Family and Matrimonial Law - OCA

The appellant appealed a consent order incorporating terms of a separation agreement, alleging the respondent misrepresented his income and failed to provide full financial disclosure, particularly after purchasing a new house.

The respondent had moved under Rule 14 of the Family Law Rules to grant the consent order, providing additional disclosure.

The motion judge granted the consent order and did not order further disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 13 (requiring updated financial statements) was inapplicable given that full disclosure was made at the time of settlement and the consent order had been implemented.

The court also found the use of a Rule 14B motion appropriate, despite opposition, as the matter was deemed "seemingly uncomplicated" and the motion judge had reviewed the evidence.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's orders regarding child support, arrears, and parenting time.

The parties had a separation agreement, but the mother sought to enforce its terms after a child changed residence to live with her full-time.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's calculation of child support and arrears, finding no error in applying the Guidelines.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by issuing a final order for parenting time when he had indicated during the hearing it would be an interim order, thereby denying procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed in part to make the parenting time order interim and to slightly reduce the costs awarded to the mother.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding prospective and retroactive spousal and child support, as well as the trial costs award.

The trial judge had imputed income to the respondent due to income fluctuations and denied retroactive support because the appellant's bankruptcy had relieved her of the tax debt that caused her financial hardship.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review, finding no material error or serious misapprehension of the evidence by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was previously granted an extension of time to perfect his appeal on the condition that he pay $29,275 in outstanding costs to the respondent.

The order provided that if payment was not made within 60 days, the respondent could move to dismiss the appeal.

The appellant failed to make the payment, arguing that an agreement with the Family Responsibility Office or the appeal itself operated as a stay.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal, awarding $2,000 in costs to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of $800, primarily for disbursements.

The Court of Appeal found the claim reasonable and ordered the appellant to pay $800 in costs to the respondent.

The parties settled their matrimonial litigation in 2008 with a consent order providing for $3,000 monthly spousal support with no termination date.

In 2010, the respondent sought to terminate support and obtain child support, citing a decrease in his income and the appellant's unexplained accumulation of wealth.

The trial judge found a material change in circumstances, terminated spousal support, and ordered the appellant to pay child support.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change but found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the circumstances at the time of the original consent order, effectively rescinding rather than varying it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision dismissing his application under the Hague Convention for the return of his six-year-old daughter to Peru.

The mother had wrongfully retained the child in Ontario but invoked the Article 13(b) 'grave risk' exception, citing a history of domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that returning the child to Peru would expose her to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or place her in an intolerable situation.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the mother's custody claim to proceed in Ontario.

The parties entered into a separation agreement requiring spousal support variations to be dealt with by arbitration.

After the husband stopped paying support, the wife filed the agreement for enforcement under s. 35 of the Family Law Act.

The husband then applied to the Superior Court to vary support and moved under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act to prevent the suspension of his driver's licence.

The motion judge held the court had jurisdiction to vary support because the wife sought enforcement under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the wife's appeal, holding that neither the Family Law Act nor the Enforcement Act supersedes a valid domestic contract's exclusive arbitration provision.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The application judge found the equalization claim was statute-barred as the parties separated more than six years before the application was commenced, and declined to extend the limitation period under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The spousal support claim was dismissed because the appellant failed to establish financial hardship or need.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no material errors and that the findings of fact were supported by the record.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment ordering joint custody of the parties' two children, arguing the parents could not communicate, there was a history of domestic violence, and the order lacked a dispute resolution mechanism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had an evidentiary basis to conclude the parties could effectively communicate once court orders preventing contact were lifted.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the domestic abuse allegations or the access schedule.

The appellant, who was in a same-sex union with the biological mother, sought a declaration of parentage for a child conceived with the assistance of a male friend.

The biological father remained involved in the child's life, meaning an adoption order would sever his parental rights.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Children's Law Reform Act only contemplates one mother and one father, a legislative gap existed regarding children born to same-sex parents through reproductive technology.

The Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to declare the appellant a mother of the child, recognizing three legal parents to protect the child's best interests.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment granting joint custody of their two children and ordering him to pay child and spousal support to the respondent mother.

The father argued the trial judge erred by focusing on the mother's rehabilitation from substance abuse rather than the children's best interests, and by improperly admitting expert testimony from the mother's treating physician regarding her parenting ability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the best interests of the child test, correctly admitted the expert evidence under the Mohan framework, and appropriately considered the statutory factors for spousal support.

The moving party brought a motion seeking to review or reopen the court's previous disposition of her appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion without an oral hearing, finding a lack of merit and a lack of jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The court noted that the proper remedy for dissatisfaction with the disposition of the appeals was to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court ordered that the moving party may not file further motions in respect of these appeals.

The appellant father appealed a Crown wardship order regarding his biological child.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal that he had separated from the child's mother, who had been found incapable of parenting.

The appeal judge refused to admit the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the fresh evidence met the test for admission as it was highly relevant and potentially decisive.

However, applying the fresh evidence, the Court concluded that the child's best interests still required Crown wardship, given the child's strong bond with his foster family over the past 17 months.

The appeal was dismissed, but the costs order against the father was set aside.

The appellant mother appealed a motions judge's decision denying her request to relocate from Ottawa to Oakville with her five-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred by refusing to admit fresh evidence regarding the mother's pregnancy and changed family circumstances, refusing to permit cross-examination of the court-appointed assessor, and delegating the mobility determination to the assessor without independently applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

The appeal was allowed, permitting the mother to relocate with the child.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, arguing that the judge erred in abridging the time for service of motion materials and refusing a brief adjournment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that voluminous materials were served less than 24 hours before the hearing and the appellant's counsel had another commitment.

The Court also found no urgency requiring a final determination on that date.

The appeal was allowed, the motions judge's order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike a same-sex former partner's spousal support claim.

The underlying action involved a support claim advanced after a long same-sex relationship ended before the legislative amendment to s. 29 of the Family Law Act extending spousal support rights to same-sex couples.

The Court of Appeal held that an order dismissing a motion to strike for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action is interlocutory, regardless of the forcefulness of the motion judge's reasons, because the substantive rights remain to be determined at trial.

The appeal therefore lay to the Divisional Court with leave, not to the Court of Appeal, and was quashed with costs.

The appellant sought to vary child support after early retirement and a resulting reduction in income.

The appeal concerned whether support should revert to the pre-retirement guideline amount or remain at the lower amount based on pension income.

With both parties effectively supporting continuation of the lower guideline figure, the court held it did not make sense to assume income above pension benefits after retirement.

The appeal was allowed and child support was fixed at $266 per month, with no order as to costs at any level.

The appellants sought a stay pending appeal of a family law order rejecting a variation application, maintaining support at $5,000 per month, fixing arrears, and requiring assignment of a second mortgage as security.

Applying the stay pending appeal test, the court held there was no sufficient showing of irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The court also noted concerns about the merits and the moving party's unilateral reduction of support payments contrary to the existing order.

The stay motion was dismissed, security for costs was refused, and motion costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.