Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The moving party brought a motion to quash the insurers' appeal of an order denying them leave to amend their pleadings to add the defence of civil fraud.

The moving party argued the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing leave to amend a pleading to advance a new substantive defence is a final order.

Because the order foreclosed the insurers' ability to assert the distinct defence of civil fraud, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash was denied.

The appellants, a condominium corporation and its snow removal contractor, appealed a trial decision finding them negligent for a slip and fall injury.

The respondent slipped on an icy roadway that had been plowed but not salted in a timely manner.

The appeal focused on the standard of care, arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence and applied an unreasonable standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the contractor's delay in applying road salt fell below the reasonable standard of care, given the foreseeable ice formation and the contractor's problematic system for salt application.

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

The respondents, who succeeded in a summary judgment motion dismissing the appellant's claim regarding ownership of coating equipment sold during a bankruptcy proceeding, sought security for costs on the appeal.

The motion judge found no credible evidence supporting the appellant's ownership claim.

The appellant appealed on four grounds, all challenging the motion judge's credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal entirely factual with no basis for establishing a palpable and overriding error, and determined the appellant corporation had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appeal concerned whether an unjust enrichment claim seeking a remedial constructive trust over real property was governed by the ten-year limitation period in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act or the two-year regime in the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that such a claim is an action to recover land because it seeks to obtain an interest in land by judgment, and that an alternative monetary remedy advanced in the same proceeding shelters under the same provision.

Although the motion judge erred in concluding that a legislative gap would otherwise exist, the court held that the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to equitable claims generally.

The appeal from the dismissal of summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant suffered soft tissue injuries in a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

At trial, the jury awarded damages but declined to award compensation for future loss of income.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge's unorthodox charge to the jury deprived her of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was unorthodox, it was fair as a whole and the jury's decision on future income loss was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the order of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $2,500.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The appellant did not seek costs for either the trial or the appeal.

Consequently, the previous trial costs order was set aside, and the court ordered that no costs be awarded for either the trial or the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of mental or emotional harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial because the appellant failed to produce any evidence of harm or illness, which is an essential element of the tort, over the eight years the matter had been outstanding.

The moving party sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The underlying action involved a claim against environmental consultants for allegedly overstating PCB contamination, which was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to set aside the Registrar's order, finding that the moving party failed to adequately explain its delay and, crucially, that the appeal lacked merit because the principal of the moving party admitted on discovery that he knew all material facts to start a claim well before the limitation period expired.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the action was a collateral attack on a previous order and therefore an abuse of process.

The court also found that the aspect of the claim challenging the propriety of a property sale would require re-litigating previous factual findings, and applied the principles of issue estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding personal liability and interpreting a second contract as open-ended as to time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's interpretation based on the plain wording of the contract and the parties' subsequent conduct.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's conclusion regarding waiver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion, which turned narrowly on the absence of a non-waiver agreement and the specific wording and timing of an August 23, 2006 letter.

The Court noted this decision does not pronounce on the general effect of a reservation of rights letter.

The appellant roofing company appealed a declaration that its insurer had no duty to defend an action brought by a motorcyclist who was injured when a ladder flew off the appellant's truck.

The insurer denied coverage based on an automobile exclusion in a rider to the commercial general liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer was entitled to rely on the rider, which excluded coverage for bodily injury with respect to which a motor vehicle liability policy is required by law to be in effect.

The court held that loading and storing the ladder constituted the use or operation of an automobile, and the underlying claim did not allege concurrent non-automobile-related negligence.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing part of his defamation action arising from material posted on the respondent's website.

The motions judge had ruled the internet publication was a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, rendering the claim statute-barred for failure to provide timely notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the internet publication constituted a broadcast from a station in Ontario, particularly given conflicting expert evidence on the nature of internet dissemination.

The appellant insured suffered a theft of equipment and subsequently made a claim for loss of income.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on the basis that it was barred by a one-year limitation period set out in the policy's conditions.

The appellant argued that the limitation period, which mirrored the statutory conditions for fire insurance under the Insurance Act, did not apply to theft or loss of profits, and that the late delivery of the policy prejudiced its ability to claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the insurer was free to incorporate the one-year limitation period into the contract for all perils, and that the contractual language was clear and unambiguous.

The court also found no prejudice from the late delivery of the policy, as the appellant's adjuster had misinterpreted the policy rather than being unaware of it.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits until the insurer terminated them.

After an unsuccessful mediation, the appellant waited almost five years to commence an action claiming damages for the insurer's bad faith conduct in terminating the benefits.

The insurer successfully moved to strike the claim as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period in s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that any dispute 'in respect of' an insurer's refusal to pay no-fault benefits, including bad faith claims, must be brought within the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff, an Ontario Provincial Police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a police cruiser.

The driver of the other vehicle was underinsured.

The plaintiff claimed under the OPCF 44 endorsement of both her personal automobile insurance policy and the police force's fleet policy.

The issue on appeal was which insurer was required to respond first.

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was an 'insured person' under the fleet policy because the cruiser was provided for her 'regular use'.

The Court found that 'regular use' does not require a personal use component.

Therefore, the fleet policy was the first loss insurance.