Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant, as litigation administrator of her father's estate, appealed the dismissal of an action concerning an alleged unauthorized property transfer and a personal costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the property transfer was authorized, for valuable consideration, and that the action was statute-barred.

The court also dismissed the costs appeal, affirming the personal costs award against the appellant due to her unreasonable conduct and pursuit of litigation primarily for personal benefit based on unsubstantiated fraud allegations.

The appellant sought an adjournment, which was refused.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that although the original Superior Court action claimed a higher amount, it was settled together with a small claims court action for a global amount within the jurisdiction of the small claims court.

Therefore, any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant client appealed the confirmation of an assessment of a solicitor's account, arguing the retainer agreement was an invalid contingency fee agreement under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreement was not a contingency fee agreement, the Act did not apply retrospectively, and the appellant had already received an assessment of the fairness and reasonableness of the account.

The appellant dentist appealed a permanent injunction enforcing a non-solicitation covenant in a management agreement with the respondent dental centre operator.

The appellant had copied patient lists before leaving the centre to start a new practice nearby.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent had a valid proprietary interest in the goodwill of its business model, the non-solicitation covenant was reasonable and did not offend the regulatory scheme for dentists, and any alleged fee-splitting arrangement was a matter for the regulator and did not invalidate the contract.

Following the successful appeal by the defendant overturning the certification of a proposed class action for unpaid overtime, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $300,000.

The plaintiff and the Law Foundation of Ontario argued that no costs or a maximum of $50,000 should be awarded, citing the novel legal issues and public interest nature of the case.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the novel points of law and access to justice considerations under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, but held that the Act does not insulate representative plaintiffs from adverse costs.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $60,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for non-earner benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period under s. 281.1 of the Insurance Act had not begun because the insurer failed to provide the required OCF-9 form with its notice of refusal.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual finding that the insurer had provided the proper notice to the appellant's lawyer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the existence of a commission agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of a written commission agreement, the interpretation of email correspondence to determine if an agreement existed was a matter for the motion judge.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action alleging that the defendant railway company misclassified first line supervisors as managerial employees to avoid paying overtime under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge certified the action but significantly redrafted the common issues, rejecting the plaintiff's proposed misclassification issue due to a lack of commonality.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly rejected the misclassification issue because individualized assessments of job duties were required.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in certifying a reframed common issue about the minimum requirements for managerial status, as it suffered from the same lack of commonality.

The certification order was set aside.

The appellant farmer sued the respondent, claiming it supplied animal feed that caused death and illness to his livestock.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, noting the appellant failed to present expert evidence or cross-examine the respondent's affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to put his best foot forward and meet his evidentiary burden.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside an earlier order, the ruling that rule 11.02 did not apply, and the decision to strike their pleadings for non-compliance with a previous order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decisions given the unexplained three-month delay in bringing the motion and the appellants' extensive delays in the action.

The appellant brought a motion for directions to determine whether an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to amend a statement of defence in an oppression action lies to the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the motion to amend was a final order.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the order was 'made under' the Business Corporations Act within the meaning of s. 255, as the power exercised was sufficiently close to the legislative source of adjudicating oppression claims.

Consequently, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court, and the matter was transferred accordingly.

Four appeals were heard consecutively to determine whether the Ontario Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims for damages against the federal Crown, or whether such claims must be brought in the Federal Court pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Courts Act.

The Crown argued that the claims constituted collateral attacks on federal administrative decisions and required prior judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court retains concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages in contract and tort against the Crown.

Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court only for prerogative remedies and declaratory relief, not for damages.

The plaintiffs' appeals were allowed and the Crown's appeals were dismissed.

The appellant moved to extend the time to perfect its appeal.

The court found that while there was substantial delay, it was attributable to the appellant's previous solicitor and not the appellant itself, who maintained a bona fide intention to proceed.

The respondent did not allege specific prejudice.

The motion was granted, extending the time to perfect the appeal, with costs of the motion awarded to the respondent.

The appellants, minority shareholders of Asbestos Corporation Limited, commenced an action in Ontario in 1987 for an oppression remedy and other relief following the takeover of the corporation by the Province of Quebec.

The appellants did not pursue the Ontario action until 2003, after exhausting five other proceedings in different forums.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay and, in the alternative, stayed it on the basis of forum non conveniens and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her conclusions that the delay was inexcusable, Quebec was the more appropriate forum, and the attempt to relitigate issues already decided elsewhere constituted an abuse of process.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the investor-state arbitration mechanism in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing it violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, judicial independence, the rule of law, and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that NAFTA tribunals do not exercise powers analogous to those of superior courts at Confederation, nor do they remove core jurisdiction from domestic courts.

The court also held that the tribunals do not violate judicial independence or the rule of law, and that the Charter challenge was premature as it was based on speculative harm rather than a specific tribunal decision.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim.

The motion judge had concluded that a letter found by one of the appellants in February 2003 did not postpone the running of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's thorough and careful reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The court found that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, but determined that the amounts sought by the respondents were excessive.

Costs were fixed at $17,500 for the main group of respondents and $10,000 for the respondent Hemming.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for injuries suffered when he was struck as a pedestrian by an unidentified motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accident occurred in a vacant parking lot, not on a public highway, and therefore the reverse onus provision under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act did not apply.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant failed to prove the accident happened on a highway and that negligence could not be inferred from the injuries alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The interveners appealed a trial judgment concerning a dispute over the assets of The Holy Virgin Church.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that proposed by-law amendments were governed by the approval requirements in the Normal Parish By-laws, noting that the dispute was fundamentally religious and outside the court's purview.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge improperly exercised his discretion under s. 106 of the Canada Corporations Act to order a meeting, as the power struggle between factions did not constitute extraordinary circumstances making a meeting impracticable.

The appellant municipality appealed a judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation arising from assurances given at council meetings that a road would be upgraded in time to permit a subdivision development.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to accept the respondent's evidence over the municipal minutes, and that the respondent reasonably relied on the assurances in proceeding with the development agreement and related expenditures.

The representations were treated as implying an existing municipal commitment and ability to complete the road work, not merely non-actionable future promises.

In the circumstances, where the Reeve spoke before full council without correction, the municipality could be liable at the operational level in negligence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.