Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The moving party, a party under disability represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian, sought leave to appeal an order approving a $1 million settlement of her motor vehicle accident claims.

The moving party was previously made subject to an order under Rule 37.16 prohibiting her from bringing further motions or appeals without leave due to a history of frivolous proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving party lacked standing to act independently of her litigation guardian, and that the proposed appeal lacked reasonable grounds and would be an abuse of process.

The unit owners purchased an adjoining condominium unit and obtained board approval to create an opening in the demising wall between the units.

A new board later sought to revoke the approval, restrict the owners' use of common elements, and impose an onerous, retroactive section 98 agreement unlike those given to other owners.

The application judge found the Condominium's conduct oppressive under section 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, ordered the execution of a standard section 98 agreement, and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Condominium's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the Condominium acted oppressively and that the original board approval was valid as the alteration was not material to the Condominium.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic during a soccer game organized by the Ontario Soccer Association (OSA).

He sued the OSA's corporate sponsors, alleging they had a duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage for players.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no relationship of sufficient proximity between the appellant and the corporate sponsors to ground a duty of care.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment which declared the parties to be 50% beneficial owners of a property based on a trust agreement.

The appellant argued that money owing under a prior agreement allowed him to walk away from the agreements, that the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment, and that the notice of motion was deficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge, noting the appellant agreed to proceed, and finding no prejudice from any deficiency in the notice of motion.

The appellants succeeded on a limitation issue in a class action appeal and sought costs for the appeal and the motion below.

The Court of Appeal declined to alter the motion judge's order that costs of the motion remain in the cause.

For the appeal, the court recognized the appellants' success but modified the costs award because the appeal raised a novel issue of law and involved access to justice considerations in a class action.

The court awarded costs of the appeal in the cause, fixing them at $20,000 for the Timminco appellants, $20,000 for the Photon Consulting appellants, and $10,000 for the Walsh appellant.

The plaintiff commenced a proposed class action alleging secondary market misrepresentations by the defendants.

The statement of claim asserted common law causes of action and indicated an intention to seek leave to assert a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 of the Securities Act.

Facing a potential limitation issue, the plaintiff successfully moved for a declaration that the limitation period was suspended under section 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 is not 'asserted' within the meaning of section 28 until leave to proceed has been granted.

The appellants purchased a house from the respondents and subsequently discovered electrical, plumbing, and structural defects resulting from the respondents' DIY renovations and previous substandard work.

The appellants, who declined a pre-purchase inspection, sued for the cost of repairs, alleging the respondents concealed latent defects.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents were unaware of the defects and did not actively conceal them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that 'active concealment' requires an intention to hide a known defect, and the principle of caveat emptor applied.

The appellant suffered a severe brain injury after being assaulted by an intoxicated patron outside a pub.

He sued the patron and the pub, relying on the civil liability provisions of s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

At trial, the jury found the patron 100% responsible and dismissed the claim against the pub.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that liability under s. 39 requires reasonable foreseeability of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 39 requires a risk assessment and is breached only if a patron is over-served to the point where it is reasonably foreseeable they might injure another person.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot, suffering a broken ankle.

She commenced actions against the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor more than six years after the fall.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing both actions, finding the discoverability rule did not apply to extend the limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the property owner, as its identity could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against the maintenance contractor, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the appellant could have reasonably discovered its identity.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for the return of money he claimed was a loan to his son and former daughter-in-law.

The trial judge found the money was a gift, believing the testimony of the former daughter-in-law over the appellant and his son.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings, which were supported by the suspicious timing of the demand for repayment just before the couple's separation.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy endorsement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly resolved the ambiguity in Endorsement II to achieve commercial reality and reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties, rather than applying a strict rule of giving the same words the same meaning which would have rewritten the policy.

The appellant subcontractor appealed a motion judge's decision to strike its statement of claim without leave to amend.

The appellant argued that the respondents' acceptance of a construction bond created a private law duty of care and a fiduciary duty to subcontractors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleading failed to assert material facts establishing a fiduciary relationship, a voluntary assumption of duty, or any specific language in the bond creating such obligations.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank on a guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The terms of the guarantee were clear and unambiguous, and there was no basis to admit parol evidence to contradict them.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision finding that the parties had reached a settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge's conclusion was amply supported by the email and voicemail correspondence between the lawyers and that she committed no reviewable error.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation and awarding damages to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and damages in favour of one respondent, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the law of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and malice.

The Court also upheld the liability and damages against one appellant in favour of the second respondent regarding untrue statements made to a reporter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the appellant's wife, finding she was not jointly liable for her husband's defamatory statements as she did not participate in making them to the reporter.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The Association of Ontario Land Surveyors appealed a decision dismissing its application for an order prohibiting the respondents from engaging in the practice of cadastral surveying.

The respondents, who were not licensed under the Surveyors Act, had located existing iron bars, measured distances and angles, and marked property lines for a customer.

The Court of Appeal found that these activities constituted the practice of cadastral surveying and that the respondents had held themselves out as engaging in such practice.

The appeal was allowed, and a prohibition order was granted.

The appellants appealed the order of Chadwick J. The Court of Appeal set aside the order without prejudice to the rights of the parties, granting them liberty to start new proceedings, including on issues not dealt with by the lower court.

Costs were fixed at $9,000 to the respondents.

The successful respondents sought to have the costs of the motion and the appeal fixed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the costs of the motion were a matter for the motions judge.

The Court fixed the costs of the appeal payable to the respondents on a partial-indemnity basis at $7,500 plus assessable disbursements and G.S.T.

The plaintiff employer settled a claim arising from its employee's fraudulent issuance of a performance bond, providing a release to the third-party contractor.

The release promised not to sue anyone who might claim contribution or indemnity from the contractor.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the employee, who then third-partied the contractor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to stay the plaintiff's action and the third-party claim as an abuse of process, finding that the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek amounts recoverable from the contractor was an impermissible unilateral amendment to the clear terms of the release.

The appellants appealed an order appointing the respondent as receiver of two corporations, alleging a conflict of interest due to the respondent's role as trustee in bankruptcy for related parties.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the appointment order was final rather than interlocutory.

The Court admitted fresh evidence—a statement of defence filed by the respondent in related litigation—which crystallized a pervasive conflict of interest.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing the receiver, and referred the matter back to the Commercial List Court, also setting aside the provision granting priority to the receiver's fees.