Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of luring and sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on his belief that the 15-year-old complainant was 16, finding he took reasonable steps to determine her age by using an alternate internet profile.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by failing to conduct the required contextual and objective inquiry under ss. 172.1(4) and 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, and by failing to properly address the issue of consent under ss. 265(3) and 273.1.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States for prosecution on drug charges.

The applicant argued the Minister erred in his Cotroni analysis under s. 6(1) of the Charter, denied procedural fairness by refusing to disclose the prosecutor's assessment, and erred in finding no abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision reasonable, no denial of procedural fairness, and no abuse of process given both countries had a legitimate interest in prosecuting the applicant.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed his acquittal.

The trial judge had rejected the applicant's defence of non-insane automatism because he failed to lead expert evidence as required by R. v. Stone.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant was tricked into consuming alcohol.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no issue of sufficient merit or importance.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to three years' imprisonment following a vicious assault on a defenceless victim.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant strides towards rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the trial judge but allowed the sentence appeal based on the fresh evidence, reducing the sentence to two years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Board held another hearing resulting in a new disposition that increased the restrictions on the appellant's liberty.

Due to delays in bringing the initial appeal and the intention to appeal the new disposition, the Court of Appeal adjourned the current appeal to be heard together with the proposed appeal of the new disposition, and appointed amicus curiae to assist the self-represented appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach when police seized drugs from his home without a warrant.

The police had attended a domestic dispute, and the appellant's common law spouse volunteered the drugs to them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the breach was inadvertent and minor, and that the trial judge did not err in balancing the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof or provided inadequate reasons.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The appellant, an adult, was convicted of robbery with a weapon and use of an imitation firearm after acting as a lookout or driver for five young offenders who robbed a gas station.

He appealed his convictions and his 18-month sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to give a Vetrovec caution for a defence witness, and imposed a disparate sentence compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of party liability, and concluding the sentence disparity was justified by the appellant's adult status and conviction for the firearm offence.

The appellant, who suffers from schizoaffective disorder and was found not criminally responsible, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention in a minimum-secure facility.

He argued the Board erred by failing to adequately consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board did err by failing to consider whether the appellant would consent to medication conditions and by failing to properly analyze the mechanisms under the Criminal Code and Mental Health Act for returning him to the hospital if he decompensated.

However, the appeal was dismissed due to fresh evidence showing the appellant had stopped taking his medication, decompensated, and been returned to a medium-secure unit.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea, seeking to withdraw the plea.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and found that a combination of factors, including retained counsel's failure to meet with the appellant for 8 months, substitute counsel's lack of preparation, the appellant's difficulties in custody, language barriers, and his consistent assertions of innocence, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference involving two of his step-granddaughters, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the young complainants' credibility and failed to adequately consider the possibility of collusion or tainting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed and properly addressed the evidence's frailties.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge improperly punished the appellant for a lack of remorse.

The Crown appealed a one-year conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for aggravated sexual assault.

The respondent, who was HIV-positive, engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with his girlfriend on two occasions without disclosing his status.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a conditional sentence, as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offence, the breach of trust, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court held that aggravated sexual assault involving HIV non-disclosure generally requires a custodial term.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 12 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation, accounting for time served.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs on his person and in his room while executing a search warrant.

On appeal, he argued the search warrant was invalid due to false information in the ITO and that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury regarding his failure to formally complain about alleged police brutality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors in upholding the warrant's validity or in her jury instructions.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender and residential school survivor, appealed his sentence for sexually abusing his step-daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the appellant's Aboriginal background and upbringing under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

Balancing the severe aggravating factors of the offence against the appellant's tragic upbringing and physical ailments, the Court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to four years.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 27 months' imprisonment and probation for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was out of the range given the circumstances of the offence, though a substantial jail sentence was required due to the appellant's record and the fact he was on probation.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 18 months' imprisonment, and the probation order was set aside.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had imposed conditional discharges.

The Court of Appeal held that a discharge is not legally available for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional discharges were set aside, and suspended sentences with probation were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence.

He argued that the search warrant was invalid due to a defect in the copy and omissions in the information provided by confidential informants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the warrant valid and the conviction supported by physical and expert evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was appropriate given the appellant's extensive record and a conditional sentence was not warranted.

The appellant applied for a stay of an order requiring the taking of a DNA sample pending his appeal of that order.

The Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to stay such an order despite section 487.056(1) of the Criminal Code.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the majority granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the appellant's privacy interests, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant as he was already in custody.

A dissenting judge would have refused the stay due to the appellant's failure to perfect the appeal on time.