Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering payment of over $4.2 million arising from breach of repair and maintenance obligations under a commercial lease for hotel and restaurant premises.

They argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the lease as imposing an enhanced repair standard and that there was insufficient evidence establishing the condition of the premises at the start of the lease.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, holding that the lease language and commercial context supported the trial judge’s interpretation.

The court further held that evidence including contractual representations, inspection reports, and witness testimony provided a sufficient basis to compare the condition of the premises over time.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a judgment requiring them to pay $30,000 to the respondents, representing the balance owing under Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error of law in the motion judge's interpretation of the agreement.

The court further held that the appellants could not rely on their own conduct to support a claim that the contract was frustrated.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of her appeal.

The court was advised that she had gone absent without leave from the hospital and was deemed discharged under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, a former police officer, sued for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation after criminal charges against him were withdrawn pursuant to a negotiated resolution agreement requiring his resignation.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the criminal proceedings did not terminate in the appellant's favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the withdrawal of charges was a bona fide quid pro quo for the appellant's resignation, not an abandonment of prosecution or an abuse of power.

The moving parties sought a stay of proceedings relating to a sealing order in a CCAA proceeding pending the determination of their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding that the CCAA judge was better placed to assess the stay, and that the moving parties failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The parties reached a settlement.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his 1995 action for delay.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing he was denied a fair opportunity to present his case as a self-represented litigant at the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding the evidence was available at the time of the hearing and the motion judge had afforded the appellant an opportunity to make his case.

The Court also upheld the dismissal for delay, noting the action was based on a 1989 transaction, there was inexcusable delay, and the respondent would suffer prejudice due to a deceased key witness and faded memories.

The appellants owned a rental property that was destroyed in an explosion caused by a tenant unlawfully producing cannabis resin.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claim under their residential insurance policy, relying on an exclusion clause for dwellings used in the processing or manufacture of marijuana.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' action to enforce the claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the interpretation of the exclusion clause and concluding that the clause was neither unjust nor unreasonable.

The plaintiff suffered a broken leg after slipping on concrete slurry that had pooled on a municipal sidewalk.

The trial judge found the adjacent property owners liable for creating the slurry and the City liable for failing to keep the sidewalk in a reasonable state of repair, apportioning 20% liability to the City.

The City appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the sidewalk was in a state of non-repair and in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions that the sidewalk's reverse slope and improper grinding repairs constituted non-repair, and that these conditions were a contributing cause of the pooling slurry and the plaintiff's fall under the 'but for' test.

The respondent sued the appellants for payment on a mortgage and related guarantees.

The respondent moved for summary judgment before attending a mandatory mediation session under Rule 24.1.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no substantive defence and that mediation would be a needless step.

The appellants appealed, arguing summary judgment could not be granted prior to mediation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a party may obtain summary judgment before a mediation session is held, provided the motion is brought within the timelines stipulated in the Rules for holding a mediation session.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondents.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and found no genuine issue for trial, as the underlying issue of forged guarantees had already been adjudicated in a previous action.

The appellant argued she was denied natural justice because the motion judge proceeded in her absence after she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, agreeing that the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the substantial indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge due to the serious allegations of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell 100,000 shares of a private company to the respondent.

The appellant argued that no binding agreement was reached, that third-party approval was a condition precedent, and that specific performance was an inappropriate remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that an objective reasonable bystander would find the parties intended to contract based on securities industry custom.

The Court also upheld the specific performance order, noting the shares were unique and damages would be inadequate.

The appellant purchased contaminated property at a reduced price.

The respondent, who caused the contamination, agreed to remediate the property to a specified standard and indemnify the purchaser for any loss arising from the contamination.

The appellant later sold the property at a profit but claimed damages under the indemnity for reduced profit due to 'contamination stigma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant suffered no loss as the reduced purchase price already accounted for the stigma, and the indemnity agreement did not cover this diminution in value.

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing successfully applied for the appointment of a receiver over the moving party, a non-profit social housing corporation, due to alleged financial defaults.

The moving party appealed the appointment and brought a motion for a stay pending appeal.

The Ministry argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the receivership order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction because the receivership was sought by application, making it a final order.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Court granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding the corporation's insolvency and the procedural appropriateness of the receivership application, and that the corporation would suffer irreparable harm if the housing projects were transferred to another entity.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

Although the appellants had an arguable defence on the merits, the motion judge found their explanation for the default unsatisfactory, as they had deliberately ignored the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.

The appellant, a dissolved corporation, sought to enforce a judgment obtained prior to its dissolution.

The motions judge found that the corporation lacked capacity to carry out enforcement proceedings absent authority from the Crown, as its property had vested in the Crown upon dissolution pursuant to s. 244 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motions judge also found an accidental omission or slip under Rule 59.06.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's findings on both capacity and the application of Rule 59.06.

The respondent municipality brought a motion to quash the appellant's second appeal as an abuse of process.

The appellant brought a responding motion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing its first appeal for delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash the second appeal, finding it was an abuse of process because the first appeal on the merits had already been dismissed for delay.

However, the Court exercised its discretion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing the first appeal, accepting the delay in settling the formal judgment as an adequate explanation, subject to strict conditions regarding representation, filing an amended notice of appeal, and ordering transcripts.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering him to repay a $90,000 loan to the respondent estate.

The appellant argued the action was barred by the six-year limitation period because the loan arose from a promissory note with a fixed repayment date of November 30, 1990.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the debt was a continuing one and that the appellant had acknowledged the debt on multiple occasions, taking it outside the limitation period.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal after missing the 30-day deadline by one day due to a failed facsimile transmission.

The moving party also argued the time period did not commence until the trial judge disposed of costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the moving party had a firm intention to appeal, the delay was adequately explained by inadvertence, and the justice of the case favoured an extension as there was no prejudice to the responding parties.