Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and three counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's prolonged inattention constituted a "marked and substantial departure" from the standard of care.

However, the Court granted the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from seven years to five years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to an overemphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and insufficient consideration of the appellant's positive personal circumstances and low risk of recidivism.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of firearm-related charges, appealed his conviction.

While released pending appeal, he failed to surrender into custody as required by his release order on the day of the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that his whereabouts were unknown.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal as abandoned, citing his repudiation of the court's jurisdiction by absconding and the terms of his release order.

A warrant for his arrest was issued.

The appellants, G.F. and R.B., appealed their sentences for sexual assault after their convictions were restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The trial judge had sentenced G.F. to three and a half years and R.B. to three years.

The appellants raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's personal objections to the conduct, penalizing them for maintaining innocence, an alleged error in finding a breach of trust, inadequate distinction in culpability, and failure to consider collateral consequences (immigration for G.F. and mental health for R.B.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all complaints, finding no errors in principle that impacted the sentences.

The court affirmed the finding of a breach of trust and reiterated that collateral immigration consequences cannot justify artificial sentences.

The sentences were deemed proportionate and not "demonstrably unfit."

The appellant, Libin Jama, appealed the parole ineligibility portion of her life sentence for second-degree murder, which was set at 12 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's decision.

The sentencing judge had properly considered all relevant factors under s. 754.4 of the Criminal Code, including the violent nature of the attack and the age differential between the assailants and the victim, and was not bound by juror recommendations.

Darren John sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his appeal from conviction and sentence for knowingly uttering threats.

His primary ground for seeking leave was the alleged non-disclosure of material prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the case did not raise significant legal issues for the general administration of criminal justice and that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit, particularly due to the appellant's failure to raise the disclosure issue during trial.

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order.

The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning.

The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the duration of a driving prohibition.

On consent and limited to the issue of the driving prohibition duration, the Court of Appeal reduced the prohibition from a lifetime ban to one expiring on May 20, 2022, pursuant to section 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft, robbery, uttering threats, breach of recognizance, and choking to overcome resistance, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of 30 months imprisonment less two months pre-trial custody credit.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on eyewitness testimony and the complainant's evidence regarding an altercation in which the appellant kicked and punched the complainant, demanded his wallet, and threatened to "rip his throat out." The appellant's self-defence claim was rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The appellant appealed a ruling under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act that denied disclosure of information sought by defence counsel on the basis of informer privilege.

The incident leading to the appellant's arrest for drug possession occurred in a small community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the requested information might tend to identify the informant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and breach of trust by a public officer.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, finding a key witness credible, and applying the elements of fraud.

The appellant had submitted false travel expense claims to the government, claiming $217 per trip while only paying $50 and pocketing the difference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility.

The court also held that the element of deprivation for fraud was met, as the government would not have paid the claims had it known the truth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for wounding following a jury trial.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding consent, party liability under sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code, and the offence of assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding any error regarding consent was harmless as it was unavailable on the facts, and the party liability instructions were unobjectionable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence properly reflected the appellant's significant record for violence.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of possessing and accessing child pornography after the trial judge excluded his statement to police due to voluntariness concerns and found the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control of the files found on his computer.

The summary conviction appeal court judge overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's mother's evidence regarding his cognitive limitations and in failing to infer guilty knowledge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to accord proper deference to the trial judge's factual findings and misapprehended the trial judge's permissible use of the mother's evidence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal an acquittal of a teacher charged with failing to report a suspicion of sexual abuse under the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent, a teacher, learned of suspected abuse while acting as a volunteer director for a community basketball program, not during his professional teaching duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the information was not received in the course of professional duties was a question of mixed fact and law, and the Crown failed to show it was essential in the public interest to grant leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the adequacy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and after-the-fact conduct, the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's review of the evidence, and the handling of a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or handling of the trial.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give appropriate credit for 31 months spent on bail under pre-sentence house arrest.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying R. v. Downes to grant an 8-month credit, reducing the sentence for the New Brunswick offences to 9 months.

However, the court upheld the rejection of a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for general deterrence in fraud cases.

The total sentence was reduced from 20 months to 12 months incarceration.

The accused was involved in a single vehicle accident.

The police arrived approximately one hour after the accident was reported and took breath samples.

The trial judge convicted the accused of driving 'over 80', but the summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown failed to explain the delay by not calling evidence of police organization.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that evidence of police organization is not strictly required if other evidence, such as the arresting officer's testimony that it was a busy night, sufficiently explains the delay.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and sexual touching of a ten-year-old boy.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his treatment of a dissatisfied juror, in his instructions on assessing the credibility of a child witness, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the juror or his jury charge regarding the child complainant's credibility, and concluding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict.