Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell land to the respondent for $4.1 million.

The appellant argued the oral agreement was unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, contending the detrimental reliance aspect of the doctrine of part performance was not met because the respondent's only obligation was to pay the purchase price, which was tendered but refused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding the respondent irremediably carried out its obligations to its detriment by taking all necessary steps to close the transaction while the appellant stood by.

The moving parties, Maryanne Carmela Bogdan and Clinton DesJarlais, sought to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal who denied their motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court had dismissed their motions, which claimed they were the actual parents of a child, asserted fraudulent US court orders, and sought to declare Douglas Leonard's second marriage a nullity.

The Superior Court found no jurisdiction as the child resided in Michigan and was subject to Michigan orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Motion Judge's decision to refuse an extension, noting the obvious lack of merit in the appeal, particularly regarding jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act and the marriage declaration.

The motion to set aside the order of the Motion Judge was dismissed.

Dr. Rochagné Kilian appealed a Superior Court order compelling her to comply with an investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding alleged false COVID-19 vaccine exemption certificates.

Dr. Kilian had refused to provide patient records, citing confidentiality and challenging the lawfulness and constitutionality of the College's demands and the statutory provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision that the scope of a s. 87 application (to compel compliance) is limited to determining if there was a breach of statutory obligations and if the information requested was within investigatory powers.

The Court reiterated the principle of non-interference in ongoing administrative processes, holding that constitutional challenges and arguments regarding the lawfulness of the investigation's initiation must first be raised before the College's Discipline Committee before seeking judicial review.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of defence due to non-compliance with discovery obligations.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge was not fully informed by respondent's counsel regarding the appellant's attempt to retain new counsel and seek an adjournment.

The court held that striking a pleading is a last resort and that the motion judge should have considered the merits and granted a less severe remedy.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the statement of defence restored.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order finding him personally liable for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The trial judge found that the appellant controlled the corporate contractor, that a bank draft constituted payment from the appellant as owner to the appellant as contractor, and that the payment was impressed with a trust under s. 8 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of ss. 8 and 13 of the Construction Lien Act.

A lawyer appealed the dismissal of an application for a declaration that sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge found the appellant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the impugned provisions affected him personally and directly, and that his scholarly contributions and representation of affected clients did not establish a genuine interest in the outcome or demonstrate that the application was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

A motion for directions regarding the proper route of appeal in a matter involving solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege over documents and audio files seized by the Ontario Provincial Police.

The moving parties sought clarification on whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The single judge in chambers declined to hear the motion and adjourned it to be heard by a three-judge panel, holding that questions of the court's jurisdiction must be decided by a panel, not a single judge.

The appellant brought an application under Rule 14 for a mandatory order enforcing an undertaking to pay money related to construction bonds.

The application judge dismissed the application on procedural grounds, finding it was not properly brought under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application was properly founded under subrules (d), (g), and (h) as there were no material facts in dispute and the interpretation of the contract was conceded.

The matter was remitted to the application judge for a decision on the merits.

The appellants obtained a default judgment against Grocery Dayton for $980,200 after discontinuing their action against Wakefern Food Corporation.

Upon discovering Grocery Dayton was not a legal entity, the appellants moved to amend the judgment to add Wakefern as a judgment debtor, arguing Grocery Dayton was merely an alias for Wakefern.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence that the two were the same entity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing there was insufficient evidence and that it would be unfair to add Wakefern without allowing it to defend the action on its merits.

However, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance against Wakefern.

The appellant, Inco Limited, appealed a costs order awarding it $1,766,000 following its successful defence of a class action at the Court of Appeal.

Inco argued it was entitled to over $5.3 million and that the trial judge erred by reducing its legal fees and applying a 50 per cent discount under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's determination that the environmental tort class action raised novel points of law and involved matters of public interest.

The court upheld the trial judge's methodical and reasonable costs analysis.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion for partial summary judgment in an Ontario action seeking to enforce German submissions to compulsory enforcement arising from guarantees of bank loans.

The central issue was whether those instruments were foreign judgments for Ontario limitations purposes or were governed by German substantive law under conflict of laws principles.

The court held the instruments were not German judgments and that German law supplied the applicable 30-year limitation period, with the result that the claims were not statute-barred.

The court also rejected the argument that the motion judge had recast the pleadings and dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence.

This appeal concerned ownership of a strip of land between riverfront lots and the Ottawa River, and whether the relevant subdivision plan extended the respondents' lots to the water's edge.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of latent ambiguity and confirmed that extrinsic evidence could properly be used to interpret the deed and plan under the governing property law framework.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly focused on the original subdividers' intention, made a palpable and overriding factual error, or relied on immaterial evidence.

On the cross-appeal respecting costs, the court held that most individual defendants were properly treated as nominal parties, but found that one individual was sufficiently involved in the litigation to justify a costs award against him personally.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge declining to reinstate the proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his former litigation counsel for solicitor's negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged his counsel wrongly consented to default judgment and failed to respond to the bank's counsel, leading to a receivership over his farm properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the counsel acted diligently and was not negligent—were firmly anchored in the evidentiary record and free from palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding trial costs was also dismissed.

The appellant withdrew its appeal from the order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appeal withdrawn with prejudice and without costs.

The appellant settled her claims against her insurer in 2003 and signed a final release.

After a 2004 action to set aside the settlement was dismissed on consent, she commenced a second action in 2009 alleging conspiracy to cause economic harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the 2009 action, finding that the six-year limitation period had expired based on the appellant's own pleadings, and that she had led no evidence to support the conspiracy claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering specific performance and purchase price abatements for two real estate transactions.

The trial judge found the appellant vendors were not ready to close, failed to bargain in good faith, and committed an anticipatory breach, while the respondent purchasers were ready, willing, and able to perform.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his interpretation of the abatement clauses.

The appellants, federal public service employees, brought a civil action against the government and senior managers alleging workplace harassment and abuse of authority.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the grievance process under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) and the collective agreement, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Weber.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the PSSRA grievance process was not intended to be an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism for complaints that are not referable to third-party adjudication.

Since the appellants' claims could not be adjudicated under the PSSRA, the court retained concurrent jurisdiction and declined to defer to the statutory regime.

The moving party, a former teacher, sought an extension of time to appeal an order striking out his statement of claim against the responding parties for malicious prosecution, slander, and intentional infliction of harm.

The claims arose after students accused him of soliciting bribes, leading to criminal charges of which he was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish a firm intention to appeal within the time limit and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the statement of claim failed to plead sufficient facts to support the causes of action.

The moving party, a self-represented plaintiff, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her motion to set aside a master's order.

The plaintiff had initially sought leave to appeal in the Divisional Court, which was the wrong forum, and allowed the motion to sit dormant for over a year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the delay and that the merits of the proposed appeal did not justify a lengthy extension.