Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The applicant was convicted of two counts of human trafficking and sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment.

She sought bail pending appeal on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to re-litigate the hearsay issue; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, granting bail pending appeal.

The appellant appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed for two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving approximately 1.2 kilograms of cocaine and over 800 grams of methamphetamine.

The Crown had sought six years while the defence sought a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erroneously relied on other seized items (cash, cocaine press, ammunition, and other drugs) to determine his level of involvement, contending these items had not been proven as separate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered facts from the agreed statement of facts to assess the appellant's level of involvement and imposed a fit sentence considering all circumstances, including mitigating factors and the appellant's genuine remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising two grounds: an alleged error in the severance application regarding charges involving two complainants, and serious errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the high deference owed to severance decisions and credibility findings.

The court found no error in the application judge's decision to not sever the charges, noting the low threshold for similar act evidence at the severance stage and the lack of injustice given the judge-alone trial and partial acquittal.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no impermissible reasoning or unequal scrutiny.

The appellant, Jerome Derby, appealed his global sentence for firearm-related offences, including discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

He argued that the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for possession while prohibited, having already considered this as an aggravating factor, which constituted double counting.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the approach was erroneous and constituted double counting, and therefore allowed the appeal in part.

The appellant appealed his conviction for various drug and firearm offences and his nine-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the validity of a search warrant under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, particularly regarding the inclusion of facts from prior withdrawn or stayed charges.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the ITO, based on the totality of evidence and corroborative facts, justified the warrant.

The sentence appeal argued the nine-year global sentence was excessive, but the Court found the trial judge's sentencing discretion was reasonable.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Shawn Clyke, appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the Crown's closing submissions at trial contained serious improprieties that rendered his trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing submissions improperly invited the jury to engage in propensity reasoning, used inflammatory language to evoke sympathy for the complainant and revulsion for the accused, and attempted to bolster the complainant's credibility through unsupported theories and personal endorsement.

Despite the trial judge's corrective instructions, the cumulative effect of these improprieties was deemed to have prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial, particularly given the non-overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and two counts of assault.

The appeal primarily concerned the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the permitted and prohibited uses of the complainant's prior consistent statements, which were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after a defence attack.

The Court of Appeal found this omission, exacerbated by instructions given only on prior inconsistent statements, constituted a reversible error.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of a pre-trial third-party records application, finding the records were not "likely relevant."

The appellant, Darren Pearce, sought leave to appeal a five-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately address the principle of parity between Mr. Pearce's sentence and that of his co-accused, Terrance Goodwin, who received a substantially shorter sentence for the same crime.

The court substituted a sentence of "time served" equivalent to approximately three and a half years, to achieve appropriate parity, considering Mr. Pearce's pre-sentence custody and credits.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years imposed for a spree of robberies committed over a two-week period.

Duty counsel argued that the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incorrect prior sentence from 2006, claiming the appellant had received six and a half years when he actually received five years and eleven months.

The court found the error immaterial as the sentencing judge had considered numerous factors and reduced a proposed 12-year sentence to 10 years based on rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was upheld as fit and justified.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of assault, one count of sexual assault, and one count of unlawful confinement arising from a domestic relationship.

The appellant was acquitted of four other charges and one charge was withdrawn.

He was sentenced to 21 months in jail and three years probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of a Charter section 11(b) delay motion and raised three grounds of appeal relating to credibility evaluation and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the case met the criteria for granting leave to appeal under the second category established in R. v. R(R.).

The court found that the appellant had not established sufficient grounds for leave to appeal and refused the application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The appellant was arrested during a traffic stop on Highway 401 when police discovered cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that the drugs belonged to another passenger and convicted him based on circumstantial evidence and credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, misapprehension of evidence, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of invitation to sexual touching of a child and acquitted of sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because there was no evidence the child did not comply with the invitations, which would have constituted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no necessary logical inconsistency.

The court noted the jury may have misunderstood that the appellant's participation in the physical contact amounted to an assault, but this error would have enured to the appellant's benefit and did not undermine the convictions.

The Attorney General appealed orders setting rates of compensation for amicus curiae appointed in three criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued that courts have no jurisdiction to fix the rate of compensation for amicus curiae, as only Parliament can allocate public funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that both superior and statutory courts have the jurisdiction to fix the rate of compensation for amicus curiae as a necessary incident of their jurisdiction to appoint amicus.

The court found that such orders do not infringe constitutional principles and are authorized by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Financial Administration Act.

The trial judges did not err in setting rates that exceeded legal aid rates, as amicus serves the court and the administration of justice, and the rates were based on appropriate factors.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and assault with intent to resist arrest.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent custody and a two-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the gravity of the conduct which involved running two red lights and causing significant injuries to two people.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of an unsavoury witness was corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence with great caution and correctly identified evidence capable of confirming the witness's testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary because he was not re-cautioned, and that the trial judge failed to direct the jury on the issue of failure to retreat regarding self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to re-caution did not render the spontaneous statements involuntary and that the failure to retreat was never a live issue at trial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The young person pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following a swarming incident where the victim was repeatedly stabbed with a box cutter.

The youth court judge imposed a sentence of two years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the probation sentence demonstrably unfit given the seriousness of the violent offence, the young person's role as the ringleader, and the devastating impact on the victim.

The sentence was varied to a nine-month custody and supervision order followed by six months' probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the trial judge failed to properly consider whether the Crown had disproved unconscious influence among the three complainants when admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly addressed the potential effect of contact on the probative value of the evidence and concluded that the testimony was not tainted.

The appeal was dismissed.