Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Rajindra Becessar, appealed his conviction for firearm possession, challenging a pre-trial ruling that admitted his statement to police.

The application judge had found breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights, excluding evidence from the search but admitting the statement.

On appeal, Becessar argued the statement should have been excluded due to the cumulative effect of the breaches, specifically that it was obtained in a manner infringing his s. 8 rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that this argument was not properly raised or supported with evidence before the application judge, thus she made no error in her analysis.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated February 6, 2018.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge from a detention order, arguing that the proposed conditional discharge terms would provide equivalent public protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but allowed it in part, finding that while the Board's refusal to order a conditional discharge was reasonable and supported by evidence, the Board had erred by failing to remove the 24-hour supervision requirement from the disposition.

The court amended the disposition to remove this phrase, allowing the appellant to continue his transition to less supervised community living.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years, challenged the constitutionality of judicial screening provisions introduced into the "faint hope" clause.

When the appellant committed the murder in 1995, she had an automatic right to apply directly to a jury for a reduction in her parole ineligibility after serving 15 years.

By the time she was eligible to apply in 2013, legislation required her to first satisfy a judge that there was a "substantial likelihood" her application would succeed before a jury could hear it.

The Court of Appeal held that the retrospective application of the 2011 judicial screening amendments violated her Charter rights under section 11(i), as the amendments increased her punishment by substantially decreasing her chances of obtaining a reduction in parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed his eight-month sentence for uttering a death threat to a correctional officer.

The appeal raised the issue of collateral immigration consequences that were not considered at sentencing.

As a landed immigrant, a sentence of six months or more would trigger mandatory deportation without a right of appeal under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's immigration status and the danger opinion process initiated by the Canadian Border Services Agency.

The court reduced the sentence to six months less one day, finding that while collateral immigration consequences are relevant to sentencing, the sentence must remain proportionate to the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that the appellant knew the firearm and ammunition were in a computer bag she possessed and transported from her apartment to her cousin's apartment.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, contending the trial judge failed to consider an alternative inference that the bag contained other contraband.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the speculative alternative inference and that ample evidence supported the inference that the appellant knew of the firearm's presence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent was charged with producing marihuana and successfully argued at trial that the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) violated s. 7 of the Charter because physicians were boycotting the scheme, rendering the medical exemption illusory.

The trial judge struck down the MMAR and stayed the charges.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his factual findings and misapprehended the evidentiary record.

The Court held that the respondent failed to provide medical evidence that he or the patient witnesses qualified for an exemption, and there was no evidence of a systemic boycott by physicians.

The trial judge's orders were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his first degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of two loaded handguns seized from him that were unconnected to the murder, and by instructing the jury that this evidence could confirm the testimony of a Vetrovec witness (a jailhouse informant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the firearms evidence was relevant to the appellant's knowledge of the murder weapons and properly admitted with a limiting instruction.

The Court also held the evidence was capable of confirming the informant's testimony, as it was independent and increased confidence in the witness's reliability.

The young person appealed her conviction and sentence for robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence exceeding the recommendations of both the Crown and defence.

The Court found the sentence excessive and reduced it to time served (two-and-a-half months) while maintaining the $350 restitution order.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's weighing of the evidence or application of the burden of proof.

The court also found the sentence imposed reflected no error in principle and fell within the appropriate range.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering a death threat against his wife, primarily arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that his trial counsel lacked legal knowledge, failed to adduce helpful evidence, and was suspended from practice by the Law Society during the trial.

The Court of Appeal applied the G.D.B. test and found that while trial counsel's performance was deficient in some respects and his suspension was a matter of serious concern, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the incompetence resulted in a miscarriage of justice or an unreliable verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent, a lawyer, for three counts of criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate, noting the prolonged and escalating nature of the harassment.

The trial judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on mitigating factors and the risk of the respondent's disbarment, while failing to emphasize general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence followed by two years of probation was imposed.

The appellant appealed convictions for counselling and mischief.

The Crown conceded that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the counselling charge without a proper election, rendering that conviction a nullity.

The Court of Appeal quashed the counselling conviction, leaving the Crown to decide whether to proceed de novo.

The appeal regarding the mischief conviction was dismissed for lack of merit.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge erred in departing from a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge articulated the proper test for departing from a joint submission and correctly concluded that the proposed sentence was wholly inadequate given the appellant's two prior recent convictions for the same offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana.

He argued for the first time on appeal that his right to an interpreter under s 14 of the Charter was violated because he was not provided with a Patois interpreter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the trial record demonstrated he understood the proceedings and could make himself understood.

However, the Court found the verdict on the gun charge unreasonable, as there was insufficient evidence that the appellant knew the gun was under the passenger seat of a communally used car.

The Court also quashed the marijuana conviction, as the Crown conceded the provision creating the offence was of no force and effect at the time the appellant was charged.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife while she was heavily medicated.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge correctly examined the circumstances from the appellant's perspective and that the complainant's credibility was not central to whether the appellant took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis under ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the detention was appropriate until the scene was secured, and that despite breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b), the violations were not sufficiently serious to merit the exclusion of the drug evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies between the complainant's evidence and statements she allegedly made to former friends regarding her sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and accepted the complainant's explanations.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed appropriate.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding how the appellant's vehicle contacted him.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a firearm.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's charge to the jury on identification evidence and section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on the Crown's closing address.

The Crown had improperly invited the jury to speculate on why one co-accused did not testify and to use that silence as positive evidence of the other's guilt.

The trial judge also erred in instructing the jury that a statement made by one co-accused to an undercover officer could be used against the other.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.