Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The appellant brought a motion for a stay of orders requiring him to pay retrospective child and spousal support pending his appeal.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking security for costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, finding he failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion for security for costs, noting the requested amount was excessive and the justice of the case did not support the order.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the respondent as she prevailed on the more significant stay request.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision refusing to stay a trial judge's order requiring her to vacate a property pending appeal.

The trial judge had ordered the property sold and found no unjust enrichment or joint family venture.

The motion judge denied the stay, finding no serious issue, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for review, holding that the appellant failed to articulate any errors of fact or law warranting intervention.

The respondent mother brought a motion for security for costs regarding the appellant father's appeal of a summary judgment order that granted her final decision-making authority and restricted his parenting time.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, as the father had not opposed the relief sought at the summary judgment motion and failed to file his materials on time.

Finding that the father had insufficient assets to pay a costs order, the court ordered him to post $18,000 in security for costs and stayed the appeal until payment.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

The parties separated in 2019.

After two years of the appellant failing to provide financial disclosure despite multiple court orders, his pleadings were struck and the matter proceeded to an uncontested trial.

The trial judge imputed an annual income of $150,000 to the appellant for child support and ordered the matrimonial home transferred to the respondent to satisfy the equalization payment.

The appellant appealed, arguing the process was unfair and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the uncontested trial was a proper consequence of the appellant's blatant non-disclosure and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's orders regarding child support, arrears, and parenting time.

The parties had a separation agreement, but the mother sought to enforce its terms after a child changed residence to live with her full-time.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's calculation of child support and arrears, finding no error in applying the Guidelines.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by issuing a final order for parenting time when he had indicated during the hearing it would be an interim order, thereby denying procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed in part to make the parenting time order interim and to slightly reduce the costs awarded to the mother.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court order that dismissed his appeal proceedings under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The interveners brought a motion under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the moving party raised no arguable grounds of appeal and was attempting to relitigate matters decided years earlier.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting joint custody but allowing the respondent mother to relocate with their two children to Washington State and giving her final decision-making authority.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by relying on the respondent's stated intention to move with or without the children, failing to maximize contact, and rejecting the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendation against relocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework, avoided the 'double bind' trap, and made an order in the children's best interests.

The access schedule was slightly amended for 2021 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions.

The appellant mother appealed an order placing her two children in extended society care with no access.

The children, who are Métis, were apprehended due to exposure to domestic violence and adult sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extended society care order, finding no error in the lower courts' assessment of the children's need for protection or the statutory time limits.

However, applying the Kawartha framework, the Court found the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the mother to prove access was beneficial.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the mother monthly photograph access as it was in the children's best interests and would not impair adoption prospects.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding prospective and retroactive spousal and child support, as well as the trial costs award.

The trial judge had imputed income to the respondent due to income fluctuations and denied retroactive support because the appellant's bankruptcy had relieved her of the tax debt that caused her financial hardship.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review, finding no material error or serious misapprehension of the evidence by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim to half the proceeds from the sale of a property and granting the respondent's counterclaim based on a resulting trust.

The parties were unmarried, and the trial judge found the appellant had financially exploited the respondent and contributed nothing to the property's purchase or upkeep.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption of resulting trust to the gratuitous transfer of the property interest, and affording deference to her credibility assessments and factual findings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal support, child support, net family property, and costs.

He argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to him and under-attributing income to the respondent.

The respondent conceded minor calculation errors regarding her 2017 income and the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal corrected the conceded errors but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments, income imputations, and costs award were entitled to deference and revealed no errors in principle.

The appellant appealed an order settling amounts owing pursuant to a previous family law judgment, arguing errors in the calculation of post-judgment interest on an equalization payment and seeking credit for spousal support paid.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by including spousal support in her income when calculating her retroactive child support obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no error in the interest calculation.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that under the Child Support Guidelines, spousal support received must be deducted when calculating a payor's income for child support purposes.

The appellant's motion for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 2015 settlement agreement to be a binding separation agreement.

The appellant argued for the first time on appeal that a provision requiring expert review of the agreement's impact on their disabled child's ODSP eligibility created an implied right to terminate the agreement, and that the court should have exercised its discretion not to enforce it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to entertain novel arguments not raised before the motion judge and finding no basis to interfere with the enforcement of the agreement.

The appellant appealed a final order in matrimonial proceedings, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, misapprehending evidence regarding support, and failing to impute income to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the appellant had ample notice of the trial date.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on spousal and child support, including the imputation of income to the appellant and the refusal to impute income to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The parties were in a romantic relationship for nearly 14 years but maintained separate residences.

The trial judge found they were spouses under the Family Law Act and awarded the respondent indefinite spousal support based on the Rule of 65, along with substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the parties were spouses, noting that maintaining separate residences does not preclude a finding of cohabitation.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in concluding the parties began cohabiting in the first five months of their relationship, meaning the Rule of 65 was not met.

Spousal support was reduced to a 10-year duration.

The costs award was also reduced to partial indemnity, as the appellant's legal position and financial disclosure were deemed reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a trial judge's order that denied him access to a child placed in extended society care.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant had standing to appeal under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and concluded that determining the appeal on the merits was in the child's best interests.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's wishes to be adopted without ongoing access by the appellant.

Finding no error in the courts below and prioritizing the child's best interests, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The moving party filed a motion for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal that should have been filed in the Divisional Court.

He sought an order under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act transferring the file to the Divisional Court.

The responding party opposed the transfer and requested the motion be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the transfer motion, finding there was no realistic chance the Divisional Court would grant leave to appeal and that a transfer would cause undue prejudice and delay to the responding party.

The appellant father brought a motion for interim access to his three-year-old child for a three-week block in Toronto, which was heard alongside his appeal of a custody and relocation order.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing it would interfere with the child's half-day nursery school attendance and conflict with a prior access order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that fostering a meaningful relationship with the non-custodial parent and his family outweighed the importance of nursery school attendance, and noting that the prior access order restricting access to one-week blocks was a nullity.

The appellant father brought a second appeal regarding a trial judgment that awarded custody of a three-year-old child to the respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to England.

The first appeal judge upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation but remitted the final order back to the trial judge to correct errors and inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in remitting the matter, as the trial judge had properly settled the order and was functus officio.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the remitted order and restore the original trial order.