Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant, Narman Abri, appealed a motion judge's decision to grant a nunc pro tunc order, deeming a statement of defence and counterclaim issued on the date of filing, despite not being formally issued before the limitation period expired.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, distinguishing the case from precedents requiring leave to commence an action.

The court found the lack of issuance to be a procedural irregularity under Rule 2.01, not undermining the purposes of limitation periods, as the appellant had notice of the counterclaim.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent, as the successful party, sought costs of $5,739.27.

The appellant argued against any costs award, citing her financial circumstances.

The Court of Appeal, considering the submissions, fixed the respondent's costs, payable by the appellant, at $3,500, all-inclusive.

This is a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal, finding that leave to appeal was required for an appeal solely from a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and the appellant had not sought leave.

The court also directed the distribution of security for costs previously posted by the appellant, awarding a portion to the respondent for prior appeal costs and the current motion costs, with the remainder returned to the appellant.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) from an order dismissing its motion for an interlocutory injunction, and also sought to set aside an interim injunction granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

Metrolinx further raised a preliminary allegation of reasonable apprehension of institutional bias against the court.

HDI, in turn, sought an extension of the interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Metrolinx's bias challenge, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court then granted Metrolinx's motion to quash the appeal, concluding that the lower court's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellants sought to appeal a Superior Court order refusing a sealing order, made in the context of a disability settlement approval.

The preliminary issue for the Court of Appeal was to determine if the order refusing the sealing order was a final or interlocutory order for jurisdictional purposes.

The Court found that the order, along with other concurrent orders dismissing claims, constituted a final disposition of the proceeding, thus making it a final order properly appealable to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, William Soroka, appealed the dismissal of his motions to set aside foreclosure judgments and default notations in three mortgage foreclosure actions.

The judgments were obtained in December 2014 and registered in April 2018, but Soroka moved to set them aside in October 2019, approximately five years after judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in applying both the test for setting aside default judgments and relief against forfeiture.

The court agreed that the motions were not brought promptly and the appellant's explanation for delay was not credible.

The court also found no error in considering whether the appellant had an arguable defence on the merits, noting he never sought to convert the claims to judicial sales until the motions to set aside.

The appeal was dismissed, emphasizing that granting the relief would amount to a substantial windfall for the appellant and would not enhance the integrity of justice.

The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.

The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.

The appellants, former members of an incorporated church's congregation, were expelled.

They commenced an action to void the expulsion, alleging the church failed to follow its internal procedures and violated their rights.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no underlying contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the church's constitution and by-laws constituted a contract binding on both members and the organization.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the contractual provisions for expulsion were breached, as the respondents failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the procedures followed.

In this matrimonial appeal, the husband challenged a motion judge's order allowing the wife to amend her notice of motion to request a set-off of costs and interest owed by the wife against accumulated spousal support and costs owed by the husband.

The motion judge set off $331,533.54 against $479,130.91, resulting in a net amount of $147,597.37 owing from the husband to the wife.

The husband argued that set-off was not available in law and usurped the jurisdiction of the Family Responsibility Office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the amendment was appropriately allowed under the Family Law Rules and that set-off was available under section 111 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of three overlapping actions brought under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The actions arose from a family dispute concerning the appellant's exclusion from his grandfather's will and alleged undue influence and fraudulent conduct by family members and lawyers.

The motion judge dismissed the actions as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge failed to make explicit findings that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process; (2) the harassment and defamation claims were supported by the pleadings; and (3) the motion judge failed to explain why the statements of claim could not be amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the dismissals.

The appellant, an egg producer, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to belatedly comply with a 2013 judgment order requiring payment into court.

The appellant had failed to pay the judgment funds into court, failed to bring a motion to add respondents as defendants to a related action, and took no further steps to advance its counterclaim for five years.

When the appellant finally returned to court in 2018, it sought permission to proceed with the counterclaim and amend it.

The motion judge applied the test from Rule 48 (dismissal for delay), placing the onus on the appellant to establish an acceptable explanation for the delay and that respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion judge found the appellant's explanation inadequate and concluded actual prejudice existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's legal test or factual findings.

The appellant appealed the order of a motion judge dismissing his motion on the grounds that he lacked standing due to non-compliance with an earlier order by Hebner J. The earlier order required the appellant to pay $17,803 by December 31, 2016, to bring his child support into good standing, failing which his Answer and affidavits would be struck.

The appellant failed to comply with the deadline and did not appeal the order.

Instead, he brought a motion to set aside the order before the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Hebner J. properly applied the test for striking pleadings and that the motion judge correctly determined the appellant had no standing in the proceeding.

In a multi-jurisdictional class action regarding credit card merchant fees, Class Counsel entered into a Fee Sharing Agreement with a competing law firm to resolve a carriage dispute.

The agreement provided the competing firm up to $800,000 from Class Counsel's fees in exchange for staying rival actions.

On a motion to approve a partial settlement and fees, the motion judge reduced Class Counsel's requested fees by 10%, declared the Fee Sharing Agreement unenforceable, and prohibited any payments to the competing firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fee reduction and the prohibition on paying the competing firm from the settlement or approved fees, finding the agreement was subject to court approval under the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court set aside the declaration that the agreement was entirely unenforceable from any source, as the competing firm was not given notice or an opportunity to make submissions on that specific issue.

The moving party, a self-represented debtor, brought motions to review the orders of two single judges of the Court of Appeal.

At the hearing, she requested an adjournment, which was opposed by the respondent bank and refused by the court.

The court reviewed the materials and found no basis to overturn the previous orders, noting that the proper tests were applied and that the Charter of Rights does not relieve a debtor of her obligations.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order regarding standing under Rule 38.11.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was at best contingently affected by the recognition order and thus did not have standing.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $20,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of a commercial real estate agreement based on a 50 per cent lost chance of closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, the date of assessment, and the use of a discounted cash flow methodology.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the amortization of capital expenditures and directed a new trial solely on the issue of recovering certain management expenses.

The respondent paid the appellant $112,056 in advance for hardwood flooring.

The appellant failed to deliver the product and instead applied the funds to a debt owed by a third party, claiming the third party was the respondent's agent.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no evidence of actual or ostensible authority to support the agency claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondents an easement over his property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondents' predecessors in title had enjoyed open, continuous, and undisturbed use of the right of way from 1982 until 2006.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that his consent defeated the prescriptive right, noting the consent was for a permanent easement.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondents were awarded costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, was acquitted of sexual assault charges and subsequently sued the Crown, police, and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

The motion judge struck the statements of claim and refused leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against Her Majesty the Queen due to failure to provide the required 60 days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, the Court set aside the order striking the claim against the Crown Attorney and Police defendants, finding that while the pleading was deficient, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the allegations, if properly pleaded with material facts, could support valid causes of action.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found him 50% contributorily negligent for his loss, despite also finding the respondent liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding a mortgage life insurance policy.

The appellant argued that a finding of negligent misrepresentation, which requires reasonable reliance, precludes a finding of contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the two findings can logically co-exist at law, as the focus of each analysis is different.

However, on the facts of this case, the trial judge's finding that the appellant acted unreasonably in failing to inquire about the insurance term was inconsistent with the reasonable reliance required for negligent misrepresentation.

The appeal was dismissed.