Civil Litigation - Plaintiff cases from the Court of Appeal
Abuse-of-process finding upheld; fresh-evidence motion and appeal dismissed.
The appellants challenged dismissal of their action as an abuse of process.
The court agreed the claim repeated issues from prior mortgage litigation and also dismissed the fresh-evidence motion.
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment based solely on party consent without an independent legal basis.
The moving party sought to set aside on consent a trial judgment declaring that it was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of a residential property.
The trial judge had made significant negative credibility findings against witnesses called on behalf of the moving party and its predecessor in title.
The Court of Appeal refused to allow the appeal on consent, holding that courts cannot set aside judgments based solely on party agreement without considering whether doing so would be appropriate in light of the law and facts, and whether it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The court found that setting aside the judgment, which incorporated findings of misconduct, would undermine the administration of justice.
The court awarded $20,000 in costs to the successful respondents, apportioned among the appellants.
This costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario addresses the allocation and quantum of costs following the respondents' success in opposing the appeal.
The court fixes costs at $20,000, apportioned 90% to the group represented by Manson and Fleury, and 10% to the group represented by Overwater, to be paid within 30 days.
The court dismissed a motion to expedite an appeal regarding forum non conveniens, holding that doing so would embroil the court in an unseemly race with parallel New York proceedings.
The applicant, Vale Canada Limited and related entities, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to expedite the hearing of their appeals.
These appeals stem from a lower court decision regarding jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in a complex insurance dispute with parallel proceedings in New York.
The motion judge dismissed the request for expedition, emphasizing that judicial comity requires avoiding an "unseemly race" between jurisdictions and that the issue of forum non conveniens should be determined on its merits by the respective appeal courts, not by the speed of litigation.
A limitation period for unpaid invoices was delayed by the debtor's assurances of payment.
This appeal concerned the application of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, specifically when the respondent knew that a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy for unpaid invoices.
The appellant, a condominium corporation, argued the action was time-barred, asserting the trial judge erred in applying discoverability principles and finding a running account.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the limitation period began when the respondent was informed the condominium corporation was not obligated to pay invoices, rather than earlier.
The court upheld the running account finding and the application of discoverability principles, noting the defendant's assurances delayed the plaintiff's understanding of the need for litigation.
The Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to quash, affirming its jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a class action settlement distribution protocol.
This motion to quash, heard by the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arose in the settlement administration phase of a class action concerning price-fixing of cathode ray tube products.
Class Counsel, representing the plaintiff Fanshawe College, sought to quash an appeal brought by Class Action Capital Recovery LLC (CAC), a third-party filer for claimants.
The grounds for the motion were that the Distribution Protocol prevented further appeals and that CAC lacked standing.
The Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, CAC had standing as an agent for its clients, and the appeal was not time-barred, as the appeal period began when the lower court's order achieved sufficient clarity.
The court declined to award costs for two inter-related appeals due to the parties' mixed success.
This is a costs endorsement for three inter-related appeals (C66633, C64430, and C64479).
The parties resolved costs for appeal C64479.
For appeals C64430 and C66633, the Court found that success was mixed, and therefore, there would be no order as to costs for those appeals.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion to set aside the administrative dismissal of her appeal due to extensive, unjustified delays.
The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside the administrative dismissal of her appeal.
The appeal had been administratively dismissed twice due to the appellant's repeated failure to meet perfection deadlines, despite extensions.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion, noting the extensive delay, the unconvincing justification for non-perfection, and the lack of proof for the appellant's claims of material tampering or respondent non-cooperation.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discharge of a mortgage based on documentary evidence of repayment.
This is an appeal from a trial judge's decision to discharge a mortgage.
The appellant claimed a loan was secured by a mortgage on the respondent's home, which was later re-loaned but remained secured.
The trial judge, unable to determine witness credibility, relied on documentary evidence to find the mortgage had been repaid and effectively redeemed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the issue of redemption was properly before the court via counterclaim, that the appellant waived technical compliance by admitting repayment, and that the trial judge was entitled to rely on documentary evidence given credibility issues.
Successful appellant awarded $65,231.79 in partial indemnity costs for the underlying action.
Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the appellant's costs for the underlying action.
The court awarded the appellant costs of the underlying action, including summary judgment motions but excluding costs associated with a cross-claim, on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $65,231.79.
The court declined to make an order regarding additional costs sought by the appellant's shareholders' counsel.
Appeal dismissed; insured must establish eligibility for income replacement benefits within 104 weeks of accident.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her motor vehicle insurer for income replacement benefits.
She argued the trial judge erred by excluding the medical reports of her deceased family physician and by misinterpreting the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the reports under section 52(2) of the Evidence Act, as they lacked necessity and reliability and would prejudice the respondent.
The Court also affirmed that under sections 4(1) and 5 of the SABS, an insured must establish eligibility for income replacement benefits within the first 104 weeks after the accident to qualify for benefits beyond that period.
The appeal was dismissed.
Invocation of statutory appraisal process does not oust insurer's contractual right to examine insured under oath.
The appellant homeowner made a claim against his insurer for flood damage, submitting a proof of loss without supporting documentation.
The insurer invoked the statutory appraisal process and successfully moved for an order compelling the appellant to submit to an examination under oath and produce documentation.
The appellant appealed, arguing the appraisal process extinguished the insurer's right to examine him.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appraisal process does not oust the insurer's contractual right to examine the insured, and the court has inherent jurisdiction to make procedural orders to give effect to the statutory scheme.
Appeal dismissed; employer not liable for employee's mental breakdown where disciplinary actions were reasonable.
The appellant employee suffered a mental breakdown and sued her employer for negligent infliction of mental suffering and negligent supervision, following a period of workplace restructuring, denial of a promotion, and disciplinary actions for absenteeism.
The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the employer's actions were reasonable responses to declining performance and that the employer was unaware of the employee's mental illness.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if a free-standing tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering exists in the employment context, the trial judge's factual findings precluded liability.
Solicitor negligence appeal dismissed; appellant knowingly mortgaged home for family business.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of her solicitor negligence claim, arguing the respondent law firm failed to ensure she received independent legal advice before mortgaging her home for a family business.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant was a partner in the business and knowingly mortgaged her home to provide funds for it.
Appeal dismissed as moot and for ongoing deliberate refusal to comply with court orders.
The added parties appealed an order striking out their pleadings for willful failure to obey court orders.
They sought to adjourn their appeal to be heard with the husband's appeal.
The Court of Appeal declined the adjournment and dismissed the appeal on two grounds.
First, the appeal was moot because the respondent had proceeded to an uncontested trial and obtained a final judgment, and the appellants had not sought a stay of the order striking their pleadings.
Second, the appeal was dismissed due to the appellants' ongoing and deliberate refusal to comply with numerous court orders.
Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.
Appeal dismissed regarding liability but allowed in part to reduce prejudgment interest to 5% per annum.
The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding joint or several liability and the rate of prejudgment interest.
The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not precluded from pursuing the action against the appellant after obtaining default judgment against a numbered company, as the causes of action were independent.
However, the Court agreed with the appellant that prejudgment interest should have been calculated at 5% per annum rather than 2% per month.
The appeal was dismissed subject to the variation of the prejudgment interest award.
Solicitor negligence appeal dismissed, but trial costs award reduced to $35,000.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their solicitor's negligence claim and awarding substantial indemnity costs to the respondents.
They also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias and negligence grounds, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported by the evidence.
However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to $35,000, while maintaining the substantial indemnity scale due to the nature of the allegations made by the appellants.
The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no costs of the appeal.
Appeal dismissed; summary judgment based on unpleaded laches and delay upheld as no prejudice occurred.
The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for damages for abuse on the basis of laches and delay.
They argued the motions judge erred because laches and delay were not specifically pleaded by the respondent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues were raised in the factums, fully argued, and caused no prejudice or surprise to the appellants, who had known of their claim since 1989 but waited 13 years to commence proceedings.
Court of Appeal clarified that the trial of the issue is limited to Part 4 of section 444.1(1) of the Municipal Act.
In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal clarified its previous order regarding a commercial lease dispute.
The Court confirmed that the trial of the issue was ordered only on Part 4 of section 444.1(1) of the Municipal Act, as the offer to lease entered into before June 11, 1998, satisfied Part 1 of the section.
Appeal allowed; plaintiff permitted to add municipalities as defendants after limitation period pending discoverability findings.
The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendant driver.
The defendant later brought third party proceedings against two municipalities, alleging snow banks obstructed her view.
The plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim to add the municipalities as defendants after the three-month limitation period under the Municipal Act had expired.
The motions judge dismissed the motion.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application of the discoverability principle to postpone the limitation period is a question of fact to be determined at trial.
The municipalities were added as defendants with leave to plead the limitation period.
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