Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against provisions of the Insurance Act, alleging the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) lacked adjudicative independence.

They obtained a motion judge's order under Rule 30.10 requiring the LAT to produce hundreds of internal records.

The LAT appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her application of Rule 30.10.

The records were not relevant to a material issue because adjudicative independence in a specific case does not impact the constitutional validity of the tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor does it engage s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court also clarified that deliberative secrecy applies to administrative tribunals to the same extent as courts.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of section 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, regarding court approval of settlements in forfeiture proceedings.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought approval for a settlement with an interested party (Rosa Norwood) for a payment from seized property proceeds, without a prior judicial determination that the property was tainted by unlawful activity.

The appellants (Michael Norwood's Estate and 947014 Ontario Inc.) argued this was an error.

The Court of Appeal held that a "settlement in relation to a proceeding under this Act" must relate to in rem property interests, which necessitates a prior finding that the property is proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The court found the motion judge erred in approving the settlement without such a finding, as it purported to settle in rem interests of others without their rights being displaced.

The appeal was allowed, and the settlement approval order was set aside.

The applicant, Lo-Ming Lum, brought two motions before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

These motions arose from an earlier action she initiated, which was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious by the Superior Court, with an order barring her from further proceedings without leave.

The motions sought to set aside an order by a single Divisional Court judge and to obtain leave to appeal another interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, affirming that appeals from a single Divisional Court judge lie to a panel of the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The court also issued an order under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the applicant to obtain leave from a single judge of the Court of Appeal before taking any further steps or proceedings related to this action in that court, citing her disregard for prior orders and procedural misuse.

The appellants, acting as mortgagees, sold a 130-acre commercial property under power of sale for $12.5 million.

The trial judge found the fair market value was $16 million and awarded the respondent mortgagor $3.5 million in damages for an improvident sale, noting the appellants failed to adequately market the property or allow meaningful due diligence by potential buyers.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding bad faith, imposing liability without expert evidence of appraiser negligence, and calculating damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal test regarding the mortgagee's duty to take reasonable precautions to obtain fair market value and made no palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The principal respondents were awarded costs of $50,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. was awarded costs of $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents for allegedly causing it to overpay for surface rights to a parking garage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The Court held that the appellant had all relevant information by August 1, 2008, when a new purchaser took control of the board, but did not commence the action until November 8, 2010.

The Court also rejected the argument that the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, as the claims were framed in tort, contract, and breach of duty.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out several paragraphs of its pleading.

The motion judge held that a ruling of the Ontario Securities Commission is not a contract as required by s. 23(1)(b) of the Condominium Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that granting leave to amend would not cure the deficiency, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The insured pickle manufacturer suffered substantial spoilage when a regional blackout interrupted the electricity supply to its refrigeration equipment.

The insurer denied coverage under an all-risks policy, relying on an exclusion for loss caused by 'mechanical or electrical breakdown or derangement'.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the insured, finding the exclusion inapplicable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that 'breakdown' and 'derangement' refer to internal defects or problems within the machinery, not a failure to operate due to an external power outage.

The appellants brought a motion to review an order requiring them to post security for costs.

They argued the motion judge misapprehended evidence regarding the corporate appellant's indebtedness and asset valuation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on the public record and financial statements over unconfirmed assertions and a late-produced tax bill.

The appellants were ordered to post security for costs within thirty days.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of an amended agreement and the definition of an encumbrance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the clear intention of the parties was for the respondent to receive $61,000 out of the net proceeds of sale.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding Jasper liable to pay the respondent and assessing costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no error in the liability determination.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs to $45,000, noting the trial judge erred by including hours spent on unsuccessful motions.

The issue of entitlement to trust funds paid into court was remitted to the trial judge.

The respondent was awarded $7,500 in costs for the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement, arguing in part that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias because of comments made by the motion judge at a previous adjournment hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's comments were merely efforts to assist an unrepresented litigant and did not meet the test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also found no reason to interfere with the order enforcing the settlement, noting that a rehearing would yield the same result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant appealed from a judgment enforcing a settlement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law by the motion judge in enforcing the settlement and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent to be deducted from the settlement funds.

The insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the insureds compensatory and punitive damages following a fire that destroyed a commercial building.

The insurer had denied the claims based on arson, misrepresentation, and fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law of misrepresentation and the interpretation of a 'shut down' exclusion clause.

The Court also set aside the jury's $1.2 million award for loss of profits as unsupported by evidence, and found the $2.5 million punitive damages award to be grossly excessive.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the interpretation of a commercial agreement and alleged misrepresentations about a liquor licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the terms of the liquor licence were generally known to the public and could be learned through due diligence.

The court also upheld the finding of fact that no misrepresentation was made and found no basis for granting relief from forfeiture.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was seriously injured when he was shot by a member of his hunting party who mistook him for a deer.

The shooter had driven his truck to the hunting site, stopped, exited the vehicle, and fired his rifle, using the truck's headlights to illuminate the target.

The appellant obtained a judgment against the shooter in negligence and subsequently sued the shooter's automobile insurer under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the injuries did not arise from the use or operation of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the use of the truck to transport the shooter and illuminate the target satisfied the purpose and causation tests, meaning the damages arose indirectly from the use or operation of the automobile.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable to the respondent bank for conversion of funds.

The bank's cross-claim had been pleaded solely in conspiracy to defraud, which the trial judge dismissed.

However, the trial judge found the appellant liable on the unpleaded grounds of conversion and piercing the corporate veil, based on a presumptive indirect benefit as a shareholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it is fundamental to the litigation process that lawsuits be decided within the boundaries of the pleadings.

The Court also noted that piercing the corporate veil requires evidence of improper conduct akin to fraud or deceit, which was absent here.

The appellant appealed an award made by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that it was open to the trial judge to make the findings she did and that there was no basis to interfere with the award.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,000.

The appellants sued a customs officer and the Attorney General of Canada for damages arising from the allegedly wrongful seizure and storage of several aircraft.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was barred by the three-month limitation period in s. 106(1) of the Customs Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellants' allegations that the customs officer acted with malice and intent to injure raised a genuine issue for trial as to whether the limitation periods under the Customs Act and the Public Authorities Protection Act applied.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside, except with respect to the Charter claims.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding municipal liability for a parking lot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the municipality's act of clearing snow from a sidewalk was not a corporate act sufficient to demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the entire parking lot for public use.