Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Pierre Senatus, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and other charges, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed his trial counsel failed to introduce exculpatory social media posts and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that the alleged evidence was either not provided to counsel, lacked evidentiary value, or that counsel's actions were competent.

The court also determined there was no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, N.H., appealed his convictions for four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his three-year custody sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding counsel's limited role under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, failure to pursue exculpatory evidence, and the appellant's seating arrangement at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the claims of unfair trial or ineffective assistance, concluding that counsel acted competently and went beyond their limited appointment.

The court also dismissed the appellant's complaint about appeal delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and appealed on two grounds: the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence on the likelihood of a drug organization using a blind courier, and by not providing a limiting instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in admitting the expert evidence, particularly because defence counsel introduced the topic during cross-examination and agreed to the rephrased question.

The court also found no need for a limiting instruction as the evidence was not prejudicial and its exploration was a tactical decision by the defence.

The appellant, convicted of multiple robberies and severe assaults, appealed her dangerous offender designation and the determinate sentence of ten years (consecutive to a prior five-and-a-half-year sentence) followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the sentencing judge's findings regarding the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism and the application of the totality principle.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge's apprehension of the evidence, analysis, or conclusion that the appellant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, nor in the determination of the sentence, including the rejection of a "spree" characterization for the planned offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Salim Richard Glasner, appealed convictions for six drug-related charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's alleged failure to provide sufficient reasons and to properly apply the law of possession.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient and that the evidence supported the finding of possession and control for most counts.

However, the Crown conceded one count (possession of oxycodone) due to lack of evidence of the appellant's knowledge and control over the specific drugs.

The appeal was allowed for that single count, and dismissed for all other convictions and the sentence appeal.

The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing the application judge erred by not allowing cross-examination of an affiant regarding omitted information about the appellant's residence and the reliability of a confidential informant (CI#1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision.

The court held that the omitted information about the appellant's residence was not sufficiently cogent to warrant cross-examination, and the affiant's omission of CI#1's general comment about lying was not an attempt to mislead, nor did it detract from the specific, corroborated information provided by CI#1 for the search warrant.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention of a not criminally responsible accused at a forensic psychiatric facility.

The appellant sought conditional discharge with residence at his mother's home.

The Court of Appeal found the Board failed in its inquisitorial duty by not adequately exploring whether safeguards could mitigate concerns about attending physicians' understanding of the appellant's specific delusional disorder, and by relying on an unexplained administrative decision denying residence with his mother without requiring justification.

The appeal was allowed and the matter returned to the Board for re-hearing on an expedited basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior discreditable conduct involving other neighbours regarding noise complaints.

The appellant had strangled and slit the throat and wrists of his neighbour following a dispute over alleged noise from her unit.

The trial judge admitted evidence of the appellant's aggressive behaviour toward other neighbours over noise complaints to establish his state of mind and provide context for the interaction with the victim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's careful balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defence of provocation to the jury; (2) whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of evidence that the appellant did not apply the brakes immediately after striking the victim; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse Crown counsel for failing to disclose certain information communicated by a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment, careless use of a firearm, threatening to cause bodily harm, and two breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years and six months, reduced by 18 months to reflect 12 months actual pre-sentence custody.

The appellant challenged the sentencing decision on multiple grounds, including the failure to give additional credit for interim release conditions, the characterization of the firearm use, and post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court, which dismissed an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission on sentence, concluding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, agreeing that the trial judge applied the proper legal test for rejecting a joint submission.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years' probation imposed on a young person convicted of assault causing bodily harm, which the sentencing judge designated a serious violent offence.

The young person, acting as the principal in a group assault, knocked the victim unconscious and continued to strike him, causing a broken jaw and concussion.

The Court of Appeal found the probationary term failed to reflect the proportionality principle under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of four months' open custody, two months' community supervision, and six months' probation was substituted.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that had upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise a pure question of law.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the appeal lacked the apparent merit necessary to warrant a second level of appellate review.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for drug-related offences.

He argued that his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated during two separate incidents.

For the first incident, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of no Charter breach, citing the cumulative effect of informant information and police observations, including an envelope from a hydroponics store and a constantly ringing cell phone.

For the second incident, the Court found no error in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis admitting the evidence despite an assumed section 8 breach.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant had control of the drugs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on three respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentences for Robert Thiffeault Jr. and Robert Thiffeault Sr. given their minor involvement and mitigating factors.

For Donald Harrison, the Court found the trial judge erred as his role was more significant and warranted a reformatory sentence.

However, based on fresh evidence and his compliance with his conditional sentence, the Court declined to incarcerate him.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the conviction, including the appellant's admission of drinking and blacking out, the odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of the collision with a bus.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of assault and two counts of uttering threats against his wife.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed, though his sentence was varied to a conditional discharge.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the summary conviction appeal court judge's conclusion that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference and supported by the record.

The appellants were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the appellants.

On an application for certiorari, the reviewing judge quashed the discharges and committed the appellants for trial, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of jurisdictional error but allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the committal for trial and remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge for further consideration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for armed robbery, pointing a firearm, and being masked with intent, as well as his sentence of 17.5 years.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding eyewitness identification and prior statements, and that there was no evidence the handgun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding any errors in the jury charge were harmless and there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the weapon was a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the lengthy sentence was justified by the appellant's status as an untreatable, dangerous career criminal with a history of bank robberies.