Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder of a drug dealer who was found dead with blunt force trauma to the head and multiple stab wounds.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the appellant's connection to the deceased, knowledge of his residence, financial motive, threatening text messages, cell phone evidence, and possession of the deceased's stolen belongings.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: exclusion of alternate suspect evidence, admission of threatening text messages, and failure to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found him to remain a significant threat to public safety and ordered a conditional discharge with reporting and drug testing requirements.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault with a weapon in 2007, sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition, finding that the Board's conclusion that the appellant would likely discontinue antipsychotic medication, increase cannabis use, and decompensate into psychosis was supported by evidence, including the appellant's lack of insight into his need for medication and his history of drug use.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking following a search of his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant did not specify a date for execution but authorized entry "at any time." The appellant appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to specify an execution date, rendering the search a violation of Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the warrant did not expressly state an execution date, an execution date could be implied from the date of issuance.

The court rejected the appellant's characterization of the warrant as expressly non-expiring and held that the absence of an express date was a technical fault that did not invalidate the warrant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for counselling murder.

While in jail for sexual assault, the appellant solicited a fellow inmate to kill the complainant so she could not testify against him.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the fellow inmate and surreptitiously recorded conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the offence of counselling was complete upon solicitation and the trial judge did not err in relying on the unsavoury witness's evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the nine-year sentence (reduced to five years for pre-trial custody) was proportionate given the aggravating factor that the target was a justice system participant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including weapons trafficking.

The Court of Appeal held that agreeing to purchase a firearm does not constitute a 'transfer' under s. 99 of the Criminal Code, quashing that conviction.

The Court also applied the Kienapple principle to stay three of the remaining five convictions, finding they arose from the same transaction and constituted a single criminal wrong.

The appellant's total sentence was reduced by three years.

The appellant, a 19-year-old, was convicted of importing nearly 2 kg of cocaine and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on her out-of-court statements, the W.(D.) framework, and her criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the established range for first-time couriers importing large amounts of cocaine and appropriately accounted for her youth.

The respondents were charged with tax offences.

During the trial, the Crown directed a stay of proceedings under s. 579 of the Criminal Code.

The respondents subsequently sought costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter for alleged prosecutorial negligence and Charter breaches.

The Summary Conviction Court judge held he retained jurisdiction to hear the costs application, which was upheld on certiorari by the Superior Court.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that once the Crown exercises its discretion to stay proceedings, the trial judge becomes functus and lacks jurisdiction to entertain a Charter costs application.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over the legal limit, arguing that his statements to police at the accident scene were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and violated his section 7 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the smell of alcohol alone justified the approved screening device demand and the police had established the driver's identity without relying on the appellant's statements.

The proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice beyond the case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping and robbery, arguing that the trial judge's questions to a defence witness created an apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly followed the established protocol by waiting until the conclusion of the witness's testimony to ask clarifying questions on a narrow issue and allowing further re-examination.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.80.

The appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error by the summary conviction appeal judge and noting the case involved well-settled legal principles with no broader significance to the administration of justice.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

After the jury was discharged, it was discovered that the jury foreman had brought a document containing extraneous information into the jury room.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the juror misconduct caused a miscarriage of justice, that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

They also appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reasonable possibility that the extraneous information affected the verdict, no error in the jury instructions or the dismissal of the directed verdict application, and that the sentences were fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial after jurors observed him in the courthouse lobby.

He also appealed the sentence, arguing it violated the parity principle because two co-accused received conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the mistrial application and concluding the sentence was appropriate given the appellant's major role in the smuggling enterprise compared to his co-accused.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug production and trafficking charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search incident to arrest and subsequent condominium searches, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, thereby violating the accused's Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the objective reasonableness of the grounds for arrest through the lens of an experienced police officer.

When viewed from that perspective, the totality of the evidence, including extensive surveillance, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder for sending tampered water bottles and letter bombs.

Seventeen months after the convictions, during dangerous offender proceedings, the trial judge amended his reasons to add an alternative theory of liability for the water bottle counts.

The Court of Appeal held that the late amendment rebutted the presumption of integrity and excised it from the reasons.

Based on the original reasons, the court found the attempted murder convictions for the water bottles unreasonable and entered acquittals.

The letter bomb convictions were upheld.

A new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and was detained at a secure forensic unit.

The Ontario Review Board granted a conditional discharge, concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety despite the hospital's recommendation for an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable as the evidence did not support a finding of significant risk to the public.

An absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant pled guilty to impaired driving causing death and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition.

He appealed only the length of the driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by adopting the Crown's recommendation for a ten-year prohibition without providing reasons or considering its appropriateness.

Given the appellant's youth, lack of prior record, deep remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and employment needs, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to five years.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

At trial, she sought to exclude her breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing her s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached because a video camera was present in the room where she spoke to duty counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding no evidence the camera was on or monitored, and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable belief that her privacy was compromised.

The summary conviction appeal court and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding the appellant did not prove her Charter rights were infringed.