Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judge's determinations regarding property and spousal support issues following a 21-day trial.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility assessments, emphasizing the high standard of deference owed to such findings in family law cases.

The appellant's arguments were largely rejected as an attempt to retry the case.

While a clerical error in the equalization payment was corrected in the appellant's favour, the appeal was otherwise dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

Appeal from trial judge's decisions regarding spousal and child support, and division of family home value in a common-law relationship of over 16 years.

The trial judge found a joint family venture and awarded the respondent $595,530 as her share of the family home, imputed $150,000 annual income to the appellant, and ordered costs of $280,000.

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the respondent's share to $527,000 by deducting the outstanding mortgage balance, but upheld the imputation of income and dismissed the cross-appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the scope of a judge's jurisdiction under section 36(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act to direct a police force to enforce a child custody and access order.

The motion judge ordered the Ontario Provincial Police to enforce a custody and access order in place of the Waterloo Regional Police Service due to an inherent conflict of interest arising from the father's membership in the WRPS and allegations that the WRPS had inappropriately intervened to further the father's interests.

The appellants argued the motion judge lacked authority to impose such an obligation and that only the Ontario Civilian Police Commission could determine whether a municipal police force had failed to provide adequate policing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that section 36(2) permits a judge to specify any police force having jurisdiction in the area where the child may be found, and that in exceptional circumstances such as this, a judge may order the OPP to assist where the municipal police force cannot act due to a conflict of interest.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision in a family law matter concerning income imputation and asset division.

The trial judge found the respondent was unemployed and effectively unemployable based on medical evidence and refused to impute income.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's curtailment of cross-examination on the respondent's medical condition and the refusal to grant an adjournment for additional witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding no error in enforcing time limits, refusing the adjournment without reasonable explanation for late witness summoning, and finding that family assets were divided equally with the appellant purchasing Syrian properties from equalization proceeds.

The respondent mother brought a motion to quash the appellant father's appeal from a trial judgment made in his absence.

The father had sought to reduce his child support obligation, end his spousal support obligation, and rescind support arrears.

The trial judge proceeded without the father, who was absent due to securing employment on his first day of work.

The mother argued the father must first bring a motion to set aside the trial order in Family Court before appealing to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court has jurisdiction under rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules to set aside an order, and that the proper procedural route was to bring a motion to set aside in Family Court rather than appeal directly to the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought an interim order restraining the responding party from depleting a specific property pending the disposition of his appeal.

The moving party had previously been awarded an equalization payment and a preservation order, but the trial judge indicated the judgment nullified the pre-trial preservation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the preservation order was necessary under s. 12 of the Family Law Act to protect the moving party's interests and ensure sufficient assets remained to satisfy the equalization entitlement, as the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring moneys to be paid into court in the context of matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the appellant's interest in the funds.

The appellant was granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment and dismissing his application to re-open financial matters arising from the breakdown of his marriage.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere, noting that the parties had resolved the matters through final Minutes of Settlement incorporated into a final court order while the appellant was represented by counsel.

The motion judge correctly found that the respondent's disclosure had been adequate and that the appellant was attempting to relitigate resolved matters.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,200.

In six family law cases, a Superior Court judge exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to order the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent children or conduct investigations, bypassing the statutory request process.

The OCL appealed these mandatory orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the judge erred by circumventing the existing statutory structure under the Courts of Justice Act, which grants the OCL discretion to accept or decline requests for involvement based on its resources and intake criteria.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding family law issues and a declaration that she was a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant had effective legal advice when entering into the 2003 Minutes of Settlement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement varying the lower court's judgment in accordance with a consent order filed by the parties.

The appellant father appealed an order permitting the respondent mother to relocate to Argentina with their child.

The appeal was limited to whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit documentary evidence regarding the security of persons in Argentina, specifically reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the documents were inadmissible hearsay and would not have materially impacted the result.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the trial judge properly focused on the best interests of the child, the mother's reasonable plan, and the stability and support available in Argentina.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to set aside a divorce judgment and replace it with an annulment.

The application judge had misunderstood the basis of the application, focusing on the fact that the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes.

However, the undisputed evidence showed that the respondent was already married at the time she married the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the divorce judgment, and annulled the marriage due to the respondent's lack of capacity to marry.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and dispensing with his signature to facilitate a prior order.

At the hearing, the appellant sought an adjournment to adduce fresh evidence, which the Court of Appeal refused.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's refusal to stay the prior order or in the exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant and setting a timetable and procedure for bringing an application to vary spousal support.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the appellant was attempting to relitigate previously decided issues and was properly declared a vexatious litigant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support payments, arguing that his business expenses were not properly credited and his income had been reassessed downward.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the record was insufficient to determine the correct business income.

However, the dismissal was granted with leave for the appellant to move to vary the order based on his tax reassessments and proper evidence of his actual business expenses.

The parties agreed that critical and further evidence respecting the best interests of the child needed to be presented, which was not presented before the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent and ordered a new trial on the issue of mobility.

The appellant appealed a decision granting permanent wardship of a child with no access, arguing that circumstances had substantially changed since the original decision, including the death of a younger child and the original foster mother, and the appellant's continuing efforts to improve parenting abilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence amply supported the lower courts' findings and that the changes did not alter the expert conclusion that permanent wardship with no access was in the child's best interests.

The court noted the child had been in a stable and loving foster home for three years and upsetting that stability would not be in the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, awarding costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted an order on consent in accordance with the amended draft order filed by the parties.