Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on sexual assault charges.

The trial judge had found both the complainant and the respondent credible but had a reasonable doubt, partly due to the complainant's inability to explain her entry into an abandoned trailer and her communication with her father after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by applying stereotypical views about sexual assault victims' behavior, specifically by inferring consent from the complainant's entry into the trailer and by judging her credibility based on her communication with her father.

The court also found an error in the exclusion of the complainant's prior consistent statement and demeanour evidence to her friend.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at retrial following an earlier appeal that resulted in a new trial.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her husband.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the alternative theory of liability permitting conviction based on an unknown killer, and the treatment of evidence from Teresa Mascia, a Crown witness who was declared adverse and cross-examined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately related evidence to legal issues, the alternative theory had an air of reality, and the treatment of Mascia's evidence, while containing minor errors, did not render the trial unfair.

The Crown appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly assessed threshold reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly in light of the complainant's developmental and psychological circumstances.

The court found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly deferred to the trial judge's findings and was entitled to review the entirety of the evidence, including expert evidence and inconsistent statements, when assessing threshold reliability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault entered by Justice Quinlan of the Superior Court of Justice on September 23, 2011.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof by assuming the assault occurred as a basis for rejecting a defence argument; and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to explain how she could convict given her comment that the defence theory regarding how some injuries were caused was "equally plausible." The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 21, 2014.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ordering the Board to conduct a new and expedited hearing within 60 days and make a new disposition order.

The interim disposition order dated March 30, 2015, remains in effect until the new order is made.

The appellant appealed a one-year sentence for possession of 97 grams of marijuana.

The Crown conceded the sentence was unfit as it was imposed due to a misapprehension of law that a mandatory minimum applied.

The Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 12 days imprisonment, equating to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge considered an email exchange in isolation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably interpreted the appellant's email response to the complainant's detailed allegations as a virtual confession when viewed in the context of all the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The conviction rested primarily on the competing credibility of the appellant and the complainant regarding whether sexual activity on a boat was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and expert evidence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence from his son, who was present on the boat but did not testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to jury instructions but admitted the fresh evidence.

The Court found the son's evidence was sufficiently cogent to potentially affect the verdict and accepted the appellant's explanation that he did not call his son at trial to protect him from the stress of testifying amid high-conflict family proceedings.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to explicitly address evidence of his return to the building as indicative of consciousness of innocence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application, finding that since the trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence for unassailable reasons, the bare fact of his return did not rise to a level of importance requiring explicit dismissal.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving after being stopped at a border crossing by border services officers (BSOs).

The BSOs noticed signs of impairment and directed the appellant to exit his vehicle, at which point they made further observations of his insobriety and arrested him.

The appellant appealed, arguing that designated BSOs lack the authority to gather evidence of insobriety and that the direction to exit the vehicle constituted an illegal, compelled sobriety test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that designated BSOs possess the ancillary powers necessary to take reasonable steps to investigate suspected impaired driving, and that the observations made upon the appellant exiting the vehicle were not conscriptive evidence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by characterizing the incident as an attack on a stranger, when it actually occurred during a drug transaction.

This misapprehension constituted an error in principle, requiring a fresh assessment of the sentence.

The Court varied the sentence to two years, in addition to four months of pre-trial custody, noting the seriousness of the assault and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation, arguing that the Crown must show evidence of untreatability to sustain the order.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly focused on whether there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant's risk in the community.

The applicant was convicted of several traffic and by-law offences after failing to appear for trial because he was out of the country.

He applied to the Ontario Court of Justice for an extension of time to appeal the convictions, which was denied.

He then sought leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Provincial Offences Act does not provide a right of appeal from an unsuccessful application for an extension of time under section 85(1), and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction under the Fisheries Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no arguable errors of law regarding the interpretation of an inspection under the Act, the admissibility of expert evidence, or the defences of officially induced error and due diligence.

The appellant was ordered to pay $10,000 and complete required remediation work.

The appellant appealed his conviction for touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior consistent statements made by the complainant to her school friends and by failing to properly resolve inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior statements were properly admitted to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication and that the trial judge's resolution of the evidentiary inconsistencies was reasonably supported by the record.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a Superior Court order allowing the respondent's appeal from his conviction on two counts of sexual assault and directing a new trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal did not raise an issue of broader significance but argued leave should be granted because the merits were very strong.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the merits alone did not warrant granting leave in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his live-in girlfriend's two daughters.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in permitting the jury to use the testimony of each complainant as similar fact evidence and in failing to provide limiting instructions on its use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence, as the similarities were highly probative and the issue of collusion was properly handled.

The Court also held that the requested limiting instructions were unnecessary and could have confused the jury or prejudiced the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge failed to relate evidence to critical issues.

The Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of planning and deliberation or forcible confinement.

The court also held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that the appellant be an active participant in the killing to be convicted under s. 231(5)(e).

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of conspiracy to break and enter and commit theft.

The trial judge had excluded surreptitiously intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the wiretap authorization breached s. 8 due to inaccurate information in the supporting affidavit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in the threshold required to name a party in an authorization and in classifying the intercepted communications as conscriptive evidence.

A new trial was ordered for both respondents.