mother argued that the child refused to attend access visits and that she had done her best to encourage attendance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the mother had effectively abdicated her parental authority by leaving the decision to the child and failing to take concrete measures beyond mere encouragement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order terminating child and spousal support and requiring her to reimburse the respondent for overpayments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the termination of spousal support, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant had achieved self-sufficiency following an inheritance.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by failing to increase spousal support for the period after child support ended, and made several calculation errors regarding child support overpayments.

The appeal was allowed in part, adjusting the amounts owed between the parties.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment that awarded his bankrupt wife an equalization payment, lump sum spousal support, and costs.

The wife's former lawyers also appealed an order requiring the assessment of their accounts and a personal costs award against them.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the equalization payment because the wife lacked capacity to assert the claim after her bankruptcy, and setting aside the assessment of the lawyers' accounts.

However, the Court upheld the lump sum spousal support award and the costs awards, including the personal costs award against the wife's former lawyer for acting in bad faith and running up costs without reasonable cause.

The appellant mother appealed an order reducing child and spousal support and dismissing her constructive trust claim.

The motion judge had refused the mother's request for an adjournment to complete previously ordered questioning, concluding the issues could be bifurcated and decided without it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge denied the mother a fair hearing by jumping to the erroneous conclusion that questioning was unnecessary and by failing to allow full submissions on the issue.

A new hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support and the dismissal of her civil claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

She argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to both parties.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings on support.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the civil claims, noting the contract issue had been previously determined and there was insufficient evidence for the emotional distress claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondent's application for child support under the Family Law Act.

The appellant argued that the respondent was required to proceed under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act and that Ontario was not the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act provides an alternative procedure and does not bar a claim under the Family Law Act if the court has jurisdiction.

The court found a real and substantial connection to Ontario based on the child's lifelong residence in the province.

The appellant also failed to establish that another forum was clearly more convenient.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant husband appealed an order enforcing a separation agreement and child support arrears.

He argued the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment and in enforcing the agreement due to an alleged power imbalance, emotional stress, and ambiguity regarding child support for his stepchildren.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal to adjourn given the appellant's history of non-compliance.

The court also held that ambiguity in the support clause and the appellant's emotional stress were not grounds to invalidate the entire agreement.

The appellant mother appealed an order changing the primary residence of her children to the respondent father unless she relocated to Waterloo.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change in circumstances due to the mother's failure to relocate as contemplated in a prior settlement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the lower courts failed to conduct the required analysis of whether changing the children's primary residence was in their best interests.

The moving party brought a motion to review an order of Weiler J.A. and to stay a December 2013 order of the Court of Appeal pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as completely devoid of merit and moot, given that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada had been refused.

The court noted the motion was another vexatious step in a protracted matrimonial dispute and dismissed it pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The children's aid society appealed the dismissal of its child protection application regarding three children.

The respondent father brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there were no current protection concerns.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal lacked merit and that, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, proceeding with the appeal would be contrary to the best interests of the children and the administration of justice.

The appellant mother appealed an order quashing her appeal from an openness order regarding her biological daughter, who had been in protection for six years and placed for adoption.

The appellant sought to challenge the adoption placement and have the child placed with extended family.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that placement cannot be determined at an openness hearing, the child consented to the adoption and the openness order, and the appellant was attempting to relitigate previously determined issues.