Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application.

The police found the firearm during a search of the appellant under the Cannabis Control Act after observing open cannabis in an idling vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the section 8 analysis, concluding it was reasonable for police to seize the appellant's identifying information before conducting the physical search.

Although the Court found a section 10(b) breach based on recent jurisprudence, it conducted a fresh section 24(2) analysis and concluded the firearm should not be excluded.

The applicant, having been convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to over 8 years in custody, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown opposed the application primarily on the public interest ground.

The motion judge found that the applicant's proposed ground of appeal regarding the jury instruction on self-defence and unlawful act assault clearly surpassed the not frivolous threshold.

Finding no public safety or flight risks, the motion judge concluded that the public interest in reviewability outweighed the public interest in enforceability, and granted bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered cross-appeals from both the Crown and D.L. regarding convictions and acquittals arising from allegations of intimate partner violence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and extortion charges and sought a harsher sentence, while D.L. appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge’s assessment of evidence and sufficiency of reasons.

The Court dismissed both appeals, upheld the trial judge’s findings, and stayed certain duplicative counts.

The decision addresses the proper approach to consent in sexual assault, the scope of appellate review, and the principles guiding sentencing for intimate partner violence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using a 911 call to corroborate Crown evidence, and whether the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the time required to stash a firearm and move a vehicle.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge double-counted breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or sentencing approach.

The appellant, Pius Bempong, appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the jury's verdicts of not guilty for sexual assault but guilty for sexual interference, based on the same facts, were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the apparent inconsistency could be reconciled by a legal error in the trial judge's instructions regarding the definition of "force" in sexual assault versus "touching" in sexual interference, as per the framework established in R. v. R.V. The court clarified that the Crown is not required to cross-appeal an acquittal to rebut an inconsistent verdict argument raised by an appellant.

Zachary Barton was convicted by a jury of firearms-related offences.

Police found a semi-automatic handgun during a warrantless search in a common hallway planter, and later ammunition and a bullet-proof vest during a warranted search of his apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in concluding the handgun was not obtained in a manner that infringed his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the handgun was unconstitutionally obtained due to its causal, contextual, and temporal links to the unlawful police conduct.

As the trial judge had not fully determined the validity of the search warrant after excising the unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial on all charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by engaging in a credibility contest and misapplying the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge's reasons indicated he based his decision on whose evidence he preferred rather than determining whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board misunderstood the joint submission of the parties and inadvertently imposed a more restrictive condition than intended.

The appeal was allowed to correct the error by substituting the jointly submitted condition regarding community accommodations.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that, aside from a comment regarding the appellant being treatment consent incapable, the Board's decision was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the trial judge gave only conclusory reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and made no comments about the complainant's evidence on Counts 1 and 2.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into his Aboriginal background and consider s. 718(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report detailing the appellant's systemic and personal challenges.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with additional probation conditions requiring the appellant to reside with his father, attend counselling, and participate in a Healing Lodge program.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing exclusively on public safety and unreasonably disregarded expert evidence that he could be managed in a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly considered all statutory criteria and balanced the appellant's treatment needs against the risk he posed to the public.

The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that the proposed management plan was speculative and that the appellant was not an appropriate candidate for a medium secure setting due to his unwillingness to undergo a necessary medication trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife by cyanide poisoning.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior fraudulent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found the admissibility of the bad character evidence to be borderline at best, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court concluded that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the impugned evidence tipped the balance or that a new trial would produce a different verdict.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for poisoning her estranged husband with antifreeze-laced wine.

On appeal, she argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and sought disclosure of confidential informer information as well as the admission of fresh evidence regarding a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, upholding the confidential informer privilege, and rejecting the fresh evidence as inadmissible and unreliable under the Palmer test.

The youthful offender appealed her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on general deterrence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an error in principle as the judge failed to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation, and the principle that a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible.

Given the offender's youth, guilty plea, and fresh evidence of rehabilitation, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to time served plus probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial when a juror expressed doubt during polling, that an adverse inference instruction should have been given for the Crown's failure to call a witness, and that the jury charge was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to allow further deliberations after the jury poll, that the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt arising from an absence of evidence, and that the jury charge was adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against his former partner's son.

The appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including improperly using neutral evidence to buttress the complainant's credibility, applying an uneven standard to criminal records, improperly using a prior consistent statement, and misapprehending evidence regarding inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or evidence.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant about his association with two individuals who had been convicted of drug importing, despite no evidence linking them to the appellant's charges.

The trial judge failed to caution the jury against drawing an adverse inference of guilt by association.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper cross-examination and lack of a limiting instruction resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident where the complainant allegedly passed out after consuming alcohol, Ecstasy, and GHB.

The Crown's case relied on a witness who observed the appellant and the complainant in a bedroom.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on the elements of consent and knowledge of lack of consent, and in his answers to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury was not properly instructed on the crucial issues of the complainant's lack of consent and the appellant's knowledge of her lack of consent, and that the trial judge's answers to the jury's questions were incorrect and unresponsive.