Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Tyson Peti, appealed the sentence imposed after pleading guilty to assault with a weapon, mischief, and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s decision to impose the Crown’s proposed sentence of 18 months, despite the judge’s reservations about its leniency.

The Court recognized the appellant’s rehabilitative efforts but concluded the sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s criminal record.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his designation and sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory and erred in finding his conduct intractable for the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate and there was ample evidence of a repetitive pattern of intimate partner violence to support the dangerous offender designation and the resulting seven-year sentence with a ten-year long term supervision order.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of breach of trust, conspiracy, and attempting to obstruct justice after disseminating confidential police information.

He appealed, arguing that the London Police Service's investigation of its own officer created an inherent conflict of interest amounting to an abuse of process under the residual category.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police service's conduct did not offend societal notions of fair play and decency, and that the failure to transfer the investigation to an outside force earlier did not undermine the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and other serious offences, appealed the imposition of a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The appeal was based on three grounds: the sentencing judge's assessment of substantial risk of reoffence, the length of the LTSO given the appellant's age and a Static-99R assessment, and the failure to explicitly grant "Duncan" enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly assessed the risk of reoffence, the LTSO length was justified by the appellant's non-participation in treatment and other factors, and that the "Duncan" factors were implicitly considered in determining the fit sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and breach of probation, as well as his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, credibility assessments, or handling of the appellant's criminal record.

In dismissing the sentence appeal, the Court explicitly abandoned the 'Smith range' (21 months to 4 years) previously used for intimate partner sexual assaults, holding that such assaults should not attract a lower sentencing range than sexual assaults committed against strangers.

The five-year sentence was upheld as fit and proportionate.

The appellant, a real estate agent, was convicted of fraud in relation to three real estate transactions.

She appealed her convictions on the sole ground that the trial judge impermissibly intervened during her cross-examination, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were primarily questions seeking clarification of confusing evidence and did not compromise the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of murder relating to four victims killed over 75 days using the same handguns.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever one murder count from the other three, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and admitting unusual motive evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal to sever the counts, concluding the jury charge was fair and balanced, and holding that the motive evidence was properly grounded in the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 40-month sentence.

He was self-represented at trial and argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, rendering the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and that the trial judge provided extensive assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 40-month sentence fell within the appropriate range for aggravated assault given the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The conviction followed police surveillance, an undercover purchase, and searches of the appellant's vehicle and apartment.

The appellant appealed, challenging the validity of the apartment search warrant and alleging various Charter violations during the police takedown and strip searches.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding sufficient grounds for the search warrant independent of evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful strip search, and finding no Charter violations that would warrant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction for theft and money laundering of gold from the Canadian Mint where he was employed.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of two years and six months, a restitution order of $190,000, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $190,000.

The appellant limited his appeal to the quantum of the restitution order and the fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restitution order but reduced the fine in lieu of forfeiture to $130,206.19, finding that the sentencing judge erred by using market value rather than the actual proceeds of crime received by the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his then 17-year-old niece, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a proper curative instruction to the jury in response to Crown counsel's closing remarks.

Crown counsel had commented that the complainant was not asked about abrasions to her genitals or the presence of male DNA on her body.

The appellant argued this violated the rule prohibiting questions about other sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the issue by explaining the legal prohibition on such questions and reiterating the Crown's burden of proof.

The court also dismissed the appellant's request for leave to appeal his sentence, which was imposed pursuant to a joint submission.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to set aside the trial judge's credibility findings.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence failed to reflect the appellant's peripheral role in the offence given the amount of marijuana involved.

The sentence was reduced to time served, with all ancillary orders remaining in place.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The appellant and victim, both in their mid-30s, engaged in a consensual fight with long-standing animosity between them.

During the altercation, the appellant struck the victim multiple times with a beer bottle, causing serious injuries to the victim's left hand requiring surgery.

The sentencing judge found the assault was not unprovoked and that the appellant caused all injuries.

The appellant had a difficult background with post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health issues, but the trial judge found these did not contribute to the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's approach and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference with a person under the age of 14 years.

The victim alleged that the appellant touched her vagina while she was sleeping on a mattress in the appellant's living room.

The appellant denied the allegations, and his son testified in support of his father.

On appeal, duty counsel raised grounds challenging the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and alleging that the trial judge mischaracterized evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered both credibility and reliability, fairly characterized the evidence, and was entitled to make the credibility findings as made.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of a 17-year-old woman who had been forced into the sex trade.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent as it lacked an air of reality; (2) Crown counsel conducted improper cross-examination and delivered an inflammatory closing address; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the defence instruction should not have been given as there was no air of reality to it, and the manner in which it was presented to the jury obscured the appellant's actual defence and confused the jury regarding his position that the acts never occurred.

The trial judge's misstatement of the appellant's position compounded this error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

He sought to strike his guilty pleas, arguing they were not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to strike the pleas, noting that the appellant was represented by counsel, personally entered his guilty pleas, addressed the court before sentencing, and was actively involved in the proceedings.

The court held that the appellant's dissatisfaction with the sentence did not undermine the voluntariness of his pleas.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with a roadside demand for a breath sample.

At trial, she testified that a panic attack prevented her from providing a sample.

The trial judge rejected her evidence, relying on her failure to mention the panic attack to the officer at the roadside and on inconsistent statements she made before being advised of her right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by using pre-counsel roadside statements to impeach the appellant's credibility and by using her pre-trial silence to draw adverse inferences against her.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had excluded the cocaine evidence, finding the arresting officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent, who was fleeing the scene of a reported robbery, due to a discrepancy in the suspect's weight description.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that in the totality of the circumstances, including the timing and the respondent fleeing the scene, the single discrepancy was not enough to render the arrest objectively unreasonable.

A new trial was ordered.