Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning defamation actions dismissed under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The motion judge had dismissed the actions, finding no valid defence in one case and a potentially valid defence in the other, and in both cases, the public interest in protecting expression outweighed the harm to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the dismissal of the defamation actions.

However, it allowed the cross-appeals on costs, finding that the motion judge erred in not awarding full indemnity costs to the successful defendants, as the actions bore the hallmarks of SLAPP lawsuits.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a motion.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the amount of $4,172.28, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a motion.

Costs were fixed and awarded to the responding party in the amount of $768.40, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil contempt and a 30-day jail sentence for failing to comply with a default judgment requiring him to provide an accounting and produce financial documents.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to articulate the test for contempt, erred in ordering production of documents from a Crown disclosure brief, and violated principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the test for contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, properly rejected the appellant's excuse regarding the Crown brief, and afforded the appellant procedural fairness.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the quantum of costs.

The appellant was awarded agreed-upon costs of $12,860.70 for the original motion and $20,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant law firm previously represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury action and obtained a judgment for $206,000 in unpaid legal fees.

A subsequent settlement approval judge, reviewing the settlement for a plaintiff under disability, reduced the appellant's fees to $102,500 in a partial judgment.

The appellant moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to vary the partial judgment to accord with the earlier $206,000 judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding Rule 59.06(2)(c) does not authorize a judge to choose between conflicting Superior Court orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and declined to allow the appellant to amend its motion to seek relief under Rule 37.14 due to unexplained delay and an inadequate evidentiary record.

The appellant was fraudulently induced by a group of individuals to obtain a bank draft for $90,190 payable to the Bank of Montreal (BMO).

The fraudsters gave the draft to a third party unknown to the appellant, who then instructed BMO to deposit the funds into her line of credit.

BMO accepted the draft and subsequently allowed the third party to withdraw the funds.

The appellant sued BMO for conversion.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that BMO committed the tort of conversion by dealing with the bank draft under the direction of an unauthorized person and making the proceeds available to someone not rightfully entitled to possession.

Following an appeal, the parties made submissions on costs.

On agreement, the Court of Appeal ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $12,500 plus HST, and the interveners to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $7,000 plus HST.

The court declined the appellant's request that the interveners pay his costs of the appeal, noting that claim should be made in pending proceedings between them.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them jointly and severally liable for commissions owing to the respondent under two financing engagement agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation that the appellants' longtime lender, RBC, was a 'lender disclosed' by the respondent, entitling the respondent to commissions.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred by double-counting $20,000 in commissions, improperly imposing joint and several liability across separate agreements, and awarding costs higher than claimed.

The respondent's cross-appeal was also allowed in part to set aside the dismissal of the action against the personal defendants, as they were not part of the summary judgment motion.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding a real estate broker commission on the sale of a property pursuant to a holdover clause in a listing agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the broker's failure to provide written notice of the introduction of the purchaser, as required by the holdover clause, was a bar to the contractual claim for commission.

However, the Court allowed the broker's cross-appeal in part, awarding $20,000 on the basis of quantum meruit for services provided to the vendor after the listing agreement had expired.

The Court also found that the corporate principal was not personally liable for the compensation.

The appellant contractor commenced an action more than two years after the last work was completed and more than two years after a reasonably-timed invoice would have been sent and payment made or refused.

The motion judge concluded the action was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal.

The parties resolved the matter in terms of a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs in accordance with the settlement.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on negligence, proximate cause, and the onus on a driver who was on the wrong side of the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, properly instructed the jury that the onus was on the defendant to explain how the accident occurred without his negligence due to an emergency situation.

The jury's conclusion that the defendant acted as an ordinary, prudent person in an emergency was upheld.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed both the claim and counterclaim because the trial judge could not determine where the truth lay.

The trial judge noted the absence of critical documentation and witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge was not material to the outcome.

The appellant appealed an order that allowed her to proceed with her causes of action if properly pleaded, but also required her to disclose the name of the counsel providing her with legal advice.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal largely without merit, noting the motion judge had been generous to the appellant.

However, the court found no reason for the order requiring the disclosure of counsel's name.

The appeal was dismissed, except for striking the paragraph requiring disclosure of counsel.

The plaintiffs, nurses who contracted SARS during the 2003 outbreak, sued Ontario for negligence and breach of section 7 of the Charter.

Ontario moved to strike the claim, arguing it owed no private law duty of care to the nurses.

The motion judge struck parts of the claim but allowed the action to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal struck the entire claim, holding that Ontario's duty to protect the public from communicable diseases does not create a private law duty of care to individual healthcare workers.

The Court also found no basis for the section 7 Charter claim, as the government's actions were not arbitrary.

The plaintiff brought an action against Ontario and two hospitals after her spouse contracted SARS and died during the 2003 outbreak.

Ontario moved to strike the claim, arguing it did not owe a private law duty of care.

The motion judge refused to strike substantial parts of the claim.

On appeal, adopting the reasons in the related Williams appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed Ontario's appeal, struck the claim in its entirety against Ontario, and dismissed the action, finding no private law duty of care was owed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding the affidavit did not make out the case.

On the appeal, the Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside a paragraph of the lower court's order that awarded unliquidated damages for repair costs.

The Court found that under Rule 19.05(2), the affidavit evidence supporting the repair costs was unsatisfactory as it lacked details and the deponent's qualifications.

The appeal was allowed in part without prejudice to the respondent's right to pursue the claim on proper evidence.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the respondent on agreement.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statements of defence for failing to comply with a peremptory order to produce documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision to enforce the strict terms of the prior peremptory order after the appellants failed to meet their production obligations.

The insured claimed for the theft of a vehicle under his automobile insurance policy.

The vehicle was later found submerged in water, and the insured's mechanic retrieved and completely dismantled it before the insurer could inspect it.

The insurer denied the claim for breach of statutory conditions.

At trial, a jury awarded the insured compensatory and punitive damages, finding the insurer wrongfully refused to pay and acted reprehensibly.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, setting aside the punitive damages and costs, holding that the jury's verdict was unreasonable as the evidence clearly showed the insurer was denied a reasonable opportunity to inspect the vehicle and there was no evidence of malicious or high-handed conduct by the insurer.