Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support based on imputed income, and a costs order.

The trial judge had drawn a strong adverse inference due to the appellant's "monumental and transnational" failure to make meaningful financial disclosure, imputing income of $130,000 (except $110,000 for 2020).

The appellant argued procedural unfairness regarding document admissibility and errors in income imputation.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness, noting the appellant's own strategic decisions regarding evidence, and upheld the trial judge's findings on income imputation, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant wife appealed several orders from a half-day trial concerning spousal support, equalization, and the matrimonial home.

The appeal raised three main arguments: error in ordering occupation rent, failure to assist the self-represented litigant, and error in valuing the respondent's Alberta pension for equalization purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's discretionary findings on occupation rent, finding no reversible error in assisting the self-represented litigant, and confirming the Alberta pension's value crystallized before marriage.

The appellant appealed an order from a motion judge striking his pleadings related to financial matters due to his failure to pay spousal and child support, section 7 expenses, and non-compliance with multiple financial disclosure orders.

The appellant did not appear at the original motion and failed to identify any error by the motion judge on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that striking pleadings was appropriate given the serious and long-standing nature of the appellant's breaches, emphasizing the essential role of financial disclosure in matrimonial proceedings.

This appeal concerned whether the validity of a marriage contract could be re-litigated between parties embroiled in multiple, long-standing family, corporate, and bankruptcy law actions.

The appellant sought to raise the issue of the marriage contract's validity, arguing it was not definitively determined in prior contempt proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the issue was integral to previous decisions and that allowing its re-litigation would constitute an abuse of process, especially given the appellant's failure to appeal earlier orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Wen-Chi Tsai, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her claim for an interest in property based on unjust enrichment and joint family venture against her former cohabitant, Lucien Dugal (now deceased, represented by his estate trustees).

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that there was no unjust enrichment or joint family venture, concluding that the parties maintained separate finances and that any contributions by the appellant were offset by benefits received.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent moved to delist an appeal pending the outcome of outstanding matters in the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal considered whether it should exercise its discretion to delist the appeal or allow it to proceed as scheduled.

The court determined that the appeal court was the appropriate forum to address the fundamental issue on appeal regarding whether an order made in the absence of the appellant should stand.

The motion was dismissed and the appeal was permitted to proceed as scheduled.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis.

The Children's Aid Society appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a Crown wardship declaration and directed the matter proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Superior Court order was interlocutory, not final.

An order directing that a matter proceed to trial, even when it sets aside a prior final order, does not itself constitute a final order for appellate jurisdiction purposes.

The appeal was quashed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding the custody of the parties' two children.

The appellant sought sole custody but agreed the children should continue to reside with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the motion judge's determination of the best interests of the children and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that the respondent lawyer breached the deemed undertaking rule by sharing information about a writ against the appellant with another respondent.

The application judge found no breach because the assignment of the writ occurred before the correspondence disclosing the writ and settlement negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings.

The court declined to award costs, noting that the respondent lawyer should not have appeared as counsel since he was a named respondent and his conduct was central to the case.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering the sale of a farm property and a subsequent order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the summary judgment, agreeing that financial imperatives required the property to be sold.

The Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the second order, permitting the appellant to amend his claim, except for asserting a claim for a vesting order or proprietary remedy.

A stay on an order for exclusive interim possession was continued with conditions.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dispensing with the requirement for his signature on a listing agreement for the sale of the matrimonial home, and the refusal of an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not exercise his discretion unreasonably in refusing the adjournment.

The appellant suffered no prejudice because the sale proceeds were ordered to be held in trust pending agreement or further court order.

The court stayed the order for 14 days to allow the appellant to remove his personal belongings.

The applicant mother sought an extension of time to appeal a summary judgment finding her children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act, appeals from such child protection orders lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant husband appealed a restraining order granted against him, arguing there was an insufficient evidential basis for the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record revealed a history of physical and verbal abuse, threats, and breaches of a probation order.

The court concluded the respondent had reasonable grounds to fear for her safety and the safety of their child, justifying the restraining order.

The wife appealed a trial judge's decision staying her Ontario application for equalization of net family property and spousal support on the basis that Greece was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the wife sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of an application the husband filed in Greece after the Ontario trial, which contradicted his previous evidence regarding the parties' assets.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, finding it radically changed the parameters of the property issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay, and ordered the proceedings to continue in Ontario.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order regarding custody and parenting time under the Divorce Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the 'maximum contact' principle under s. 17(a) of the Divorce Act.

The court noted that the allocation of parenting time was consistent with the appellants' own submissions, albeit made on the assumption they would be the custodial parents.

Minor factual errors by the motion judge were not overriding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $13,000.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal held that the order appealed from was interlocutory in nature, meaning leave to appeal from the Divisional Court was required.

The court noted that the order did not preclude the responding party from renewing an abuse of process argument at the hearing of the main application.

The motion to quash was allowed with costs awarded to the moving party.

In a costs endorsement following an appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that success in the proceedings was divided.

The appellant succeeded on his appeal to the Court of Appeal, but the Divisional Court had correctly held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Considering the divided success and the disparity in income between the parties, the Court ordered no costs for the proceedings in either court.

The lower court's costs order was set aside and reserved to the judge hearing the application to vary.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for spousal support under the Divorce Act.

The parties had signed a separation agreement in 1992 under which the appellant released all claims to further support after June 1994.

The appellant subsequently failed to qualify to practice medicine and applied for support in 2001 while destitute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the trial judge had properly applied the principles later established in Miglin v. Miglin.

The trial judge correctly concluded that the agreement substantially complied with the Divorce Act's objectives and that the appellant's current circumstances were largely the result of her own choices, making a support order unjustified.

The mother, who had primary residence of the children under a joint custody agreement, appealed a motions judge's order refusing to permit her to relocate with the children from Delhi to Tecumseh for new employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in principle by failing to give sufficient consideration to the custodial parent's views, the children's wishes, and the enhancement of the mother's ability to care for the children, as required by Gordon v. Goertz.

The mother was permitted to move, with an order to share travel for the father's access.

The appellant father appealed findings of contempt and a suspended sentence imposed after he unilaterally removed his child to Bermuda, frustrating the respondent mother's access rights.

The father argued his appeal was timely under the Criminal Appeal Rules.

The Court of Appeal held that civil contempt proceedings arising from matrimonial litigation are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering his appeal of the contempt findings out of time.

The appeal of the sentence conditions and the mother's cross-appeal regarding child support and costs were both dismissed.