Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion concerning a repudiated agreement of purchase and sale for a cottage.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the appellants failed to meet their onus to prove the respondents did not take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses, and that the motion judge did not err in her assessment of the evidence.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the costs order but ultimately dismissed the costs appeal, upholding the motion judge's application of Rule 49.10 and the award of substantial indemnity costs to the respondents, finding that an informal settlement discussion did not revoke a prior formal offer to settle.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing their application as an abuse of process.

Although the moving parties formed an intention to appeal within the time limit and adequately explained their delay, the court found no merit to the proposed appeal.

The claims related to an oil reserve had already been litigated and finally determined in British Columbia, rendering the Ontario application an attempt to relitigate.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired several years prior.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor following the death of a patient who underwent an axillary-femoral bypass.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by using a graft that was 'not recommended' by the manufacturer and failing to obtain informed consent, but concluded the appellants failed to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in his robust and pragmatic analysis of the evidence and correctly concluded that the 'material contribution' approach to causation was inapplicable.

Following a successful appeal that ordered a new trial limited to damages, the appellant sought its costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to defer the costs assessment until damages were quantified, citing the respondent's reprehensible conduct in rigging bids prior to the litigation.

The court awarded the appellant its trial costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $370,000, after applying a 40% reduction to account for the appellant's lack of success on certain issues.

The court declined to make a distributive costs order in favour of the respondent.

The respondent applied for a police records check and discovered it included a withdrawn assault charge.

After the police service refused to remove the reference, the respondent successfully brought an application before the Superior Court under Rule 14.05 to have the reference removed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the police service's appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that the police service's decision was an administrative decision subject to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and therefore the challenge had to be brought by way of an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court, not via a Rule 14.05 application.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that a release in a settlement agreement with her former employer did not bar her claim for long-term disability benefits against the insurer.

She argued the release violated the Employment Standards Act by effectively waiving her right to benefit coverage during the statutory notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the employer had maintained coverage as required by the Act, and the appellant was free to compromise her claim for benefits.

The Court also upheld the finding that the insurer, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce the release.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement with the respondent general contractor regarding substantial renovations to their family home.

The issue was whether the settlement included amounts potentially owed to a millwork sub-contractor with whom the appellants had dealt directly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the settlement did not include work carried out by the sub-contractor as a result of direct dealings with the appellants.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that ordered the production of an insurance policy under Rule 30.02(3).

The motion judge had originally refused production, finding the policy was sought for a collateral purpose and that uncontradicted evidence showed the deductible exceeded the claim amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge did not make a palpable and overriding error by relying on uncontradicted affidavit evidence without reading the policy itself.

The Divisional Court's order for production was set aside and the motion judge's decision was restored.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim for professional negligence and breach of contract against the respondent accounting firm.

The motion judge dismissed the counterclaim on a summary judgment motion because the appellant failed to provide direct evidence, relying instead on an affidavit based on information and belief.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's finding that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the timing of payment of its fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the fees and granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The respondent was injured when a spider rope, left secured to a guardrail by the appellant's employees, was released by an unknown vandal and struck her car on the highway below.

The trial judge found the appellant liable in negligence for failing to meet industry standards to prevent tampering.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a duty of care was owed, the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the standard of care.

The intervening act of vandalism was not reasonably foreseeable given the lack of prior incidents and the location of the work.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging that the respondents, former officers and directors of a renovation company, conspired to divest the company of its assets to prevent the appellants from realizing on a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had only pleaded the tort of conspiracy and failed to prove that they suffered special damages as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and entitlement to punitive damages.

The appellant garnishee appealed an order from a garnishment hearing, arguing the motion judge reversed the burden of proof, improperly admitted transcript evidence from the judgment debtor's trial, and failed to give weight to a former solicitor's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's approach to the burden of proof, the admission of the transcript, the adverse inference drawn from failing to call the judgment debtor, or the weighing of evidence.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding a motor vehicle accident where the respondent made a left-hand turn into the path of the appellant's approaching vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were inadequate and erroneous, particularly by suggesting 'competing onuses' rather than emphasizing the heavy onus on a left-turning driver under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge also failed to adequately review the evidence and improperly expressed personal opinions on the appellant's possible negligence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement for the purchase of shares for $275,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the settlement was not contingent on a corporate reorganization and that payment was due within a reasonable time.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in ordering an additional payment for tax consequences, as the $275,000 was inclusive of taxes.

The Court also reduced the motion costs from substantial to partial indemnity, finding that a letter sent by the respondent did not constitute a Rule 49 offer.

The appellant sued the respondent school board and its former director for defamation based on statements made during a television broadcast regarding her allegations of a teacher's sexual misconduct.

At trial, the jury found the statements defamatory and malicious, but true, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury unfairly restricted the context of the words complained of, leading to a substantial wrong.

Despite the appellant's failure to object to the charge at trial, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing part of his defamation action arising from material posted on the respondent's website.

The motions judge had ruled the internet publication was a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, rendering the claim statute-barred for failure to provide timely notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the internet publication constituted a broadcast from a station in Ontario, particularly given conflicting expert evidence on the nature of internet dissemination.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment regarding a sewer contract dispute.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to address the principal issue of the effect of exclusion clauses on the contractor's bid, given the timing of a representation made by the City's project engineer.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in awarding solicitor/client costs without hearing submissions.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding them bound by a December 17, 1999 agreement.

The appellants argued the agreement was based on a misrepresentation regarding the accounting approach used for a pay-out calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that differing views on accounting approaches did not constitute a misrepresentation, especially since the view of the appellant's Chief Financial Officer was known to the appellant.

The appellant challenged a contempt order arising from non-payment of a lump-sum support-related amount ordered in dependant support proceedings under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal held that rules 60.05 and 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permit contempt enforcement only for orders requiring an act other than the payment of money, and that this includes support orders.

The court rejected any purported family law exception and held that the Rules displaced any inherent jurisdiction to use contempt for money judgments in proceedings governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The contempt order was set aside and the motion for contempt was dismissed.