Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

Appeal from a trial judgment finding that a nurse and hospital were liable for negligence in the care of a newborn who developed kernicterus due to untreated hyperbilirubinemia.

The trial judge found the nurse breached the standard of care by failing to report jaundice to the resident physician and that but for this negligence, phototherapy would have been commenced earlier, preventing the development of kernicterus.

The appellants challenged the causation findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the trial judge properly inferred causation based on expert evidence and the factual progression of the infant's condition, and that the appellants could not escape liability by pointing to hypothetical negligence of other physicians.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

The respondent farmer sued the appellant municipality for negligence after the municipality forced him to remove his wild boar herd under a by-law.

The farmer amended his claim to allege the municipality owed him a duty of care under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998, which exempts 'normal farm practices' from municipal by-laws.

The municipality moved to strike the negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' decisions allowing the claim to proceed, finding that while the statute does not impose an explicit duty of care, the municipality may owe a common law duty of care to the farmer when enforcing by-laws that could restrict farming operations.

The appellant's proposed wind power project was cancelled by the Ontario government during an election campaign.

The appellant sued for damages, alleging misfeasance in public office, claiming the government acted in bad faith for electoral expediency and specifically targeted the appellant to cripple it financially.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the claim for misfeasance in public office to proceed, but only on the narrow basis that the government's conduct was specifically targeted to injure the appellant financially.

The court held that core policy decisions based on electoral expediency do not constitute bad faith for the purposes of misfeasance in public office.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to serve a Notice of Appeal from an order dismissing their motion to set aside an order for the assessment of the respondent's bills under the Solicitors Act.

The moving parties had mistakenly sought leave to appeal in the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal applied the five-factor test for extending time and found that the intention to appeal was formed in time, the delay was explained, and there was no prejudice.

Despite concerns about a conflict of interest involving the moving parties' counsel, the court found an arguable legal issue regarding the interpretation of an Associate Agreement and granted a 15-day extension.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for an assessment of a lawyer's accounts.

The accounts were paid by a court-appointed supervisor out of the appellants' funds.

The appellants did not receive copies of the accounts until two years later and brought the application shortly after.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in imputing the supervisor's knowledge to the appellants and in failing to consider discrepancies in the accounts.

The appeal was allowed, and an assessment was ordered based on special circumstances.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissing their claim for rectification.

The appellants argued the motion judge applied the incorrect test for summary judgment and improperly made credibility determinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly directed herself to whether the record raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The documentary record confirmed that the requirements for rectification could not be met, which was dispositive of the motion.

The appellant police officer sued the respondent police association for breach of its duty of fair representation.

The motion judge struck the claim for want of jurisdiction, finding that such claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was bound by its previous decision in Renaud v. LaSalle (Town of) Police Assn., which established that an arbitrator appointed under the Police Services Act has exclusive jurisdiction over these disputes.

The appellants appealed an order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the claims fell within Rule 17(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, establishing a presumption of jurisdiction simpliciter based on a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court also deferred to the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario was the convenient forum, noting the location of parties and witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of an adjudicator's refusal to recuse himself from a police disciplinary hearing.

The Commissioner alleged the adjudicator's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the adjudicator should have been named as a respondent and the Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the adjudicator's conduct did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias and the procedural issues raised in the cross-appeal were without merit.

The appellants appealed a jury's damages award, arguing it was plainly unreasonable and unjust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the $250,000 general damages award, while generous, was supported by evidence of the devastating impact the injuries had on the respondent's life, including his inability to work, bankruptcy, and marriage breakdown.

The court also upheld the future loss of income award and found no error in the trial judge's decision not to instruct the jury on the cap on general damages.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a mortgage, raising issues regarding the enforceability of unregistered standard terms, accounting errors, and a stay due to US bankruptcy proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings of fact, noting the standard terms were agreed to, and confirming the claim was not stayed by the foreign bankruptcy.

The trial judge's decision to fix costs was also upheld.

The appellant appealed the order of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons to be exemplary and agreed with her analysis and conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,000.

The appellants appealed paragraph one of the trial judge's order, arguing that there was no settlement because the wrongful dismissal claim component had not been resolved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties agreed the respondent would be paid 16% of the company's value, and the business valuators would account for the contingency of the wrongful dismissal claim.

The unresolved claim afforded no basis to set aside the agreement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing there were two genuine issues for trial: where the passenger was seated during the crash, and the damages she would have suffered had she worn a seat belt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the appellant's position on the seating location and agreeing with the motion judge that expert evidence showed seat belt use would have made no difference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The court made no order as to the costs of the motion before the motion judge, as no submissions were made and the issue was not raised at the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court's costs order was maintained.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $10,000 each for the MFP respondents and the Bondy Riley respondents, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Backhouse.

The Court of Appeal found that, assuming it had jurisdiction, the appeal was moot in light of a subsequent judgment by Justice Siegel, except for the issue of costs.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the costs order and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $2,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against her family physician.

She alleged a lack of informed consent when the physician prescribed birth control pills without adequately discussing the risk of blood clots, after which she developed deep vein thrombosis.

The trial judge found a lack of informed consent but concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's position would have taken the pill anyway, meaning the lack of disclosure did not cause her injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the objective test for informed consent.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge dismissing a motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $1,500.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Guatemala involving an uninsured driver.

He sought recovery under the uninsured automobile coverage provision of the Insurance Act.

The motions judge found the respondent was entitled to coverage, holding that the territorial limit in the policy was inconsistent with the Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, finding no ambiguity or conflict between the policy limitation and the legislation.

The Court held that the territorial limit in the policy applied to preclude coverage for the accident in Guatemala.