Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference (with the sexual assault conviction stayed under the Kienapple principle) following a trial in the Superior Court of Justice.

The offences involved repeated sexual touching of a complainant between the ages of 13 and 15, who attended a home daycare operated by the appellant's wife.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) improper use of a fabrication finding to bolster the complainant's evidence; (2) failure to expressly reject his denial of the offences under the W.(D.) framework; and (3) misapprehension of the evidence regarding the complainant's alleged motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds, finding the fabrication finding was used only as a credibility assessment tool, that the denial was plainly rejected on a holistic reading of the reasons, and that the trial judge clearly understood and implicitly rejected the motive to lie argument.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, Jerome Williams, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision ordering his continued detention in the High Secure Provincial Forensic Programs Division at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

Williams argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge, or alternatively, a transfer to a medium secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and the necessity of continued detention at Waypoint were reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly in light of ongoing concerns about medication compliance and substance use.

The appellant, J.F., appealed his convictions for multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering death threats, and careless storage of firearms.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the explanation of memory gaps due to trauma, reliance on testimonial demeanour, and the use of lack of exaggeration.

The appellant also argued insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, did not reverse the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the verdict.

This is an appeal of a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by permitting extensive cross-examination of the s. 752.1 expert by the Crown after the defence had cross-examined him, which allegedly undermined the fairness of the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the procedure was unusual, it did not result in unfairness or affect the outcome.

The sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable expectation that measures other than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect children, given the offender's history of refusing treatment, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a Crown appeal of an 18-month custodial sentence imposed on the respondent for making child pornography, distributing child pornography, and voyeurism involving two child victims.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by elevating the offender's age and rehabilitation potential over denunciation and deterrence, and by failing to recognize a breach of trust.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the sentencing objectives, including the principle of restraint for young first offenders, and did not err in not finding a breach of trust.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by prioritizing the offender's age and failing to address aggravating factors like the familial relationship, resulting in an unfit sentence.

The applicant sought release pending his appeal of convictions and a 36-month sentence for weapons offences.

The Crown opposed bail on the public interest criterion, citing the applicant's history of weapons offences and breaches of release terms.

The motion judge found that the proposed release plan, which relied on the applicant's mother as a surety, was inadequate given her past inability to supervise him and prevent violations.

Concluding there was a strong likelihood of breach and a real risk to public safety, the court dismissed the application for release pending appeal.

The appellant, Lalendra Desilva, appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for his arrest, the lawfulness of subsequent searches, and in assessing breaches of his Charter right to counsel (sections 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding of reasonable grounds for arrest and the lawfulness of the searches.

While the Court found an additional breach of the appellant's right to counsel due to a one-hour delay in facilitating access, it concluded that, applying the Grant test, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, given the seriousness of the crime and the minimal impact of the breach on the appellant's protected interests.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board concerning a restriction of liberty hearing for an appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) for aggravated assault.

The appellant, who has schizophrenia, had his liberty restricted and was transferred to a more secure forensic unit after his mental health deteriorated due to discontinuing medication.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to consider his liberty interests and other needs, including a request for a lateral transfer to another unit, and that the Board's findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board considered all required factors and that there was sufficient evidence to support the transfer to a more secure unit, including testimony from the treating psychiatrist regarding the appellant's unmanageability and risk of harm.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the restriction of liberty was necessary to be reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding the complainant had no motive to fabricate and using this to assess her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between a "proven absence of motive to fabricate" and an "absence of evidence of motive to fabricate." The court held that while a proven absence of motive is a high bar, the absence of evidence of motive can be considered as one factor among many in assessing credibility, provided it is not given undue weight or used to reverse the burden of proof.

The trial judge's approach was found to be consistent with established legal principles.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts related to child prostitution and his sentence of four and a half years.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to call a witness and that the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion regarding the adjournment and conducted the trial impartially.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly applied the principle of totality and the Tang factors, resulting in a fit sentence.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault arising from a late-night truck pursuit and repeated ramming of a vehicle after an altercation at a bridge.

The court held that unidentified hearsay statements describing a plan to push Asian fishermen into the water were admissible under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established through corroborative surrounding events.

The jury charge, read as a whole, adequately limited the use of those statements to the issue of common intention and motive, and improper Crown cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, leave was granted but the sentence of two years less a day, probation, and a driving prohibition was upheld as not manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender.

The appellant appealed three convictions and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in accepting the daughter's evidence as corroboration of the complainant being pushed down the stairs, disbelieving his evidence regarding his knowledge of the assault, and finding his evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the conviction appeals.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's excellent oral reasons.

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for assault, seeking to convert the remainder to a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge overstated the seriousness of one incident, the custodial sentence was justified given the appellant's previous record for assault, the seriousness of the current assault, and the serious injuries caused to the victim.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The appellant appealed the refusal of a Superior Court judge to grant an order under section 37.1(1)(a) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The appellant sought disclosure of the existence or absence of a criminal record of a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that such disclosure might enable the accused to determine the identity of the confidential informant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge granted a motion for a directed verdict.

The Court of Appeal held that the identity of names between the person the complainant identified as her assailant and the accused constituted some evidence on the issue of identity.

The appeal was allowed, the directed verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed a conviction under s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code involving a paint-gun.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the paint-gun was a 'firearm' under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge erred in law by applying a negligence standard instead of the correct standard of 'a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances' for s. 86(1).

The Court declined to apply the proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and exposing genital organs for a sexual purpose involving a seven-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the evidence reasonable despite the complainant's recantation to a friend.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the Court stayed the convictions for sexual touching and exposure, as they arose from the same factual and legal nexus as the sexual assault.

The global sentence of three years was upheld and applied solely to the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and obstructing justice after brutally beating his pregnant common-law spouse, leaving her with permanent, severe brain damage.

He was sentenced to the maximum of 14 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody and his guilty plea, resulting in a net sentence of 8 years.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors such as his lack of a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was at the high end of the range, it was not demonstrably unfit given the extreme violence, devastating impact on the victim, and the appellant's lack of remorse.