Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order pending his retrial for terrorist-related offences.

The bail judge had dismissed his application on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred by misapprehending a risk assessment, failing to address the applicant's present ideology, and considering irrelevant factors regarding the proposed sureties.

Fresh evidence regarding trial delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the applicant's rehabilitation was admitted.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict bail conditions including house arrest, electronic monitoring, and four sureties.

The applicant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking in 2008.

Over 11 years later, he was arrested in the United States for immigration violations and sought an extension of time to appeal his Canadian conviction, arguing his plea was uninformed regarding immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the 11-year delay excessive, the proposed ground of appeal weak, and that the applicant failed to establish that the justice of the case required granting the extension.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States on fraud charges.

He argued the extradition judge erred in finding he was the person sought by the requesting state and that the identification evidence was manifestly unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that identity was conceded at the hearing and established on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found the identification evidence from three co-conspirators was not manifestly unreliable.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Prior to the hearing of his appeal, the appellant died.

His counsel filed a notice of abatement.

The Court of Appeal applied the established principles regarding mootness and abatement, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify proceeding with the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, cannabis resin, and oxycodone) and sentenced to ten months custody less three days' presentence custody.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest based on reliable confidential informant information corroborated by police surveillance, that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and that the trial judge's findings on the trafficking purpose were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of a serious medical issue, and the custodial portion was reduced to time served (44 days with credit for pre-sentence custody), with the victim surcharge set aside.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to dangerous driving and failure to comply with conditions of a recognizance, arising from a serious motor vehicle collision involving a police vehicle and a stolen vehicle.

The trial counsel failed to adequately advise the appellant of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea and joint submission on sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appellant demonstrated he was unaware of these consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant established a reasonable possibility that he would not have pled guilty had he known of the immigration consequences, thereby meeting the threshold for setting aside the guilty pleas.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.

The appellant appealed her conviction for robbery arising from a drug transaction where the complainant was stabbed multiple times.

At trial, there was conflicting evidence regarding who was buying and selling the drugs, and what type of drugs were involved.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make specific findings of fact regarding what was stolen, which was necessary as the Crown had particularized the charge as stealing money.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not address the charge as particularized.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to appear, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his motion for a directed verdict because the Crown failed to lead evidence of his identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the identity of names, the appellant's concession on confirmation of the promise to appear, his surrender to police, and the certificates tendered provided sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity to defeat a directed verdict motion.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assault-related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons, finding the trial judge gave a detailed explanation for his credibility findings.

However, based on fresh evidence and a Crown concession, the Court substituted a conviction for assault simpliciter on count six instead of assault causing bodily harm.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence of two years less a day—significantly higher than the Crown's 90-day proposal—without allowing counsel to make submissions.

The global sentence was reduced to 18 months.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 15, 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent order dated February 14, 2011, had superseded the order under appeal.

The appellant appealed her effective five-year sentence for impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

She argued the sentencing judge overemphasized deterrence and failed to give sufficient weight to her aboriginal background and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge carefully considered her background but appropriately weighed serious aggravating factors, including her prior record, high blood alcohol level, and lack of accepted responsibility.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasons of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge, noting that he considered the same issues raised on appeal and committed no error in law.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that 15 years was outside the appropriate range given the appellant's young age, lack of prior criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

However, noting the brutal and senseless nature of the group murder, the Court concluded that an increase from the minimum period was warranted.

The appeal was allowed and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years.

The appellant appealed an order of the Ontario Review Board directing his continued detention at a mental health centre.

The index offence was criminal harassment.

The Board found that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness, continued to have feelings for the victim, and would likely discontinue his medication without external controls.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat was not unreasonable and was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while subject to a prohibition order under s. 100(2) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the original order was invalid because it failed to specify a reasonable period for surrendering ammunition as required by s. 100(13).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that challenging the validity of the original order constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court also found the actus reus was proven, as possessing ammunition three years after the order exceeded any reasonable time limit, and dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding an offer to sell cocaine, in holding that a sample was provided, and that the trial judge's interventions created an appearance of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that, although the trial judge's interventions were intemperate, they did not give rise to an appearance of bias.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, threatening death, and obstructing justice after slashing two victims with an Exacto knife in their home.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting his statements to police, excluding evidence of a victim's complete criminal record, refusing to allow comment on a victim's failure to testify, and permitting his own criminal record to go to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year term was justified given the serious nature of the assaults and the appellant's lengthy criminal history.