Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Bill Allison, appealed his conviction for firearms trafficking offences, including conspiracy and offering a restricted firearm for sale, in association with a criminal organization.

The case relied on circumstantial evidence from intercepted telephone communications, which the appellant argued were ambiguous and did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant claimed the firearms were for personal use or that conversations related to drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that her methodical assessment of the evidence, including expert testimony on coded language and Jamaican Patois, was exemplary and that the verdict was not unreasonable despite some ambiguities.

The appellant, Rayon Williams, appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, raising three grounds: errors in finding no ss. 9 and 8 Charter breaches regarding his arrest and vehicle search, and an error in jury instruction concerning sunglasses found with the drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search based on corroborated confidential informant information and police investigation.

The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the sunglasses issue was not central and lacked sufficient evidentiary support.

This appeal concerned the Ontario Review Board's refusal to order a psychiatric assessment for an accused, found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) for double murder, who had been designated a "high-risk accused." The accused sought the assessment to promote an application to the Superior Court to remove his high-risk designation, arguing his progress meant he no longer qualified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Board's decision.

The Court clarified that the "substantial likelihood" test for reviewing a high-risk designation assesses the accused's inherent risk of violence if not subject to external constraints, not their risk under current supervised conditions.

Given the accused's history and ongoing risk factors, the Board's conclusion that an assessment would not change its determination was reasonable.

The Court also noted the Board's error in applying an "onus" on the accused in inquisitorial proceedings, though found it non-prejudicial.

The appellant, Alexander Rose, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's post-event demeanour and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on video surveillance footage of the complainant's distraught emotional state as powerful corroboration of non-consent.

The court affirmed the principles of appellate deference to credibility findings and the functional review of trial judge reasons, dismissing arguments that the verdict was unreasonable or that the evidence was improperly assessed.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by Jeremy Bailey, who was convicted of serious drug offences and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

He had previously been granted bail pending appeal but was subsequently charged with new drug offences (fentanyl trafficking) and breaches of his release conditions, leading to his father withdrawing as surety.

Although he was granted new bail pending trial for the fresh charges with new sureties and electronic monitoring, the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for release pending appeal for the original convictions.

The court found that despite the proposed strictures and new sureties, the applicant's history of flagrant and almost immediate breaches of prior bail conditions, coupled with the seriousness of the offences, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice and presented lingering public safety concerns.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The trial judge found that while the appellant initially acted in self-defence during an altercation with an intruder in his apartment, he went beyond the limits of self-defence by continuing to strike the victim with a metal object after the threat had diminished.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the significant mitigating factors arising from the appellant's initial justification in self-defence and the victim's role as an aggressor and trespasser.

The sentence was reduced from six years to time served (approximately two and one-half years).

The appellant was convicted of perjury for giving evasive and deliberately misleading testimony at another trial.

While the appellant was never directly asked whether he associated the nickname "Carlito" with Pierre Aragon, the trial judge found that the appellant deliberately refrained from identifying Aragon by that nickname despite knowing the questions were directed at soliciting that information.

The appellant's inadvertent reference to Aragon as "Carlito" and subsequent attempt to cover up the mistake further demonstrated deliberate intent to mislead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence and that the Crown had established all requisite elements of perjury.

Appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, use of a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, discharge of a firearm with intent, breach of probation, possession of a prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appellant was identified as the shooter in surveillance video footage by three witnesses based on recognition from prior acquaintance.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on this recognition evidence despite finding that facial features were not visible on the poor-quality video.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to properly scrutinize the reliability of the recognition evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of his wife's affidavit suggesting provocation.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit the fresh evidence because it was available at trial, inconsistent with the defence advanced, and the appellant himself had not claimed provocation.

The court found the sentence imposed at trial was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant applied to reopen her appeal from a 1998 conviction for defrauding Legal Aid, which had been dismissed on its merits in 2000.

She alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and a conflict of interest involving her former junior counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that its jurisdiction to reopen an appeal is generally limited to cases not heard on the merits.

Assuming Civil Rule 59.06 could apply, the court found no merit to the applicant's allegations and no concern of a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal for assaulting a police officer.

He argued that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in concluding that fresh evidence regarding a wrist injury would not have affected the verdict.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the issues raised were not questions of law of general application and that the appellant failed to demonstrate a clear error of law.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

At trial, the accused called evidence of his alcohol consumption to rebut the presumption of accuracy of the breathalyzer certificate.

The trial judge considered the breathalyzer readings as some evidence, without the presumption of accuracy, in rejecting the accused's evidence to the contrary.

The summary conviction appeal judge held this was circular reasoning and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, the certificate is some evidence of its contents and can be weighed along with other evidence in assessing the accused's evidence to the contrary.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for certiorari regarding his committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was a basis upon which the preliminary inquiry judge could conclude that a reasonable jury properly instructed could find the appellant guilty under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellant was sentenced on a joint submission to two years in a penitentiary followed by three years' probation.

He appealed to vary the custodial part of his sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Act, a consequence he was unaware of at sentencing.

The Crown did not oppose the variation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that immigration consequences are a relevant consideration and the variation would not disserve the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had relied on evidence of an incident at a Christmas party seven years prior to the alleged assault to infer that the appellant had a sexual inclination toward the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable and central to the conviction, requiring the verdict to be quashed.

However, the Court rejected the argument that the verdict itself was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, as a reasonable trier of fact could have accepted the complainant's evidence.

A new trial was ordered.

The respondent pled guilty to seven counts of robbery, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and possession of a stolen vehicle, receiving a total concurrent sentence of four years.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the total sentence manifestly inadequate given the respondent's extensive record, the number of offences, and the fact that he was on parole.

The Court varied the sentences for dangerous driving and failing to stop to be consecutive to the robbery sentences, resulting in a total sentence of six years, and imposed a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The Crown appealed a forfeiture order made during sentencing for conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic.

The trial judge ordered that out of $100,000 in seized proceeds of crime, $40,000 be paid to Legal Aid Ontario and $12,000 to defence counsel, with the remaining $48,000 forfeited.

The Crown argued this bestowed a financial benefit on the respondents by reducing their indebtedness to Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had discretion under the Criminal Code to make the order and did not misapprehend the facts or proceed on an erroneous principle.

The appellant, a young person, appealed an order transferring him to adult court for numerous offences including robbery, unlawful confinement, and related property offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the maximum youth sentence was inadequate to protect the public and failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant's excellent progress in secure custody.

The court found that the objectives of public protection and rehabilitation could be reconciled within the youth justice system.

The appeal was allowed and the Crown's transfer application was dismissed.