Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against an investigator appointed by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The motion judge had found the lawsuit was a collateral attack on the Discipline Committee's decision to revoke the appellant's designation, and was an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions or in his discretionary decision to deny an adjournment.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claims for economic torts, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of a settlement agreement containing non-competition terms, as well as the judgment granting a counterclaim for an unpaid bonus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants' arguments were primarily disagreements with the trial judge's factual and credibility findings.

The court held that the trial judge made no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact, and that the findings were supported by the evidentiary record.

ID Inc. appealed the dismissal of its claim against StrategyCorp, which arose from a dispute over the transformation of a billboard to a digital sign and a related consulting agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that StrategyCorp did not intentionally interfere with ID Inc.'s economic relations, the consulting agreement was conditional on a separate agreement that never materialized, StrategyCorp had repudiated the agreement which ID Inc. accepted by silence, and StrategyCorp did not breach its duty of good faith.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties, Henia Gefen and Harvey Gefen, sought a review of a single judge's dismissal of their motions to stay a motion judge's order.

The underlying order had declared Henia Gefen incapable of managing her property and instructing counsel, appointing a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motions, finding no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the single judge's decision.

The court also addressed costs, fixing Harry Gefen's costs at $5,000 and ordering Ronald B. Moldaver, K.C., Henia Gefen's counsel, to bear personal responsibility for costs related to the review motion he brought on her behalf without authority, disallowing him from charging Henia Gefen for these costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for summary judgment, which the motion judge found to be a nullity because it was commenced by an undischarged bankrupt and was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the action was a nullity as the bankrupt lacked capacity to sue and the claim was time-barred.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the postponement of the limitation period and apprehension of bias, noting the appellant's counsel had waived any conflict.

The appellant, Felice Scala, appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim for damages alleging excessive police force during his arrest and the associated costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, which largely favoured the police officers' account over the appellant's.

The trial judge found the appellant's evidence inconsistent and implausible, while the police officers' evidence was credible and reliable.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or the application of the law regarding necessary and objectively reasonable force under s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal regarding the costs award was also dismissed, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion.

An insured brought an action against international insurers for breach of an insurance contract.

The insurers moved to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration in London, England pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding that the "Action Against Insurer" endorsement provided an alternative method of dispute resolution allowing domestic court proceedings.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was mandatory and the sole method of dispute resolution, and that the "Action Against Insurer" clause was a service of suit provision that did not conflict with the arbitration clause.

The court also clarified that the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration applies to agreements providing for arbitration of certain disputes, not only those providing for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution.

The applicant obtained a default judgment for fraud against the respondents regarding a tax loss allocation scheme.

He subsequently obtained an ex parte order under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act appointing a receiver over the respondents' assets.

Through further ex parte applications, the receivership was expanded into a broad investigative receivership freezing the assets of 43 additional non-party individuals and entities to protect the interests of thousands of other investors.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders, holding that while s. 101 permits investigative receiverships in appropriate circumstances, the orders here were unjustifiably overreaching and went beyond protecting the applicant's judgment recovery.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The appellant, Goodyear Canada Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision declining to adopt the American 'Stonewall Principle' into Ontario law.

Goodyear sought to hold its insurers liable for asbestos-related injuries occurring after 1985, when it could no longer obtain liability insurance for such risks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurance policies unambiguously limited coverage to occurrences during the policy periods.

The Court held that adopting the Stonewall Principle would unfairly shift the risks of Goodyear's business decisions to the insurers, contrary to the express terms of the policies and public policy.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding of liability for a fire that destroyed his hotel and damaged adjacent buildings owned by the respondents.

The trial judge had accepted the respondents' expert evidence that the fire was caused by a defective boiler and inadequate clearance of its exhaust ventilation duct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to articulate the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequately explained his resolution of the conflicting expert evidence and his conclusion that the appellant's failure to maintain the boiler breached the standard of care and caused the fire.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that the respondent lawyer breached the deemed undertaking rule by sharing information about a writ against the appellant with another respondent.

The application judge found no breach because the assignment of the writ occurred before the correspondence disclosing the writ and settlement negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings.

The court declined to award costs, noting that the respondent lawyer should not have appeared as counsel since he was a named respondent and his conduct was central to the case.

The appellant and respondent were both defrauded in an investment scheme.

A receiver was appointed and identified three methods for allocating the remaining funds.

The motion judge ordered that distributions be made pursuant to the fund unit allocation method, which is a form of the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR).

The appellant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in finding that LIBR is the general rule and in equating the receiver's calculations with proper LIBR tracing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that LIBR is the preferred allocation method for comingled funds where practically possible, and finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the receiver's calculations.

The employee appealed a summary judgment order dismissing his misrepresentation claim against his former employer based on the expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's conclusion that there may not have been a definitive decision to breach the contract until 2007 applied equally to the misrepresentation claim.

Therefore, the discoverability of the falsity of the recruitment representation was a triable issue.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment decision finding it failed to comply with s. 64(14) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule when terminating the respondent's benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly assessed the issue of compliance.

The Court also upheld the award of compound interest under s. 68 of the Schedule, finding no unusual circumstances to justify a different conclusion.

Following the release of the appeal decision, counsel requested clarification regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal clarified its previous ruling, ordering that the respondent pay the costs of the action at trial, to be fixed by the trial judge, if demanded.

The tenants appealed a trial judgment finding their commercial lease invalid and terminating their month-to-month tenancy.

They argued the trial judge erred by excluding the female tenant from the courtroom while her husband testified.

The Court of Appeal held that while excluding a party violates rule 52.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in this case.

The landlord's estate cross-appealed the dismissal of its claim for arrears of rent and taxes.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal in part, finding that while the landlord's course of conduct waived the rent arrears, the tenants' uncorroborated evidence regarding property and business taxes could not defeat the estate's claim under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for solicitor negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial on the issue of damages.

The court held that even on the appellant's new theory, there was no evidence that he suffered any damages due to the negligent advice, as the theories were based on speculation and contradicted by his own affidavit.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that no enforceable agreement was reached for a fur salon licence, as essential terms were missing.

The respondent cross-appealed the finding that it negligently misrepresented its ability to terminate an existing licence, and appealed the costs award, specifically the allowance of expert witness fees as a full disbursement on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, cross-appeal, and costs appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable errors and correctly treated expert fees as disbursements not subject to partial indemnity reduction.

An Indigenous band appealed from a summary judgment disposition concerning reserve lands sold in the 19th century without a lawful formal surrender.

The Court of Appeal held that there had been no surrender and that the claim was not barred by statutory limitation periods, but concluded that declaratory and possessory relief should nevertheless be refused.

The court applied public law discretion and equitable doctrines, emphasizing the band's historical acquiescence, the extraordinary delay in asserting the land claim, and the reliance of innocent third-party landowners who had held and developed the properties for generations.

The band was left to pursue its damages claims against the Crown.