Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants.

He applied to reopen his trial based on fresh evidence from a related proceeding where a judge found a police officer had deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the misconduct was not relevant to the appellant's defence and the evidence could have been adduced with due diligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's decision not to reopen was a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion and the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence were not met.

The appellant appealed his five-year penitentiary sentence for offences including break and enter, criminal harassment, and firearms violations committed against his former spouse.

The trial judge treated the conduct as an escalating pattern of intimate partner violence and prioritized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the trial judge properly characterized the offences as intimate partner violence and appropriately weighed the aggravating factors, including the appellant's extensive record of breaching court orders.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 years imprisonment (less 50 months presentence custody) imposed after pleading guilty to twelve firearm-related offences, including two counts of discharge of a prohibited firearm with intent to prevent arrest, possession of a firearm while prohibited, dangerous driving, and possession of explosive substances.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, failed to properly consider mitigating factors including his guilty plea, and imposed an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's decision reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for an exemplary sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Melissa Hart’s motion to re-open her summary conviction appeal for assault and failure to comply with an undertaking.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction, as Hart failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court also prohibited Hart from filing further documents regarding these convictions without written leave of the court.

The appellant, Qalid Abderezak, appealed a 12-year sentence for robbery and firearms offences, arguing that the sentence was unreasonably disparate compared to a co-accused, Zakariye Yousuf, who received a 10-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis, noting the different roles and culpability of the offenders and the deferential standard of review for sentencing decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of importing cocaine, sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years and three months.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider collateral consequences related to her children's care by the Catholic Children's Aid Society and the impact of systemic discrimination and racism.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered family circumstances as a mitigating factor and that systemic factors, while relevant to responsibility, do not diminish the gravity of the offence.

The sentence was at the low end of the established range for such offences.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's reliance on the complainant's willingness to undergo a sexual assault examination and prophylactic medications, the finding of painful intercourse, and alleged reversal of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, his consideration of medical evidence corroborating the complainant's account, or his application of the burden of proof.

The trial judge properly considered the complainant's physical injuries, demeanor, identification of the perpetrator, and the appellant's exclusive opportunity to commit the assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, as well as his sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W.(D.) instruction regarding defence witnesses, by finding he lacked standing to challenge a search under section 8 of the Charter, and by denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) instruction was required, the appellant was merely a privileged visitor with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched residence, and there was no evidence of adverse effects from the lockdown conditions to warrant enhanced credit.

The appellant sought to institute a private prosecution against the Chief Firearms Officer of Ontario for declining to issue an unconditional firearms transport authorization.

A Justice of the Peace declined to authorize the private prosecution following a pre-enquete hearing, and the Superior Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace and noting that any authorization to transport a restricted firearm must comply with the condition to name specified places under the Firearms Act.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found he posed a significant threat to public safety and denied him an absolute discharge.

The hospital and treatment team supported an absolute discharge, noting that while the appellant suffered from schizophrenia, he was not violent and could be managed under the civil mental health system.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, as it relied on speculative correlations between drug use, mental illness symptoms, and risk to the public, while ignoring the unique circumstances of the index offence and the appellant's lack of violent history.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after his trial counsel was removed from the record by an application judge due to unpaid legal fees.

The appellant was forced to represent himself for the remainder of the trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in removing counsel absent a fundamental disagreement, serious breakdown in communications, or ethical dilemma.

The removal violated the appellant's right to counsel, and actual prejudice was not required to order a new trial, though prejudice likely existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance, as well as his global sentence of 44 months.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge on identification evidence, restricted cross-examination on the Sophonow report, misdirected the jury on inferences from a cell phone call, and failed to grant two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court also upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to deny two-for-one credit based on the appellant's history of disobeying court orders.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop.

The motion judge had ruled the search lawful, finding the appellant consented.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, as the police officer's threat to bring in a canine unit—which he had no lawful authority to do—vitiated the appellant's consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his convictions, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of his application under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter and her handling of a juror's reaction during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings regarding police testimony and her conclusion that no Charter violations occurred.

The Court also found that the trial judge's mid-trial instructions were a suitable response to the juror's conduct, noting that defence counsel had not sought a mistrial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The police responded to a 911 call regarding a domestic assault.

The complainant fled her home in pyjamas and the police accompanied her back to retrieve her belongings and protect her property.

The respondent blocked the bedroom doorway and refused to move, leading to his arrest for obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge acquitted the respondent, finding the police lacked authority to remain in the home.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the police entry and subsequent conduct were lawful under their common law and statutory duties to preserve the peace and protect property.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction on three grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the charge did not strictly comply with Lifchus, the jury would not have misunderstood the standard of proof given the W.(D.) instruction on the alibi defence.

The court also found no merit to the argument that cross-examination was improperly curtailed.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent, while under the influence of alcohol, struck and killed a pedestrian at high speed, then fled the scene and failed to seek assistance.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was manifestly unfit as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was imposed.

The young person appellant and an adult co-accused were charged separately with murder.

The appellant was compelled to testify at the adult's preliminary inquiry, during which the Crown extensively questioned him about his own involvement, leading to self-incriminating statements.

This compelled testimony was then used to elicit incriminating evidence from another witness, who later testified at the appellant's trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's predominant purpose at the preliminary inquiry was to build a case against the appellant, violating his section 7 Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The derivative evidence should have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and hashish and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly turned the trial into a credibility contest, and failed to properly answer a jury question regarding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge or the recharge on reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year sentence for importing 2.13 kilograms of cocaine and 1 kilogram of hashish was not demonstrably unfit.