Employment and Labour Law - OCA

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded him damages for constructive dismissal but dismissed his claims for aggravated damages, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace verbal abuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer's conduct, while creating a poisoned work environment, did not rise to the level required for additional damages.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee was injured by a reversing truck unit that did not have an attached trailer.

The trial judge acquitted the employer, finding the truck was not 'material handling equipment' under s. 56 of the Industrial Establishments Regulation.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal, holding that s. 56 applies only to vehicles that constitute material handling equipment, and not to road vehicles that are not actually or typically used to handle materials.

The employer, Hudson's Bay Company, cross-appealed a trial judgment declaring that it was not a beneficiary of a pension plan trust fund and not entitled to surplus assets on plan termination.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. and found that the original trust agreement created an irrevocable trust for the exclusive benefit of the plan members.

The Court distinguished the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co., noting that the originating documents in this case contained exclusive benefit language that precluded the employer from claiming the surplus.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a former executive and minority shareholder, sued the respondents in Ontario for wrongful dismissal, unpaid wages, and oppression.

The motions judge denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the respondents' motion to stay the action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in a Shareholders' Agreement favouring England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of summary judgment but set aside the stay.

The Court found that the motions judge erred by ignoring a non-exclusive Ontario forum selection clause in the appellant's Service Agreement and by failing to consider that the respondents had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits and counterclaiming before invoking the English forum selection clause.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the employer unilaterally and fundamentally changed the terms of employment.

The Court also agreed it was objectively unreasonable to expect the employee to return to work for the same small employer after losing faith in them.

The damages awarded were upheld based on the Bardal factors, considering the employee's age, length of service, position, and difficulty finding other work.

The appellant bank alleged that the respondent employee engaged in an illicit currency arbitrage scheme and unilaterally froze his bank accounts, including accounts at an affiliate and a third-party bank.

The respondent brought a motion for the release of the funds, which the motion judge granted for the non-appellant accounts.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion should be treated as one for summary judgment, and affirmed that the bank had no legal basis to unilaterally freeze the accounts at the affiliate and third-party bank without obtaining an interlocutory injunction.

Following a successful appeal by the employer regarding the administration of a pension plan, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The pension committee argued that its costs should be paid out of the pension fund on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on traditional trust principles.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, adopting the 'pension trust approach' which limits costs from the fund to cases involving the due administration of the trust or claims advanced for the benefit of all beneficiaries.

Finding the litigation to be adversarial, the Court ordered the committee to pay the employer's costs of the appeals on a partial indemnity basis.

The interim receiver of a bankrupt company sought to distribute funds from operating assets to a secured creditor.

The pension plan administrator opposed, claiming priority under a statutory lien for unpaid pension contributions pursuant to s. 57(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Ministry of the Environment also opposed, arguing funds should be retained for environmental remediation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding that the pension administrator is not a secured creditor under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the unpaid contributions are not a debt due to the administrator.

The Court also held that the MOE was an unsecured creditor regarding the operating assets and that the BIA's specific provisions for environmental claims governed.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the employer's Fairness Appeal Program did not apply to his termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the program expressly excludes terminations without cause.

The court held that an employer's underlying concerns regarding performance do not convert a termination without cause into a termination for cause when the employer elects to provide notice or payment in lieu thereof.

No evidence of employer bad faith was found.

The respondent employee sued his former corporate employer and its directing mind for breach of an employment contract, claiming a 50 per cent commission on profits from a real estate project completed after his resignation.

The trial judge found both the corporation and the directing mind liable for the full 50 per cent of the profits, including those earned by third-party investors.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the contract entitled the employee to post-termination profits based on an objective interpretation of the agreement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the employee was not entitled to profits earned by third-party investors, and dismissed the action against the directing mind personally, finding no basis to pierce the corporate veil.

The appellants, executors of the estate of a deceased nurse, sued her former employer for negligence in administering a group life insurance plan, resulting in the denial of enhanced benefits.

The trial judge found the employer negligent but dismissed the action, concluding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and thus subject to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute did not arise from the collective agreement, which only required the employer to pay premiums and provide an information booklet.

Judgment was granted in favour of the appellants for the value of the enhanced benefits.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action, arguing that the employer's unilateral changes to his employment contract invalidated the termination clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the changes were not fundamental and had been condoned by the appellant.

Furthermore, the Court found that the appellant was estopped from claiming more than six months' notice, as he had accepted the six months offered at termination without objection.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, was wrongfully dismissed and subsequently defamed by his former employer on two separate occasions.

The trial judge awarded damages for defamation but failed to distinguish between the first slander, which was statute-barred, and the second actionable slander.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the global damages award and substituting an award of $10,000 for the actionable slander.

The Court upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs order, which denied costs to a successful co-defendant and required the unsuccessful defendant to pay the plaintiff's entire costs, due to the defendants' failure to make timely documentary disclosure.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding reimbursement of advertising fund contributions was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a Divisional Court decision setting aside a motion judge's order that appointed judges and judicial officers as referees to determine individual class members' claims under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a court cannot appoint a judge or judicial officer to conduct a reference under s. 25(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act without first obtaining the authorization of the Chief Justice or her designate under s. 14(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The consent of individual judicial officers is not an adequate substitute for the Chief Justice's overarching responsibility for judicial assignments.

The appellant, a long-term employee of an insurance brokerage, was constructively dismissed when her new employer unilaterally transferred her to an office an hour away and impugned her work quality when she objected.

The trial judge awarded damages for constructive dismissal, finding an implied term that she would work in her original location.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision, holding that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the location of the workplace was an essential term of the employment contract.

The respondent employee resigned mid-year and successfully sued for a pro rata share of his non-discretionary profit-sharing bonus.

The appellant employer appealed, arguing that the bonus was calculated at year-end and no pro rata share should be implied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the profit-sharing plan was an integral, non-discretionary part of the compensation package and that there was no clear practice denying the bonus upon mid-year departure.

The Minister of Health and Long Term Care appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an order by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner to produce records relating to physician remuneration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the phrase 'labour relations' in s. 65(6)3 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act is not restricted to employer/employee relationships.

The court held that the relationship between the government and physicians, including the work of the Physician Services Committee, falls within 'labour relations', exempting the requested records from the Act.

The employee, a tour foreman, was fired after refusing a new, unpaid weekend on-call requirement due to child care commitments.

He sued for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found the on-call requirement was a material change to the employment contract, constituting constructive dismissal.

The employer appealed, arguing the trial judge exceeded the agreed statement of facts, erred in finding a material change, exhibited bias through preliminary comments, and that the employee failed to mitigate by not accepting the on-call shifts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings and concluding the employee was not obliged to accept the on-call requirement to mitigate damages.

The appellant appealed an order finding it in contempt of an arbitration award.

The appellant argued the agreement between the parties was ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties had agreed to a specific calculation method and the appellant's deviation from it constituted a clear violation of a clear order.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent 15 months' notice for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the respondent was an independent contractor, that a release barred her claim, and that prior asset sales severed her employment history.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking a longer notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the respondent was an employee, that her employment history carried over through asset sales, and that the 15-month notice period was within the acceptable range.